


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Corrigenda

to FRANCISCAN STUDIES 21, 3—4

Alexander Schaefer O.F.M.: The Position and Function of Man in the created World according to Saint Bonaventure

As a result of an oversight during the printing, some of the references made to other pages of the issue have not been adjusted to the final pagination. Hereby they are corrected in the following way:

- On page 235, note 6, line 7: Instead of p. 30, read p. 262
On page 242, note 28, line 4: Instead of p. 24, read p. 256
On page 245, note 37, line 5: Instead of p. 24 ff., read p. 259
On page 247, note 47, line 2: Instead of p. 7, read p. 239
On page 257, note 70, line 1: Instead of p. 12 and 17, read p. 244 and
p. 249
On page 257, note 71, line 1: Instead of p. 4, read p. 236
On page 257, note 73, line 1: Instead of p. 4, read p. 236
On page 262, note 94, line 5: Instead of p. 3, read p. 235
On page 271, note 130, line 4: Instead of p. 59, read p. 290—1
On page 272, note 136, line 3: Instead of p. 50, read p. 290—1
On page 272, note 137, line 2: Instead of p. 27, read p. 259
On page 274, note 141, line 2: Instead of p. 3, read p. 235
On page 274, note 142, line 1: Instead of p. 4, read p. 236
On page 277, note 155, line 9: Instead of p. 42, read p. 274
On page 278, note 159, line 6: Instead of p. 00, read p. 258
On page 278, note 160, line 1: Instead of p. 26, read p. 274
On page 279, note 162, line 1: Instead of p. 32, read p. 265—6
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On page 290, note 203, line 1: Instead of p. 27 . . . and p. 40, read
p. 259 . . . and p. 272
On page 291, note 207, line 3: Instead of p. 38, read p. 270
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On page 318, note 29, line 3: Instead of p. 2, read p. 244
On page 340, note 126, line 1: Instead of p. 61, read p. 292—3
On page 365, note 46, line 9: Instead of p. 110, read p. 342
On page 372, note 80, line 2: Instead of p. 132, read p. 363

MATTHEW OF AQUASPARTA'S COGNITION THEORY

PART II IDEOGENESIS*

Chapter III

ROLE OF THE OBJECT AND THE INTELLECT IN IDEOGENESIS

Any study of cognition must concern itself with two problems: the ideogenetic process by which the mind comes into contact with reality and the object of cognition, what the mind can know. This chapter will be devoted to the first of these and will present the ideogenesis of Matthew of Aquasparta, as well as the historical developments of this doctrine in the teachings of Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus.

That man knows the extra-mental world via the five senses is a thesis which would be admitted by all but the most extreme idealists. Certainly, it would find acceptance among the Scholastics of the thirteenth century. The exact process by which the object and intellect are united, however, would be described in almost as many ways as there are philosophers. Those philosophers who belong to the Augustinian school, on the one hand, would stress the activity of the intellect, following the principle that "action is more noble than passion." The Aristotelian emphasis, contrariwise, would be on the initial impetus furnished by the object with the intellect regarded as passive. This position is in line with the premise "all that is in motion is moved by another."¹

Matthew of Aquasparta

Basically Augustinian in orientation, Matthew stresses the activity of the intellect; his presentation, however, also includes certain Aristotelian elements at least in terminology. Here we will present his theory

* See *Franciscan Studies* 20 (1960), pp. 161—204.

¹ P. Argos, "La actividad cognoscitiva en los escolasticos del primer período postomista," *Pensamiento*, IV (1948), p. 303.

of sensation, the role of species, the activity/passivity of intellection. Special attention will be given to Matthew's own formulation of a *causa partialis* theory anticipating the later developments of John Duns Scotus.

Theory of Sensation

Cognition of corporeal objects originates in the senses in such a way that man knows external things through the "senses, through memory and through experience" and from them "collects" the universal which will be the principle of art and science.² Here it seems that Matthew is simply giving a condensation of an Aristotelian principle.³ It is a typical example of the surface agreement which covers very fundamental doctrinal divergencies.

In line with this initial position, Matthew asserts that "nothing is in the mind which was not first in the senses." He immediately qualifies this, however, pointing out that though it may be an adequate explanation of corporeal knowledge it fails to explain how the mind can know incorporeals, for example how it comes to self-knowledge.⁴ Just how the mind arrives at knowledge of spiritual substances is given more detailed description in the sections on the object of the intellect and the soul's knowledge of itself. The present discussion will be limited to sense cognition with the reminder that this is only one type of ideogenesis, according to Matthew.

Even for the knowledge of corporeal objects sensation is inadequate, since divine illumination, as well as the activity of the intellect, are required for complete and perfect cognition of external objects.⁵ In fact, the senses are neither the effective, principal nor formal cause of cognition; rather their causality is simply material and ministerial.⁶ According to Belmond, the senses are not the complete cause of cognition, since they only furnish the matter of man's concepts.⁷

² *De cognitione*, Q. II, p. 233. *De fide*, Q. I, p. 44.

³ *Posterior Analytics*, II, 100 a, 3—9. Aristotle, *Opera Omnia* (Translated into English under the editorship of W. D. Ross, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1908—1952).

⁴ *De cognitione*, Q. IV, p. 290.

⁵ *De cognitione*, Q. I, p. 219.

⁶ *De cognitione*, Q. II, p. 271. . . . cognitio intellectualis non causatur a sensibilibus effective et principaliter sive formaliter, sed tantum materialiter et ministerialiter, quia materiam cognitionis accipit anima sensibus.

⁷ S. Belmond, "A l'école de S. Augustin," *Études Franciscaines*, XXXIII (1921), p. 147. Le sens n'intervient pas dans la connaissance pour la faire, mais uniquement pour l'alimenter.

Perhaps one can see here some germ of what will become in Scotus a well developed *causa partialis* theory.⁸ Where Scotus speaks of the intellect as the principal efficient cause and the object as the secondary efficient cause, Matthew relates them hylomorphically as matter and form. This reciprocal activity of object and intellect is given more detailed analysis in a subsequent discussion on the role of the species in Matthew's theory.

Speaking of the causality of the exterior corporeal object, Matthew declares that God could imprint a species on man's understanding even without the presence of the object⁹ and in this respect his doctrine might be compared with the discussion in Scotus¹⁰ and Ockham¹¹ on the intuition of non-existents. Matthew seems to admit, as they do, the supernatural possibility of a knowledge impressed by God and not initiated by the object. In general, however, Matthew maintains the material causality of the object in cognition of extra-mental objects, since the senses offer the matter for man's concepts. The intellect, however, has the efficient and principal role while illumination is also required for complete and perfect cognition. Thus one might characterize Matthew as an Augustinian activist who still allows for a certain "realism" on the part of the object. To understand just how the senses bring this matter to the intellect Matthew's description of the phantasm must be examined.

According to Aristotle, the intellect depends on the phantasm in such a way that the phantasm is required for all cognition and nothing can be understood without it.¹² Matthew immediately rejects such dependence for knowledge of incorporeals, for example the soul's knowledge of itself.¹³ His emphasis on the activity of the intellect, moreover, forces him to describe the relations of the mind to the phantasm in a way quite different from Aristotelian passivity. According to his thesis, the intellect is not informed by the phantasm, nor is the phantasm transformed into a species which in turn informs the intellect. Rather, the

⁸ I *Op. Ox.*, 3, 7, 20; IX: 361—63. III: 289—95. This problem is discussed by E. Bettoni, "Rapporti dottrinali fra Matteo d'Aquasparta e Giovanni Duns Scoto," *Studi Francescani*, XV (1943), pp. 124—28.

⁹ *De cognitione*, Q. I, p. 219.

¹⁰ IV *Op. Ox.*, 10, 5, 4; XVII: 258. A good summary of Scotus on this controversial point is given by S. Day, *Intuitive Cognition, a Key to the Significance of the Later Scholastics* (St. Bonaventure, New York: Franciscan Institute, 1947), pp. 101—104.

¹¹ P. Boehner, "The *notitia intuitiva* of Non-existents according to William Ockham," *Traditio*, I (1943), pp. 223—75.

¹² *De cognitione*, Q. V, p. 293.

¹³ *De cognitione*, Q. V, p. 310.

intelligible species is "brought forth" from the phantasm by the intellect.¹⁴ Note that the species is not abstracted. Such an abstractive process would be impossible, since the intelligible species must be immaterial if it is to be understood by the spiritual intellect, while the phantasm is still "under the conditions of matter."¹⁵ In other words, the immaterial cannot be abstracted from the material; rather the intellect must somehow act on the phantasm.

Matthew limits the causality of the phantasm saying that, in this life, extra-mental objects are understood with and through the phantasm; even incorporeals are not understood without the phantasm.¹⁶ In other words, man ordinarily relies on the phantasm, at least, for some type of motivation, but this need is not absolute, since Matthew admits that cognition without the phantasm is the privilege of a few "especially elevated men," even in this life.¹⁷ Actually, such dependence on the phantasm even for knowledge of spiritual beings is really a hindrance and an imperfection of man's present state.¹⁸

In conclusion, then, one sees that the object furnishes the material for intellection in the sense that it offers the phantasm to the intellect, while the mind brings forth the intelligible species from the phantasm and in this sense can be said to depend on it. Such dependence, however, is not the complete reliance or "conversion" to the phantasm found in Aristotle. The human intellect, according to Matthew, understands corporeal objects with and through the phantasm; but in knowing itself or when informed by an impressed species the soul escapes such absolute dependence.

Role of the Species

Continuing the development of Matthew's ideogenesis, one comes to an examination of the species in cognition and here again the activism of Matthew's theory is apparent. In question III of his *De cognitione*, Matthew asks: Is the species received from the object or formed from it, or is it found in the mind itself? In a section of historical importance, Matthew presents and criticizes the opinion of Plato, Avicenna, Aristotle, Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, Roger Bacon, Thomas of York, John Peckham and William of Auvergne on these questions. All these theories

¹⁴ *De cognitione*, Q. III, p. 272. . . quoniam intellectus non informatur phantasmate, nec phantasma transmutatur in aliquam speciem quae informat intellectum; sed ex phantasmate gignitur species illa quae intellectum informat.

¹⁵ *De providentia*, Q. VI, p. 367.

¹⁶ *De anima* VI, Q. VI, p. 343.

¹⁷ *De providentia*, Q. VI, p. 394.

¹⁸ *De anima* VI, Q. VI, p. 343.

are rejected in favor of a position which Matthew feels agrees with the authority of Augustine and Aristotle.¹⁹

In presenting his own solution to the problem, Matthew first reiterates that he is not discussing knowledge of incorporeals, since such knowledge does not come through the senses. In the case of corporeal objects, however, the soul collects knowledge of them from the extramental world; consequently, some kind of contact must be established between the spiritual mind and the material world. For Matthew, the problem is to safeguard the reality of cognition without jeopardizing the supremacy of the intellectual subject over the material object.²⁰ Basic to his whole explanation is the thesis that the soul is active and thus does not receive a species or remain passive under any external influence. Such passivity on the part of the soul he calls absurd and contradictory to the teachings of both Augustine and Aristotle.²¹

When he describes the initial stages of ideogenesis, Matthew speaks of a certain *immutatio* made in the corporeal organ through the species. Since the soul, as substantial form, is the perfection and mover of the body, it immediately perceives this change in the organ and in this very perception the soul forms itself in proportion to the organ.²² According to Rohmer, corporeal objects are such, that by their very nature, they produce spontaneously their own resemblances and thus make known their essence. Certainly, such activity would serve to "objectify" the cognitive process, while ensuring the superiority of the knowing subject, since the soul does not adapt itself to the bodily movement but rather assimilates the change in the sense organ to the soul's own superior mode of being.²³ It is in this sense, that the intellect "brings forth," rather than abstracts, the species from the phantasm; here is a clear example

¹⁹ *De cognitione*, Q. III, pp. 261—62. Et ideo est alia positio fortassis magis concors dictis beati Augustini et Philosophi, quae medium tenet inter istas. Dico ergo quod duo sunt genera rerum cognoscibilium, scilicet corporearum et incorporearum. Incorporearum rerum notitiam anima a sensu corporis non accipit nec recipit, sed aut in semetipsa videt, dum ad semetipsam se movet, in quantum est connexa regulis immutabilibus, aut in regulis illis.

²⁰ G. Bonafede, "La conoscenza del singolare nella scuola Francescana del secolo XIII," *Collectanea Franciscana*, XXII (1952), p. 14.

²¹ *De cognitione*, Q. III, p. 262.

²² *De cognitione*, Q. III, p. 262. Quando autem fit immutatio in aliquo organo corporeo per aliquam speciem, non potest latere animam secundum illam potentiam organi perfectricem et motricem, sed statim percipit eam; percipiendo vero format eam in se secundum illius organi proportionem, ita quod vel sensibilem vel imaginabilem.

²³ J. Rohmer, "La Théorie de l'abstraction dans l'école franciscaine d'Alexandre de Halès à Jean Peckam," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, III (1928), pp. 167—68.

of Matthew's attempt to balance Augustinian activism with Aristotelian realism.

The species, then, has its origin in both the object and the subject. The fact that it is a likeness comes from the object, since every object tends to diffuse and to multiply itself. But the distinction between the various kinds of species — whether it be a sensible, imaginative or intelligible species — comes from the knowing subject. Since the species is the product of the soul, it is proportionate to the power of the soul; however, it is not formed from the substance of the soul but taken from the external world.²⁴ Having established the source, it now remains to describe just how the species is formed from the object.

In the first place, the species of the object is brought to the particular sense organ, for example the organ of sight, where the sense power perceives it and transforms it into a more spiritual form. Next this purified species is carried via the nervous system to the *sensus communis*, which makes a judgment on it. In the imagination, the species is purified still more, made more spiritual and more acceptable to the intellect; it is now called the *intentio intellecta in potentia*. Finally, the agent intellect transforms the species in the possible intellect, thus making it intelligible in act.²⁵ This latter process Matthew calls "abstraction".

Throughout this process, emphasis is placed on the activity of the intellect and on the proportion between the purified species and the various powers. Here again one sees Matthew's version of the *causa partialis* theory, since he postulates a change or *immutatio* in the sense power, as well as an *intentio* in the mind. The former is the matter of the concept while the latter is its form.

In line with Matthew's realism, cognition is based on the object; according to this theory, the intellect forms the species from the object and not from itself. To support his thesis, Matthew presents six arguments. In the first place, the agent intellect, as an active power, must exercise its abstraction or actualization on something taken from the extra-mental world. Secondly, the possible intellect, which is in potency to all intelligibles, must be determined by a particular species. Now this

²⁴ *De cognitione*, Q. III, p. 264. Sed attendendum est hic quod de illa specie possumus loqui duobus modis: aut secundum quod species, aut secundum quod sensibilis, imaginabilis sive intelligibilis. Quod sit species, hoc habet a suo principio originali, quoniam quaelibet res nata est suam speciem difundere et multiplicare. Sed quod sit sensibilis aut imaginabilis aut intelligibilis hoc habet a virtute animae, quae facit eam in se et proportionat eam sibi. Unde non tam recipit a rebus, quam accipit vel rapit vel format, non de se, ut dictum est sed ex illis et de illis.

²⁵ *De cognitione*, Q. III, pp. 263—64.

species cannot come from itself, since nothing informs itself. Therefore the species must be formed from the object via the agent intellect and thus the phantasm becomes the object of the possible intellect. A third reason, Matthew finds in the fact that the phantasm is the motivating object of the intellect. The phantasm itself does not excite the intellect but rather out of the phantasm the intelligible notions are obtained. Matthew's fourth argument is based on the very nature of intelligible things. These extra-mental objects are not intelligible in terms of their concrete objective existence but only through a species; this species taken from the object leads the mind to know the object. If the species were taken from the mind, then it would cause the mind primarily to know itself. Matthew advances a fifth reason for his position that the object is a partial cause of cognition. Augustine says that the cause of cognition is the species or similitude of the object. But a similitude may refer to that likeness which gives origin to the object, for example to the creative thought of the artist, or it may indicate the likeness which originates from the thing itself. It is the latter type of species, originating from the object, which causes cognition. As a final reason, Matthew explains that the powers of the soul are so united that nothing occurs in the superior power which was not first in the inferior sense power. This relationship can be illustrated by the fact that a man born blind has no image of color simply because he has never received any species from a colored object. On the other hand, the mind can be clouded by that very phantasm from which the intelligible species is formed.²⁶

Here, then, Matthew lines up the arguments from his thesis that the intellect forms the species from extra-mental objects. It does not receive the species through an action of the corporeal object upon itself, a passivity which would be contrary to the very nature of intellect and an activity transcending the powers of the material object. Nor does the intellect form the species from itself, since such a species would be a likeness of the mind rather than a similitude of the extra-mental object.

If the species originates from the activity of the intellect on the object, this representation is characterized as both material and immaterial. It is material in so far as it leads to cognition of the whole material being, both matter and form; it is immaterial as an intention of the mind.²⁷ The species, in fact, has not real being but exists only as an intention in the intellect.²⁸ This species might be further described as

²⁶ *De cognitione*, Q. III, pp. 264—76.

²⁷ *De cognitione*, Q. IV, pp. 287—88.

²⁸ E. Chiocchetti, "La cognizione dell' individuale Matteo d'Aquasparta e Duns Scoto," *Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica*, XXXII (1940), p. 285.

a potency and an actuality; the sensible species has a potency to become intellectualized, but this capacity is realized only after it has been purified and actualized by the various cognitive powers. Finally, the sensible species may be called corporeal, since it is a likeness of a body;²⁹ the intelligible species, on the other hand, is called the form of the intellect, since the soul understands through this species which informs its own act of knowing.³⁰ Both sensible and intellectual species are produced by the soul which bestows its own spiritual nature on the likeness of the material object, making it intelligible in act. From the standpoint of the whole cognitive process, each species must be more purified and more ready for intellection than the preceding one. This has led Rohmer to conclude that Matthew does not postulate only one species but rather a procession of species, each formed from the other and each more purified and more intellectual.³¹

How long do these species endure? Since they are products of the mind, they remain as long as the cognition causing them remains; they cease when it ceases.³² Here Matthew is referring to the actual species which are the means of knowing a present object, but he also grants that a species may be stored in the memory for future recall. Such a species in the memory may be an object of cognition, while the actual present species is only a means of knowing and not the object of knowledge.³³

Finally, it is to be noted that various kinds of species are postulated by Matthew's theory. He speaks of a singular species, of a universal species, a species required for the soul's knowledge of itself, and an innate species. All of these types will be met in subsequent discussions on the varied objects of cognition. Since the species is essentially the product of the intellect, it represents not only the extra-mental object but also the way in which the mind views it, for example as a singular or as a universal.

This, then, is Matthew's theory on the species formed by the mind from the external object. This likeness is not abstracted from the thing, nor formed by the mind from itself. Such a species is immaterial and intellectual, yet capable of representing a material, corporeal, extra-mental body. It is only potentially intellectual but it becomes actually so through a process of abstraction, or purification, in which one species

²⁹ *De providentia*, Q. VI, pp. 388 —39.

³⁰ *De cognitione*, Q. V, p. 314.

³¹ J. Rohmer, *art. cit.*, p. 169.

³² *De gratia*, Q. VII, p. 183.

³³ *De cognitione*, Q. V, p. 312.

succeeds another until the intelligible species is ready to inform the possible intellect.

Such is Matthew's own doctrine on species. His interesting and historically important critique of the teachings of Plato, Avicenna, Aristotle, Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, Roger Bacon, Thomas of York, John Peckham and William of Auvergne³⁴ will now follow.

Plato teaches that the soul receives its species from another world and that it is only because of the impeding action of the body that a man seems to learn, whereas he is actually only remembering. Avicenna and Algazel, rejecting the idea that the species comes from corporeal objects, maintain that the "last intelligence" impresses these similitudes upon the minds of men. Matthew dismisses both of these opinions, even though they "have been held and still are held" by some Catholic teachers.

The Aristotelian thesis that sensible things impress their images not only on the senses, but even on the intellect, a position attributed to Bonaventure by the editors of the text edition of *De cognitione*, is also refuted. Thomas Aquinas and Roger Bacon, in a variation of this impression theory, hold that these species are educed from the potencies of the intellect in much the same way as natural forms are educed from the potencies of matter through the activity of an extrinsic agent. Matthew objects to both these impressionistic theories on the ground that they are contrary to Augustine and Aristotle and because it seems unreasonable that the soul should suffer any action from a material object.

Matthew also criticizes those who hold with Thomas of York that the soul is only "excited" by the external objects. This group of theorists includes those who say that the intellect already has certain innate seeds or active potencies of all species and those who hold that the mind has a certain basic likeness to all intelligible things. Though Matthew admits that such a theory is not erroneous, still he objects to it because it is not consonant with the teachings of Aristotle, who denies all innate species, nor does it agree with Augustine, who requires illumination for knowledge of immutable truth. Moreover, Matthew finds it difficult to see how such an explanation can avoid a certain receptivity, since these innate principles, as universals, would still need to be determined and such determination would involve reception of a species from exterior things. In fact, even an "excitation" would involve some kind of reception and a consequent passivity on the part of the soul.

³⁴ *De cognitione*, Q. III, pp. 256—62.

Another group, represented by John Peckham (Matthew's master) and William of Auvergne, requires only an "excitement" from external things, since the soul is already a likeness to all objects. These philosophers regard the intellect as already a species of species, since it possesses both an active and a possible intellect as well as a body, which it informs. Because of the soul's union with the body, any change in the sense organ or in the imagination, they say, disturbs and excites the soul to change itself proportionately. Such an interpretation, Matthew observes, would save Aristotle's theory of abstraction, yet it is to be rejected as contrary to the doctrine of Augustine and Anselm. Moreover, if the intellect were the species of species, it would be more inclined to come to cognition of itself rather than to knowledge of the extra-mental object. Thus the "excitation" theories would endanger the objectivity of cognition.

In conclusion, Matthew clearly denies the reminiscence theory of Plato and the illumination through a separate agent intellect postulated by Avicenna. He also disagrees with the impressionism of Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas as being contrary to the active nature of cognition. Finally, he claims that any innatist theory such as that of Thomas of York or John Peckham would endanger man's knowledge of reality.

Such is Matthew's review of the theories of his predecessors and contemporaries. His own solution, however, was severely criticized by one of his fellow Franciscans, the Englishman Roger Marston, who says he does not see how Matthew can "rationally sustain" his "unhappy compromise" between Augustine and Aristotle. It fails to be Aristotelian, since it postulates a cognition that is both active and passive; it likewise destroys the Augustinian theory of sensation, since it also admits a species coming from an impression of the object on the soul.³⁵

To compare the theories of these two contemporaries: for Matthew, the corporeal object is the instrumental cause of cognition; for Marston it is the occasion only. Matthew says that the species in the sense organ is the raw material from which the intelligible species is produced; for Marston, this species in the sense organ is the exemplary cause of a more spiritual species. In general, then, Matthew admits of more activity on the part of the object than Marston does.

Another Franciscan, who taught at Paris shortly after Matthew, was Vitalis de Furno. His question on the species shows a close parallel to

³⁵ Roger Marston, *Quaestiones disputatae* (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1932), Q. VIII, p. 386—87. In this connection see F. Prezioso, "L'attività del soggetto pensante nella gnosologia di Matteo d'Acquasparta e di Ruggiero Marston," *Antonianum*, XXV (1950), pp. 259—326.

Matthew both in presentation and in critique.³⁶ Unfortunately his *De rerum principio* has been incorrectly attributed to Scotus, and this false authorship has sometimes mislead Belmond in his article on Matthew and Scotus.³⁷ Today it is rather generally admitted that the *De rerum* is the work of Vitalis and thus close in time and doctrine to Matthew.³⁸

Activity and Passivity of the Intellect

As one notes throughout this discussion, Matthew's doctrine relies upon Aristotelian terminology to explain Augustinian doctrine; consequently, his formulation attempts to harmonize passivity with activity. He admits that there must be a certain initial activity on the part of the object, because the object can be known only by the resemblance or species which it produces spontaneously. However, the activity of the intellect in distinguishing and judging this species safeguards the superiority of the spiritual power.³⁹ Both elements will be repeated in Bonaventure's theory of ideogenesis. Matthew, unlike his teacher, does not admit that the object makes any impression on the intellect. In the light of this positive and repeated thesis, one wonders how Belmond can conclude that Matthew's abstraction theory "does not depart in any way" from that of St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure,⁴⁰ both of whom admitted some kind of an initial impressionism.

Matthew continually emphasizes the active nature of cognition describing how the agent intellect forms the species which corresponds to the sense stimulation and then transforms this first representation into an intelligible species. In this way, the active intellect illumines both the possible intellect and the phantasm.⁴¹

In the light of this same activism, Matthew interprets Aristotle's comparison of the soul with matter. While he admits that the possible intellect, like matter, is in potency towards the intelligible objects, still he claims that this is really only the indetermination of an activity with regard to its term, or end, and not a complete passivity.⁴² As already noted, the possible intellect turns itself toward the phantasm and in this sense is active in determining its own object as well as receptive of the agent intellect's illumination.

³⁶ Vitalis de Furno, "Le cardinal Vital du Four. Huit questions disputées sur le problème de la connaissance," ed. F. Delorme, *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, II (1927), pp. 211—32.

³⁷ S. Belmond, *art. cit.*, p. 20.

³⁸ Vitalis de Furno, *Quodlibeta tria*, ed. F. Delorme (Rome: Pontificum Athenaeum Antonianum, 1947), p. x.

³⁹ *De cognitione*, Q. I, p. 221.

⁴¹ *De cognitione*, Q. III, p. 269.

⁴⁰ S. Belmond, *art. cit.*, p. 18.

⁴² E. Bettoni, *art. cit.*, p. 129.

Present day historians differ in their evaluation of Matthew's attempt to harmonize Augustine and Aristotle. De Wulf sees in his ideogenesis a pure Augustinianism adapted to the Aristotelian agent intellect and representing the very occasionalism which Bonaventure tried to destroy.⁴³ Gilson also observes that Matthew attempts to reconcile Augustine with Aristotle and by so doing sets in relief the inherent difficulties of trying to find a doctrine of ideogenesis in the works of Augustine.⁴⁴ Rohmer broadens the source of Matthew's doctrine to include the ideas of Augustine and Pseudo-Denis, as well as the medieval heritage of Arabian doctrine via Avicenna and Alfarabi. As evidence of this latter influence, he observes that Matthew relates Arabian cosmology to the body/soul, intellect/matter problems, thus making man a resumé of the universe. In Matthew he finds a more faithful follower of Augustine than in Bonaventure, since Matthew stresses the active nature of sensation even to the extent that his doctrine might be called a medieval phrasing of the moderns' dynamism of consciousness.⁴⁵

St. Bonaventure

Although Matthew of Aquasparta upholds the Augustinian emphasis on the activity of the intellect, yet he admits, with Aristotle, a certain impetus from the object. His thesis seems consonant with the general doctrine of the Franciscan school represented by Bonaventure and Scotus and the Augustinianism of Henry of Ghent. In Bonaventure one finds a slightly different combination of Aristotelian terminology and Augustinian doctrine. This combination is seen in his theory of sensation, his discussion of the role of the species as well as his abstractive process.

Theory of Sensation

Knowledge of corporeal objects originates in the senses, in the memory and in experience;⁴⁶ here the initial agreement of Bonaventure and of Matthew with a dictum of Aristotle is apparent. Bonaventure, like Aristotle, rejects any Platonic innatism for knowledge of corporeal objects.⁴⁷ In the formula of Geoffrey of St. Victor, Bonaventure declares

⁴³ M. De Wulf, *Histoire de la philosophie médiévale* (Louvain: Instit. supér. de phil., 1924), I: 360.

⁴⁴ E. Gilson, "Sur quelques difficultés de l'illumination augustinienne," *Revue néoscholastique de philosophie*, XXXVI (1934), p. 325.

⁴⁵ J. Rohmer, *art. cit.*, pp. 168—70.

⁴⁶ *Sermo* IV, 18; V: 572 a. A general reference on this problem is Sister Mary Rachael Dady, *The Theory of Knowledge of Saint Bonaventure* (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1939).

⁴⁷ B. Luyckx, "Die Erkenntnislehre Bonaventuras," *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, XXIII (1923), p. 14.

that the world of the macrocosm enters the mind of men, the microcosm, through the gate of the senses.⁴⁸

The process of sensation through which man comes to know the external world, he describes in terms of a reception. According to Bonaventure, the sensible species formed from the external object is received by the bodily organ, but before it can be received it must be purified of all matter.⁴⁹ In another passage, Bonaventure specifically states that the corporeal organ is a passive power; it simply receives an impression from the object.⁵⁰ This impression made by the senses on the intellect can be compared to a kind of "handwriting" on the soul.⁵¹ The point to be observed in all these formulas is this: the object initiates the activity, impressing its species on the senses which passively receive this impression.

It is precisely this activity of the object on the sense organ which is so definitely rejected by Matthew as a betrayal of the true Augustinian doctrine.

Bonaventure's theory, however, cannot be simply dismissed as a pure representation of Aristotelian passivity. In addition to the initial activity of the object impressing its species on the knowing subject, Bonaventure also postulates some activity on the part of the intellect beyond the receptivity and consequent adaptation required for Aristotelian ideogenesis. Even though the object acting on the sense organ initially determines that organ, still the soul must somehow determine itself. As Bonaventure expresses it, quoting from Augustine, "the soul moves itself on the occasion of something received from outside."⁵² For Bissen this means that the sense organ submits to the action of the object, but since the sense organ is living, it also adapts itself to the new form which is imposed upon it.⁵³ In this way, sensation is not only a passive endurance but also an active adaptation; it involves both a reception from the object and a judgment by the intellect.⁵⁴ The passive element is mainly in the bodily organ, while the active judgment is

⁴⁸ *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*, II, 3; V: 300. In this chapter there is a classic exposition of the Bonaventurian theme that the visible world is the "vestige" of God.

⁴⁹ II *Sent.*, 8, 1, 3, 2; II: 222 b.

⁵⁰ IV *Sent.*, 50, 2, 1, 1; IV: 1046 a b.

⁵¹ In *hexaëmeron*, XII, 16; V: 386 b.

⁵² II *Sent.*, 23, 2, 1; II: 538 b. Here Bonaventure quotes from St. Augustine, *Musicae*, VI, 5, 9.

⁵³ A. Pisvin, 'L'intuition sensible selon S. Bonaventure,' *Scholastica ratione historico-critica instauranda* (Rome: Antonianum, 1951), pp. 371—72.

⁵⁴ II *Sent.*, 25, 2, 1, 6; II: 623 a.

found in the soul.⁵⁵ Both belong to the compositum, and it is this union of body-soul which actually effects cognition of sensible objects in this life. As Bonaventure explains, sensation belongs to the soul only in its role as form of the body.⁵⁶ In other words, it is not the soul, but the compositum of which the soul is the form and the perfection, which is influenced.

This conception of sensation as both reception and action follows, then, from Bonaventure's psychology. Since the soul is the form of the body, it perceives the impression of the sensible species on the corporeal organ. Because the soul is not only a form but also a substance in its own right, it has an action which transcends that of the body and which is independent of it.⁵⁷ Like Matthew, Bonaventure claims that sensation is only part of the soul's ideogenesis. The way in which the human mind comes to know itself and other spiritual substances is explained in a subsequent chapter.

The relation of Bonaventure's doctrine on the soul to his theory of sensation is used by Gilson to illustrate the Augustinian and Aristotelian elements in both these theories. Since the soul is the form of the body, a certain Aristotelian passivity can be admitted. Since the soul is something more than the form, it must also be given a more active role. This activity of the soul, however, is less necessary in Bonaventure's theory because the soul, possessing spiritual matter, is already more closely united to the material object than in Aristotelian ideogenesis.⁵⁸ Moreover, if the soul is not really distinct from its faculties, then sensation is simply a lower form of the soul's power of knowing, a form which the soul simply communicates to the body.⁵⁹

Obviously, for Bonaventure sensation is both a composite of activity and passivity, with neither predominating; according to Bissen's interpretation, one factor is super-imposed upon the other.⁶⁰ In so far as an impression is received from the object, sensation is passive but in so far as the intellect "converts" itself upon this species, sensation is an active process.⁶¹

⁵⁵ II *Sent.*, 8, 1, 3, 2; II: 223 a b.

⁵⁶ II *Sent.*, 8, 1, 3, 2; II: 222 a.

⁵⁷ H. Križovljan, *Philosophia S. Bonaventurae* (Rome: Collegium Internationale S. Laurentii a Brundusio, 1956), pp. 288—91.

⁵⁸ E. Gilson, *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1938), pp. 354—55.

⁵⁹ II *Sent.*, 8, 1, 3, 2; II: 223 a b. This passage is discussed by E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 356—57.

⁶⁰ A. Pisvin, *op. cit.*, pp. 370—71.

⁶¹ IV *Sent.*, 50, 2, 1, 1; IV: 1046 a b.

A certain agreement between Bonaventure's theory of sensation and that of his pupil, Matthew of Aquasparta, is clearly apparent. Both agree that knowledge of corporeal things comes by way of the senses; both admit some activity on the part of the intellect. Bonaventure, however, seems more Aristotelian in his doctrine that the object impresses itself on the organ, while Matthew follows Augustine in maintaining that the intellect forms the species by bringing it forth from the phantasm. The object is simply the passive material which offers itself to the "formation" of the active intellect. As already pointed out, Matthew's teaching seems closer to the *causa partialis* theory of Scotus than to the passivity of Bonaventure.

Role of the Species

In Bonaventurian ideogenesis, sensation involves a union of the knowing subject and the object, initiated by an impression from the object on the sense organ. Just exactly what does this union entail and how is it achieved? Obviously, it does not mean that the senses are united to the concrete substances found in the extra-mental world. Rather the union must be effected by means of a similitude, a likeness or species, which is first generated in the exterior organ, then in the common sense and finally in the intellect itself.⁶² In this way, the union of the species or similitude of the object with the sense faculty causes a new perception. By means of these perceptions the subject comes to know extra-mental reality.

What exactly is this species which initiates the union between the knowing subject and object known? In the first place, this similitude is a substance *per reductionem*; it can be reduced to the substance from which it emanates.⁶³ This concept of the emanation of the species is corroborated by Bonaventure's theory of light forms. Since the first form of every object is the form of light, bodies act on other bodies by a kind of self-luminosity, thus surrounding themselves with a "perpetual radiation" which Bonaventure terms a resemblance. Since this likeness expresses the whole object, both matter and form, it can be called a similitude; since it enables the object to be known, it can also be referred to as a species.⁶⁴ According to Bonaventure, both subject and object

⁶² *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*, II, 4; V: 300 b. A further explanation of this cognitive process is given in the commentary and notes by P. Boehner, *Itinerarium mentis in Deum* (St. Bonaventure, New York: The Franciscan Institute, 1956), p. 116.

⁶³ II *Sent.*, 24, 1, 2, 1; II: 563 a b.

⁶⁴ E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 351—52.

share in this same form of light and consequently their transcendental relation can be explained more easily. Finally, such a species of light is already purified and ready for the intellect.⁶⁵ Thus Bonaventure's identification of the sensible species with the radiant light form of all beings explains how the object can be said to impress itself on the subject and suggests that Bonaventure's use of this Aristotelian formula is indoctrinated with much of his own metaphysical background.

In one sense, then, the sensible species is simply the propagated light form of the object. But, as both Bonaventure and Matthew agree, this species as a species is not formed by the object, but is rather a product of the intellect. This first act of the knowing subject Bonaventure calls a "protension", a reception, an intuition. It is a protension in so far as the intellect is active; a reception, in terms of the passivity involved; finally, it is an intuition, in relation to the whole cognitive process.⁶⁶ Further this species is an intention of the mind, a singular accident qualifying and disposing the soul to know a particular extra-mental object.⁶⁷ Bonaventure balances the notions of receptivity and activity, while Matthew definitely and clearly emphasizes the activity of the intellectual process. Despite this disagreement, both admit a species which is a representation of the object and which has only intentional being in the mind of the knower. In relation to the object, this similitude is simply the propagated light form, found in every being; in relation to the intellect, this similitude is a species enabling the mind to come into contact with material substances.

Bonaventurian Abstraction

In Bonaventure's theory of sensation, one observes that the sensible species is impressed on the sense organ; this species is then perceived and judged by the sense power; finally, the species is gathered by the common sense and stored for future recall in the imagination. Sensation, then, is both a passive reception in the sense organ as well as an act of the soul; both doctrines are rooted in Bonaventure's theories on the union of soul and body. On the intellectual level, one also discovers the same active/passive synthesis; again Aristotelian terms are used in a unique interpretation.

Bonaventure explains that from the data supplied by the senses, the intellect abstracts the "universal from the particular, the form from the

⁶⁵ A. Pisvin, *op. cit.*, p. 368.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 374—75.

⁶⁷ H. Križovlján, *op. cit.*, pp. 302—304.

matter''; in this way the object is made intelligible.⁶⁸ Such a thesis might easily be taken for a sentence expressing the traditional Aristotelian ideogenesis. Rohmer indicates, however, that Bonaventure uses the word "abstraction" in a completely different way. For Bonaventure, according to Rohmer, it designates a special judgment of the sensible species, a judgment which is called abstraction in order to distinguish it from the general faculty of judgment.⁶⁹ To substantiate his opinion, Rohmer cites from chapter II of Bonaventure's *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*, where he does not even use the word "abstraction", but prefers the term "judgment".⁷⁰ In another text where Bonaventure enumerates the requirements for cognition, he lists proportion, reception, judgment, information;⁷¹ again, he omits any mention of abstraction, substituting the term "judgment".⁷² Finally, Bonaventure uses abstraction in describing the intellect of the angels where there can be no possibility of an Aristotelian stripping from the phantasm.⁷³ Gilson agrees with Rohmer in thus explaining judgment as Bonaventure's own theory to replace the Aristotelian abstractive process.⁷⁴

The question then arises, exactly what did Bonaventure mean by this abstractive type of judgment? According to Bonaventure himself, his theory involves a purifying action by means of which the sensible species is made ready for the intellect.⁷⁵ Actually, the cognitive process involves a threefold judgment, or a threefold series of abstractions. First the judgment of the sensitive faculty "acts upon" the sensible impression which is received by the organ; secondly, the common sense decides why the sensible species seems to please or displease. In this latter stage the sense impression is replaced by the idea.⁷⁶ To follow Bonaventure's own example: on the sense level, abstraction involves a judgment about whether an object be black or white; on the intellectual level, judgment concerns the essence of the object.⁷⁷ Such a conceptual judgment has been called the "primordial synthesis."⁷⁸

⁶⁸ *I Sent.*, 27, 1, 1, 3; I: 476 a.

⁶⁹ J. Rohmer, *art. cit.*, p. 161.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 149. Also see P. Boehner, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

⁷¹ *I Sent.*, 3, 1, 1, 1; I: 67 a b.

⁷² J. Rohmer, *art. cit.*, pp. 157—58.

⁷³ *II Sent.*, 3, 2, 2, 1; II: 119 a.

⁷⁴ E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 398—99.

⁷⁵ *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*, II, 6; V: 301 a.

⁷⁶ E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 399.

⁷⁷ *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*, II, 6; V: 301 a.

⁷⁸ J. De Dieu De Champsecret, "L'intuition de la présence et la théorie bonaventurienne de la formation du concept," *Études Franciscaines*, VIII (1957), p. 26, in the notes.

For Bonaventure, then, the abstractive process is really a progressive type of judgment until, on the intellectual level, the essence of the object is apprehended. Not only is such an abstractive process different from the Aristotelian theory described by the same term but the *rationale* of this judgment is distinct. For Bonaventure there is less need of an abstraction from the matter of the object, since the intellect itself possesses a kind of matter.⁷⁹ Nor is the intellect required to abstract from the material individuating principles to obtain a universal concept, since matter alone is not the principle of individuation; the true universal on the other hand, can only be known with the aid of divine illumination. (This latter point will be discussed in the next chapter on illumination.) Abstraction, then, is not needed to transform the sensible species; rather the intellect, perceiving the intelligibility of the object, must judge the species and thus come to know the essence of the thing.⁸⁰

Both Matthew and Bonaventure use the word "abstraction", but neither explains it in the Aristotelian sense. Matthew speaks of an illumination made by the agent intellect, whereas Bonaventure describes a process of purification and judgment.

Active and Possible Intellect

If abstraction is described as a judgment, then the role of agent and of the possible intellect in Bonaventurian ideogenesis differ from the Aristotelian conception of these faculties. As in his position on sense cognition, Bonaventure's doctrine is based on his theory of the union of the soul with its faculties and is influenced by the active/passive nature of intellection.

First of all, the active and passive intellect are really two phases, or two aspects of the same faculty, each having its own proper essence and yet being reducible to the substance of the soul.⁸¹

Since the agent intellect and the possible intellect are not really distinct faculties, neither are they completely opposed in operation. For Bonaventure, the agent intellect is not always in act, nor is it completely active; neither is the possible intellect purely a potential power without any activity. By nature, the agent intellect is an intellectual light and consequently actively enlightens the sensible species, but it is also passive in so far as it receives a species. This same activity/pas-

⁷⁹ L. Veuthey, *S. Bonaventurae philosophia christiana* (Rome: Officium Libri Catholici, 1943), p. 61.

⁸⁰ J. Rohmer, *art. cit.*, p. 150.

⁸¹ H. Križovljan, *op. cit.*, p. 302. St. Thomas speaks rather of two distinct powers of the soul; see his *Summa Theologica*, I, 79, 4—5.

sivity is seen in the possible intellect. Though the possible intellect is only in potency toward the intelligible species, yet it is active in so far as it turns itself toward the species existing in the phantasm and judges with the aid of the agent intellect.⁸² In this way, the agent intellect and the possible intellect appear as reciprocal movements of the soul.⁸³ Departing again from the Aristotelian notion, Bonaventure says that for complete knowledge both require illumination.

Here as in the abstractive process, Bonaventure interprets familiar terms in a unique fashion. The agent intellect is active in judging, yet it is passive in its need for a species. However, it is the activity of the possible intellect turning itself towards the species which shows the greatest Augustinian influence. Matthew is substantially in agreement with this when he says the possible intellect acts on the phantasm enlightened by the active intellect.

Bonaventure does stress the active nature of cognition. He defines it as "an act arising from the power of the mind";⁸⁴ "a motion from objects to the mind."⁸⁵ Cognition, for Bonaventure is both the active assimilation of the object known and the expression of this relation between the knower and the thing known.⁸⁶ Since it implies a unification, it requires a motivation on the part of the object, the activity of the intellect, and finally divine enlightenment.⁸⁷ But all this activation presupposes a corresponding reception. Therefore, Bonaventure agrees with Augustine that cognition is "a movement of the soul but this movement is in receiving something."⁸⁸

Here, then, is the Augustinian and Aristotelian synthesis in Bonaventurian ideogenesis: an original impetus received from the object; a reception and judgment of this impression by the intellect, i. e. a species formed by the intellect from the lightform resemblance of the object; a judgment or abstraction of the intellectual content of this species by the agent intellect; a reception of and turning towards this species by the possible intellect to complete the cognitive process.

Matthew of Aquasparta seems to agree with Bonaventure in the general orientation of this theory. However, he does not admit of any "impression" made by the object on the sense power; in this thesis he seems more Augustinian than does Bonaventure.

⁸² II *Sent.*, 24, 1, 2, 4; II: 569—71.

⁸³ E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 368.

⁸⁴ *De scientia Christi*, V, 14; V: 31 b.

⁸⁵ I *Sent.*, 45, 8; I: 813 b.

⁸⁶ *De scientia Christi*, II, 2; V: 8 a.

⁸⁷ *In hexaëmeron*, IV, 9; V: 350 b.

⁸⁸ IV *Sent.*, 49, 2, 1, 1; IV: 1020 a.

Henry of Ghent

One discovers a modified emphasis on activism in the ideogenesis of the secular master, Henry of Ghent. Here again, a blending of Augustinian theory with Aristotelian terminology is apparent. Yet Henry also presents an original interpretation, one which was later to occasion Scotus' own development of these points. The following section will discuss Henry's theory of sensation, his denial of any intelligible species and his abstraction theory.

Theory of Sensation

In common with other Scholastics, Henry accepts the dictum that all knowledge comes from the senses.⁸⁹ Like his Augustinian predecessors, however, he modifies this "all" even for knowledge of corporeal objects, since illumination is required if the intellect is to know the truth of things. Anxious to safeguard the integrity of man's natural powers, Henry claims, however, that the intellect can come to know "what is true" in the creature through sense knowledge alone.⁹⁰ In other words, true knowledge of corporeals originates in the senses, but it must not terminate there if the mind is to achieve complete knowledge of truth. Paulus regards Henry's position as a combination of the innatist theories of Plato and Avicenna with the Aristotelian ideogenesis coming from the object.⁹¹

Having agreed that true cognition originates in the senses, Henry now explains how the object known is related to the mind of the knower. In the first place, for him, the object determines the subject by determining the powers of sensation, an action comparable to the mechanical action of one natural element on another. Such determination, however, is not merely passive on the part of the knower for the soul itself is active in organizing the impression and communicating it something of its own spiritual nature.⁹² This interpretation follows the Aristotelian emphasis on an initial impetus from the object, while still allowing for some activity on the part of the intellect. On this point, then, Henry seems closer

⁸⁹ *Summae quaestionum ordinariarum*, I, 2, C: f. 4 v. A reprint of the 1520 edition. (St. Bonaventure, New York: The Franciscan Institute, 1953). This edition will be cited throughout the dissertation.

The abbreviations refer to article I, question 2, marginal letter C, folio 4, verso (or recto, as the case may be).

⁹⁰ *Summa* I, 2, K; f. 6 v. A more complete explanation of this illumination theory will be given in the next chapter.

⁹¹ J. Paulus, *Henri de Gand* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1938), pp. 5—6.

⁹² M. De Wulf, *Études sur Henri de Gand* (Brussels; Mém. couronnés de l'Académie Royale de Belgique, 1895), pp. 78—79.

to the formulation of Bonaventure than to Matthew's theory of dual causality.

That cognition originates from a motivation received from the object is basic to Henry's theory of sensation and intellection. The exact nature of this causal relation between subject and object will be given further description in the next section where Henry's denial of a species will be explained; here it suffices to say that when the object produces a modification in the sense organ, the sense power accepts this *immutatio*. Thus Henry can define sensation as a form composed by the sense power of the organ which has been informed by a sensible species.⁹³ In other words, sensation comes principally from the sense power but it is instrumentally caused by the organ determining the sense power to form a *verbum mentis*; this word becomes a concept in the mind, the true quiddity of the object by means of which the intellect can understand extra-mental reality.⁹⁴ Thus Henry retains a certain Augustinian activism while claiming, with Aristotle, that the action of the object determines the sense organ.

This determination is effected by means of a species, i. e. by a sensible or particular species. Since this species is a real determinant, it has natural being in the object, but only intentional being as a similitude in the mind.⁹⁵ To use Henry's own example: color, a quality of real being, is impressed on the medium and finally on the organ of sight.⁹⁶ As a species in the organ, color would have only intentional being, but in the object it would have some kind of real existence, according to the physical theories of Henry's times. This determination of the sense power, effected by the species, might be compared with the natural union which exists between substance and accident.⁹⁷

A sensible species is required, according to Henry, in order to ensure contact between the subject and the object. (It may be noted, that such a species will not be needed for intellection, but more of this later.) The need for a species on the sense level arises from the fact that otherwise the object could not be united to the sense power since the subject must be determined by some agent which is capable of acting upon it. Hence a species is needed to unite the object and the sense faculty and to

⁹³ *Quodl.*, XI, 5, f. 82 r b.

⁹⁴ *Quodl.*, I, 12—13, f. 16 v a. Note the use of the Augustinian term, *verbum mentis*.

⁹⁵ *Quodl.*, V, 14, f. 261 v b.

⁹⁶ *Quodl.*, IV 21, f. 200 r a.

⁹⁷ E. Bettoni, *Il processo astrattivo nella concezione di Enrico di Gand* (Milan: Pubblicazione dell' Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Nuova Serie, XLVII, 1954), p. 42.

determine the sense power itself.⁹⁸ In other words, the sense power could not be impressed by something purely material, nor could the object be united with the purely spiritual. Now the phantasm is immaterial in so far as it is abstracted from the presence of matter but it still retains the particular conditions of matter and for that reason can be intermediary between the subject and the object.⁹⁹

According to Henry, then, the extra-mental object makes an impression on the senses in such a way that the sense power apprehends this change in the organ which has been determined by the sensible species. Sensation is primarily an activity of the sense power to form the *species expressa*, but the *species impressa*, i. e. the impression made by the object, initiates the whole process.¹⁰⁰ These two types of species may be said to summarize Henry's concept of activity/passivity on the level of sensation.

Role of the Species

It is obvious then that Henry of Ghent requires a species to account for the union of the sense faculty and the object. He just as resolutely denies the need for such an intermediary on the intellectual level. According to Henry, there is no need for an intelligible species, since the sense species, transformed by the agent intellect, suffices for cognition.¹⁰¹ In other words, the intelligible element in the phantasm is directly united to the understanding and this is sufficient to produce the required *immutatio* in the intellect.¹⁰² Moreover, an intelligible species is impossible, since the object of the intellect is universal, while the impressed species still retains some of its individual aspects.¹⁰³ Thus Henry rejects an intelligible species on two grounds: first, it is unnecessary because the intelligible element is already contained in the *species expressa*, and, secondly, any such similitude in the intellect would be a hindrance rather than a means to cognition since the species is the sign of the individual while the intellect knows only the universal.

⁹⁸ *Quodl.*, XIII, 2, f. 292 r b.

⁹⁹ *Quodl.*, V, 14, f. 262 r b. The question that Henry raises: whether angels understand through their essence or through a similitude or through the presence of the quiddity of the thing.

¹⁰⁰ *Quodl.*, IV, 21, f. 200 r a. The *species expressa* is an accident of the mind, while the *species impressa* has only an *esse ut cognitum* in the intellect. See *Quodl.*, IV, 8, f. 152 r a.

¹⁰¹ M. De Wulf, *Histoire de la philosophie médiévale*, II: 57.

¹⁰² M. De Wulf, *Études sur Henri de Gand*, p. 104.

¹⁰³ *Quodl.*, V, 14, f. 259 v b. Here Henry shows his anxiety to avoid Aristotelian passivism; the object cannot effect the intellect. See E. Bettoni, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

How does the intellect know the object without the aid of an intelligible species? In recalling Henry's theory of sensation, one learns that for him the sensible species initiated by an impression from the object and expressed by the sense power is stored in the memory and reproduced by the imagination. Abstraction is not made from the *species impressa*, since such an impression would be material; rather it is formed from the *species expressa*, where the intellect has only to actualize the intelligible elements. His hierarchy of abstraction includes three stages: first, the singular object, present extra-mentally, is grasped by the senses; secondly, the object, still singular but no longer present, is reproduced by the imaginative powers; finally, the intellect understands the object under a universal aspect.¹⁰⁴

In short, Henry's teaching might be crystallized by saying that the intellect knows the intelligible in the sensible. Since the image, present in the imagination, places the object at the door of the understanding, the active intellect simply renders intelligible the essence of the object. Consequently, no species needs to intervene between the knower and thing known;¹⁰⁵ as Henry says, the sensible species is the perfect reason for the assimilation of the object to the intellect. In this way the species can even be called the truth of the thing, because it is an equivalence of the thing and the intellect.¹⁰⁶ Bourgeois interprets this to mean that the object, existing in the phantasm and universalized by the agent intellect, is immediately present to the mind.¹⁰⁷

Does Henry's rejection of the intelligible species mean that the extra-mental object acts directly on the intellect? Obviously not, since such an interpretation would clearly be contrary to the principle that nothing material can influence a spiritual being. If the material object could not act on the sense power without an intervening species, still less could it affect the understanding. The agent intellect, then, is not determined by the object but by a certain *immutatio* coming from the phantasm.¹⁰⁸ As already explained, the image reproduced by the imaginative power, a certain representation Henry calls it, motivates the intellect.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁴ *Quodl.*, IV, 21, f. 200 v a.

¹⁰⁵ *Quodl.*, IV, 7, f. 201 v a.

¹⁰⁶ *Quodl.*, III, 15, f. 120 r b. Here Henry's theory of cognition is linked with his psychology; knowledge is the act of the compositum.

¹⁰⁷ R. Bourgeois, "La théorie de la connaissance intellectuelle chez Henri de Gand," *Revue de philosophie*, XXXVI (1936), pp. 248—49.

¹⁰⁸ *Quodl.*, XI, 5, f. 451 v b—452 r a.

¹⁰⁹ *Quodl.*, IV, 7, f. 151 r a. Henry distinguishes between the species as the similitude of all creatures and a species in the proper meaning of the term; it is the latter which enables the mind to know external objects.

This representation is already non-material; hence it does not require any intelligible species to place it in contact with the mind.¹¹⁰

It might be well, in conclusion, to review the various terms Henry has used in his doctrine on the species. On the sense level, he admits a *species impressa*, which is the effect of the object's determination of the subject, as well as a *species expressa*, formed by the sense power. Since the *species expressa* already contains the intelligible essence of the thing, it is capable of determining the intellect without the intervention of any other species. This *species expressa* is also called *notitia*¹¹¹ and *phantasma universale*.¹¹²

As can be seen from the above glossary, Henry's use of terms might create misunderstandings. Perhaps this very difficulty has caused Huet to maintain that the principal difference between Henry and St. Thomas is this: the former holds that the species are formed by the intellect while the latter says that they are simply impressed.¹¹³ De Wulf objects to such an interpretation, pointing out that Henry differs radically from St. Thomas in his rejection of any intelligible species and that in this respect Henry becomes the forerunner of Durand and Ockham.¹¹⁴ De Wulf criticizes Henry's denial, saying that he has suppressed the real function of abstraction; "cognition is now reduced to a phenomenon of vision."¹¹⁵

By way of comparison, Matthew posits a sensible species formed by the intellect and not impressed upon it, as well as an intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm. Matthew's position seems, then, more traditional than Henry's, the latter pointing in the direction later taken by Scotus, Ockham and the "moderns".

Role of the Agent Intellect

In denying any intelligible species, Henry alters the traditional doctrine on the agent intellect. For him, the agent intellect illuminates and abstracts,¹¹⁶ and the term of its activity is neither the extra-mental

¹¹⁰ E. Bettoni, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

¹¹¹ *Quodl.*, IV, 7, f. 150 r a.

¹¹² *Summa*, LVIII, 2, E, f. 129 v—130 r. Here he speaks of the species as received by the possible intellect. In this connection see E. Bettoni, *op. cit.*, pp. 51—59.

¹¹³ F. Huet, *Recherches historiques et critiques sur la vie, les ouvrages et la doctrine de Henri de Gand* (Ghent, 1838), p. 135.

¹¹⁴ De Wulf, *Études sur Henri de Gand*, p. 90. P. Boehner, "The *notitia intuitiva* of Non-existents," *Traditio*, 1 (1943), p. 223. Here he agrees with De Wulf saying that Ockham's rejection is a return to the "pure position" of Henry of Ghent.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 95—96.

¹¹⁶ *Quodl.*, IV, 21, f. 200 r a. This contact of the agent intellect and the phantasm was rejected by Scotus. See below to note 128.

object nor the intelligible species but "something which is contained within the soul."¹¹⁷ In other words, it is the phantasm or image of the object which "attracts" the intellect and gives a certain direction to the mind. When the intellect is thus turned toward the object, there is no further need for any abstraction from a species since the object is ready to be understood.¹¹⁸ The agent intellect simply illumines the intelligible elements discovered in the phantasm so that they are distinctly known and can be proposed to the possible intellect.¹¹⁹

The abstractive function of the agent intellect consists in making actually intelligible what was potentially intelligible in the phantasm. On the sense level, the form is abstracted from the matter, then made universal by the intellect.¹²⁰ Actually, this is not so much an abstraction in the Aristotelian sense as a *denudatio*, *spoliatio*, *segregatio*.¹²¹ This highlights a theme common to Bonaventure and Matthew: abstraction is a type of natural illumination. The material with which the agent intellect works is the phantasm, which it renders actually intelligible and to which it gives the power to attract or determine the possible intellect.¹²² These functions of the agent and possible intellect are clarified by Henry's own example, which compares the rapport of the agent intellect and the phantasm with the relation of light and color,¹²³ the agent intellect making visible the intellectual elements in the phantasm. The intelligible essence and the possible intellect are related as matter and form.¹²⁴

Even though the "abstraction" of the agent intellect is absolutely essential to cognition, it is the possible intellect which really understands. Like the agent intellect, it has a twofold role: first, the possible intellect discerns the intelligible object in the light of the agent intellect and without the intervention of any intelligible species. Secondly, the possible intellect applies the first principles to these intelligibles, constructing definitions and preparing the way for knowledge.¹²⁵ It is to be noted here that Henry attributes an activity to the possible intellect, an

¹¹⁷ *Quodl.*, IV, 7, f. 150 r a.

¹¹⁸ *Quodl.*, IV, 21, f. 201 r a b. According to Henry, this is the true interpretation of Aristotle's thesis that man knows the universal in the phantasm.

¹¹⁹ *Quodl.*, IV, 21, f. 200 r b.

¹²⁰ *Quodl.*, IV, 21, f. 200 r b.

¹²¹ R. Bourgeois, *art. cit.*, p. 246.

¹²² *Quodl.*, XIII, 8, f. 301 r a.

¹²³ *Quodl.*, IV, 21, f. 201 r b. This use of light and color as examples of intellectual illumination is common to the whole Augustinian school.

¹²⁴ *Summa*, I, 5, B, f. 14 v.

¹²⁵ R. Bourgeois, *art. cit.*, p. 251.

activity which perfects the agent intellect yet depends upon the agent intellect for illumination.¹²⁶ On this point, again, he seems to agree with the doctrine of both Bonaventure and Matthew.

It is evident that Henry's theory presents only a modified version of Aristotelian cognition. While using the term "agent intellect" and "abstraction" he explains that the agent intellect abstracts only in the sense that it strips away the particular conditions of the phantasm; it does not produce an intelligible species but only enlightens the intelligible essence in the phantasm. Hence one can safely say that Henry seems more in line with Bonaventure and Matthew on these points than with Aristotelian passivity and abstractionism.

Henry's whole theory of abstraction, however, was severely criticized by Scotus. Bourgeois says that the Scotistic edifice is built by opposition to Henry.¹²⁷ In the first place, the Subtile Doctor takes exception to the statement that the agent intellect illumines the phantasm; this thesis he says is against the authority of Augustine. Secondly, he criticizes Henry for denying any direct causality from the object.¹²⁸ More details on Scotus' own theory will be given in the next section of this chapter.

To summarize Henry's theory: the agent intellect illumines the universal phantasm and proposes this object to the possible intellect. The possible intellect receives the universal phantasm and forms from it a simple, intelligible though indistinct concept. After a subsequent illumination by the agent intellect, the possible intellect finally forms the intellectual word, i. e. the definition, and thus grasps the distinct universal.¹²⁹

Activity/Passivity

Henry's theory of ideogenesis includes both active and passive elements. In so far as the sense power receives a species it is passive, in line with the Aristotelian doctrine that the object impresses the sensible species on the organ.¹³⁰ Once this determination has been received, however, the understanding becomes active; "to understand is to act."¹³¹ According to De Wulf, Henry's theory of sensation is comparable to

¹²⁶ *Summa*, LVIII, 2, I, f. 130 v.

¹²⁷ R. Bourgeois, *art. cit.*, p. 255.

¹²⁸ *I Op. Ox.*, 3, 6, 3—4; IX: 234 a—235 b. III: 205—209.

¹²⁹ T. Nys, *De Werking van het menselijk verstand volgens Hendrik van Gent* (Louvain: E. Nauwelaerts, 1949), p. 115.

¹³⁰ *Summa*, I, 5, B, f. 14 v. Bettoni points out that Henry seems at first glance to be a faithful disciple of St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

¹³¹ *Quodl.*, IV, 21, f. 200 r b.

that of Bonaventure, Thomas and Scotus. De Wulf, however, disagrees with Werner, who sees the passivity of intellect as the leitmotif of Henry's theory.¹³² In other words, De Wulf admits the passivity of the mind under the initial impression from the object as fundamental to Henry's ideogenesis, without, however, claiming that his theory is completely passive. Bettoni seems to agree with this interpretation, saying that this is a typical example of Henry's eclecticism.¹³³

Granting a certain passivity in terms of the initial impetus from the object, the remainder of Henry's theory might be characterized as "Augustinian reflection" with emphasis on the illuminating abstraction of the agent intellect and the activity of the possible intellect. Perhaps it would be most correct to say that active intellect, phantasm and possible intellect are common terms among the Scholastics; differences in doctrine arise over the proportional roles played by these cognitive factors.¹³⁴

In line with this inheritance from Augustine and Aristotle is the role which Henry assigns to the species. Bourgeois sees his denial of an intelligible species as an Augustinian notion, in that it allows for more immediate contact between the soul and the object,¹³⁵ whereas the need for some intermediary is traditional with all the Scholastics. Consequently, one may say that Henry is traditional in his acceptance of a sensible species; he is revolutionary in his rejection of any intelligible species.

John Duns Scotus

The ideogenesis of Matthew of Aquasparta, Bonaventure and Henry of Ghent clearly reveals a common theme of Augustinian activism running through their very diverse doctrines. Equally apparent is a gradually developing Aristotelianism manifested by the use of such terms as "abstractionism" and "active intellect," even though these labels are used to cover much that is Augustinian doctrine. Besides this use of Aristotelian terminology, some doctrinal influences are apparent, for example the insistence of Bonaventure and Henry that sensation is initiated by an impression made by the object. In short, a new blending of Augustine and Aristotle appears in each author studied thus far.

In John Duns Scotus this same trend continues with a corresponding originality of doctrine. The following pages will emphasize his unique interpretation, especially his *causa partialis* theory and the doctrine of

¹³² M. De Wulf, *Études sur Henri de Gand*, pp. 109—10.

¹³³ E. Bettoni, *op. cit.*, pp. 11—13.

¹³⁴ M. De Wulf, *Études sur Henri de Gand*, p. 83.

¹³⁵ R. Bourgeois, *art. cit.*, p. 254.

intuition and abstraction; finally, some consideration will be given to the thorny question of whether Scotus held a species for the various types of cognition.

Causa Partialis Theory

Following the general thesis maintained by all his predecessors, Scotus admits that man's cognition originates in the senses.¹³⁶ Like Bonaventure and Matthew before him, he limits this sense origin to knowledge of corporeals, so that he posits a knowledge of incorporeals which is above and beyond the knowledge acquired through the senses. Unlike his predecessors, however, Scotus does not require any illumination to complete and perfect sense knowledge. The senses enable man to grasp truth without recourse to any special illumination. Sense experience, however, does not give the mind scientific knowledge, since it is not "necessary"; rather sensation occasions the intellect to initiate knowledge.¹³⁷

Having admitted that sense knowledge is basic to the mind's contact with corporeal objects, Scotus poses the question how extra-mental things and the knowing subject are related. Scotus' answer is his famous *causa partialis* theory. Intellect and object together form "one, integral cause" of cognition. In other words, both are essentially ordered causes. Granted that the intellect is more perfect in being, yet in terms of causality both are perfect partial causes, independent of each other.¹³⁸

To explain further this relationship of subject and object as perfect, independent and essentially ordered causes, Scotus has recourse to a comparison. In the procreation of a child both father and mother are essential causes, yet each is independent in its activity. Even though the mother is the less perfect cause, still she does not receive her causality from the father; moreover, her contribution is unique and absolutely necessary.¹³⁹ In a similar way, the object, though less perfect than the subject, still is a necessary and an independent cause.

According to Scotus, the object may be considered as a formal or material cause, as an active or passive element in cognition. It is material in as much as the intellect finds in the object the elements of cognition, i. e. the matter from which concepts can be formed; it is also a formal cause, since the object informs, not only the sense faculty, but even the

¹³⁶ I *Metaph.*, 4, 4; VII: 53 a.

¹³⁷ I *Metaph.*, 4, 6; VII: 55 a.

¹³⁸ I *Op. Ox.*, 3, 7, 20; IX: 361—62. III: 289—93.

¹³⁹ I *Op. Ox.*, 3, 7, 21; IX: 362 a. III: 294.

very act of knowing.¹⁴⁰ Now if the object can be compared to both matter and form, it follows that this object is both active and passive. In one way, it is passive, since the material of cognition is subordinated to the action of the intellect, but in another sense the object is active in so far as it is intelligible in act by a certain rapport with the intellect. The formal reason of the object's intelligibility is its immateriality and universality as represented in abstractive cognition by the species.¹⁴¹ In other words, the object may be called passive in so far as it offers the matter of cognition to the intellect, but it is also active in that the species of the object, or the object itself, along with the intellect is the cause of cognition.

If the object and the intellect are essentially ordered causes, each independent of the other and each perfect in its own causality, it follows that the mind should have an activity/passivity complementary to that of the object. Scotus says that the intellect, unlike the will, is moved by a natural necessity in the presence of the object.¹⁴² In so far as it is moved by the object the intellect exhibits a certain passivity. But because the intellect is something essentially spiritual, a certain primacy is given to the activity of the intellect.¹⁴³ This is a superiority in nature, not in causality, since it is the nature of the intellect which effects the immateriality of the intellection.

In support of this *causa partialis* theory, Scotus points out that since intellection is a vital operation, it should not be initiated solely by the non-living object.¹⁴⁴ Moreover, if the cognitive process could be effected by a purely passive intellect, then only one agent intellect would be required and the error of Averroes would be repeated.¹⁴⁵ Here Scotus opposes both the initial passivity admitted by Bonaventure and the denial of any intelligible species by Henry of Ghent. If the mind were the total cause of cognition, then it would always be in the act of knowing.¹⁴⁶ According to Scotus, cognition is caused by subject and object operating as essentially ordered causes; consequently he attributes

¹⁴⁰ S. Belmond, "Le mécanisme de la connaissance d'après Jean Duns Scot.," *La France Franciscaine*, XIII (1930), p. 295.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 290—91. It is difficult to see how Belmond concludes from this that Scotus has made an "open rupture" with the Augustinian and Franciscan tradition. See p. 291.

¹⁴² IX *Metaph.*, 15, 6; VII: 610—11.

¹⁴³ G. Bonafede, "La Conoscenza del singolare nella scuola Franciscana del secolo XIII," *Collectanea Franciscana*, XXII (1952), p. 49.

¹⁴⁴ I *Op. Ox.*, 3, 7, 25; IX: 370 a. III: 301. The example or comparison he uses is that the sun is the partial cause of human generation!

¹⁴⁵ IV *Op. Ox.*, 43, 2, 6; XX: 38 a.

¹⁴⁶ I *Op. Ox.*, 3, 7, 3; IX: 339 a. III: 251.

activity and passivity to both these complementary principles. This position, Scotus claims, is the best interpretation of the doctrine of Augustine.¹⁴⁷

In many respects Scotus' theory seems quite similar to that of Matthew but, of course, more fully developed. Matthew does speak of the object as an instrumental cause but reserves the principal activity for the intellect; Scotus on the other hand claims that both intellect and object are equal in causality though not in nature.

Intuition and Abstraction

Having established the thesis that both the subject and the object are essentially ordered causes of cognition, Scotus shows how they are related in the act of cognition. First he distinguishes between two acts of the intellect on the level of simple apprehension. These two acts, intuition and abstraction, differ in whether the object is known as absent or present. Intuition involves an apprehension of the object as present and existing, while abstraction is indifferent to its existence or nonexistence, to its presence or absence.¹⁴⁸ Scotus' own example clarifies these two types of apprehension: intuition can be compared to seeing a color, abstraction to imagining this same color.¹⁴⁹ Looking at the sky gives direct, intuitive knowledge of the color blue; it is also possible to grasp this concept of "blue" without considering any particular piece of sky at any particular time. The first of these would be intuitive knowledge, the latter abstractive.

From these examples it is evident that the presence or absence of the actually existing object is one way of distinguishing intuition from abstraction. More precisely, these two types of knowledge can be differentiated in terms of their *rationes formales*, or their motivating forces. In intuition, the object *per se* moves the intellect; in abstraction, it is not the object itself, but "that which makes the object intelligible," i. e. the species which causes the cognition.¹⁵⁰ It follows, then, that in intuition the object is known as singular and individual, a vital point in Scotus' theory on direct cognition of the singular.

Scotus' emphasis on the presence of the object for intuitive cognition, might mislead one into thinking that only an actually present object can be known intuitively. This is only the first type of intuition; one

¹⁴⁷ IX *Metaph.*, 14, 13; VII: 529 a.

¹⁴⁸ *Quodl.*, VI, 8; XXV: 243—44.

¹⁴⁹ *Quodl.*, XIII, 8; XXV: 521 a. This discussion is of major importance in any study of Scotistic intuition.

¹⁵⁰ *Quodl.*, XIII, 8; XXV: 522 b.

which Scotus designates as "perfect". There is also an "imperfect" intuitive knowledge of the past and of the future in which the intellect grasps the past as past and the future as future.¹⁵¹ Such an habitual cognition presupposes a perfect intuition which in turn causes a habit in the intellectual memory. Thus both perfect and imperfect cognition involve a direct motivation from the object, either actually present or present in the memory as a habit.

Though the definition of intuition is clearly formulated in many passages of Scotus' works, the question of man's possession of such cognition is a more difficult problem. In a famous passage in *Quodlibet* VI, Scotus argues that man can have intuition, he should have it, he will have it. Man can have such cognition on the intellectual level, since he does have it on the sense level, as all agree; what the lower powers are able to do the higher intellectual powers also are able to do. Man should have such intuition, since the angels have it and men have been likened to the angels. Man shall have it, since the beatific vision means direct knowledge of God.¹⁵²

The first of these arguments, called the *per simile* proof, since it is based on the similarity of the powers, is perhaps the one cited most often by Scotus. As Father Day points out, Scotus uses it at least half a dozen times in various passages.¹⁵³ All of these arguments, however, seem to conclude to the possibility of such intuition and not to the actual fact of man's possession of it.

That man actually does possess intuitive knowledge follows from the fact that Scotus uses this type of cognition to establish the certainty of cognition and to make possible a knowledge of contingent things. In one passage he maintains that if man did not have intuitive knowledge he could not have certainty of his own acts.¹⁵⁴ (This use of intuition to establish the validity of man's cognition without recourse to any special illumination will be further explained in the next chapter.) In a further proof from experience, Scotus maintains that intuition enables men to know contingent beings as existing and as singular, for example to know "Socrates runs."¹⁵⁵

¹⁵¹ III *Op. Ox.*, 14, 3, 6; XIV: 527 a. This whole treatment centers around an inquiry into the knowledge of Christ.

¹⁵² *Quodl.*, VI, 8; XXV: 244 b.

¹⁵³ S. Day, *Intuitive Cognition, A Key to the Significance of the Later Scholastics* (St. Bonaventure, New York: The Franciscan Institute, 1947), p. 57, footnote 34.

¹⁵⁴ IV *Op. Ox.*, 49, 8, 5; XXI: 306 b.

¹⁵⁵ II *Op. Ox.*, 3, 11, 11; XII: 278 b.

Since intuition is more direct and more certain, it is also more perfect than abstraction.¹⁵⁶ In fact, abstractive knowledge presupposes intuition. Moreover, Scotus claims that man can have intuitive knowledge of any object whatsoever.¹⁵⁷ If every being is potentially intelligible, a thesis which will be developed in connection with the object of the intellect, and if intuition is the more perfect type of cognition, one which abstraction presupposes, then man can have intuitive knowledge of any being, including the supreme being of God. Needless to say, Scotus is here speaking about the natural powers of the intellect; certainly such an intuition of God is not possible for man in this life.

In contrast to this intuition of the present, existing object, abstractive knowledge is motivated by the species and the intellect; in other words, the actual presence of the object is "abstracted" in this type of cognition. In proof of this second type of cognition, Scotus appeals, first of all to experience, and secondly, to the fact that in a judgment man prescind from the existence of the object conceived.¹⁵⁸ Thus a judgment on the second level of thought is not concerned with existence but presupposes the mind possesses concepts which are "abstracted" from the present. Moreover, such an abstractive knowledge is necessary if there is to be a universal and completely valid science.¹⁵⁹

How is such abstractive knowledge effected? Just as intuition is caused by both the object and mind, so in abstraction a motivation arises from the phantasm and the intellect.¹⁶⁰ According to Basly's interpretation, the phantasm and the agent intellect produce a spiritual and accidental modification in the soul which modification corresponds to the object.¹⁶¹ Finally, the agent intellect and the intelligible species act together to produce a further modification in the possible intellect.¹⁶²

In a manner reminiscent of Bonaventure, Matthew and Henry of Ghent, Scotus here uses the term abstraction to mean something quite different from the Aristotelian ideogenesis. As Gilson points out, the Scotistic agent intellect does not abstract from the phantasm; rather it causes, produces and reveals the intelligible elements in the species.¹⁶³

¹⁵⁶ *II Op. Ox.*, 9, 2, 19; XII: 454 b.

¹⁵⁷ *Quodl.*, XIII, 8; XXV: 521 b.

¹⁵⁸ *Quodl.*, VI, 7; XXV: 243 b.

¹⁵⁹ *II Op. Ox.*, 3, 9, 6; XII: 212 b. The Scotistic concept of science is based on a vigorous application of Aristotelian doctrine.

¹⁶⁰ *II Op. Ox.*, 3, 9, 7; XII: 213 a.

¹⁶¹ D. De Basly, *Scotus docens* (Paris: Supplement to *La France Franciscaine*, 1934), pp. 69—70.

¹⁶² E. Gilson, *Jean Duns Scot.* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1952), p. 519.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 517.

Since the agent intellect produces the species and this species in turn makes the object intelligible, it may be said that the process of intellection can be attributed to the active intellect. Pure intelligibles, however, lacking any species are known only by the possible intellect. In this sense, it might be better to reserve for the possible intellect the principal causality in cognition. Such an interpretation, as Gilson points out, must be related to the background of Scotus' formal distinction between the powers.¹⁶⁴

As has been seen, Scotus divides cognition, on the level of simple apprehension, into intuition and abstraction. The former is motivated by the present, existing object; the latter abstracts from this presence of the object and is moved by a species. Scotus declares that intuitive knowledge is required to give validity to knowledge and to establish a true cognition of contingent things. Experience and scientific knowledge are presented as proofs for abstraction. In the latter type of cognition, the agent intellect does not strip the phantasm but rather reveals to the possible intellect the intelligible element in the object.

Role of the Species

It seems clear that Scotus requires a species for abstractive cognition, an interpretation which finds general acceptance among scholars. But is a species also required for intuition? On this debated point, some texts from Scotus will be given to show the origins of the problem and to indicate the *pro* and *con* arguments of two authorities.

Regarding the phantasm, Scotus says that in this life, man's senses and intellectual powers are so connected that he cannot understand anything in the universal which is not first presented in the singular via the phantasm.¹⁶⁵ Such a statement might be taken as absolute, were it not that Scotus elsewhere asserts that such dependence results from original sin. Before the fall, man could understand without the phantasm because his intellect was able to dominate his body. For the same reason, man will no longer need the phantasm after his resurrection.¹⁶⁶ In still another passage Scotus agrees with Augustine that man's inability to know without the phantasm is a punishment for sin. As final proof that man's dependence on the phantasm is not absolute, Scotus points out

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 542.

¹⁶⁵ I *Op. Ox.*, 3, 6, 19; IX: 273 a. III: 239. This Aristotelian dictum is found in *De anima* III.

¹⁶⁶ II *Op. Ox.*, II, 1, 4; XII: 532 a. The Scotistic position is developed against Henry, *Quodl.*, V, 14.

that the intellect can know God and other spiritual substances without a phantasm.¹⁶⁷

It seems from the above passages that Scotus sometimes speaks of the natural powers of man's mind and sometimes of man *in statu viae*. Perhaps this has occasioned some of the confusion in interpretation.

These, then, are Scotus' statements on the phantasm. As to his theory on the species, Father Day believes that Scotus does not require a species for intuition and he assembles an array of texts to prove this point.¹⁶⁸ Gilson, on the other hand, expressly disagrees with the findings of Day and in a special note he analyzes Day's texts and comes to the opposite point of view. According to Gilson, a species is necessary for both abstractive and intuitive knowledge.¹⁶⁹ The interested reader is referred to these two works for a complete treatment of the problem. For the present, one might say that if Scotus denies a species in intuition, as Day thinks, then he breaks with his predecessors and points in the direction of Ockham.

This present study of Scotistic ideogenesis clearly shows a synthesis of Augustine and Aristotle. According to Longpré, Scotus is more Augustinian, since he admits of a knowledge which is not completely dependent on the phantasm.¹⁷⁰ Even when he uses Aristotelian terms he gives them a new interpretation; for example his teaching on the agent intellect seems closely related to the superior reason of Augustine.¹⁷¹

In connection with the agent intellect, it could be noted that Tochowicz charges Scotus with idealism, claiming that he postulates a species formed solely by the mind.¹⁷² Such an interpretation seems difficult to reconcile with Scotus' own avowals that both object and mind form the concept in intuition, while species and intellect are present for abstractive knowledge.¹⁷³

From the above analysis one observes how Scotus' doctrine relates to that of Matthew, Bonaventure and Henry of Ghent. All agree in emphasizing the active nature of cognition. Bonaventure and Henry do

¹⁶⁷ *I Op. Ox.*, 3, 2, 24; IX: 148 b. III: 112—13.

¹⁶⁸ S. Day, *op. cit.*, pp. 105—11. He claims that a species is impossible in intuitive cognition on the basis that Scotus uses a species to distinguish intuition from abstraction.

¹⁶⁹ E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 553.

¹⁷⁰ E. Longpré, "La philosophie du Bienheureux Duns Scot," *Études Franciscaines*, XXXVI (1924), p. 40.

¹⁷¹ S. Belmond, *art. cit.*, p. 295.

¹⁷² P. Tochowicz, *Joannis Duns Scoti de cognitionis doctrina* (Freiburg: Studia Friburgensia, 1926), p. 107.

¹⁷³ *I Op. Ox.*, 3, 6, 15; IX: 256 a. III: 231—32. Here Scotus quotes from Aristotle, *De anima* III, 19.

admit of a certain impression from the object while Matthew, in his theory, is closer to Scotus' own *causa partialis* formula. In terms of a species, Bonaventure, Matthew and Scotus agree in holding that the agent intellect illumines the intelligible in the phantasm rather than abstracting something from it.

Despite these basic similarities, the originality of each man can be seen. Matthew stresses the activity of the intellect in bringing forth the species from the phantasm. Bonaventure develops an abstraction theory which is really a simple type of judgment. Henry of Ghent completely rejects the intelligible species, while Scotus contributes a well developed *causa partialis* theory. All seem basically Augustinian with various overlays of Aristotelianism.

Chapter IV

DIVINE ILLUMINATION

The preceding chapter has presented the ideogenetic theories of Matthew of Aquasparta, Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus explaining how the mind knows extra-mental objects. For Aristotle, such an ideogenesis would complete the theory of cognition, following from his principle that all knowledge comes through the senses. The Scholastics in this study, however, accept the Aristotelian dictum with some reservations. First of all, such a cognition acquired through the senses does not explain man's knowledge of incorporeals and hence does not give a complete account of man's intellectual powers. Moreover, such an ideogenesis, limited to a knowledge acquired through the senses, would be only a partial source of man's knowledge; a complementary and superior way of knowing is effected by divine illumination.

This thesis that man requires a special divine enlightenment to perfect his knowledge was common doctrine among the earlier Scholastics, especially among the followers of Augustine. As the teaching of Aristotle became more popular, however, this theory of special illumination came to be modified and finally rejected entirely. The next section will present the traditional Augustinian positions of Matthew of Aquasparta and Bonaventure, the more hesitant explanation of Henry of Ghent and finally, the rejection of illumination in the epistemology of John Duns Scotus.

Matthew of Aquasparta and St. Bonaventure

Since there is almost a verbatim agreement between Bonaventure and Matthew on this particular theory, it seems more economical to present their common teaching in this one section. Only on this one point of doctrine is there a close enough parallel to make such a joint discussion feasible.

Preceding sections have shown that Bonaventure and Matthew both insist on an ideogenesis acquired through the senses from the external object. Despite divergencies in their individual formulas, especially on the role of the object in initiating cognition, they agree that the agent intellect illumines the phantasm and the possible intellect grasps the intelligible object. Both maintain, however, that such an ideogenesis, dependent on the knowing subject and the object, is insufficient for complete and perfect knowledge. As Bonaventure phrases it, three lights are needed: first, the light which comes through the senses from the species of exterior things; secondly, the light of natural judgment which, as already noted, is the Bonaventurian abstraction; thirdly, illumination from the eternal reasons.¹ Matthew agrees that neither the truth of the real being, which is its essence, nor the illuminating action of the agent intellect in abstracting the intelligible essence, is sufficient for cognition; each of these is incomplete unless supplemented by the eternal light.² Basically Bonaventure and Matthew agree. Both admit the necessary causality of the subject and the object; both require the intervention of a superior source if man is to attain the perfection of knowledge. This interrelation of subject, object and divine light, according to Belmond, is a kind of hylomorphic composition. The material element, *id ex quo*, is the sensible object; the formal, composed element, *id per quod*, is the idea formed by the action of the intellect and the divine light.³ Such hylomorphism is simply a completion and continuation

¹ II *Sent.*, 39, 1, 2; II: 903 a b.

² *De cognitione*, Q. II, p. 233. *Ista ratio ut est impressa creaturae, hoc est ipsa sua forma vel quidditas, non est sufficiens ad se manifestandum vel declarandum nec ad movendum intellectum. Ideo providit Deus nostrae menti quoddam lumen intellectuale, quod species rerum obiectarum abstrahit a sensibilibus, depurando eas et accipiendo earum quidditates, quae sunt per se obiectum intellectus. Indidit nihilominus naturale iudicatorium, quo discernat et iudicet bona a malis, vera a falsis. Sed nec istud lumen est sufficiens, quia defectivum est et opacitati admixtum, nisi subiungatur et connectatur illi lumini aeterno, quod est perfecta et sufficiens ratio cognoscendi, et illud attingat et quodam modo contingat intellectus secundum sui supremum.*

³ S. Belmond, "A l'école de S. Augustin," *Études Franciscaines*, XXXIII (1921), p. 11.

of the body/soul, mind/object theories explained in the first two chapters of this study.

Bonaventure, in a classic passage, explains exactly what is involved in this divine illumination: "this eternal principle is the regulating and motivating principle of all certitude . . . it is necessarily present, not by itself, but with the created idea; it is 'contuited' by us, not in its full splendor, but only partially, as befits our present condition."⁴ The remainder of this section on the nature and meaning of illumination will simply try to develop and explain this basic thesis.

In the first place, this special divine light can be characterized as a regulating and motivating influence; the exact nature of this motivation is perhaps the most vexing question in the whole problem. According to Bonaventure, illumination is something more than the *concursus mediatus* of God required for all men's actions; rather, illumination is a *concursus immediatus*.⁵ Matthew concurs with this position, since he explains illumination as God's co-operation with a nature acting naturally.⁶

According to Matthew, a thing can be called natural in two senses: when it is caused by a natural principle and when it always accompanies nature. In the latter way illumination is natural, since it is according to man's God-given nature that his cognitive process should be completed with the help of divine enlightenment.⁷ Bissen explains this influence, not as a general, but rather as a specific determination, enabling the soul to grasp the uncreated truth under a particular aspect in some individual creature.⁸

Illumination can be described, then, as an immediate divine influence, distinct from mediate concurrence; it is an influence coming from God, yet natural in character. The exact nature of this motivation may be further clarified by comparing it with light. Matthew says that illumination is similar to the natural light of the sun which enables a man to have knowledge of any object whatever.⁹ Bonaventure agrees that this divine light is like a polished mirror which permits the soul to see both

⁴ *De scientia Christi*, IV; V: 23 b. Here is the classic description of Bonaventurian illumination.

⁵ *De scientia Christi*, IV; V: 24 a.

⁶ *De cognitione*, Q. II, p. 241. Nec propter hoc debet dici operatio supernaturalis vel miraculosa, quia cooperatur naturae naturaliter operanti secundum gradum et modum suae naturae, quam operationem nulli subtrahit.

⁷ *De cognitione*, Q. II, pp. 243—44.

⁸ J. M. Bissen, *L'exemplarisme divin selon saint Bonaventure* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1929), pp. 202—203. This work is a very fine exposition of this phase of Bonaventure's metaphysics.

⁹ *De gratia*, Q. V, p. 128.

God and itself.¹⁰ Illumination, then, is a light enabling man to see the object; it is a mirror reflecting the divine light. Such semi-poetic comparisons serve to indicate the slightly different emphasis of Matthew and Bonaventure; the former stresses the naturalness of illumination; the latter is more concerned with the light/truth ratio. In fact, Bonaventure clearly identifies this light with truth.¹¹

If the influence of this special illumination can be compared to the role of sunlight in corporeal vision, the further question arises: is this light a means of knowing or is it something which can be known in itself, i. e. is the divine light an object of knowledge? Both Bonaventure and Matthew reject this latter interpretation and thus save themselves from the charge of ontologism. Matthew returns to his original comparison, pointing out that just as the sun enables man to see other objects but is not the thing seen, so too the soul does not rest in this divine light but rather uses it to know other objects.¹² Bonaventure agrees that the divine light is the cause, not the object of cognition. He refers to it as the *objectum fontanum*; in other words, divine illumination is the source of cognition and only in this sense can it be called *objectum*.¹³ In itself, this light is perceived indirectly by means of a process which he names *contuitio* to distinguish it from intuition. While the latter means a direct knowing of the object, the former is "only the apprehension, in a perceived result, of the presence of a cause which one cannot discover intuitively."¹⁴ Such an explanation might easily be linked with Bonaventure's truth theory. Since man experiences the effect of certain truth in his fallible mind, he must look for a cause of his certitude and so he comes to an indirect perception of the divine light.

Though divine illumination is known only indirectly through a "contuitio", it does not follow that the influence of this light is also indirect. Rather, there is a direct collaboration of the eternal reasons

¹⁰ *Dominica III Adventus*, XIV; IX: 73 a. As already noted, this doctrine of the plurality of forms and the discussion of light as the first form of all things was a favorite among the masters of the Franciscan school. For a further development of this theme see the commentary of Sister Emma Thérèse Healy, *De reductione artium ad theologiam* (St. Bonaventure, New York: The Franciscan Institute, 1955), pp. 46—49 and 67—68.

¹¹ *In hexaëmeron*, V, 1; V: 353 a b.

¹² *De cognitione*, Q. II, p. 242. Dictum est enim quod intellectus necessario illam lucem attingit, illam lucem cernit; non tamen ut obiectum quietans, in quam defigat aspectum, quia talis visio facit beatum, sed ut obiectum movens; nec ducens in se, sed ducens in aliud; sicut oculus videns in luce solis videt lucem solis, non ut obiectum, sed ut est ratio et medium videndi.

¹³ *In hexaëmeron*, V, 33; V: 359 b.

¹⁴ E. Gilson, *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1938), pp. 400—401.

with man's created intellect.¹⁵ As Bonaventure says explicitly, God immediately illumines the mind.¹⁶ Such an immediacy would rule out any possibility of the angels enlightening the human intellect. Even though these separated spirits enjoy a superior type of being, still they are not related to man, as cause to effect.¹⁷ If the human intellect has not been created by the angels, neither can it be illumined by them. Such an angelic illumination is likewise rejected by Matthew, at least in principle, when he denies that the angels have power to infuse a species into the human mind.¹⁸ God and God alone can enlighten the human intellect.

Though the angels do not illumine the mind, still they themselves are the recipients of divine influence. Matthew declares that the same light which illumines man also illumines the angelic intellect, but such illumination is proportioned to the intellect receiving it.¹⁹ Since the angels have a superior type of being and a superior type of cognitive power, they also enjoy a greater degree of enlightenment.

Bonaventure applies his illumination theory even to God's knowledge of Himself. Since in God light and intellect are really identical and can be distinguished only by reason, divine illumination is superior and more immediate than all other kinds. In the angel, divine light and the intellect are identified in time but not in nature; in man this special light is distinct both in time and in nature.²⁰

Further, Bonaventure and Matthew explain the nature of this divine light and influence as an impression of truth on the intellect either of men or of angels. Opposed to this impression theory, Roger Marston declares that this light is an intervention in the formation of concepts.²¹ (This interpretation seems to be involved with his identification of God's illuminative action and the Avicennian agent intellect.)²² Both Bonaventure and Matthew, as seen previously, postulate an individual agent intellect which is responsible for the formation of concepts; for them

¹⁵ E. Bettoni, "La dottrina bonaventuriana dell' illuminazione intellettuale," *Revista di filosofia neoscolastica*, XXXVI (1944), p. 147.

¹⁶ *De scientia Christi*, IV, 24; V: 24 a.

¹⁷ *II Sent.*, I, 2, 2; II: 46 b.

¹⁸ *De cognitione*, Q. VI, p. 334.

¹⁹ *De cognitione*, Q. II, p. 247. Eadem luce illustratur angelicus spiritus et rationalis. Est autem proportionalis, ut per naturam feratur in ipsum tamquam in obiectum movens, non tamen quietans.

²⁰ *De donis Spiritus Sancti*, VIII, 20; V: 498 b.

²¹ Roger Marston, *Quaestiones disputatae* (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1932), Q. III, p. 262. This Avicennian notion of a separate agent intellect was vigorously rejected by Bonaventure; see *II Sent.*, 7, 2, 2, 1; II: 198 a b.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 264.

illumination is simply a third cause of cognition along with the intellect and the object. For both, causality of divine light is really an impression of truth, rather than the formation of a concept by a separate intellect.

Matthew sees this divine light as a constant element in cognition and one which is given to all men, but in varying degrees depending on their co-operation with it.²³ Thus this light is offered even to the damned.²⁴ As Bonaventure points out, illumination is necessary for all men, if they are to correct the errors resulting from the action of the intellect and object.²⁵ To return to Matthew's original comparison, man can refuse to avail himself of the light of the sun, but without this illumination he cannot see clearly nor distinctly. Although the light of the sun is equally available to all men, yet its efficiency will be determined by man's cooperation, as well as by his own natural powers of vision. Such an interpretation helps to explain the element of necessity posited by Bonaventure's theory. The light itself is necessary for the perfection of cognition but man's co-operation with it is contingent.

Illumination, then, is a certain immediate influence, natural in character, which motivates and regulates the intellect. Negatively considered, it is not the object known, nor the complete cause of cognition. Rather, it is an immediate impression of the divine ideas on the intellect both of men and of angels, an impression which enables their minds to know truth in proportion to their own nature and their individual co-operation with this special divine enlightenment.

Illumination and the Divine Ideas

The question of the positive nature of this illumination still remains. As already observed, illumination is a special motivation and regulation coming directly from God and characterized as both light and truth. More specifically, this illumination or regulating influence has its beginnings and its end in the eternal ideas.²⁶ These divine reasons are the similitudes of objects, through which God knows and produces things.²⁷ In other words, the all-wise God has a pattern or idea of everything which He makes; these ideas are expressions of God, and extra-mental reality is simply an externalization of these ideas. In Bonaventurian

²³ *De cognitione*, Q. II, p. 241

²⁴ *De gratia*, Q. V, p. 146.

²⁵ *Sent.*, 24, 2, 1, 1; II: 575 a. The example that Bonaventure gives; in the light of natural reason, unaided by any illumination, the human mind can judge incorrectly about the Trinity.

²⁶ J. M. Bissen, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

²⁷ *Sent.*, 35, 1, 1; I: 601 a. The revelation of God in all creation is the theme of the *Itinerarium*, especially Ch. II; V: 299 b—303 a.

metaphysics, every creature reflects, reveals something of its Creator; this exemplarism becomes one of the leitmotifs of his whole philosophy/theology. Gilson calls attention to Bonaventure's use of the word "expresses" in the above formula, explaining that it implies a resemblance which is established, generated, and not merely stated. For instance, a father expresses something of himself in the generation of his son and thus it is true to say that a child is like his father.²⁸

These divine ideas, then, occupy an intermediary position between God and His creation. Though they are not really distinct from God, nor really distinguishable from each other, since God is one and simple,²⁹ still they can be mentally distinguished from the divine Essence in its relation to creatures. Such a relation is not a real one considered from the side of God, but it is real from the side of the creature. What the term "idea" signifies, then, is this relation of the creature to God.³⁰

To apply this notion of the divine ideas to the illumination theory: when the mind is illumined it "attains" these divine ideas and thus comes to know things, not only as they exist extra-mentally, but as they are originally in the creative plan of God. As already indicated, this "attaining" does not mean that the mind sees these *rationes aeternae* in a clear, distinct and objective fashion. Rather, these ideas are impressed on the mind through the divine activity; thus they regulate the intellect's search for truth.³¹ Thus illumination, according to Bettoni's explanation, is identified with that infinite act by which God knows Himself and all His creatures; illumination is the very divine activity which causes and gives certitude to man's knowledge.³²

It follows, then, that for Bonaventure and Matthew the divine ideas, which express the relation of creatures to an exemplary pattern of God, are the special influences which motivate and regulate the intellect of both men and angels. These influences, though direct and immediate, are not objective, since they are not known in themselves, nor are they compulsive. Actually, only a few men really co-operate fully with this illumination; as Bonaventure says, "few are the wise; many the learned."³³

²⁸ E. Gilson, *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure*, p. 147.

²⁹ *De scientia Christi*, II; V: 9 a.

³⁰ E. Gilson, *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure*, p. 152.

³¹ H. Križovljan, *Philosophia S. Bonaventurae* (Rome: Collegium Internationale S. Laurentii a Brundisio, 1956), pp. 331—34.

³² E. Bettoni, *art. cit.*, pp. 147—49.

³³ *De scientia Christi*, IV, 19; V: 26 a. Here again Bonaventure admits the possibility of knowledge, *scientia*, without illumination; but wisdom, *sapientia*, requires this special divine aid. For a further explanation of these two powers of the soul see *In hexaëmeron*, V, 12—13; V: 356 a.

This explanation of the eternal reasons as the source of illumination repeats itself in the theory of Matthew of Aquasparta. Since created truth is simply an expression of the uncreated truth, complete cognition of the object involves a knowledge of its relation to the eternal exemplar. But this does not mean that, in this life, men actually understand the eternal reasons themselves, a knowledge which is reserved for the beatific vision. Rather it is the quiddity of the object, conceived by man's intellect and related to the eternal exemplar, which motivates man's mind.³⁴

Here again the basic similarity between the formula of Bonaventure and Matthew appears. Both explain that the divine ideas are the source of illumination which perfects man's natural knowledge of creation by relating it to the eternal exemplar. In this way all creation is seen as an externalization of the divine ideas, and these divine ideas in turn are simply expressions of God Himself. Two points are especially to be noted: man cannot attain these ideas in themselves, since they are only mentally distinct from the Essence of God Himself; moreover, such illumination is only a perfecting cause of cognition and one which presupposes a type of natural knowledge.

It is not surprising that Bonaventure develops his theory of illumination and exemplarism in connection with his thesis of Christocentrism. If the divine ideas are expressions of God, the perfect expression of the Father is found only in the Son. In one and the same act, God knows and expresses Himself in the Word, and at the same time knows and expresses all creatures. Thus the Word becomes the Archetype of all things and all creation is centered in Christ. Furthermore, since the principles of being are also the principles of knowledge, all things both exist in Christ and are known in Christ. Christ is the center of all knowledge and consequently the source of all illumination.³⁵

According to Bonaventure, then, both the Word and the world are expressions of God. Just as intelligible species are the means through which man's intellect comes to know the intelligible world, so the Word is the means through which man can come to know both the Uncreated and all that He creates.³⁶ For Bonaventure, then, Christ is the medium through Whom all knowledge is attained: He is the Light of lights which

³⁴ *De cognitione*, Q. I, pp. 214—15. Sed est quidditas ipsa concepta ab intellectu nostro, relata tamen ad artem sive exemplar aeternum, in quantum, tangens mentem nostram, se habet in ratione moventis.

³⁵ E. Gilson, *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure*, pp. 143—44.

³⁶ *In hexaëmeron*, II, 20; _aV: 383 a.

illuminates all men, giving them existence and cognition.³⁷ This beautiful Christocentric doctrine of Bonaventure permeates all his philosophy and gives new significance to his illumination theory.

In Matthew's published works, one finds no specific development of the Christocentric theme, though he does hold that the divine ideas are the principles of all men's perfected knowledge. On the other hand, Matthew seems more careful than Bonaventure in distinguishing the exact nature of illumination's regulating influence. Thus he speaks of the Essence of God as the effective cause of man's knowledge, while illumination is called the formal cause of cognition.³⁸ In this way God is the effective, objective reason for man's knowledge, since He causes man's whole being, as well as his cognition.³⁹ Bonaventure uses the same formula, saying that God is the *ratio intelligendi et causa essendi*.⁴⁰ But God is not only the efficient cause of man's cognitive activities; He is also the formal cause, since He motivates man's faculties through a special illumination, i. e. through the regulating force of His own divine ideas.⁴¹ Needless to say, man's cognition of these eternal principles is very imperfect in this life and consequently this "information" remains incomplete.⁴²

Both Bonaventure and Matthew agree then in stating that cognition comes not only from the object and the knowing subject but also from a special divine illumination. This divine enlightenment they characterize as an immediate influence, moving and regulating the intellect and thus enabling it to know truth. But this light is only a means of knowing and not the object known, a thesis which necessarily follows from the identification of this influence with the divine ideas which are not really distinct from the divine Essence. In other words, the divine ideas are expressions of God which are externalized in created reality. If complete and perfect knowledge necessitates a grasping of this relation of created things to their divine exemplars, then illumination is required for the perfection of man's intellectual process. On all the above points Bonaventure and Matthew agree *ad litteram*. Unique with Bonaventure, however,

³⁷ *In hexaëmeron*, I, 11; V: 331 a. This concept of Christ as the center of all knowledge finds beautiful expression in *In hexaëmeron*, I, 13—39; V: 331 a—335 b.

³⁸ *De cognitione*, Q. II, pp. 245—46. . . . ipse Deus per essentiam suam est ratio assimilandi effectiva; sed illa influentia est ratio assimilandi formalis.

³⁹ M. Grabmann, *Die Philosophische und Theologische Erkenntnislehre des Kardinals Matthaeus von Aquasparta* (Vienna: Verlag von Mayer, 1906), p. 52.

⁴⁰ *De donis Spiritus Sancti*, VIII, 15; V: 497 a b.

⁴¹ S. Belmond, *art. cit.*, p. 15.

⁴² E. Bettoni, *art. cit.*, p. 157.

is his identification of this illumination with the Word, Who is the perfect expression of God and consequently gives all things their being and their reason for being known.

Illumination and Truth

The role of illumination in the truth theories of Bonaventure and Matthew has already been made apparent when it was explained that Bonaventure identifies this special light with truth. If perfect and certain knowledge requires an "attaining" of the divine exemplary ideas, then illumination assumes an epistemological role both for Bonaventure and for Matthew. At the outset, it might be well to indicate the various definitions and descriptions of truth given by both philosophers, before going into more detail on just how illumination gives certitude to cognition.

Bonaventure repeats the classic *adaequatio* theory but he gives it a unique twist. Truth, according to his thesis, is not so much an adequacy of the object to man's intellect but to that Intellect which is the cause of all things, i. e. to the divine Intellect. In other words, an object is true when it exists extra-mentally or in the mind of the knower, in a way comparable to its existence in the divine exemplary idea.⁴³ Furthermore, this adequacy gives to the object both its being and its intelligibility in much the same way as man receives the truth of his role as *imago* from the creative hand of God.⁴⁴ From the above explanation, it immediately becomes apparent that Bonaventure gives a new interpretation to the classic definition of truth. For him, it is an adequacy of the object to the divine idea, and not simply to the knowing subject. His position is a natural development of his theory of exemplarism which links the integral intelligibility of the object with divine illumination. Moreover, in his adaptation of the *adaequatio* theory, Bonaventure speaks of a proportion between the mind and the spoken word. In fact, truth may be predicated of things or of words or of actions.⁴⁵ Since this last type of truth is moral in nature, it need not be further developed in this study of cognition. The truth of words, however, is of importance, since it involves a discussion of Bonaventure's signification theory.⁴⁶ A proposition is true, if it signifies as affirmative a thing which is, or signifies as negative a thing

⁴³ *In hexaëmeron*, III, 8; V: 344 b.

⁴⁴ *I Sent.*, 3, 2, 1, 2; I: 83 a b.

⁴⁵ *In hexaëmeron*, IV, 2; V: 349 a. These three divisions of truth form the basis for the whole fourth *Collatio*.

⁴⁶ P. Boehner, "Ockham's Theory of Truth," *Franciscan Studies*, V (1945), pp. 146—51.

which is not.⁴⁷ Hence a proposition is essentially or accidentally true, whereas falsity is simply a privation of such truth.⁴⁸ Perhaps an example may help to clarify these points. For instance, the proposition, "man is a rational animal," is essentially true; the verification of this truth, however, in extra-mental reality is only accidental. Falsity is a lack of that essential truth which should be in the object or in the proposition.

Obviously, then, Bonaventure's explanation of the *adaequatio* theory must be viewed against the manifold interpretations which he gives to the notion of truth. Thus adequacy may refer to a word, i. e. according to a signification theory, or to the truth of the object, i. e., the relation of the object to the exemplary idea in the divine Intellect. In either case, truth refers to "being in so far as it is knowable."⁴⁹ Created truth exists in the knowability of creatures, while uncreated Truth refers to the knowledge possessed by the divine Essence Itself.⁵⁰

Bonaventure's repeated identification of truth and being has caused his interpreters to charge him with confusing logical and ontological truth. Actually, this "apparent" confusion results from the identification of the principle of being with that of knowing.⁵¹ To know a thing truly one must know it as it exists, not only objectively in the extra-mental world, but also formally in the divine Mind. In other words, a being is true when it is adequate to the divine idea according to which it is created; thus the being of the object as well as its being known has its source in God. But in addition to this exemplary truth, Bonaventure also speaks of a created truth in the subject which is informed and in the intellect which is "excited" by the subject.⁵² Finally, Bonaventure develops a type of logical truth in connection with his signification theory. From this manifold description of truth, it seems inadequate to dismiss Bonaventure's theory as a confusion of logical and ontological truth or as a type of ontologism.

Similarly, Matthew interprets the *adaequatio* theory according to Augustinian principles. Truth is originally from objects, formally in the intellect and exemplarily in God.⁵³ Again, Matthew says that the material

⁴⁷ I *Sent.*, 46, 1, 4; I: 828 b. In *De scientia Christi*, IV; V: 23 b, he speaks of a created truth which is not immutable in itself but only through supposition.

⁴⁸ II *Sent.*, 37, 2, 3; II: 874 a b.

⁴⁹ *Breviloquium*, I, 6; V: 215 a.

⁵⁰ I *Sent.*, 8, 1, 1; I: 152 a.

⁵¹ J. Bissen, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

⁵² I *Sent.*, 8, 11; I: 151 a.

⁵³ *De cognitione*, Q. I, p. 222. Et ideo ratio adaequationis vel veritas originaliter est a rebus, sed formaliter est in intellectu, exemplariter tamen est in Deo.

reason for truth is found in created things, the formal reason in the natural light of the intellect and in illumination, but the complete and perfect principle of all certitude is found in the world which is above human minds.⁵⁴ Here again, the basic agreement of Bonaventure and Matthew is apparent. Though the perfection of truth is found in relation to the eternal exemplar, yet a certain natural truth is also granted to the created intellect and to the object. Perhaps there is even more emphasis on this realistic aspect of truth in Matthew than in Bonaventure. For example, Matthew further explains the *adaequatio* formula by saying that the knowable measures knowledge so that things measure man's understanding.⁵⁵ Consequently, what man is able to know depends on objective reality, even though the ultimate source of true knowledge is linked with special illumination.

Since Bonaventure and Matthew agree in explaining truth in terms of object, knowing intellect and illumination, it only remains to relate their proof for this last aspect of cognition. Bonaventure clearly and repeatedly states that illumination is necessary to give immutability to the objects known and infallibility to the mind.⁵⁶ On the one hand, he contends that the objects which man apprehends are contingent, while his mind is changeable and subject to error; nonetheless, man does experience a knowledge of certain truths. For example, from observation of external things, man can come to know with absolute certitude that "the whole is greater than any one of its parts." Now the mind could not abstract the necessary character of this statement from contingent objects alone; consequently, recourse must be had to eternal reasons, in order to explain the necessity of such a judgment.⁵⁷

For Bonaventure, illumination is required to explain the evident and necessary character of man's judgments, but it must be remembered that in Bonaventure's ideogenesis, judgment is not limited to the second level of cognition. In the very formation of the concept, i. e. on the level of simple apprehension, there is a rudimentary type of judgment; in fact Bonaventurian abstraction is itself a type of judgment. Consequent-

⁵⁴ *De cognitione*, Q. II, p. 240. Sic igitur dico quod quidquid cognoscitur certitudinaliter cognitione intellectuali, cognoscitur in rationibus aeternis et in luce primae veritatis eo modo quo fuit explicatum, concludente hoc et natura cognoscente et re cognoscibili, et medio certo et iudicio recto; ita quod ratio cognoscendi materialis est ab exterioribus, unde ministrantur species rerum cognoscendarum; sed ratio formalis partim est ab intra, scilicet a lumine rationis, partim a superiori, sed completive et consummative a regulis et rationibus aeternis.

⁵⁵ *De cognitione*, Q. I, p. 222.

⁵⁶ *De scientia Christi*, IV; V: 23 b.

⁵⁷ S. Belmond, *art. cit.*, p. 19.

ly, this very synthesis by which man comes to know diverse beings already requires illumination to explain evident and necessary truth.⁵⁸ Obviously, then, Bonaventure has a need for illumination, which is not evident in Aristotelian ideogenesis.

Illumination is required in the first place to insure the infallibility of the mind's judgment on reality; it is also necessary to give immutability to the object known. Now this immutability of the object must be interpreted in the light of Bonaventure's doctrine of exemplarism. According to this basic thesis, every creature reflects God. As a sign it looks to God for its source; as an image it finds in God the object of its knowing and willing; as a similitude it receives from Him an infused gift of grace. Thus God co-operates with creatures as the source of their being, as the mover of their intellect, as the giver of grace.⁵⁹ In line with the first two ways, God illumines the mind of man, who is His image, and also enables man to relate all other creatures to their source. Specifically, God co-operates with man's intellect by revealing the object in the light of the eternal reasons so that the mind can grasp being in all the splendor of its truth. In his commentary Belmond cautions that this *exemplatum* must never be substituted for the created object, if illumination is to avoid the skepticism which it professes to cure.⁶⁰ The illumined mind can and must know the reality of the thing; it is only the perfection of cognition which requires the *concursus immediatus* of illumination. Thus Bonaventure speaks of a certitude *secundum quid* which the mind acquires from created things and a *simpliciter* certitude which is the result of illumination.⁶¹ If someone were to object that man is not conscious of such an illumination, Bonaventure would reply that this divine light is not known in itself but only in its effects, i. e. in the true and perfect cognition of the object.

As a final argument in support of his theory, Bonaventure points out that it is in accord, not only with the dignity of man, the knower,⁶² but also with the nobility of the cognitive process, which follows from the spiritual nature of man's soul.⁶³

⁵⁸ *De scientia Christi*, IV, 28; V: 20 a.

⁵⁹ M. Hurley, "Illumination according to S. Bonaventure," *Gregorianum*, XXXII (1951), pp. 390—92.

⁶⁰ S. Belmond, *art. cit.*, pp. 16—17.

⁶¹ *De scientia Christi*, IV; V: 26 b. In the light of this passage it is difficult to accept the criticism that Bonaventure's illumination leads to a denial of all natural knowledge.

⁶² *De scientia Christi*, IV; V: 24 a.

⁶³ *De scientia Christi*, IV, V: 23 b.

In proof of his illumination theory, then, Bonaventure claims that such a motivation is necessary from the standpoint of both subject and object. On the one hand, it guarantees the certitude of man's judgments, on the other, it gives immutability to the object known.⁶⁴ Moreover, such a special co-operation by God is in accord with man's dignity, as an image of God.

To turn now to Matthew of Aquasparta, one discovers a whole section devoted to the question: whether whatever is known certainly is known in the eternal reason.⁶⁵ As previously noted, Matthew answers this question affirmatively, explaining that man knows objectively and effectively by the light of natural judgment but sufficiently and formally through illumination.⁶⁶ In proof of his thesis, Matthew argues from the nature of the knowing mind, from the thing known, from the medium of knowing and from the certainty of judgment. These very divisions already show his dependence on his master, Bonaventure.

First, Matthew argues that illumination is necessary because of man's nature. Basically, there are three grades of conformity to God: that of the vestige which has God as its principal cause, the similitude which is related to God as the recipient of His gift and finally, the image of which God is the motivating force. God co-operates with the vestige as a principal efficient cause, with the similitude through grace, but with man, His image, He co-operates by becoming his motivation in such a way that the human intellect comes to perceive incommunicable truth. To substantiate this argument Matthew quotes from Augustine, thus indicating the source common to both Bonaventure and Matthew. The parallel in this particular passage is so close that it needs no further comment.

Matthew bases his second reason on the object known. As in the previous question, the similarity with Bonaventure and Augustine will be obvious. In fact, according to the editors of the critical edition, this material follows almost verbatim chapter III of Bonaventure's *Itinerarium*. To know something with certainty, Matthew says, one must know it immutably; but such an unchanging judgment requires knowledge of the signification of the terms which, in turn, involves a definition of the terms themselves. Now when something is defined, it is placed in

⁶⁴ S. Belmond, *art. cit.*, p. 14.

⁶⁵ *De cognitione*, Q. II, pp. 230—40.

⁶⁶ *De cognitione*, Q. II, pp. 234—35. Lumen ergo illud, movendo nostrum intellectum influit quoddam lumen menti nostrae, ita quod per lucem divinam videt objective et quasi effective, sed per illud et in illo lumine videt formaliter; quod quidem lumen continuatur et conservatur in mentibus nostris ad praesentiam divinam.

its proper genus, but this genus must be defined by still another term logically superior to it and thus one finally comes to the most common term, being. In other words, if man does not know being, then he cannot know inferior terms. As an example of his point, Matthew indicates that man cannot know substance, unless he knows *ens per se*; he cannot know *ens per se* unless he knows its conditions, the one and the true and the good. In other words, to know the imperfect one must know the perfect, and such cognition requires the illumination of the most perfect Being.

Having established that knowledge of any proposition is based on a perception of the meaning of its terms — terms ultimately defined by the most common genus of being — Matthew clarifies the point that illumination is needed to explain the necessary character of the reasoning process itself. Thus man comes to recognize that "the whole is greater than any of its parts" is a necessary truth. But such necessity cannot come from the contingent world and therefore must come from divine illumination. Furthermore, since every creature is somehow an expression of the eternal, creative idea of God, true cognition requires a knowledge of the object's relation to that exemplar according to which it is made.

Illumination is required, then, in order to explain the truth of the object expressed by the terms of a proposition, to explain the truth of the object in relation to the eternal rule of God.

Matthew finds still further evidence for illumination in the medium of knowing. If cognition is to be certain, then the medium must also be certain, i. e. immutable and infallible. Now these are not qualities of the created intellect and hence must be accounted for by means of illumination. If there were no such stability in the medium of knowing, how could one ever judge of more or less; how could one ever say that an object were beautiful, round, etc., since such judgments require some definite standard of comparison apart from the particular object? Thus the medium or standard by means of which man makes certain judgments must be superior to the created reason.

As a final point, Matthew shows that the law by which man makes these judgments must also be above judgment. Such a law could not come from anything lower than the mind because inferior objects are subjected to man's judgments; nor could it come from the mind itself, since created intellects are mutable. Therefore, this certain law by which judgments are formulated must come from above.⁶⁷

⁶⁷ *De cognitione*, Q. II, pp. 235—40.

Here again one observes that Matthew and Bonaventure advance the same arguments to prove that illumination is necessary. To have evident and necessary cognition, an infallible subject and an immutable object are required. Since neither of these can be explained in terms of the created intellect or the object which it knows, recourse must be had to a superior source of knowledge, i. e. to divine illumination. Such are the main reasons advanced by Bonaventure and Matthew in their proofs for divine enlightenment.

Critique of the Illumination Theory

This study thus far has presented the typical Augustinian approach to illumination found in the texts of Bonaventure and Matthew; the following section will consider the critique by later historians.

Bonaventure's theory has been given a wide variety of interpretations, some diametrically opposed to each other. For example, Bettoni claims that Bonaventure's illumination theory is intended to solve both the problem of ideogenesis and the critical problem for it eliminates the separate agent intellect of the Arabians and establishes the certitude of man's ideas.⁶⁸ De Wulf, on the contrary, says that Bonaventure's theory does not explain the origin of ideas at all but simply gives their metaphysical foundations.⁶⁹ Van de Woestyne agrees that illumination does not refer to the acquiring or forming of concepts but only to judgment or reasoning.⁷⁰ Perhaps this divergence can be reconciled by the thesis of Rohmer, who points out that an Augustinian judgment replacing Aristotelian abstraction brings with it all the metaphysical conditions required for illumination.⁷¹ Basically, the problem centers on whether or not illumination should be admitted on the first level of apprehension or reserved for the judgment.⁷² This, however, may become only a pseudo-problem, since one ought to recall that for Bonaventure, the very formation of the concept involves some type of judgment and hence allows for the influence of divine light.

Whether illumination refers to the formation of the concept or applies only to the judgment may still be debated, but all the historians agree

⁶⁸ E. Bettoni, *art. cit.*, p. 140.

⁶⁹ M. De Wulf, *Histoire de la philosophie médiévale* (Louvain: Instit. supér. de phil., 1924), I: 352.

⁷⁰ Z. Van de Woestyne, "Augustinismus in gnoseologia S. Bonaventurae et S. Thomae," *Antonianum*, IX (1934), pp. 479—81.

⁷¹ J. Rohmer, "La théorie de l'abstraction dans l'école Franciscaine d'Alexandre de Halès à Jean Peckam," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, III (1928), p. 183.

⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 175—76.

that Bonaventure's theory proposes to establish certitude. They disagree, however, as to the epistemological effectiveness of the illumination theory. Gilson objects very strongly to Bonaventure's appeal to a special divine enlightenment in order to ensure the validity of man's cognition. He says that if illumination must be admitted, then all sense cognition is regarded as deficient and the doors to skepticism are opened.⁷³ Moreover, all rational cognition becomes infused and knowledge is established in the supernatural order.⁷⁴ According to Gilson, then, illumination defeats the very purpose given to it by Bonaventure and Matthew. It both underlines the deficiencies of sense knowledge and makes all natural cognition impossible. But as has already been shown, Bonaventure and Matthew do admit the possibility of a true, natural knowledge, even without special illumination.

In connection with this critique of Bonaventure's theory of illumination as establishing certitude, Luyckx objects that a creature's knowledge of creation is still subject to the illumination of the knowing subject.⁷⁵ No amount of special help infused into a fallible mind will make that intellect infallible and immutable. Bissen counters that though this divine enlightenment exists in the creature, it is not the act of the creature but of God.⁷⁶ Thus the infallibility comes from God and not from the creature.

The foregoing objections clearly show that the very purpose of illumination — to give evidence and necessity to man's knowledge — has been criticized by the historians. In fact, critics are generally agreed that such a theory invalidates all knowledge. It is interesting to note how some of these very criticisms will be used by Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus, as will be illustrated in subsequent sections.

Perhaps the most difficult problem for the historian concerns the exact meaning of this divine influence. Bettoni claims that it is really an innate idea.⁷⁷ Bissen, on the other hand, says that it is a habit of mind and in support of his position points out that Bonaventure also calls grace an influence and certainly it is a habit. According to his theory, the divine action produces an effect in the soul and this effect becomes the *habitus* of cognition.⁷⁸ It is to be questioned, however, if

⁷³ E. Gilson, "Sur quelques difficultés de l'illumination augustinienne," *Revue néoscholastique de philosophie*, XXXVI (1934), pp. 327—38.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 329.

⁷⁵ B. Luyckx, "Die Erkenntnislehre Bonaventuras," *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, XXIII (1923), p. 216.

⁷⁶ J. M. Bissen, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

⁷⁷ E. Bettoni, *art. cit.*, p. 151.

⁷⁸ J. M. Bissen, *op. cit.*, p. 194.

Bissen's comparison is valid, in the light of the careful distinction which Bonaventure makes between the influence of grace and that of illumination.

In view of the varied opinions of the meaning and function of illumination, it is only natural that Bonaventure will be subjected to a wide variety of comparisons. He has been charged with skepticism and his *a priori* theory compared with the transcendental idealism of Kant, in contrast to St. Thomas' *a posteriori* theory.⁷⁹ On the other hand, Bonaventure's ideogenesis is called identical with that of St. Thomas who is also classified as a faithful follower of Augustine. According to De Wulf, Bonaventure, Thomas and Scotus show hardly any divergence on their respective theories of ideogenesis, differing only in their way of expressing themselves.⁸⁰ Grabmann agrees that the Franciscan version of Augustinian illumination differs very little from the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor.⁸¹ But Van de Woestyne gives a number of contrasts, concerning the starting point and the conclusion, which distinguish the ideogenetic theory of St. Thomas from that of Bonaventure;⁸² the interested reader is referred to his study for a complete comparison and contrast. It might be well to mention here that the first two works, those of De Wulf and Grabmann, are early studies when the revival of Scholasticism was first being effected; consequently, the authors may be more anxious to harmonize the doctrine of the other Scholastics with that of St. Thomas.

Since Matthew has shown himself a faithful follower of Bonaventure on this question of illumination, it is safe to presume that the above critiques would also be applicable to his doctrine. Specifically, Matthew has been commended for a clarity and precision of expression beyond that found in the writings of Bonaventure.⁸³ Grabmann proclaims Matthew's interpretation as "beautiful and deep."⁸⁴ On the negative side, Matthew has been criticized for failing to specify the type of influence found in illumination. Gilson gives a whole series of quotations where Matthew seems to waver between a special and a general influence.⁸⁵ But it seems in the light of his over-all doctrine, that Matthew teaches the immediate

⁷⁹ J. Fellermeir, "Die Illuminationstheorie bei Augustinus und Bonaventura und die Aprioristische Begründung der Erkenntnis durch Kant," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*, LX (1950), pp. 296—305.

⁸⁰ M. De Wulf, *op. cit.*, I: 352.

⁸¹ M. Grabmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 70—71.

⁸² Z. Van de Woestyne, *art. cit.*, pp. 499—504.

⁸³ J. M. Bissen, *op. cit.*, p. 254.

⁸⁴ M. Grabmann, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

⁸⁵ E. Gilson, "Sur quelques difficultés de l'illumination augustinienne," p. 329.

character of illumination, distinguishing it, however, from the supernatural influence of grace.

Of further interest is the fact that Bissen has noted a certain controversial character found in Matthew's presentation and not so conspicuous in the discussions of Bonaventure.⁸⁶ For example, he observes that Matthew introduces his question of illumination with a refutation of the positions of Plato and Aristotle, as well as those of his contemporaries. According to the Academy, all knowledge comes "from above"; such a thesis, Matthew objects, would destroy the whole structure of rational knowledge. He likewise rejects the Aristotelian inspiration that all cognition originates from the object and the action of the agent intellect. Matthew recognizes that versions of these positions were held by the Catholic philosophers of his own time, men who say that this is the correct interpretation of Augustine. As already seen, Matthew himself holds a middle way, declaring that cognition comes from the object, the intellect, but also from a superior source, divine illumination.⁸⁷

Certainly Matthew is polemic, which indicates that illumination is already on the defensive. The growth of this distrust will be more evident in the doctrine of Henry of Ghent and will become an outright rejection in the teachings of Scotus. There are, however, many philosophers to defend Augustinian illumination long after the time of Matthew and Bonaventure. Even today there are those who see in the Bonaventurian theory a "meditative and comprehensive" ideogenesis, which could serve as a balance for contemporary overemphasis on logic.⁸⁸

Henry of Ghent

Bonaventure and Matthew posit a triple source of knowledge from the object, the intellect and divine illumination. These same three elements, with less emphasis on the absolute need for illumination, form the ideogenetic theory of Henry of Ghent. The following discussion will present Henry of Ghent's theory of exemplarism, knowledge of truth, illumination and truth, and finally, a critique of Henry's theory.

The Doctrine of Exemplarism

In the introductory question of his *Summa*, Henry, like Matthew before him, criticizes the innatist position of Plato, who had placed all truth in separate forms, as well as Aristotle's ideogenesis from the object

⁸⁶ J. M. Bissen, *op. cit.*, p. 255.

⁸⁷ *De cognitione*, Q. II, pp. 230—32.

⁸⁸ R. Messner, "Über die Gegenwartsbedeutung der Erkenntnishaltung Bonaventuras und Ockhams," *Antonianum* XXVII (1953), p. 147.

and the agent intellect, omitting any special illumination. With typical eclecticism, Henry declares that a true theory combines the good points of both theses. Granted that the intellect obtains ideas from the sensible object, still this natural cognition must be supplemented by divine illumination.⁸⁹ Henry admits here that sense cognition can lead to a true knowledge of the object; however, he still requires illumination for a complete and perfect knowledge of truth. Thus Henry's illuminationism reveals his Augustinian heritage, while his own theory occasions the subsequent extensive criticism and rejection of Scotus.

Basic to an understanding of Henrican epistemology is his thesis that a being is true in so far as it conforms to the exemplar of which it is a representation.⁹⁰ At first glance, this seems only an echo of Bonaventure and Matthew. But Henry explains that there are two exemplars and consequently two ways in which the truth of a being can be known. The first exemplar is abstracted from the object and exists in the soul as a universal idea; a second exemplar is the divine idea which contains the pattern of all things.⁹¹ In other words, a human judgment is true when it corresponds to the reality of the object; but the truth of the thing itself is based on its resemblance to the eternal idea in the mind of God. As De Wulf states it, the object itself leads to logical truth but ontologically speaking, the divine exemplar is the absolute norm of all truth.⁹²

Obviously, Henry's illumination theory places greater emphasis on the role of the object in true cognition. Consequently, he speaks of an exemplar obtained from the object and existing in the mind; a "natural" exemplar, if it may be called such, which is really a universal idea. If the object corresponds to this universal idea in the intellect, then true knowledge is ensured. But the mind needs still another type of exemplar to completely grasp the truth of the thing.

Here, then, emerges the twofold exemplarism of Henry: the universal idea in the mind and the eternal reasons. Bettoni prefers to speak of two similitudes, the one abstracted from the object, the other impressed by God, and these two likenesses are related as matter to form. The first is absolutely necessary for cognition, yet it is incomplete and needs to

⁸⁹ *Summa*, I, 4, O, f. 14 v.

⁹⁰ *Summa*, I, 2, E, f. 5 r.

⁹¹ *Summa*, I, 2, E, f. 5 r. According to Henry, this theory of the twofold exemplar is first found in the *Timaeus* of Plato.

⁹² M. De Wulf, "L'exemplarisme et la théorie de l'illumination speciale dans la philosophie de Henri de Gand." *Revue néoscolastique*, I (1894), p. 56.

be informed by illumination.⁹³ In his comparison of these two exemplars to matter and form, Henry is in agreement with Matthew who declares that the object is the material element of cognition while illumination is the form.

Knowledge of that Which is True

Henry, then, defines truth as a relation with an exemplar, explaining that there are two kinds of exemplars: one in the mind, another in the divine Intellect. Consequently, he speaks of a natural truth which is established by the relation of the object to the universal idea in the human mind. The first type of true cognition can be achieved by the exclusive use of man's natural powers and without any special divine illumination.⁹⁴ In other words, man can know if his concept conforms to the object and hence is true; in this way the intellect is true, if it grasps the object as it really is. However, knowledge of the truth of the thing also involves a certain judgment about the essence of the object, i. e. a comparison with the divine exemplar; therefore, knowledge of truth requires illumination.⁹⁵

Thus Henry distinguishes between true knowledge and knowledge of the truth. Through the natural light of the intellect, man can come to a true knowledge of the object, but he cannot know the truth of the thing.⁹⁶ Not only extra-mental things, but even the formation of general concepts and the enunciation of first principles, are included in this true cognition.⁹⁷

Basic to this theory is the thesis that the senses, when they are not impeded, know the object truly and without any danger of deception or fallacy.⁹⁸ But Henry adds that any such knowledge of the object acquired through the senses is really only "opinion", not a true judgment.⁹⁹ A sense is true, according to Henry, when it does not contradict any other sense, nor negate itself in a better disposition, nor conflict with any intel-

⁹³ E. Bettoni, *Il processo astrattivo nella concezione di Enrico di Gand* (Milan: Pubblicazione dell' Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Nuova Serie, XLVII, 1954), p. 27.

⁹⁴ *Summa*, I, 2, E, f. 5 r. Here Henry relies on the authority of both Aristotle and Augustine.

⁹⁵ *Summa*, I, 2, F, f. 5 r. One finds a close parallel in the works of Vitalis de Furno, edited by F. Delorme, "Huit questions disputées sur le problème de la connaissance," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, II (1927), p. 335.

⁹⁶ *Summa*, I, 2, B, f. 4 b.

⁹⁷ *Summa*, I, 12, R, f. 23 r.

⁹⁸ *Summa*, I, 1, F, f. 2 v.

⁹⁹ *Summa*, I, 4, D, f. 11 v.

lectual knowledge.¹⁰⁰ In this way, Henry refutes the distortions of sense knowledge which were used by the skeptics. He bases his thesis on the principle that the senses are ordinarily correct since they are nonfree powers; errors in sense knowledge are simply accidental. In other words, a nonfree cause acts according to its nature and consequently will be correct, provided nothing impedes its natural operations. It will become apparent in the next section, that this is the same argument Scotus uses to establish the validity of sense knowledge and to obviate the need for any illumination.

Henry's further proof that illumination is not required for true knowledge is based on the fact that if man's natural powers do not enable him to perform that intellectual act which is his proper perfection, then man is inferior to all other creatures.¹⁰¹ Since creatures lower in the hierarchy of being perform their own distinctive actions without any special divine co-operation, then man too should have the perfection of his cognitive powers without special illumination. Henry hastens to add, however, that man always needs the general concurrence of God to perform any action. From this statement it can be deduced that illumination, according to Henry, is something more than a general influence such as was the explanation of Thomas and Scotus.

Granted that knowledge acquired through the senses is true,¹⁰² Henry immediately qualifies his conclusion by saying that knowledge abstracted from the exemplar of the thing is "imperfect, obscure and cloudy."¹⁰³ Absolute certainty cannot be found in the object, according to him, since the thing of itself is mutable and man's senses are still finite, imperfect and subject to error.

Another proof that natural knowledge of a true object is possible is found in the premise that all creation is an image of its divine exemplar.¹⁰⁴ Knowledge acquired from the object, however, does not reveal the truth of the object but only the truth of the similitude.¹⁰⁴ In other words, true knowledge of a thing may be had since man grasps a true similitude, but yet man does not know the truth of the object as related to its eternal exemplar. Complete and perfect truth, then, is not derived from a simple apprehension of the object but depends on a judgment and comparison. As De Wulf explains, perfect cognition requires not only the knowledge

¹⁰⁰ E. Gilson, "Avicenne et le point de départ de Duns Scot," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, II (1927), p. 125.

¹⁰¹ *Summa*, I, 2, B, f. 4 r v. Throughout, Henry stresses the "dignity and nobility" of man's natural powers.

¹⁰² *Summa*, I, 2, I, f. 7 r.

¹⁰³ *Summa*, I, 2, I, f. 6 r.

¹⁰⁴ E. Bettoni, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

that man's concept is conformed to the object but also knowledge of the reason for this conformity.¹⁰⁵ Here Henry equates truth with an act of the judgment; on the level of the concept he admits only a knowledge of "that which is true." This thesis may seem to repeat the doctrine of Bonaventure and Matthew but the latter teaches that even the level of the simple apprehension involves some degree of abstractive judgment. The principal departure in Henry's theory is the greater development of a type of natural truth based on comparison of the thing with the exemplar in the mind. It should be remembered here that Bonaventure and Matthew do not deny such a natural truth, they merely give a less explicit treatment of it.

Illumination and Truth

It is evident that Henry posits two exemplars, one in the human intellect leading to true knowledge of the thing, and another in the divine Mind, requiring divine illumination to make it intelligible to man. With the aid of such an enlightenment man is able to compare the object with its divine exemplar¹⁰⁶ and thus to arrive at a valid judgment of reality.¹⁰⁷ Thus perfect truth and certain knowledge require a comparison based on the divine idea known through a special illumination.¹⁰⁸

In applying this thesis, Henry further explains that knowledge of truth involves a recognition of the essential forms seen in the divine ideas, as they realize themselves in a specific created reality.¹⁰⁹ It is no longer a question of man's acquiring a true knowledge of an extra-mental object but rather a question of reflection and judgment which enables the mind to know why this object is true, i. e. a judgment based on the resemblance of the thing to the divine idea.

Consequently, Henry explains illumination as God's modeling man's concepts after His own divine ideas of things.¹¹⁰ This divine light influences the human mind in such a way that the ideas abstracted from the object, resemble God's own exemplary idea of the thing.

In one passage Henry speaks of a light which imprints itself on man's mind and transforms his concepts.¹¹¹ But in another text he says that

¹⁰⁵ M. De Wulf, *Études sur Henri de Gand* (Brussels: Mém. couronnés de l'Académie Royale de Belgique, 1895), p. 64.

¹⁰⁶ *Summa*, I, 2, E, f. 7 r.

¹⁰⁷ *Summa*, III, 4, Q, f. 29 v. In this paragraph Henry makes a careful distinction between natural and supernatural knowledge.

¹⁰⁸ *Summa*, I, 3, F, f. 10 r.

¹⁰⁹ *Quodl.*, IX, 15, f. 111 v a.

¹¹⁰ *Summa*, XXIV, 8, O, f. 145 r.

¹¹¹ *Summa*, I, 2, L, f. 7 r. He compares this to an impression made on wax.

they "sin" who call this light an impression from the eternal rules.¹¹² Perhaps this contradiction in terminology stems from Henry's desire to save himself from the charge of ontologism; or perhaps it is still another evidence of his hesitation over the whole theory of illumination. At any rate, he compares this light of illumination, whether it be an impression or not, with the natural light of the sun.¹¹³ Obviously, this comparison follows the terminology of Bonaventure and Matthew.

From the above description, it seems clear that Henrican illumination is less of a motivating force and more of a regulating norm. The concept is already formed to give a true knowledge of the object; however, God must enlighten the mind so that man can know God's own exemplary idea, if the human intellect is ever to arrive at truth.¹¹⁴ According to the above interpretation, illumination is no longer required for all true knowledge but only for the truth of a judgment. Consequently, illumination plays a more limited role in Henry's theory than in that of Bonaventure and Matthew.

This conclusion seems to be substantiated by a passage where Henry remarks that illumination is God's free gift, given to whomever God wills and in varying degrees.¹¹⁵ Perhaps it would be more correct to say that God impresses the idea of the truth of things on all minds; some men, however, remain content with a true knowledge of reality and do not arrive at the reason for the truth of things. Again Henry's vacillating position becomes apparent, for he limits illumination to some men, whereas Matthew claims that it is given to all, even the damned. Both agree, however, that the amount of illumination a man receives depends on his capacity and co-operation.

Another point of agreement between Henry and his predecessor appears when both make the divine ideas the form through which God knows creation; for Henry divine knowledge establishes an ideal relation between God and creatures.¹¹⁶ Since divine ideas are identified with the divine Essence, man cannot know them directly or naturally in this life.¹¹⁷ Consequently, divine ideas are the source of man's knowing, in so far as they reveal other objects, though they themselves are never the object of man's knowledge.¹¹⁸

¹¹² *Summa*, I, 3, G, f. 10 v. This inconsistency is also noted, but not explained, by E. Bettoni, *op. cit.*, pp. 33—34.

¹¹³ *Summa*, I, 3, F, f. 9 v.

¹¹⁴ *Summa*, I, 2, M, f. 7 v—8 r.

¹¹⁵ *Summa*, I, 3, A, f. 8 v—9 r.

¹¹⁶ *Quodl.*, V, 3, f. 230 r b.

¹¹⁷ *Summa*, I, 3, A, f. 8 v.

¹¹⁸ *Summa*, I, 3, E, f. 9 v.

It follows that God is not the object of man's cognition, at least in this life; rather He is the *ratio cognoscendi*. God may be considered, however, as the principle of cognition in two ways: first, in so far as He gives being to man's intellect; secondly, as He illumines objects and also man's cognitive process and thus makes things intelligible.¹¹⁹ Moreover, God is the norm of man's intelligence since the divine ideas, identified with God's Essence, are the exemplary forms by which man comes to judge the truth of created essences.¹²⁰ Here again Henry's stress on illumination as a regulating force is conspicuous, though he places less emphasis on illumination's motivation.

Up to this point, Henry's explanation of God's causality of being and the illumining of man's mind is in accord with the teaching of Bonaventure and Matthew. He differs from them, however, in comparing God with the agent intellect, saying that God is the agent which enables the human mind to contemplate certain and complete truth, in much the same way as man's own agent intellect permits him to know an object through a sensible species abstracted from the phantasm.¹²¹ Such identification of God as an agent intellect illumining human minds enables one to come to a better understanding of his theory of an impression made by this light on the created intellect. Here a development not found in the theories of Bonaventure or Matthew comes to light; in fact, Henry seems to have used some of Roger Marston's terminology without, however, claiming that God is the agent intellect in man. According to Copleston, this is a trace of Avicennian doctrine in Henry's ideogenesis,¹²² an influence which is repeated in a subsequent development of his thesis on the object of the intellect.

In establishing the need for this special illumination, Henry repeats the proofs used by both Bonaventure and Matthew. As he points out, all created reality is changeable, the human intellect is fallible and the similitude, generated by the imagination, has a note of truth and of error.¹²³ As an example of the latter, he says that man should be able to distinguish truth from apparent truth so that he knows whether a particular thing comes from a dream or from reality; such true cognition, however, must be based on an exemplar more perfect than the one abstracted from things.¹²⁴

¹¹⁹ *Summa*, I, 3, D, f. 9 r.

¹²⁰ R. Braun, *Die Erkenntnislehre Heinrichs von Ghent* (Freiburg: St. Paulus-Druckerei, 1916), p. 48.

¹²¹ *Quodl.*, IX, 15, f. 111 v b.

¹²² F. Copleston, *A History of Philosophy* (Westminster, Maryland: Newman Press, 1950), II: 474.

¹²³ *Summa*, I, 2, E, f. 5 v.

¹²⁴ *Summa*, I, 2, E, f. 5 v.

Thus, illumination is required in order to make the object immutable, to render the mind infallible and to enable the intellect to distinguish apparent truth from reality. Like his predecessors, Henry here shows a strong Augustinian influence. For example, in a key passage of this important second question of the *Summa*, Henry repeats on almost every line "Augustine says," "according to Augustine," "as Augustine wishes," etc.,¹²⁵ all of which proves the thesis that Henry shares the common Augustinian heritage on this particular point, even though he also weakens some of the central theses of the illumination theory.

By way of recapitulation, one can say that Henry defines truth as a relation to an exemplar, either the universal idea in the mind of the knower, or the perfect exemplar in the mind of God. Through the first of these, man comes to a true knowledge of the object; through the second he is able to grasp the truth of things. This latter cognition, based on the divine ideas, requires a special illumination, i. e. an impression made on man's intellect by God Himself. Such a perception of the truth of the thing is necessary, if man is ever to establish a necessary and "scientific kind of knowledge."¹²⁶

Finally, Henry distinguishes between two kinds of illumination: one is a supernatural, divine influence giving man an impressed knowledge of the truths of theology; the other is a "common" kind of illumination discussed in this study.¹²⁷ Even this common type of illumination seems to have a more supernatural character in Henry's theory than in the ideogenesis of Bonaventure or Matthew. According to Henry, illumination is not absolutely necessary; although it reveals the truth of the thing, it is not required for all true knowledge. Barth concurs with this interpretation that illumination, according to Henry, is a *per modum actus specialis*; for Bonaventure, it is a *per modum habitus*.¹²⁸

Critique of Henry's Theory

First to be considered in an evaluation of Henry's theory is the problem of his sources. Certainly, Henry relied on Augustine, as has been indicated. De Wulf points out that the whole opening question of

¹²⁵ *Summa*, I, 2, L, f. 7 r.

¹²⁶ *Quodl.*, IV, 8, f. 152 v b—153 r a.

¹²⁷ M. De Wulf, "L'exemplarisme et la théorie de l'illumination spéciale dans la philosophie de Henri de Gand," p. 66.

¹²⁸ T. Barth, "Duns Scotus und die ontologische Grundlage unserer Verstandeserkenntnis," *Franziskanische Studien*, XXXIII (1951), p. 350. In general, Bettoni agrees with Barth's interpretation saying that for Bonaventure, illumination was more natural, while Henry made it more unnatural. *Op. cit.*, p. 35.

Henry's *Summa* is really a "brilliant and original paraphrase" of the teaching of Augustine.¹²⁹ However, Henry's presentation of a true knowledge of the object certainly depends on Aristotelian inspiration. The question remains: can Aristotelian ideogenesis be reconciled with Augustinian illumination?

Bettoni calls Henry's answer to this question a "difficult" theory, one which never really becomes a stable doctrine in Henry's philosophy.¹³⁰ Henry's hesitation on various points of his theory, particularly on the question of this light as "impressed" on the mind, can hardly be disputed. Even more important is the consideration that Henry perhaps comes to deny illumination towards the end of his career. This contention is advanced by Paulus who points out that in the *Summa*, Henry strongly argues for illumination in his opening question, but in *Quodlibet* IX, which is a later work, he mentions it only in a passing reference.¹³¹ Bettoni objects, saying that Henry does speak of illumination in his later works, for example in *Quodlibet* I and VIII, the latter being almost contemporary with the disputed *Quodlibet* IX.¹³² Perhaps this ninth *Quodlibet* with its hesitant reference can be cited as evidence for an evolution of doctrine, since it dates from 1286, while the *Summa* was begun around 1276.¹³³ At any rate, Scotus, writing some years later, must have believed that Henry held an illuminationism, since he bases his own refutation on this doctrine of Henry's.

John Duns Scotus

The preceding section of this discussion on illumination has shown the traditional Augustinian doctrine of Bonaventure and Matthew of Aquasparta, as well as the compromise position of Henry of Ghent. The latter held that, since man's senses are natural powers operating according to the laws of nature, knowledge derived from them is true; however, a judgment on the truth of things is based on a comparison with its eternal exemplar and hence requires illumination.

Now this very compromise doctrine of Henry forms the basis for Scotus' critique of Augustinian illumination. Having denied this special

¹²⁹ M. De Wulf, "L'exemplarisme et la théorie de l'illumination spéciale dans la philosophie de Henri de Gand," p. 55.

¹³⁰ E. Bettoni, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

¹³¹ J. Paulus, *Henri de Gand* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1938), pp. 4—5. The reference here is *Quodl.*, IX, 15, f. 110 v.

¹³² E. Bettoni, *op. cit.*, p. 71. The material cited is found in *Quodl.*, III, 1, f. 78 r and *Quodl.*, IV, 8, f. 152 v.

¹³³ J. G. Caffarena, "Cronología de la 'Summa' de Enrique de Gante por relación a sus 'Quodlibetos'," *Gregorianum*, XXXVIII (1957), p. 133.

divine enlightenment as an explanation of certitude, Scotus develops a new theory of valid cognition. The next section will treat of Scotus' critique of Henry's illumination theory, Scotus' own theory of truth and, finally, of his explanation of certitude.

Scotus' Critique of Henry's Illumination Theory

In his *Opus Oxoniense*, Scotus gives a detailed refutation of Henry's argument in favor of illumination. Though he does not specifically refer to the fact, some of the proofs that Henry advanced were also used by Bonaventure and by Matthew. Paradoxically enough, what Scotus is actually presenting in this question is a refutation of the whole Augustinian tradition, even while he invokes the authority of Augustine.

Scotus begins his question with a summary of Henry's position that truth depends on the knowledge of two exemplars; by his natural powers, man can have a true knowledge of the sensible object but certain and infallible cognition of the truth requires a comparison with the eternal exemplar. Summarizing Henry's arguments, Scotus mentions the mutability of the object, the fallibility of the mind and man's inability to distinguish a true from a false exemplar.¹³⁴ In answer to Henry, Scotus declares that these proofs are really false interpretations of Augustine, since they lead to the very skepticism which Augustine tries to refute. Moreover, they are false reasonings in themselves and actually lead to a denial of all certitude.

In the first place, if the object is mutable, as Henry says, then there can be no certain knowledge of it, even with illumination, since to know a thing in a way other than as it is, would not be true knowledge. In other words, no one can have true, immutable knowledge of an object which is mutable. However, the idea that all things are constantly changing is actually the error of Heraclitus; consequently, Henry's thesis is false, since he adduces it from an erroneous principle.

Secondly, Scotus reasons that if the created exemplar cannot lead to certitude because of the subject's fallibility, then no perfect exemplar enlightening the understanding can do so. For if the soul is by nature incapable of grasping the truth of the object, then no extrinsic agent accidental to the soul can rectify this intrinsic defect. No matter how perfect the exemplar, the soul remains fallible.

Thirdly, even if the weakness of the created similitude were corrected by an eternal exemplar, there would still be an element of uncertainty

¹³⁴ I *Op. Ox.*, 3, 4, 1—3; IX: 162—65. III: 126—32. In this famous question, Scotus is quoting from Henry's *Summa*, I, 2.

in man's cognition to prevent complete certitude because knowledge can only be as certain as the weakest element in the cognitive process. As in a syllogism the conclusion always follows the weaker side, so no created exemplar can ensure perfect certitude.

Scotus thus refutes Henry's reasoning based on the nature of the object, the fallibility of the mind and the imperfection of the created exemplar. If these proofs destroy the possibility of any certitude arising from man's natural intellectual powers, they also destroy all possibility of valid cognition.

As a final refutation of illumination, Scotus uses the authority of Augustine himself, who teaches that the truths of scientific reasoning are evident and certain. Augustine also holds that sense experience gives valid knowledge and that man can have certain knowledge of his own internal experiences.¹³⁵ In none of the above-mentioned cases does Augustine make specific appeal to illumination; therefore, Scotus concludes that Augustine himself admits the possibility of valid and certain knowledge of truth without the aid of illumination.

In a subsequent article of this same third question, Scotus denies the thesis that sensible objects are all mutable, repeating that this is not Augustinian doctrine but an old error. Even if such a false statement were admitted, it would still follow that some knowledge is certain and immutable, if only the thesis that all things are in state of flux.

Of greater importance is Scotus' objection that even if the object itself were constantly changing, nevertheless, the product of this object need not be completely mutable, for the product arises from the nature of the object in such a way that the product represents this nature essentially; therefore, the relation between the product and the nature remains immutable. Thus man can have immutable knowledge of this immutable relation even though the object itself be changing. Furthermore, a representation that is mutable can lead to knowledge of an object that is immutable in itself. For example, man can have knowledge of the unchanging Essence of God, even though this knowledge comes via representations which are mutable and finite.¹³⁶

From the above explanation it seems that Scotus tries to establish the certainty of cognition on the basis of the relation between the object and its representation in the mind. Since such a representation is produced by the nature of the object, the relation between the similitude and the thing itself is essential and consequently immutable. Even though

¹³⁵ I *Op. Ox.*, 3, 4, 5—6; IX: 168—70. III: 133—37.

¹³⁶ I *Op. Ox.*, 3, 4, 13; IX: 181—82. III: 149—52.

the representation, the object and the intellect be fallible and mutable, as Bonaventure, Matthew and Henry have argued, still man can have certain knowledge of the truth, a truth founded on the relation of the representation to the object and the mind.

It seems that Scotus' doctrine of certitude via a representation which is an immutable product of the object, follows from, or is linking to, his theory of intuition, which was presented in the preceding chapter. Since the mind immediately grasps the present and existing thing, it immediately knows the truth of that thing. For Scotus, the created exemplar reflects the truth of the object without any recourse to a special divine enlightenment.

Having thus avoided the arguments on which Henry had based his theory of the two exemplars, Scotus now replies to the charge that the soul is by its very nature a mutable being and hence can never come to immutable knowledge. Here the Subtle Doctor distinguishes between two kinds of mutability in the soul: that which causes the soul to change from affirmation to negation and that which involves a transition from one contrary to another. As an example of the first type of mutability, the soul passes from ignorance to knowledge; such a transition must be effected by something outside of the soul itself. The change from one position to its contrary, however, concerns only those propositions which are not self-evident. When there is a question of self-evident principles, the soul necessarily possesses certain knowledge as soon as it grasps the terms of these propositions. Thus the soul does grasp necessary, immutable evident truth so that it cannot be said that everything is mutable and fallible.¹³⁷

It is to be noted, here, that Scotus does not deny that the soul itself is mutable in nature; he simply counters by explaining that despite man's essential fallibility, the soul can still come to certain knowledge when it apprehends the necessary truth of self-evident principles. What the mind perceives is the unchanging relation of the subject and predicate terms in such a way that once the mind has realized, through an analysis of terms, that "the whole is greater than any of the parts," then the mind possesses immutable truth.

In reply to Henry's difficulty in distinguishing between a true and an apparent species, Scotus points out that such a problem arises from Henry's denial of any intelligible species. Granted that a dream phantasm

¹³⁷ *I Op. Ox.*, 3, 4, 14; IX: 182 a b. III: 152. In the next chapter one will see how Bonaventure and Matthew speak of an innate knowledge of these principles.

can be confused with reality, still the intelligible species, which is formed by the understanding, can never occur in a dream.¹³⁸ But one recalls that Henry denies the intelligible species and thus occasions confusion between the phantasm and the true species.

Such are Scotus' answers to Henry's arguments for illumination. If the subject, the object and even the created exemplar are defective, still the human intellect can grasp the unchanging relation of the representation with the nature that produces it; the mind can also know with absolute certitude the truth of self-evident principles.

Having thus refuted the Henrican arguments for illumination, Scotus reinterprets the Augustinian dictum that men see necessary truths in the light of eternal reasons. Scotus describes these eternal reasons as all the "actual intelligibles of the divine understanding." Thus the divine ideas are secondary objects of the divine understanding and in conformity with it; consequently, they are necessary, eternal lights.¹³⁹ Now man can be said to see in the uncreated light of these eternal reasons in the sense that the divine understanding gives all things their being, their intelligibility; moreover, God moves the human intellect in such a way that man can know created beings. Since God has given all created objects their *esse secundum quid*, He has also given them their capacity to know and to be known. In this way, man can be said to know in the light of the eternal reasons, since He sees all things as the effects of this uncreated light.¹⁴⁰ Obviously, Scotus is here referring to some sort of motivation from the eternal light which is a far cry from the *concursus immediatus* of Augustinian illumination.

Having explained, at least to his own satisfaction, the dictum of Augustine that men see necessary truths in the light of the eternal reasons, Scotus then concludes that such a cognition, even though it is true, necessary and eternal, does not require a special illumination.¹⁴¹ Thus Scotus clearly rejects the entire doctrine of illumination, while still retaining the terminology of "light" and "eternal reasons" and while still invoking the authority of Augustine.

For a further understanding of Scotus' position, it must be remembered that for the Subtile Doctor, the divine ideas are simply defined as the "quiddities" of things as known by the divine Intellect. Thus God knows the absolute essence of things, giving them their *esse intelligibile* by creating a relation between the object known and the divine Intel-

¹³⁸ I *Op. Ox.*, 3, 4, 14; IX: 182—83. III: 153.

¹³⁹ I *Op. Ox.*, 3, 4, 18; IX: 187—88. III: 160—61.

¹⁴⁰ I *Op. Ox.*, 3, 4, 19; IX: 188—89. III: 162—63.

¹⁴¹ I *Op. Ox.*, 3, 4, 20; IX: 189 a b. III: 163—65.

lect.¹⁴² The divine ideas are not patterns of the way in which God's Essence can be imitated outside Himself; rather, they are created beings as known by God.¹⁴³ Consequently, the Scotistic explanation of the divine ideas is quite distinct from interpretations of his predecessors who saw all creation as an imitation of the divine exemplary ideas. Therefore, for Scotus the truth of the created object is no longer known through a comparison with the eternal reasons, a comparison which involves special illumination.

Scotus' Theory of Truth

The preceding section has shown Scotus' rejection of the traditional arguments for illumination and indicated his careful attempt to save the authority of Augustine. It now remains for Scotus to establish a truth theory of his own, a theory based on the knowing subject and on the object which is known.

In the same third question, referred to above, Scotus discusses three kinds of truth: the truth of the exemplar, the truth which is the property of being and the truth of the mind.

As already demonstrated, Scotus interprets the divine ideas in a unique fashion; consequently his whole notion of exemplarism is likewise unique. To establish truth through a relation of man's ideas to their divine exemplars, it would be necessary for man to have a knowledge of both terms of this relation. Consequently, the divine ideas would have to be the objects of knowledge, as well as the means of cognition. Since, in this life, man cannot know the divine Intellect, it follows that exemplary truth involves only a comparison with created models.¹⁴⁴

Here a striking contrast with the doctrine of Bonaventure and Matthew appears. In agreement with them Scotus admits of no objective knowledge of the divine ideas in this life for, according to the Subtile Doctor, any knowledge of a relationship must be based on a cognition of both terms involved; therefore no comparison can be established with the eternal exemplar in this present life. It might be pointed out, however, that Matthew and Bonaventure had carefully specified that the mind "attains" the eternal reasons, not in themselves and not by its natural powers, but through an influence of light from above. When Scotus denies this divine illumination as a special motivating and regulating

¹⁴² I *Op. Ox.*, 35, 1, 10; X: 548 b.

¹⁴³ I *Op. Ox.*, 35, 1, 13; X: 555 a. Space does not permit a longer explanation of this point. See E. Gilson, *Jean Duns Scot* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1952), pp. 279—306, for a comparison of Thomas, Henry and Scotus.

¹⁴⁴ I *Op. Ox.*, 3, 4, 16; IX: 185—87. III: 156—57.

influence, he also denies any knowledge immediately derived from these divine ideas, i. e. any divine exemplar.

His next thesis treats of that kind of truth which is the property of all being. Here Scotus affirms that infallible truth is attainable by man's natural powers without any special illumination. He explains that everything which exists is true; thus being and truth are convertible and every being is capable of being known.¹⁴⁵ This basic principle distinguishes Scotus' whole treatment of this problem. If a thing exists, it is true; if it is true, it is knowable. This knowability of things, Scotus calls their *evidentia rei in se*.¹⁴⁶ In this way, things are true in themselves, without any need of a comparison with an eternal exemplary idea. Again this explanation seems to follow from Scotus' teaching on intuition as a direct apprehension of the present, existing object. Even on the level of simple apprehension, the intellect grasps the being of things and consequently their truth.

A full and complete knowledge of the truth of a being, however, requires additional steps beyond this simple apprehension of a true being; the intellect must come to know that its apprehension is true.¹⁴⁷ In other words, the intellect grasps the true in the first direct intuition of the being, but a knowledge of truth involves a reflective process. Granted that a concept may be said to be true, in the sense that the intellect cannot have a false idea but only an "ignorant" one,¹⁴⁸ nevertheless formal truth involves a comparison of concept and an apprehension of the conformity between them.¹⁴⁹

Having first ruled out the special influence of illumination, Scotus bases his theory of evidence on the mind of the knowing subject, who participates in the uncreated light, and on the presence *in se* of the object. Man thus comes to certitude of first principles and of his internal experiences. Finally, he achieves a degree of certitude with regard to sensible objects by basing his knowledge on a study of their natures.

In this subject/object ideogenesis of Scotus one finds the completion of a trend observed in the preceding philosophers. Bonaventure had made illumination and exemplarism the very heart of his doctrine, while Matthew introduced a certain defensive attitude into his polemic. Though still giving a more or less traditional explanation of illumination,

¹⁴⁵ VI *Metaph.*, 3, 4; VII: 336 a.

¹⁴⁶ I *Op. Ox.*, 3, 2, 30; IX: 83 a b. III: 63—65. The full truth of a thing is known only by an intellect which apprehends all things in their proper cognoscibility.

¹⁴⁷ VI *Metaph.*, 3, 7; VII: 339 a.

¹⁴⁸ VI *Metaph.*, 3, 6; VII: 338 a.

¹⁴⁹ VI *Metaph.*, 4, 7; VII: 339 a.

Henry of Ghent had also postulated a true knowledge of being which did not require any special illumination. Scotus completely rejects the theory of special illumination as unnecessary to ensure the validity of cognition which he establishes in the immediate union of knowing subject with the object known.

Scotus does agree with Bonaventure, Matthew and Henry of Ghent in saying that truth is formally the product of the judgment. The former Scholastics, however, base this judgment on a comparison of the object with its eternal exemplar, while Scotus speaks of a reflective operation by which the intellect first grasps a true concept of being and then comes to recognize the truth of its own cognitive process.

According to Scotus the *adaequatio* of the traditional definition of truth expresses the conformity of things as measures with the mind which is measured.¹⁵⁰ What the intellect judges is this conformity; if the objective state of affairs is found in the intellect, then the mind possesses truth.¹⁵¹ Obviously, such a theory of knowledge based on the object and the knowing subject, no longer requires the aid of any special illumination.

Scotistic epistemology, then, presents a realistic theory of truth. Through the causality of the intellect and the object in intuition and the joint action of the intellect and the species in abstraction, the mind simply apprehends the quiddity of the thing. On the next level, the mind compares the two concepts and the intellect judges their relation. If the resulting comparison conforms, or is adequate to reality, then the judgment is true; otherwise it is false. In this way the intellect comes to know truth.

Truth, according to Scotus, is actually predicated of the relationships existing between two concepts; it involves the conformity of the sign with that which is signified.¹⁵² Following Father Boehner's interpretation, one concludes that truth becomes the conformity of the proposition with the relation given virtually in the extremes; if the proposition is in conformity with the signification or meaning of its terms, then it is true; otherwise, it is false.¹⁵³ Thus a proposition is true, when it expresses a true judgment; a judgment is true, when it is based on a relation of concepts; i. e. a relation which is validated in the state of affairs.

It is well to note here that Bonaventure had already presented a signification theory of truth. However, he held that this was only a

¹⁵⁰ VI *Metaph.*, 3, 13; VII: 344 a.

¹⁵¹ I *Op. Ox.*, 48, 1, 2; X: 780 b.

¹⁵² VI *Metaph.*, 3, 8; VII: 340 b.

¹⁵³ P. Boehner, *art. cit.*, pp. 156—60.

very limited degree of truth; illumination was necessary for a complete and perfect grasping of the thing in its relation to the eternal exemplar. Scotus, however, having rejected illumination as unnecessary and impossible, now builds up a theory on the relation given virtually in the concepts, recognized by the judgment, and expressed in a true proposition. Such an epistemology must first be investigated on the conceptual level. Does the mind have evident knowledge of existing reality?

Evidence in the Theory of Scotus

In presenting his theory of evidence, Scotus describes it as a distinct knowledge of an object, present and existing in itself.¹⁵⁴ This requirement of a "present" object reverts to the doctrine of intuitive cognition. Further, the object must be present *in se*; now the most perfect example of this latter is found in the soul's knowledge of itself and consequently, this type of intuition gives the most perfect evidence.¹⁵⁵ This presence of the thing itself is the objective factor in evidence but, on the subjective side, the intellect must also be able to distinguish the object known from all other things.¹⁵⁶ Subjective certitude is based on the distinct knowledge of the object existing *in se*; here again Scotus distinguishes himself as a realist.¹⁵⁷

The ultimate basis for certain knowledge of any object is the very being of the thing itself. Given the fact that an object exists and that man has an intellect which has also been given existence by God, then all the elements necessary for perfect evident knowledge are present.¹⁵⁸ In this way, the agent intellect, which is a participation in the uncreated light, comes to certain knowledge of the mutable object which is immutably represented to the mind.¹⁵⁹

The link between evidence and the Scotistic truth theory now becomes apparent. Granted that sensible things and the soul itself are mutable, still the representation of the object apprehended by the intellect is immutably related to both the thing and the mind. When the object is thus known as present in itself, then the mind possesses objective certitude, which in turn causes a subjective evidence. In this process, the senses operating as natural powers, always lead to a true

¹⁵⁴ *Rep. Prol.*, 2, 18; XXII: 43 a.

¹⁵⁵ *I Op. Ox.*, 3, 4, 10; IX: 179 a b. III: 144—46.

¹⁵⁶ *Rep. Prol.*, 2, 18; XXII: 43 b.

¹⁵⁷ P. Vier, *Evidence and Its Function according to John Duns Scotus* (St. Bonaventure, New York: The Franciscan Institute, 1951), p. 60.

¹⁵⁸ T. Barth, *art. cit.*, p. 351.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 367.

concept of the thing but the full subjective recognition of this truth requires a judgment of the intellect.

Since the intellect can know varied objects and know them in different ways, there arise corresponding degrees of evidence. Thus man possesses three kinds of certitude: that of *per se notae* principles, knowledge of his own internal acts and knowledge derived from experience.¹⁶⁰ In each case, the soul comes to evident knowledge without the intervention on any special illumination.

In regard to first principles, the intellect immediately apprehends their truth, when it comes to knowledge of their terms.¹⁶¹ Gilson explains this certitude as such that when man knows one term of a *per se nota* proposition, he immediately knows the other. In other words, the essential relationship of the terms is contained in their very meaning, so that once the mind knows the term, it also knows the proposition. Even if the senses were to err, these first principles of all knowledge remain stable so that the logical contradictory of "the whole is greater than any of its parts" always is impossible.¹⁶²

This *habitus principiorum* is one type of absolute knowledge which does not require the aid of illumination. An even greater degree of certitude accompanies man's knowledge of his own internal states. In the light of Scotus' doctrine of the soul's intuition of itself, which will be further explained in another chapter, one can well ask what object of intellection can be more present to the mind and consequently more evident? This knowledge which the soul has of itself is the first of all contingent truths and prevents that infinite regress which would invalidate all knowledge of the real created world.¹⁶³

Cognition of first principles and the soul's intuition of itself are two examples of evident and certain knowledge which do not require illumination. From this foundation, man can build up a logic and a rational psychology, but what about a science of sensible contingents? Here Scotus bases his claim for evident knowledge of sensibles on the axiom that "whatever occurs most of the time in virtue of a nonfree cause, is the natural effect of this cause."¹⁶⁴ In this way, he again bases his evidence on the very nature of the thing itself with the knowing subject recognizing this repetition in causality.

¹⁶⁰ I *Op. Ox.*, 3, 4, 7; IX: 173 a. III: 138.

¹⁶¹ II *Op. Ox.*, 39, 2, 4; XIII: 415 a.

¹⁶² E. Gilson, *Jean Duns Scot* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1952), p. 560.

¹⁶³ I *Op. Ox.*, 3, 4, 10; IX: 179 a. III: 144—45.

¹⁶⁴ I *Op. Ox.*, 3, 4, 9; IX: 176—77. III: 141—43.

Scotus thus bases his theory of evidence on the mind of the knower, who participates in the uncreated light, and on the presence *per se* of the object. In this way, man comes to certitude even without the aid of special illumination.

In this subject/object theory of Scotus one finds the completion of a trend observed in the preceding philosophers. Bonaventure had made illumination and exemplarism the very heart of his doctrine, while Matthew followed the theory of his teacher but introduced a certain "defense" attitude into his discussion. Henry of Ghent does admit a natural knowledge of the true but requires illumination for an understanding of the truth of a being. Finally, Scotus rejects all need for illumination and bases his epistemology on an evident knowledge derived from the nature of the knower and the object known.

Chapter V

IMPRESSED SPECIES

Having considered ideogenesis from the point of view of the object and illumination "from above," one should now inquire, if there are any other sources of knowledge for these Scholastics, a question immediately associated with innate ideas and impressed species.

Bonaventure and Matthew adhere to the generally accepted Aristotelian description that the soul is a *tabula rasa*, yet they still retain certain Augustinian notions. Once again Henry of Ghent occupies an intermediate position, whereas Scotus follows more closely the literal interpretation of Aristotle.

Matthew of Aquasparta

Matthew begins his discussion of an impressed species by accepting the dictum of Aristotle, but the immediately qualifies his proposition by saying that the soul has no impressed species of those objects knowable through a species formed from the phantasm. Instead, he asserts that the soul does possess innate knowledge of first principles, along with an innate "reason" of cognition. In other words, the soul has a certain innate natural light and judgment.¹ In addition to these, the

¹ *De fide*, Q. I, p. 50. Quod vero dicit, quod anima creatur nuda, verum est quantum ad species cognoscibiles. Habet tamen insertam et inditam rationem cognoscendi et notitiam primorum principiorum, lumen scilicet

soul also receives knowledge from a species which the mind does not form but which is simply impressed upon it by God, just as He impresses a species on the intellect of the angels.² Human dignity demands, however, that only God can impress something upon the human intellect; an angel can only offer species to the mind which must then transform them.³

In this way, Matthew admits of a certain innate or impressed type of knowledge, in addition to ideogenesis from the knowing subject and the object. That very light by means of which a man can know, for example, is somehow innate to him. Even closer to the Platonic notion of innate knowledge is Matthew's theory on man's knowledge of first principles; but God, and God alone, can impress a species on the human intellect.

Just what kind of innate and impressed notions can a man have? Following Augustine, Matthew answers that the soul has an impressed notion of its own nature, but such an impression is only a partial cause of the soul's knowledge of itself; reasoning and illumination must also be present to guarantee the reality and validity of this knowledge.⁴ It is to be noted here that Matthew speaks of the "nature" of the soul as known through an impressed species; this is not that knowledge which is acquired through intuition. This latter point will be discussed more completely in a subsequent chapter.

Of even greater importance for his whole cognitive theory is Matthew's demand for innate knowledge of first principles. Thus by a certain natural impression the mind adheres to the truth of intellectual principles and the will clings to goodness and affective norms.⁵ The soul, for example, has an innate knowledge of and desire for the highest good, but this innate principle is still indeterminate and imperfect.⁶ Thus God has impressed the natural law on the hearts of men so that they may more easily attain their goal.⁷ On the intellectual level, a judgment

naturale et naturale iudicarium, quo, cum adiutorio luminis primi, statim, obiecto aliquo principio et cognitis terminis, approbat et iudicat, et mediante ista notitia acquirit scientiam.

² *De cognitione*, Q. I, p. 219. Sed res non sunt causa necessaria nostrae scientiae: posset enim Deus imprimere nostris intellectibus rerum species per quas cognosceremus, sicut indidit angelis.

³ *De cognitione*, Q. VI, p. 334.

⁴ *De cognitione*, Q. V, pp. 300—301. Partim per impressam notionem, quoniam anima habet impressam naturae . . . Partim per subtilem investigationem et inquisitionem; sed consummative per lucis aeternae irradiationem.

⁵ *De gratia*, Q. I, p. 23.

⁶ *De gratia*, Q. V, p. 140.

⁷ *De gratia*, Q. V, p. 125.

such as "the whole is greater than any of its parts" is an innate first principle. Even though the concepts of "whole" and "part" are derived from extra-mental things, still it is by means of an innate principle that man judges these relationships.⁸ Though man's knowledge of the relationships of first principles is innate, still the concepts which enable him to express these principles are derived from the external world. Finally, Matthew concludes that such innate knowledge and love of goodness and truth are especially appropriate to man as an image of God.⁹

As an instance of an impressed species, Matthew speaks of man's knowledge of angels which is effected by a species impressed by God and not by the angels.¹⁰ In fact, this Franciscan devotes a whole question to man's knowledge of separated substances. He concludes that man can reason to the existence of separated spirits, but the essence of the angels can only be known through an impressed species and with the aid, of course, of divine illumination. Would this impressed notion permit man to have an intuitive knowlege of separated spirits? Matthew answers that such a direct vision is certainly possible through grace, but he cannot answer with assurance about the natural possibility of such infused intuition.¹¹ Noteworthy here is the fact that Matthew, like other followers of Bonaventure, often treats of mystical knowledge alongside of purely natural cognition. In the former way, man can have intuitive vision of an angel but the question of a natural knowledge of the angelic nature remains undecided.

Another example of an impressed species appears when Matthew refers to a means by which man can come to know God "under some general reason."¹² This is not a privative knowledge but rather a positive recognition that God is the Highest Being, Highest Good and the Eternal Being.¹³ In this way man comes to know God as that being

⁸ *De fide*, Q. I, p. 50.

⁹ *De gratia*, Q. II, p. 53.

¹⁰ *De cognitione*, Q. VII, p. 332. Sic igitur dico ad quaestionem quod intellectus coniunctus potest intelligere substantias separatas cognitione 'quia' per effectuum manuductionem, et cognitione 'quid', imperfecte et semiplene, tum per subtilem inquisitionem tum per impressam notionem, tum per divinae lucis irradiationem. Utrum autem contuitive possit eum in sua specie cernere? Utrum possit vel non possit per naturam, nescio; hoc tamen scio, quod potest per donum gratiae et virtutem divinam.

¹¹ *De cognitione*, Q. VI, pp. 329—32.

¹² *De fide*, Q. I, p. 52. Quamvis posset responderi ad probationem minoris: quoniam, etsi de Deo non sit cognoscibile quod quid est sub determinata et propria ratione, est tamen sub quadam ratione generali, quod est 'quo maius cogitari non potest;' et istud est insertum menti humanae.

¹³ *De cognitione*, Q. VII, p. 353. . . in vita ista potest de Deo sciri quid est, non tantum privative, sed positive; non tamen plene et perfecte, sed semiplene et imperfecte, notitia utcumque apprehensiva, non comprehensiva, ut quod Deus est summum ens, summum bonum, aeternum, et iis similia.

"than which a greater is not able to be conceived." This notion is impressed on the human mind by God Himself, but in this life the notion remains a very imperfect and general one.

From the above presentation one can clearly see that Matthew accepts an impressed or innate type of knowledge in addition to the knowledge caused by the subject and the object with the aid of illumination. Through these extra-sensory means, man obtains a general and imperfect cognition of God, of first principles and of the natural law, as well as a knowledge of the nature of his own soul.

St. Bonaventure

In his discussion of an impressed species, Bonaventure distinguishes between two different kinds of similitudes: one he compares to a picture of sensible realities which is impressed on the mind, the other to an impression of the highest truth.

In the first case, the soul has no innate "picture" of extra-mental reality, but it does possess a "certain directive light."¹⁴ Here is a doctrine which re-appears in Matthew and other Augustinians; the soul has no innate knowledge of those corporeal objects which can be known through abstraction. However, the very power which effects the natural ideogenetic process can be said to be innate, since it "directs" all man's cognition.

The second type of similitude, the impression of the highest truth, Bonaventure admits and makes important applications of it in his works, in his natural theology, for example, where he holds that man has some innate knowledge of God. Granted that the soul can reason to the existence of God as the cause of all the effects in the universe, still the soul has another source of knowledge through a certain limited impression of the divinity.¹⁵ In this way, the soul need not rely entirely on abstraction from extra-mental reality; it already possesses innate knowledge which, though inferior to the being of God, is none the less superior to the nature of the soul.¹⁶ Naturally, Bonaventure appeals to this superior type of cognition in his natural theology, using it in his proofs for the existence of God. According to Bonaventure's theory, there is little need of elaborate reasoning to prove God's existence, since man already possesses an innate knowledge far superior to any ratiocination. As already seen, this innate knowledge of God is also part of the doctrine of Matthew.

¹⁴ I *Sent.*, 17, 1, 4; I: 301 b. In this regard see B. Rosenmöller, "Die religiöse Erkenntnis nach Bonaventura," *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, XXV (1925), Nos. 3—4.

¹⁵ II *Sent.*, 39, 1, 2; II: 904 a.

¹⁶ I *Sent.*, 3, 1, 1, 1; I: 70 a b.

Bonaventure likewise postulates an innate knowledge of first principles. The first axioms can be called innate in the sense that they enable man to receive an impression through which he forms his judgments of them; however, the species from which these principles are constructed must be derived from the senses. Like Matthew after him, Bonaventure uses for his example "the whole is greater than any of its parts." Now the species of "whole" and "part" are derived from the senses, but once they are known, the soul has a certain amount of natural light by means of which it can form a valid judgment about these species.¹⁷ In much the same way, knowledge of first moral principles is innate, since the mind judges them as soon as the species are received from the senses.¹⁸ These first principles acquire their truth and universality from the natural light of the intellect, but the external object supplies the content.¹⁹ This "light" of which Bonaventure speaks is connatural with the soul and in this sense is innate; it is, however, distinct from special illumination.²⁰ Here then is Bonaventure's very clear formulation of innate knowledge. It does not replace the object, knowing subject, nor even the special aid of illumination. Rather, it is a natural light inhering in the soul by means of which the intellect is directed to form infallible judgments about first principles.

Such an impressed light is also required to explain how sinners can have knowledge of virtues which they do not possess. According to Bonaventure, knowledge of, let us say, charity, cannot be derived from the senses; nor can a sinner know it from an intuition of his own soul, since he does not possess charity. Therefore, a sinner must obtain a knowledge of charity by means of an innate species.²¹

For Bonaventure, then, an innate idea is a certain directive light which enables man to possess a superior type of knowledge. This knowledge, however, does not replace the ordinary ideogenetic process, nor does it obviate the need for illumination. Rather, it enables man to have a certain cognition of God, first principles, and the virtues which is beyond that acquired through the senses.

In the light of these texts, it is difficult to understand the interpretation of Belmond, who claims that Bonaventure denies all innate knowl-

¹⁷ II *Sent.*, 39, 1, 2; II: 903 a. Innate knowledge is seen primarily in terms of a moral pre-knowledge, for example, of the commandments.

¹⁸ II *Sent.*, 39, 1, 2; II: 903 b.

¹⁹ H. Križovljan, *Philosophia S. Bonaventurae* (Rome: Collegium Internationale S. Laurentii a Brundisio, 1956), pp. 321-22.

²⁰ *De donis Spiritus Sancti*, VIII, 20; V: 498 b.

²¹ I *Sent.*, 27, 1, 1, 4; I: 301 b.

edge.²² Perhaps it would be more correct to say that Bonaventure, as well as Matthew, denies innate knowledge of corporeal objects but both certainly holds some types of innate and impressed knowledge with regard to incorporeals. Thus the explanation of Bettoni — that Bonaventure held a “virtual, dynamic innatism”²³ — seems more tenable.

As was the case in the treatment of illumination, the similarity between Bonaventure and Matthew is again very striking. Both speak of an infused light which is still natural. Both postulate an innate knowledge of God and of first principles. Bonaventure, however, seems to make more extensive use of this innate light in his proofs for the existence of God.

Henry of Ghent

Where Matthew and Bonaventure take a definite stand on innate knowledge and impressed species, Henry of Ghent, in typical fashion, presents a less clear doctrine on the same question. Like his predecessors, Henry holds the Aristotelian principle that man's mind is a *tabula rasa* at birth,²⁴ but he does use the term “innate” in connection with man's potential for learning.²⁵ Thus he speaks of three kinds of knowledge: potential, habitual and actual. The first of these is that capacity to know with which a man is born and which precedes all habitual and acquired knowledge.²⁶ He compares man's capacity for knowledge to the ability of matter which can receive all types of forms.²⁷

Innate knowledge, then, is not a “light” or a “directive” but only that inborn capacity to know which is intrinsic to man's nature as a rational animal. In this sense, innate knowledge is said to precede all acquired or habitual cognition. The Henrican interpretation of “innate” might be compared with Matthew's statement that the “reasons” of cognition are innate.

In a more definite formula, Henry claims that the ideas of “being, thing and necessity” are somehow impressed on the soul.²⁸ These ideas

²² S. Belmond, “A l'école de S. Augustin,” *Études Franciscaines*, XXXIII (1921), p. 13, note 2.

²³ E. Bettoni, “La dottrina bonaventuriana dell' illuminazione intellettuale,” *Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica*, XXXVI (1944), p. 158.

²⁴ *Summa*, I, II, E, f. 21 v.

²⁵ *Summa*, I, II, B, f. 21 r.

²⁶ *Summa*, I, II, B, f. 21 r. Man's knowledge of first principles is acquired “naturally but not properly.” Bettoni interprets this as unconscious and spontaneous, reflective knowledge. See *Il processo astrattivo nella concezione di Enrico di Gand* (Milan: Pubblicazione dell' Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Nuova Serie, XLVII, 1954), p. 69.

²⁷ *Summa*, I, II, B, f. 21 r.

²⁸ *Summa*, I, 12, I, f. 22 r. Here Henry refers to the doctrine of Avicenna. See *Metaphysicae Avicennae* (Venice, 1508), p. 19.

are not derived from the senses; rather, the mind forms them on the occasion of sense experience.²⁹ To substantiate his interpretation, Henry quotes from Avicenna for whom "being, thing and necessity" are first impressions of the mind which are not acquired from anything better known than themselves. Gilson points out that Scotus also uses this same quotation in his discussion on the object of the intellect.³⁰

Thus Henry not only admits man's innate potentiality to know but also claims that man has some sort of knowledge which is not derived from the senses but only occasioned by them. He includes cognition of first principles in this innate knowledge. Granted that these principles are neither anterior to sense experience, nor derived from it, still they are formed by the intellect on the occasion of the reception of a sensible species. It is to be noted, however, that this species is not impressed on the mind, but rather the possible intellect naturally forms these "first concepts" and by means of them comes to have a natural judgment of first principles.³¹ In thus identifying innate knowledge of first principles with a natural judgment occasioned by the reception of a sensible species, Henry seems to follow the teaching of Bonaventure and Matthew.

Does such a natural perfection of the judgment still require the special help of illumination? In one text, Henry seems to assert that the innate light of the human intellect suffices;³² in another passage he declares that illumination is necessary for the mind to know first principles and the conclusions which flow from them.³³ Again Paulus points out that such an ambiguity is not a rare phenomenon in the doctrine of Henry;³⁴ as already seen, his whole position on illumination is somewhat indecisive. However, this thesis might be clarified by recalling that Henry admits a natural knowledge of a true principle, illumination, then, for him would be required to enable the mind to know the truth of that same axiom.

Henry postulates an impressed species only in the case of the separated soul acquiring some knowledge which it has not previously known by way of the senses. This thesis of Henry calls forth the criticism of

²⁹ *Summa*, I, 11, Q, f. 23 r. This applies not only to being but also to the convertibles. Henry calls them "the most common universals." *Summa*, I, 12, L, f. 22.

³⁰ E. Gilson, "Avicenna et le point de départ de Duns Scot," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, II (1927), p. 107.

³¹ *Summa*, I, 11, K, f. 22 r. On this point see J. Paulus, "Henri de Gand et l'argument ontologique," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, X (1935), pp. 274—75.

³² *Summa*, I, 5, B, f. 15 r.

³³ *Summa*, I, 2, L, f. 7 r v.

³⁴ J. Paulus, *Henri de Gand* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1938), p. 9.

Scotus, who sees in it a needless multiplication of beings and something derogatory to the nature of the soul.³⁵ Paulus agrees that such an impressed species would create a break between sensible cognition and intellectual knowledge, the former coming from the phantasm while the latter could be derived from some superior source.³⁶ At any rate, Henry makes a much more limited use of impressed knowledge than does Bonaventure or Matthew.

By way of critique on Henry's position, one can agree with Barth who calls it a kind of "mitigated innatism."³⁷ According to Barth's interpretation, Henry's innate ideas were intended to bridge the gap created by his doctrine of an analogous concept of being.³⁸ If the concept of being is predicated analogically, then some extrinsic means, Henry's innate notion, must be invoked to safeguard the validity of man's knowledge of God. At any rate, Henry's more limited doctrine of innate knowledge and impressed species serves as a transition to its rejection by Scotus.

John Duns Scotus

In line with his rejection of illumination, Scotus denies any impressed species or any innate knowledge. Here again the Subtile Doctor shows himself more Aristotelian than his predecessors, although still using some Augustinian terminology. Perhaps the latter element has caused some historians to attribute a kind of innatism to the Scotistic ideogenesis.

Bettoni declares that Scotus holds a virtual innatism, such as would be necessary to safeguard his univocal concept of being. Since such a concept is transcendental, it could not have been abstracted from any real being and therefore must be innate. Bettoni then compares this innate, univocal idea of being in Scotus with Bonaventure's innate idea of God.³⁹

Barth, on the other hand, rejects the interpretation of Bettoni, pointing out that Scotus clearly denies any innate knowledge.⁴⁰ The only specific reference to "innate" is in a passage where Scotus equates it with the mind's natural desire to know.⁴¹ In this sense, Bonaventure

³⁵ IV *Op. Ox.*, 45, 2, 5; XX: 281—82.

³⁶ J. Paulus, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

³⁷ T. Barth, "De univocationis entis scotisticae intentione principali necnon valore critico," *Antonianum*, XXVIII (1953), p. 90.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

³⁹ E. Bettoni, "Puncti di contatto fra la dottrina bonaventuriana dell' illuminazione e la dottrina scotista dell' univocità," *Scholastica ratione historico-critica instauranda* (Rome: *Antonianum*, 1951), pp. 517—32.

⁴⁰ T. Barth, *art. cit.*, p. 92.

⁴¹ I *Metaph.*, 2, 7; VII: 43 b—44 a.

and Matthew, as well as Henry of Ghent, admit an innate knowledge which is nothing more than the soul's desire to know. Bonaventure and Matthew, however, also speak of a definite innate knowledge of God, angels, virtues, first principles and even of the soul itself.

All these Scholastics agree in rejecting any kind of Platonic innatism for knowledge of corporeal objects. Bonaventure and Matthew, however, admit of some kind of natural light which directs the mind in its search for knowledge of God, of first principles and of virtues. Henry takes a more hesitant stand on the whole question, yet he also postulates a kind of innate knowledge of first principles and the first notions of being, thing and necessity. Scotus, in line with his emphasis on the subject/object source of knowledge completely and clearly rejects any type of innate or impressed cognition. Noteworthy again is the gradual shift from the Augustinian to the Aristotelian view. There is no doubt that the development of the doctrine on innatism and the impressed species closely parallels the development on the illumination theory.

(To be continued)

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SOME BRIEF REMARKS CONCERNING THE *QUINQUE VIAE* OF SAINT THOMAS

In the *quinque viae* to the existence of God Saint Thomas claims to be arguing in an *a posteriori* manner. That is to say, he argues from things or actions which fall within the sphere of the natural, empirical experience of human beings to that Being on which all those things and actions depend. By reflection on the facts of experience the individual is able to discover 'the existential relationship of dependence of empirical realities on a being which transcends them.'¹ These facts of experience on which the *quinque viae* are based are held by Saint Thomas to be quite familiar to everyone. Consequently, the proofs do not require the discovery of any new empirical data, which the method of the natural sciences would call for. Nor is there any new discovery in these proofs such as an explorer might make in coming across as unknown river, mountain or the like. What is required is attention and reflection rather than research or exploration.

Such a point of view rather reminds me of some passages in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*. Consider just this one:

126. Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. — Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us.

One might also give the name "philosophy" to what is possible *before* all new discoveries and inventions.²

The point that Wittgenstein has in mind is that it is not the business of philosophy to add to our information, or yet to alter our language. Philosophy makes no difference of this sort. But it does make a difference in that by it we may achieve a clear view, a command, a grasp, of what was always there to be seen, but which had not been seen in all of its bearings and connexions. In this sense what is required in the understanding of the *quinque viae* is not discovery, but rather attention and reflection upon our experience and the way in which we speak about

¹ Copleston, F. C., *Aquinas*, Baltimore, Penguin Books., 1959. page 109.

² Wittgenstein, Ludwig, (G. E. M. Anscombe, translator), *Philosophical Investigations*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1959. 126.

this experience. We start from familiar facts. Mention of these facts is made in the *quinque viae* themselves. Let us review these.

In the *prima via* Saint Thomas says that 'it is certain, and it is clear from sense-experience, that some things in this world are moved.' We must be careful to understand the use of the term 'motion.' The saint is not referring *only* to local motion. Rather we must understand the term to be used in its broader sense of change. This is to say that from 'X could be Y' we can empirically infer 'Y, in fact is.' Or, in Thomistic terminology we say that the term 'motion' refers to a reduction from a state of potentiality to one of act.

In the *secunda via* the saint begins with the remarks that 'we find in material things an order of efficient causes.' In our experience of things and their relations to one another we are aware of efficient causality. Thus while in the *prima via* Saint Thomas begins with the fact that some things are in motion or a state of change, the *secunda via* is based upon the fact that some things act upon other things, as efficient causes.

As the starting point for the *tertia via* 'we find among things some which are capable of existing or not existing, since we find in things that some things come into being and pass away.' To put this in other terms some things are corruptible or perishable, and we notice this fact.

The *quarta via* notes that we 'find in things that some are more or less good and true and noble and so on [than are others].' We can make meaningful statements about this or that being better than something else.

Finally in the *quinta via* it is maintained that 'we see that some things which lack knowledge, namely natural bodies, act for an end, which is clear from the fact that they always or in most cases act in the same way, in order to attain what is best.'

There would seem to be little difficulty involved in grasping the meanings of the *a posteriori* propositions of the first three demonstrations. The last two *viae*, on the other hand, might cause some misunderstanding. They might generate some inclination to a misapprehension of the *a posteriori* propositions involved.

We are all accustomed to speak as though, e. g., there were different degrees of intelligence and intelligent capacity. 'Albert is smarter than Edward' is a perfectly meaningful statement in our discourse. It is true that in order to *estimate* the different degrees of intelligence we need some fixed point of reference, some standard. But this standard does not have to be very elaborate or complete. Nor does it always have to

be made explicit. Once given these standards we make statements which at least imply various degrees of perfection. You will notice the weakness of the claims I am making. Now, such statements refer to something which falls within *ordinary experience* and finds expression in *ordinary language*. This is how I believe we must understand the basic *a posteriori* statement of the *quarta via*. To go further than this at the beginning of the proof would be to say too much. While Saint Thomas develops later his position of 'ordered levels of being', such a doctrine might be argued by some to go beyond our ordinary experience, although it finds its foundations in ordinary experience.

In the *quinta via* the saint is beginning by drawing attention to the fact that we see things of different natures acting in such a way as to maintain a relatively stable order or system of nature about us. When he says that we see purely material things acting for an end, Saint Thomas is *not* maintaining that they act in a manner that is univocal to that in which human beings consciously act for definite purposes and ends. For the saint the behavior of material natural things is based on the 'form' of the various things in question. It is because of their form that these things co-operate, not consciously but as a matter of fact, in such a way that there is relatively stable order or system of nature. While it is not at once obvious to us that the "form" is the foundation for this ordering, at least the ordering of the system of nature is experienced by each of us. Further, this ordering is expressed in our ordinary language in a variety of ways. What we need to do is to analyse our experience and language. This calls for reflection and attention.

In considering the *quinque viae* it should be noticed that especially in the *prima*, *tertia*, *quarta*, and *quinta via* the term 'some' appears in the *a posteriori* statements. In the terms of modern logic these statements would be expressed with the use of the existential quantifier. One of the important consequences of this is that in the *quinque viae* we require only one instance of motion, contingency, degree of perfection, or unconscious action toward an end. We are not required to make universal statements of an *a posteriori* type. In that only one instance in each of these various cases is needed for the proofs the difficulty which may be experienced in regard to the proofs of the existence of God concerns not so much the empirical facts with which Saint Thomas starts as in seeing that these facts imply the existence of God. Here the key to the matter is the term 'imply'. Thus, I am led to say a few words about the idea of implication as it is found in these various proofs.

I hold the following comments to be of extreme importance in connection with the *quinque viae*.

It will be noted in a reading of the *quinque viae* that Saint Thomas does not use the term 'implication.' He rather speaks of 'proof' and 'demonstration.' Further, he here means by 'demonstration' a *demonstratio quia*, which is understood as a causal proof for the existence of God, proceeding from the affirmation of some empirical fact to the affirmation of a transcendent cause. Of course it is the *secunda via* which is, strictly speaking, the causal argument in the sense that it deals explicitly with the order of efficient causality. But in every proof the idea of ontological dependence on a transcendent cause appears in some form or other. It is the conviction of the saint that a full understanding of the empirical facts involved in the *quinque viae* means the understanding of the dependence of these facts on a transcendent cause. For example the fact that some things change can be made intelligible only if seen as dependent on a transcendent cause . . . a cause which does not itself belong to the order of changing things. Therefore, the statement 'there are some things that change, but there is nothing that is permanent in itself' would be held by Saint Thomas to be a blatant contradiction. Exactly what kind of contradiction is this? To point *this* out would be to clarify the meaning of the term 'implication.'

By way of comparison consider the statement, 'John is a bachelor, and is married.' This is a contradiction in terms. To see that the statement is a contradiction we do not have to wait and watch for an instance of a 'married bachelor.' We say that such a case is impossible in the same way that a 'round square' or a 'blue sound' is impossible, i. e., because of the very meanings of the terms involved and not because of any observable fact, or set of facts. On the other hand we have statements of the type 'men don't fly with their arms.' We say that this statement is perfectly true, but its truth value rests on observable facts. The truth or falsity of the statement does not rest on the presence or absence of a linguistic contradiction. True, men do not fly with their arms, but it *could* have been otherwise. Further, it *might* be otherwise at some distant point in the process of evolution . . . even if now we have very little, if any, evidence that might tend to support this possibility.

Now when we say that the statement 'there are some things which change, but there is nothing that is permanent in itself' is to count as a contradiction for Saint Thomas, we do *not* mean to say that it is a

contradiction in the same way that 'men *do* indeed fly with their arms' is a contradiction. Nor do we mean that it is a contradiction in the same way that the statement 'John is a bachelor, and is married' is a contradiction.

The key to our problem is to be found in what Saint Thomas understands by 'causal explanation.' First, he is not concerned with framing an empirical hypothesis to explain certain particular facts, though he is attempting to give the basis for all facts. The statement 'men don't fly with their arms' would be of this order of particular facts. The saint does not regard the statement affirming the existence of God as a causal hypothesis in the sense of being in principle revisable in the light of new empirical data, or one which might be replaced by a more economical hypothesis. We have already pointed out that in the *a posteriori* statements of the *quinque viae* only one example of each case is required for the proof in question. In the opinion of Saint Thomas no fresh scientific knowledge about the physical constitution of natural things could affect the validity of the various arguments. Perhaps added discovery of new cases agreeing with the *a posteriori* statements employed would strengthen the "rhetoric" of the argument, i. e., increase our propensity to agree with the argument. This, however, is a matter of psychology. It has nothing to do with the validity, as such, of the argument. Let us not confuse psychology and logic!

The saint did not look on a demonstration of the existence of God as an empirical hypothesis in the sense in which, e. g., the wave theory of light is said to be an empirical hypothesis. Neither should we be led astray by the illustrations which Aquinas often uses, as taken from the contemporary sciences of his day. These are used to attempt to clarify specific points for the reader. They are in no way meant to indicate that the *quinque viae* are to be considered as empirical hypotheses in the modern sense of the term.

Is this to say that Saint Thomas thinks of the existence of God as being logically implied by facts such as motion, change, and so forth? In a word does our very use of the term 'change' in a purely logical way imply that there must exist that which is in itself unchangeable? No. This would become particularly clear if one were to notice how parallel such thinking is to that employed in the Ontological Argument of Saint Anselm of Canterbury, as understood by Saint Thomas. The entailment of the facts of motion, change, and so forth, and the existence of God is not one of pure logic and definition of terms.

Saint Thomas does not regard the statement 'there are things which come into being and pass away' as logically entailing the statement 'there is an absolutely necessary independent being' in the sense that affirmation of the former statement and denial of the latter involves one in a verbal or formal linguistic contradiction. But he does think that metaphysical analysis of what it objectively means to be a thing which comes into being and passes away displays the fact that such a thing must depend existentially on an absolutely necessary being . . . *et hoc dicimus Deum*. Further, he does think that metaphysical analysis of what it objectively means to be a changing thing shows that such a thing depends on a supreme unmoved mover, and once again . . . *et hoc dicimus Deum*. It follows, for Aquinas, that someone is involved in a contradiction if he affirms the statements 'there are things which change' and 'there are things which come into being and pass away,' and at the same time denies the statements 'there is a supreme unmoved mover' and 'there is an absolutely necessary being.' But the contradiction in question can be made apparent only by means of metaphysical analysis. For the entailment in question is fundamentally an ontologically causal one.

A type of criticism which would be expected to be forthcoming against this position held by Saint Thomas is that he is certainly confusing and muddling the distinctions between causal relations and logical entailment. Only by doing this, it will be claimed, could he even attempt to carry out his bizarre arguments. But let us recall a few important points to mind. Aquinas is convinced that the statement asserting that everything which begins to exist has some cause is absolutely certain. Yet he does not think that the existence of any finite thing entails the existence of any other finite thing in the sense that the existence of any finite thing can be said to entail the existence of God. To put the matter in another way, if we once admit that there is an omnipotent Creator, we can say that He could create and maintain in existence any finite thing without the existence of any other finite thing. But it does not follow that there can be any finite thing without God. This amounts to saying that Saint Thomas is not required to produce other instances of the ontologically causal entailment which he asserts between the existence of finite things and God. Though the relation of finite things to God is in some way analogous to the relation of causal dependence of one finite thing upon another, the first relation is, if we consider it as such, unique. Aquinas is, therefore, not confusing causal relations in general with logical entailment. He is drawing our attention

to a quite unique relation between finite things and the transcendent cause on which they depend. And in doing *this* he also provides the ground by which we may make cognitively meaningful statements about God.

Let us now, after these general remarks, turn our attention to a closer examination of each of the *quinque viae*. In the *prima via* Saint Thomas argues that motion or change is to be understood as the reduction of a thing from a state of potentiality to a state of actuality. Further, a thing cannot be reduced from potentiality to actuality unless it is moved by another agent already in act. It is in this sense that we must understand the statement 'everything which is moved must be moved by another.' He concludes that in order to avoid an infinite regress in this progression of movers, the existence of a first unmoved mover is necessary . . . 'and this everyone understands to be God.'

In the second of these arguments Aquinas considers things not as being moved, but as active agents of higher efficient causes. From the first *a posteriori* statement he argues that there is a hierarchy of efficient causes, a subordinate cause being dependent on the cause "above" it in the hierarchy. He then proceeds, after excluding the hypothesis of an infinite regress, to draw the conclusion that there must be a first efficient cause . . . 'to which everyone gives the name of God.'

Before proceeding let us reflect upon several points mentioned in the first two arguments. In the first place it is essential to realize that Aquinas supposes that movement or change is dependent on a mover acting here and now, and that in the second argument he supposes that there are efficient causes in the world which even in their causal activities are here and now dependent upon the causal activities of other causes. This point is implied in the uses of the terms 'hierarchy' and 'series.' This brings us to the subject of an 'infinite regress.' Let us attempt to ascertain what the saint means by this term 'infinite regress.'

In each of the first three arguments Saint Thomas denies the possibility of an infinite regress. When he denies an infinite regress, this is not to deny the possibility of an infinite series. Z is sired by Y, who is sired by X, who is sired by W, possibly *ad infinitum*. Neither is he denying a mathematical infinite series. What Aquinas is denying is the possibility of an infinite series in the order of ontologically causal dependence. This is to say that given any series, it must depend upon something outside of that series for an explanation of the fact that it exists. To say that something outside the series is needed in order to explain the series would be too weak a statement. The reason for this is that we can explain something

essentially without a consideration of its ontological status, i. e., of its existence. The ground of the existence of any series must be something existing necessarily outside of the series. Further, the series, for its existence, must be dependent upon this necessary ground. The necessary ground of the existence of the series, however, is in no way dependent for its existence upon the series. Such an ordering of necessary ontological dependence is termed a 'hierarchy.' It is the possible infinite regression of a hierarchy that is denied by Saint Thomas.

The meaning of the rejection of an infinite regression should now be clearer. Aquinas is not rejecting the possibility of an infinite *series* as such. He does think that no one has ever succeeded in showing in principle the impossibility of an infinite series of events stretching back into the past, or projecting into the future. We remember that the statements dealing with the creation of the world *ex nihilo* are basically statements of faith, not demonstration. He does not, therefore, mean to rule out the possibility of an infinite series of causes and effects, in which a given member depends on the proceeding member, but which does not, once it exists, depend here and now on the present causal activity of the proceeding member. To use a pictorial metaphor Aquinas is not denying the possibility of an infinite *horizontal* series, but of a *vertical* hierarchy in which a lower member depends here and now on the present causal activity of the member above it. He rejects this on the ground that unless there is a first member, e. g., a mover which is not itself moved or a cause which is not itself caused, then it is not possible to account for the existence of the motion or the causal activity of the lower members. Suppress the first unmoved mover, and there is no motion here and now. But this is blatantly contradictory to our senses, and to the expressions of our ordinary language. The same sort of reasoning is applied to the suppression of a first efficient cause. Here again let it be pointed out that the term 'first' does not mean first in a temporal order, but rather we are to understand it as meaning first or supreme in the ontological order.

Another important term already mentioned in this paper and which is important to the understanding of the position of Saint Thomas in the *quinque viae* is that of 'cause.' As against Hume, Aquinas holds that there is real causal efficacy and real causal relations. Neither does he agree with Kant that the cause-effect relation finds its ground in the understanding of rational beings. The saint certainly does not maintain that causal efficacy is an object proper to the senses, e. g., of sight, or any other of the single senses. We do not perceive causal efficacy as we perceive color or sound. But, nevertheless, Saint Thomas would make the

claim that the human being is in some way aware of real causal relations. Further, if we understand the term 'perception' as meaning the co-operation of both sense and intellect in a single action, we can say that we perceive causality. It is not unlikely that Aquinas would have argued against Hume on at least two counts. First, from the very point of experience itself; and second, from the point of usage of terms in our language. Against the claim that a phenomenalist explanation of causality is quite sufficient for the purposes of the physical sciences, he might retort that even granting this point, it proves nothing against the validity of a metaphysical notion of causality.

Saint Thomas commences in the *tertia via* from a statement of contingency. Some things come into being and then perish. From this he first concludes that it is possible for these things to exist or not to exist. In a word, they do not necessarily exist. He then argues that it is impossible for things of this kind always to exist, 'for that which can not-be at some time is not.' From this it follows, according to the saint, that if all things were of this kind, at some time there would have been absolutely nothing. But this is obviously incorrect, for if at one time there had been absolutely nothing, there would be nothing now. The reason that some contingent things now exist is because of the existence of some prior and necessary thing. There is some necessary thing which guarantees the existence of some contingent thing at any time x you please. The term 'necessary' now becomes important.

Perhaps this being is necessary in the sense that it must exist if something else exists. As such, its necessity would be hypothetical, i. e., if x, y, z exist, then A must exist. But it is clear that we cannot proceed to infinity in the hierarchy of necessary beings. For then we would not be able to explain things here and now in our experience . . . things which are capable of existing and not existing. We must, therefore, affirm the existence of a being which is absolutely necessary *per se* . . . 'This all men speak of as God.'

In contradistinction to the preference Saint Thomas gives to the *prima via* in calling it the *via manifestior* I should like to maintain that the *tertia via* is quite basic to all of the rest. This is due to the notion of contingency introduced here. Looking carefully at the other proofs, we see that the notion of contingency is applied in particular circumstances. In the *prima via* it is applied to the special fact of motion or change, in the *secunda via* to the order of causality or causal efficacy, in the *quarta* to degrees of perfection, and lastly in the *quinta* to finality, i. e., to the co-operation of natural non-rational objects in the attainment of some

cosmic order. The argument from contingency itself is based on the presupposition that everything must have its sufficient reason, i. e., the reason why it exists. Change or motion must have its sufficient reason in an unmoved mover, the series of secondary causes⁸ and effects in an uncaused cause, limited perfection in absolute perfection, and finality and order in nature in an Intelligence or Designer.

In the *quarta via* Aquinas argues that there are degrees of perfection in things. Different kinds of finite things possess different perfections in diverse limited degrees. He then argues not only that if there are different degrees of perfection like goodness there is a supreme⁹ good to which all other good things approximate, but also that all limited degrees of goodness are caused by the supreme good. Further, since good is convertible with being, a thing is good insofar as it has being, i. e., insofar as it is. Therefore, the supreme good is the supreme being and the cause of every perfection in all other things . . . 'and this we call God.'

The term of the *quarta via* is a Being which transcends all sensible objects. As such, the perfections in question can only be those perfections which are capable of subsisting by themselves. In a word they must not involve any necessary relation to extension or to quantity. The argument is seemingly Platonic in origin, and as such presupposes the notion of 'participation.' Contingent beings do not possess their being *per se*, nor their goodness. They "receive" these perfections. The ultimate cause of perfection must itself be perfect. It cannot receive its perfection from another cause. It must be its own perfection. If this were not the case, then there would be an infinite regress of the ontological and axiological order. But to say this is to deny any degree of perfection in finite things. But this is contrary to our experience. The argument of the *quarta via* is therefore, in spite of its Platonic flavor, a particular application of general principles already discussed in this paper.

Like the rest of the various proofs, we must not consider the *quarta via* in connection with either causal relations or logical entailment in the modern senses of these terms. Rather it must be understood in terms of ontological entailment. To view the argument in the first manner would be to deny it any necessity. To attempt to understand it in terms of pure logical entailment would be to deny the proof of any actual existing being. As such, the *quarta via* would become a form of an "Ontological Argument." Further, it must be noted that Saint Thomas is not here speaking purely of the use of words in our ordinary language. If he were, the following type of criticism would be valid against the *quarta via*.

"Surely we use terms like 'good,' 'better,' and 'best' in our language. But to use these words correctly is not to maintain that there is an absolute best. In fact it is simply a *non sequitur* to say that there is. Further, because we use a term correctly in our language it does not follow that the term names any *thing* at all. What *thing* does 'Zeus' name? Nothing! To say that because we use the term 'best' and the term 'good,' there must be something absolute which these terms name is to maintain the worst sort of confusion. To say that because we use such terms as 'best' there must be a Best is a confusion of the operation of our language. To then proceed and claim that this Best names something, like a Platonic form, is even a worse muddle."

This type of argument does not hold against the *quarta via* for the simple reason that Saint Thomas is not talking about ordinary language and our use of it. Neither is he talking in terms of ordinary language. He *is* talking about what he believes to be an empirical fact, viz., degrees of perfection in finite objects, which find their expression *in* language, but which are not dependent *on* language. If we were to speak of dependence, it is our language which is dependent for its development and basic structure on the facts of our experience. To hold the reverse of this would be for Aquinas the "muddled point of view." Surely, we must attend and reflect upon our language, the saint might say, but this is because our language finds its roots in the facts of our experience. It is this experience of the world that is fundamental. And from this experience we can proceed to a transcendent Being.

Finally: the *quinta via* may be stated in the following manner. The activity and behavior of each thing is determined by its form. But we observe material things of very different types co-operating in such a manner as to produce and maintain a relatively stable order in the world about us. They achieve an end which is the production and maintenance of this order. But non-intelligent material things certainly do not co-operate consciously in view of a purpose. To say that they do realize a purpose or an end is not to say that they do this in a way analogous to that in which a man can act consciously with a view to the achievement of a purpose. Nor is it to refer to things of this sort, i. e., non-intelligent material things, as being useful to the human race, and gaining their purpose from this usefulness. I do not say that something has a purpose if and only if it is useful to me. It is the unconscious co-operation of different kinds of non-intelligent material things in the production and maintenance of a relatively stable cosmic system that Aquinas is thinking about . . . not the benefits we receive from our use of certain objects.

From this point he argues that such co-operation certainly entails the existence of a final cause *per se* . . . 'and this being we call God.'

A difficulty which might be offered against the *quinta via* is that it presupposes an ordered world, and that this order is by no means simply and only a fact of experience. One would do well here to notice John Wisdom's essay, "Gods." But such a remark is really founded in a basic confusion. To attempt to make this type of confusion clear I shall introduce the use of two terms, 'external finality' and 'internal finality.' Their meanings will become clearer in my use of them.

To ask why there are storms, sicknesses, harmful events might imply two sorts of answers. The first of these would be of a scientific nature. We would cite empirical reasons. Some of these reasons would be more complete than others, but perhaps an absolutely complete listing for any case could not in principle be given. Further, for the scientist such an absolutely complete list is not required. He is concerned with proximate causes of particular events. Or the question might be put in a moral tone of voice in this way . . . 'why was the storm so destructive to so many people? Surely if nature were well ordered this would not have happened.' But to ask this type of question is not to ask any question at all, for *in principle* there is no answer to the question. And perhaps the person uttering these words did not even intend for them to be anything more than emotive sounds which have the outward grammatical appearance of a question. But, at any rate, Saint Thomas would say that is a mystery to us, i. e., why so many good people were harmed by the storm. To say otherwise would be to claim that the finite mind of man could know the divine plans of God. This amounts to saying that in principle we can find no answer such as would be required to answer the question 'why was the storm so destructive to so many people?' From this it follows that the question is not a properly formed question at all. But in both cases, i. e., the scientific and the moral-tone, I have been considering external finality. We have seen in the first case that only proximate reasons are given, and that in the second case we really have no question at all. Thus, the second case can be eliminated from our philosophical discussion as an extremely bad confusion. But in order for the *quinta via* to maintain any validity we certainly require more than proximate causes. As a matter of fact, we do not have to rely upon external finality for this argument.

It is quite sufficient to the *quinta via* that we should be able to establish the fact of internal finality. This we can do. For example we do know that the eye is constructed for the purpose of seeing, the ear for the purpose

of hearing, a mosquito bites for the purpose of nourishing itself. Knowledge such as this is sufficient for the starting point of the *quinta via* of the existence of God. And in fact, as has been pointed out already in this paper, only one such example of internal finality would be sufficient for this proof. Here I have already suggested three!

Neither is this internal ordering to be explained by chance. To attempt to explain this order in the cosmos by chance is simply unsound. Certainly we can say in a sense that chance exists, that it is. But to make this statement is to presuppose the existence of the essential. Our very use of the term 'chance' implies that there is at least relative stability and order. If not, what meaning could the term 'chance' have? On the other hand we do not need to rely upon our use of the term 'chance' to understand 'order.' To argue from a non-linguistic point of view we might say the following. Chance is no more than the coming together of two causes as they attempt to pursue their own purposes or ends. As such, chance is an accident which happens to the essential. If everything happened by chance, all of nature would be reduced to the level of the accidental. Things would not be essentially what they are, but only accidentally so.

But such an explanation is a contradiction. It is an attempt to explain the greater by the less, the perfect by the imperfect, order by the lack of order, grammar by using no grammar. It is to make a statement of the type 'to have order is to have no order.' What we have is a self-contradictory statement of the general type 'John is a bachelor, and is married.' Here we have an attempt to identify opposites.

It is important, then, to keep in mind the distinction between what I have called 'internal finality' and 'external finality.' By doing this we will avoid many pitfalls in any discussion of the *quinque viae*.

In closing I shall raise one more important question in connection with the *quinque viae*. In each of these arguments we find final statements such as, '*... et hoc omnes intelligunt Deum,*' and '*... quod omnes dicunt Deum.*' Now it might be argued that even if it be granted that there is a first unmoved mover, a first efficient cause, an absolutely necessary being, and all of the rest as understood in this paper, still it does not follow that in any immediate way these can be identified with God. To make such an attempt would surely be a *non sequitur*. After all the Christian God is a bit more than an unmoved mover.

In answering such an objection I might first of all point out that the *quinta via* concludes with the affirming of a transcendent intelligent being, and that the *quarta via* certainly at least implies that the supremely perfect being possesses the absolute perfection of intelligence. By fol-

lowing such a *modus operandi* and taking the *quinque viae* in conjunction with one another through their overlapping areas, it is the existence of one supreme being which is being affirmed by Aquinas. It may also be pointed out that, once given Saint Thomas's analysis of motion or change and of efficient causality, the first unmoved mover and the first efficient cause must transcend the level of empirical causes for the very reason that it is unmoved, uncaused and independent. And it is true to say that this is what we mean when we use the term 'God,' in the sense that all who acknowledge the existence of a transcendent, supreme and uncaused cause do in fact recognize this as being divine. At the same time Saint Thomas surely realizes that the notions of a first cause, a first unmoved mover, an absolutely necessary being, are not *all* that is generally meant by the term 'God.' He, therefore, proceeds in the following sections of the *Summa Theologica* to argue that this being has certain attributes. So it might be well said, if we are looking for the saint's complete establishment of theism, we have to take the *quinque viae* in conjunction with the succeeding sections concerning the divine attributes. Finally, in the Question and Article (Ia, 2, 3) of the *Summa* dealing with the *quinque viae*, Saint Thomas is asking how we are able to prove the existence of God. In answer to *this* question he gives five conclusions, *any one of which is sufficient* for his immediate purpose.

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EARLY PORTRAITURE OF SAINT FRANCIS

Each family cherishes the representations of its progenitors whether the likenesses be sketches, portraits done in oil, daguerreotypes, ferrotypes or photographs produced by the contemporary polaroid-land method. Hence it is but natural that the Franciscan family — First, Second or Third Order Secular and Regular — reveres the portraits of its founder, St. Francis.

Thirteenth century art knew little or nothing of what today we term portraiture for at that time art was rather symbolic. When an individual was depicted, it was not for the purpose of showing his natural visage but rather the work was intended to reveal some ideal or some aspect of his character. Just as everything human is in a state of evolution, so, too, the art of representation of the human form passed through and is still undergoing various transitions and stages. As may be expected the early artistic achievements in connection with St. Francis were both austere and conventional while later ones approximated Our Holy Father Francis' appearance.

Quite naturally his portrayals fall into more or less well defined stages. The initial one embraces the likenesses executed prior to the composition of the *Legenda minor* and the *Legenda maior* of St. Bonaventure. The earliest painting with which we are acquainted is a full-length figure on the wall of the *Sacro Speco* at Subiaco. Examination of it has led to an opinion among critics which is almost certain that it was painted in 1228, or approximately two years after the death of St. Francis. It is a work of extreme simplicity, wherein the Poverello is shown wearing the holy habit of the Minorites and having his hood drawn over his head. The Saint bears in his left hand a scroll partially unrolled upon which appear the words *Pax huic domui*. It is worth noting that the picture omits both the Stigmata and the halo. In one of the upper portions of the study are to be found the abbreviated forms (palaeographic symbols) for *Frater Franciscus*. The use of the term 'Frater' has led to some differences of opinion in regard to the dating of this cherished piece of early *Franciscana*. Some hold that the use of this term indicates that the work was completed prior to the death of the Poor Man of Assisi (October 3/4, 1224) because almost immediately after

the decease of Francis a cult in his honor arose and he was referred to as 'Saint.' Other reputable critics tenaciously advance the view that an earlier date is to be held as valid because the absence of the Stigmata shows that the work was painted prior to the bestowal of this singular favor on Francis.

Also coming from the First Stage of early portraiture of St. Francis is a strange painting depicting the Poverello in profile and weeping copiously. It is a generally held opinion that this treasure was produced shortly after the one found at Subiaco which has just been discussed. Tradition informs us that this was the artistic creation of the Lady Giacomo de Settisoli, who was the Roman friend of St. Francis who supplied him with the almond cookies for which he had such a liking, and the one that Francis requested to appear at his bedside when he was dying. It is a typical work of the earliest attempts to delineate the Saint and it lacks the humaneness and amiable characteristics so much a part of him who preached to the birds as well as to the other specimens of God's creation.

A further early pictorial representation of the Franciscan founder is to be seen in a manuscript kept at Cambridge University Library. This text is a part of a collection attributed to Alexander Neckham and it is believed to be of early thirteenth century origin. At least one folio of this work is spurious and it is quite evidently an insertion since it has no relation to the rest of the manuscript. In the illustration, St. Francis is shown as having the tonsure. He wears a hood and he is bearded. In his hands he holds a book and on the hands are the marks of the wounds.

All three of these very early paintings show St. Francis as a simple, humble creature. Absent are the mien of the ascetic and the saint, suggesting that these works were brought forth before the cult of the Saint had been established.

The Second Stage embraces those paintings executed after the official *Lives* of the Saint had been written. The first representative of this period may be dated 1235 and it is recognized as coming from the brush of Bonaventure Berlinghieri. Today this likeness of Our Holy Father Saint Francis is to be found at Pescia near Lucca. This work typifies a whole group of similar compositions. The Saint is the central figure and on both sides of him are certain scenes from his life. There is marked contrast between the Francis of this picture and those of the precious period for in the earlier division the Little Brother who loved all creatures is especially discernable as a simple, loving figure, while in the present work he is repelling and forbidding of countenance. The scenes of his

life shown on either side of him depict those incidents given prominence by Brother Elias and include the Stigmata, the sermon to the birds and some of the miracles of healing performed by St. Francis. The whole composition highlights the miraculous activity of the Saint and relegates simplicity and the dramatic to a secondary consideration.

A further representative of this period comes from Giunta Pisano, who in 1236 aided in the decoration of the Lower Church of the Basilica of St. Francis. A panel very similar to the one painted by Bonaventure Berlinghieri was produced by Pisano but in the latter the central figure, again St. Francis, is not a stylized, conventional figure but is much more appealing and human. The ascetical qualities of the Saint are emphasized by sunken eyes, hollow cheeks, and an emaciated countenance. The rest of the panel is devoted to illustrating some of the miracles attributed to the Saint.

If we place the representative painting of the First and Second Stages alongside each other, we readily discern a marked distinction between the two stages. There is a transition from humility, simplicity and poverty characteristic of the early time to a sharply emphasized ascetical, spiritual and miraculous tendency of the second due to the influence of the *Vita Prima* of Thomas of Celano.

The next stage embraces the years 1240 to 1255, or approximately from the conclusion of the Generalate of Brother Elias to that of St. Bonaventure. A work that aptly illustrates the painting of this period is to be found painted on the wall of the Church of Santa Croce in Florence. Here we find that the Saint is the conventional, ascetic figure but the whole theme of the composition is definitely centered around the dramatic, and the miraculous plays only a minor role.

Of like character is a painting to be found in Siena where the Poverello is surrounded by eight scenes from his apostolic endeavors. Again austerity and the dramatic are the keynotes which totally obliterate the miraculous.

The evolution from the Second Stage to the one under consideration can be explained by the fact that in the minds of his followers an alteration had occurred. At the outset the Little Brother was remembered for his piety and miracles and Brother Elias labored to foster these qualities to promote reverence for and devotion to the Seraphic Saint. In time, the Brothers felt that while these characteristics were true, they alone did not represent Francis to the fullest and in order to supply what was lacking they included not only his humility, simplicity and piety but endeavored to express in addition his spirit of renunciation, his

early struggles, his originality and the manner in which he won the approval of the Papacy. So it was to come about that each stage represented different facets of the Founder of the Lesser Brothers.

The final stage covers approximately the years 1255 to 1300. During these forty-five years the Upper Church of the great Basilica built in Francis' honor was completed and decorated by artists of exceptional talent.

Of note is a particularly touching portrait of the Saint by Cimabue which brings out to a remarkable degree the tenderness, simplicity and the humility which are captured better by this artist than by any previous one.

The *Legenda maior* of St. Bonaventure was the inspiration for some justly celebrated frescoes by the great Giotto. This work executed in 1296 clearly shows the dramatic element in the life of the Saint. In 1320 the same artist painted another group of frescoes centering around the Poverello for the Church of Santa Croce in Florence. We are doubtful about the source of inspiration for this series wherein the Saint appears more youthful and animated by the spirit of joy. There have been many conjectures as to the motivation in regard to these exquisite works. Some art critics firmly hold the source of inspiration to have been the writings of Brother Leo, while other equally qualified art connoisseurs advance opinions favoring the *Fioretti* and even the *Speculum Perfectionis* as the well-springs from which Giotto drew his superb depictions.

However doubtful the source for the frescoes just mentioned, it is authenticated that Giotto found inspiration in the *Sacrum commercium* for an allegorical series based on Francis' wooing, winning and espousing of Lady Poverty. This famous series, completed before 1330, is to be found over the High Altar in the Lower Church of the Basilica and beautifully illustrates the vows Poverty, Chastity, Obedience and a fourth scene displays the glorification of St. Francis.

This final stage shows us a St. Francis as infinitely more human than in any of the other divisions and the dramatic is a highlight of each portrait represented in this division.

We conclude the classification of the early portraits of the Seraphic Founder around 1300 because for at least another century there were no significant attempts to portray the Saint.

SISTER M. ANTHONY BROWN, O. S. F.

FRANCISCAN ILLUMINATION IN LATIN MSS. 29—31 OF JOHN RYLANDS LIBRARY, MANCHESTER

What's wrong with our present civilization?

There must be something wrong, when mass media like the *Saturday Evening Post* and the *Saturday Review* pay money to prominent "authorities" to write articles, while the Foundation for Adult Education spends seventy-five million dollars in ten years to make adult Americans think about their own thinking.

The other day, browsing in our library in a big book with excellent illustrations, I personally found one answer. I think possibly one part of what is 'wrong' with our culture is an oldfashioned disease known as "pride of intellect."

The very complication of our I.B.M. civilization has bred the cult of the specialist, the pessimism of the average man.

What the big book¹ taught me was that a bare-footed little Grey Friar, back in the 14th Century, in a little Italian city, without benefit of a slide-rule or a computer or electrical brain, solved, (two centuries ahead of Mercator or Leonardo da Vinci) the problem of portraying a spherical figure on a plane surface.

The evidence and proof is contained in three very valuable mediaeval volumes on vellum in the John Rylands Library in Manchester, England. Their title is *Postilla super omnes libros bibliae tam veteris tam novi testamenti*, by Nicolaus de Lyra, (1270—1340). Nicolaus was a Franciscan of whom the Jesuit Hugo Hurter wrote in *Nomenclator Litterarius*: „Hätte Lyra nicht über die Bibel geschrieben, wäre mancher Doktor ein Esel geblieben."

This sprightly couplet refers to the friar's chef d'oeuvre, the first complete Commentary on the Bible. He wrote it while a Franciscan professor at the University of Paris. The John Rylands copy (made before Gutenberg invented printing) was written by a Franciscan scribe and the elaborate picture-borders of each page were 'illuminated' by a brother-Franciscan.

¹ *Descriptive Catalogue of Latin Manuscripts in the John Rylands Library at Manchester, (England)*. N. Y., Longmans, Green. 1921. 2 vol.

Moreover, unwittingly, the artist-illuminator, on one leaf of vellum, folio 123, recto and verso, has left us a holograph note, revealing not only his knowledge of Scripture, but also his integrity and perseverance in his art, and his possession of the faculty styled today 'eidetic imagery.'² There are very clear reproductions of the two pages, 123a and 123b in the *Descriptive Catalogue of Latin Manuscripts of the John Rylands Library at Manchester*³ (Plates 67, 68, Vol. II) and a detailed collation (Vol. I, Pp 81—87).

In the colophon of each volume, as rendered in the Catalogue, is the statement that the work was done by order of Pandolfo di Malatesta (1377—1427), "der Soeldnerfuehrer und Kunstmaecen."⁴ The Malatesta family were Lords of Rimini and Pesaro for 250 years, as leaders of the Guelf faction in Italy's long civil wars, until in 1445, they sold their rights to the Sforza family. Pesaro itself, on the right bank of the river Foglia where it meets the Adriatic sea, was a walled city until 1830. While his elder brother ruled, Pandolfo was a soldier of fortune, possibly a university student since he was not more than 18 years old when he commissioned the Franciscans of Pesaro to write and illuminate for him the *Postilla* of Nicholas of Lyra. In 1416, Pandolfo inherited the dukedom at his brother's death and presumably lived at the ducal palace of Rimini.

A note at the end of each volume, dated 23 March, 1459, states that Louis de Gonzaga, (1414—1478) Marquis of Mantua, gave the three volumes to the Franciscan monastery at Mantua, "*ad fratrum ibidem commorantium usum et spiritualem consolationem.*" Since the mother of Louis was Paula Malatesta, (d. 1452) he probably inherited the codices through her. According to the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (13th edition), Louis was "a celebrated soldier and also a learned and liberal prince, a patron of literature and the arts."

Mantua was besieged by Napoleon in 1796; it would be permissible to speculate whether the vellum *Postilla* disappeared from the Mantua Franciscan Monastery as war loot, as did another manuscript, an illuminated *Antiphonal*, now at St. Bonaventure University which had been in the Franciscan monastery at Bologna from 1476 to 1796. The

² English, Horace and Ava: *A comprehensive dictionary of Psychological . . . terms*. N. Y., Longmans, Green. 1958. P. 173. "A peculiarly vivid type of imagery; it is practically as though the subject were actually perceiving, although in general he realizes that the imaged object is not literally present to the senses."

³ James, Montague Rhodes, ed. (title as above). N. Y., Longmans, Green, 1921.

⁴ Brockhaus' *Konversations-Lexikon*. (Berlin, 1894) Band XI, 519. (Leader of mercenaries and patron of the arts.)

Preface of the John Rylands Catalogue states that the *Postilla* codices came to the library in Manchester in 1901, from the library of the Earl of Crawford and Balcarres, (1812—1880) and were formerly kept at Haigh Hall.

Illustrious as are the associations of the *Postilla* codices with great military leaders and patrons of art and literature, the Franciscan associations are even more interesting to us at St. Bonaventure University.

Nicolaus de Lyra, a Frenchman born in Normandy, entered the Franciscan Order at Verneuil in 1291, studied at the University of Paris, received his doctorate and was teaching at the Sorbonne by 1309. He was Provincial of his Order in France from 1319; became Provincial of Burgundy in 1325. That was the year that Queen Jeanne of Burgundy, widow of Philip V of France, died. She had named Nicolaus executor of her will, empowering him to sell her Paris residence, the Tower of Nesle, in order to found a College of Burgundy at the University of Paris. Nicolaus thenceforth lived in the College of Burgundy until his death, which Hurter gives as 1340, although other sources make his dates 1245—1349.⁵

Nicolaus (*Doctor planus et utilis*), according to the colophon of the *Postilla*, was learned in "ydiomatum hebreorum, grecorum, caldeorum, sicque latinorum."⁶ His knowledge of Hebrew was so excellent that by the 15th century it was rumored that he had been a Jewish convert to the Catholic faith. This, however, is considered a pure legend.

The name of the Franciscan scribe at the Pesaro monastery who wrote the text in a clear hand in two columns of 68 lines for a total of ff. 735, or 1470 vellum pages, is given in the colophon as Ugolino Marini Gibertuzzi of Sarnano.⁷ Completed in April, 1402, the work must have been several years in progress.

No mention is made of any other friar concerned in the work, although it would be unusual for one man to be both scribe and illuminator of such a monumental work. However, on f. 123a a miniature of Ezekiel's vision has manifestly been inserted at the time the scribe was working on the text, for there are 70 lines in the left-hand column and only 35½ lines in the righthand column. The oblong miniature extends approximately 2 mm into the right hand margin and 4 mm into the bottom

⁵ *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (Chicago, 1958) XVI, 429.

⁶ Vide Hurter, *op. cit.* *Catholic Encyclopedia* (1913) XI, 63.

⁷ Scripta per fratrem uolinum marini gibertutii de sarnano alumpnum ordinis ante dicti minorum provintie marchie. (John Rylands Catalogue) *op. cit.* Vol. I, p. 81.

margin. Moreover, f. 123b has no text, and seems to have been in the hands of the illuminator while the scribe continued writing the text on the next leaf of vellum.

As Bland says, the middle of the 14th Century was a turning point in the history of illumination. "The time of the virtuoso had arrived and he disdained to copy other men's works."⁸ The illuminator of the *Postilla* was a virtuoso with a truly Franciscan approach to Nature. We see none of the exaltation of man-built castles, or of the portrayal of contemporary costume and secular occupations such as are found in the more sophisticated work in France of Pol de Limbourg or Jean Fouquet. We do not find in the *Postilla* the delicate, formalized ivy-leaf borders used by the contemporary Jean Pucelle, nor even the formalized 'Italianate' foliage border such as in the 1409 Gradual in the Laurentian Library at Florence, said to be done by the Dominican Fra Angelico.

The Franciscan artist has broken away from the Byzantine influence of neighboring Venice; and has not succumbed to the Gothic school⁷ of a contemporary like the Flemish Bertram von Minden (1345—1415).⁹ Instead there is a Romanesque feeling in his forms, with a refreshing realism in the figures of flowers, beasts, butterflies in the borders, and a lively concept of the Biblical stories.

An excellent example of the latter is found in the Book of Tobias. Two medallions in the lower border of f. 150b show (right) the son Tobias leaving on his journey, while his little dog barks and mother Anna tries to hold him back; and (left) the return of Tobias to his father, with the dog joyously recognizing him "fawning and wagging his tail."¹⁰ The border of this leaf includes a beautiful swallowtail butterfly just emerged from its chrysalis. It could almost take wing and fly off the page!

There may be a clue in the next scenes from Tobias as to how the scribe and the illuminator worked. It would seem that the illuminator at times worked ahead of the scribe in painting the borders, for on both f. 150b and f. 163, the text is of *Kings* but the scenes are from *Tobias*. On f. 163b, at right is seen Sara, the future wife of young Tobias in her chamber awaiting him,¹¹ while (left) Tobias is boiling the huge fish

⁸ Bland, David: *A history of book illustration*. N. Y., World Pub. Co. 1958, p. 61.

⁹ Keller, Hilgart & Cichy, Bodo: *Twenty Centuries of Great Painting*. N. Y., Sterling Pub. Co., 1957.

¹⁰ Tobias, xi, 9—10.

¹¹ Tobias, vii, 18—19. The English collator, Montague Rhodes James, working at Cambridge University, and presumably using the King James version of the Bible, does not identify the scenes from Tobias. "At bottom

whose liver and gall were to be such powerful medicines. The birds of this border include a peacock, crane and pair of mourning doves. An initial on the same leaf, of a seated prophet in flowing damask robe, holding a scroll with Hebraic characters, again illustrates the friar-artist's close acquaintance with Scripture: "a hand was sent to me wherein was a book rolled up and he spread it before me and it was written within and without."¹²

The above-mentioned instances will serve as examples of the general tenor of the artist's work. Most revelatory, however, are the two leaves, f. 123a, which contain the artist's personal note of his problem, in his own handwriting; and f. 123b on which he has resolved the problem most ingeniously a century in advance of the genius of Leonardo da Vinci (1452—1519) or Gerhard Mercator (1512—1594).

The miniature of f. 123a, which occupies the lower half of the right-hand column, has a simple border of scallops, or half-moons with no floral border on the page. It represents an attempt to visualize the vision described by the prophet: To grasp the artist's dilemma, the relevant passage is here quoted:

"I saw, and behold . . . a great cloud . . . and in the midst thereof the likeness of four living creatures . . . there was the likeness of a man in them. Everyone had four faces, and everyone four wings. Their feet were straight feet . . . and they sparkled like the appearance of glowing brass. And they had the hands of a man under their wings on their four sides . . . and as for the likeness of their faces: there was the face of a man, and the face of a lion on the right side . . . and the face of an ox and the face of an eagle over all . . . And above the firmament that was over their heads, the likeness of a throne (and) . . . the appearance of a man upon it."¹³

In the miniature on f. 123, the artist has drawn only one cherub, or 'living creature,' with four heads crowded between the two upper wings, and four hands. The feet are not shown. Above the firmament, sits God in a throne that has lion-headed arms. God holds a Tree¹⁴ in His right hand, and an orb, divided into quarters by two 'equators' in His left. The introduction of the Tree strengthens the idea that the illuminator was a friar, familiar with the breviary as well as the Scriptures. It is not mentioned by the prophet, but it symbolizes both the Tree of

L. youth carrying tree on his shoulder, man and dog attack him; R. a similar scene, with two dogs and man pulling at tree. (* f. 150b). "Youth in red stands in water, a fish on his shoulder which he makes to drink out of a red vessel on L. R., a woman in blue and vermilion seated nursing a red object and looking to L. (* f. 163). *John Rylands Library Catalogue*, Vol. I, 84.

¹² Ezekiel, ii, 9.

¹³ Ezekiel, i, 4—26.

¹⁴ Venantius Fortunatus (530—609) from *Pange lingua gloriosi: Crux fidelis, inter omnes, Arbor una nobilis*.

Knowledge of Good and Evil in the Garden of Eden, (where Adam and Eve committed the '*felix culpa*') and the Cross — *Arbor decora et fulgida, ornata regis purpura* — of redemption.

Below the figure of the 'living creature' is a rimmed white circle. In this circle is written, in a different hand than that of the scribe, the artist's dissatisfaction with his miniature:

Ista linea que || dividit circulum || per medium intelligenda || est circularis. Ita quod facit circulum ad an|| gulos rectos super alas ||. Siquidem non potest sic in plano || figurari debet per ymagi || nationem insipientium || suppleri et idem dicendum de figura circulari posita || in pagina sequente ||¹⁵

This note clearly demonstrates that the Franciscan artist, by eidetic imagery, held a clear mental image of the prophet's vision. He had, by the 'equators' at right angles in the orb in God's left hand, divided the world into four quarters, and he was visualizing in imagination the four faces of the living creatures "in the round." But he was temporarily baffled, since it was not possible to draw in three dimensions on a plane surface. Then the solution came to him. He turned over the vellum leaf and painted a full-page version of the vision on f. 123b, anticipating by a century the Mercator projection of the globe on a flat sheet. He drew the four living creatures, wing-to-wing, like a string of paper dolls, each with its individual head of lion, man, ox, and eagle. By making the painting full page, he was able to show their 'straight feet' and to indicate that their feet 'sparkled like glowing brass.'

Also, it is to be presumed that he had been re-reading the prophet's own description, because in the upper margin is a brief title for the painting: "Figura secundum hebraeum." The collator of the John Rylands Library manuscript waxes enthusiastic over this second version of the prophet's vision: "A very gorgeous composition."¹⁶

Thus the three magnificent folio volumes, so well described and illustrated in the John Rylands Library Catalogue, bring vividly to mind the scholarship and the artistry of Franciscan friars more than five centuries ago, as well as the liberality and love of learning of Italian nobles and military men.

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¹⁵ Transcribed from Vol. II, Plate 67, John Rylands Library Catalogue, *op. cit.*

¹⁶ John Rylands Library Catalogue, vol. I, p. 86. *op. cit.*

THE QUEST FOR CERTAINTY IN BONAVENTURE

I

The quest for certainty is one of the basic problems which gave orientation to many of the fundamental notions and theories in the thought of Saint Bonaventure. The whole intellectual life of Saint Bonaventure resolved itself in a perpetual quest for certainty, for necessary and plausible reasons, that would give him some clear and convincing insight into the inner-intelligibility and the cogent evidence of the truths so firmly and irrevocably held through faith on the authority of God manifesting his truth through divine revelation as expressed in the Sacred Scriptures and determined by the Church. The doctrine of divine illumination which was brought about to explain and justify our success in achieving the quest for certainty plays a central role in the thought of Saint Bonaventure, being "a sort of leit-motiv, present everywhere and constantly recalled"¹ which pervades and permeates the whole of his speculations.²

For a Franciscan of the type of Saint Bonaventure in whom unction and science united to help him fulfil his vocation as a Christian seeking above all in knowledge, in love and in service the union with God, it was the whole man, body and soul, in his natural and supernatural life, who must pursue the quest for perfection in truth for the mind and in peace of the soul.³ Saint Bonaventure the believer, the philosopher, the

¹ Et. Gilson, *The Philosophy of Saint Bonaventure*, tr. Iltyd Trethowan and F. J. Sheed, New York, Sheed and Ward, 1938, p. 338. Cf. French ed., *La philosophie de saint Bonaventure*, Paris, Vrin, 1st ed., 1924, p. 373; 2nd ed., 1943, p. 312: "On remarquera cependant l'insistance particulière avec laquelle cette thèse est formulée dans la doctrine bonaventurienne, où elle joue le rôle d'une sorte de thème conducteur, partout présent et sans cesse rappelé."

² Cf. J.-M. Bissen, *L'exemplarisme divin selon saint Bonaventure*, Paris, Vrin, 1929, p. 176: "La doctrine de l'illumination divine joue chez lui le rôle de thème conducteur; toute sa spéculation en est comme pénétrée." B. refers to R. Guardini, *Die Lehre des hl. Bonaventura von der Erlösung*, Düsseldorf, L. Schwann, 1921, p. 4: "Diese Lehre (vom lumen mentis, der Erkenntnis im Lichte Gottes) durchdringt Bonaventuras ganze Spekulation."

³ Cf. *Itin.*, I, 1—8, (Quaracchi critical edition, V. 296—298). Cf. n. 4: "Secundum hunc triplicem progressum mens nostra tres habet aspectus principales. Unus est ad corporalia exteriora, secundum quem vocatur animalitas seu sensualitas; alius intra se et in se, secundum quem dicitur

theologian, the mystic, the imitator of Saint Francis of Assisi and of Christ, strove with all his being to ascend to the possession of truth and peace in the contemplation of God.⁴ Thus it is that beyond the humanly acquired and developed wisdom of purely natural and philosophical knowledges, he seeks to be brought up to the partaking of Christian wisdom whether theological or mystical.⁵ The basic elements to be considered in the pursuit of the quest for certainty, which in Saint Bonaventure will find its fulfilment in the restful quiet produced by the under-

spiritus; tertius supra se, secundum quem dicitur mens. — Ex quibus omnibus disponere se debet ad conscendendum in Deum, ut ipsum diligat ex tota mente, ex toto corde et ex tota anima, in quo consistit perfecta Legis observatio et simul cum hoc sapientia christiana." Cf. n. 6: "Juxta igitur sex gradus ascensionis in Deum sex sunt gradus potentiarum animae, per quos ascendimus ab imis ad summa, ab exterioribus ad intima, a temporalibus conscendimus ad aeterna, scilicet sensus, imaginatio, ratio, intellectus, intelligentia et apex mentis seu synderesis scintilla. Hos gradus in nobis habemus plantatos per naturam, deformatos per culpam, reformatos per gratiam; purgandos per justitiam, exercendos per scientiam, perficiendos per sapientiam." Cf. n. 8: "Qui igitur vult in Deum ascendere necesse est, ut vitata culpa deformante naturam, naturales potentias supradictas exerceat ad gratiam reformatam, et hoc per orationem; ad justitiam purificantem, et hoc in conversatione; ad scientiam illuminantem, et hoc in meditatione; ad sapientiam perficiendam, et hoc in contemplatione. Sicut igitur gratia ad sapientiam nemo venit nisi per gratiam, justitiam et scientiam; sic ad contemplationem non venit nisi per meditationem perspicuam, conversationem sanctam et orationem devotam. Sicut igitur gratia fundamentum est rectitudinis voluntatis et illustrationis perspicuae rationis; sic primo orandum est nobis, deinde sancte vivendum, tertio veritatis spectaculis intendendum et intendendo gradatim ascendendum, quousque veniatur ad montem excelsum, ubi videatur Deus deorum in Sion."

⁴ Cf. Et. Gilson, *La philosophie de saint Bonaventure*, Paris, Vrin, 1st ed., 1924, p. 69—88, 2nd ed., 1943, p. 59—75. E. Longpré, "La théologie mystique de saint Bonaventure", *Arch. francis. hist.*, XIV (1921) 36—108. *Id.*, "S. Augustin et la pensée franciscaine", *France francis.*, XV (1932) 8—10. *Id.*, "Esprit Séraphique", *D. A. de F. C.*, (XXIII (19) 1309—1320. *Evangeliste de saint Béat, Le Séraphin de l'École*, Paris, 1900, p. 95—106. E. Smeets, "Saint Bonaventure" *D. T. C.*, II (1905) 979 ff. Leonard de Carvalho e Castro, *Saint Bonaventure, Le Docteur Franciscain*, Paris, 1923, passim. T. Carreras i Artau, *Els caracters de la filosofia franciscana i l'esperit de sant Francis*, Barcelona, 1928, 49—79.

⁵ Cf. *Reduc. Art.*, 26 (V. 325): "Et sic patet, quomodo multiformis sapientia Dei, quae lucide traditur in sacra Scriptura, occultatur in omni cognitione et in omni natura. Patet etiam, quomodo omnes cognitiones famulantur theologiae; et ideo ipsa assumit exempla et utitur vocabulis pertinentibus ad omne genus cognitionis. Patet etiam, quam ampla sit via illuminativa, et quomodo in omni re, quae sentitur sive quae cognoscitur, interius lateat ipse Deus. — Et hic est fructus omnium scientiarum, ut in omnibus aedificetur fides, honorificetur Deus, componantur mores, hauriantur consolationes, quae sunt in unione sponsi et sponsae, quae quidem fit per caritatem, ad quam terminatur tota intentio sacrae Scripturae, et per consequens omnis illuminatio desursum descendens, et sine qua omnis cognitio vana est, quia nunquam pervenitur ad Filium nisi per Spiritum sanctum, qui docet nos omnem veritatem; qui est benedictus in saecula saeculorum. Amen."

standing of the intellect and the peace of the soul, are succinctly presented in the *Itinerarium*.⁶ The various steps through which the progress toward perfection in the contemplation of God will develop indicate how it is the whole man with the use of his natural powers in their different forms of activity,⁷ senses and imagination, reason and intellect, intelligence and spirit, with the consideration of the whole of reality outside himself, within himself and above himself, with the disposition of the self in virtue and prayer that can lead step by step to a greater and greater knowledge, to a greater and greater perfection until the total union in knowledge, in love with God can be achieved. Man for Saint Bonaventure is more than simply a rational animal with a purely natural end and perfection. The whole development of man tends towards the perfecting of the self in supernatural union with God the source of all virtue, knowledge and love. Saint Bonaventure throughout his life remains a dynamic believer seeking the total and full development of man as a rational animal endowed with grace and called to a supernatural end. The ever-present awareness of man's concrete vocation was bound to have an effect upon his conception of philosophy and rational inquiry. The problem of the possibility, the propriety and the value of the influence of revelation and faith for the purely natural intellectual inquiry is analysed and solved in the subjective and concrete approach involving the whole of reality in its various aspects rather than on the objective and abstract level of formal and specific requirements.⁸ The whole development is given precedence over the particular aspect and formalities.

⁶ Cf. *Prol.*, 4, (V. 296): "Igitur ad gemitum orationis per Christum crucifixum, per cuius sanguinem purgamur a sordibus vitiorum, primum quidem lectorem invito, ne forte credat, quod sibi sufficiat lectio sine unctione, speculatio sine devotione, investigatio sine admiratione, circumspectio sine exultatione, industria sine pietate, scientia sine caritate, intelligentia sine humilitate, studium absque divina gratia, speculum absque sapientia divinitus inspirata. — Praeventis igitur divina gratia, humilibus et piis, compunctis et devotis, unctis oleo laetitiae et amatoribus divinae sapientiae et ejus desiderio inflammatis, vacare volentibus ad Deum magnificandum, admirandum et etiam degustandum, speculationes subjectas propono, insinuans, quod parum aut nihil est speculum exterius propositum, nisi speculum mentis nostrae tersum fuerit et politum. Exerce igitur te, homo Dei, prius ad stimulum conscientiae remordentem, antequam oculos eleves ad radios sapientiae in ejus speculis relucentes, ne forte ex ipsa radiorum speculatione in graviorum incidas foveam tenebrarum." Cf. *ibid.*, I, 4 and 6, quoted in fn. 3.

⁷ For this distinction of the faculties and powers of knowing and the various aspects or forms of the activity taken cf. diagram given in Et. Gilson, *La philosophie de saint Bonaventure*, 2nd ed., Paris, Vrin, 1943, p. 307, fn. 1. (1st ed., 1924, p. 366, fn. 1.) Ed. Lutz, *Die Psychologie Bonaventuras*, *B. G. P. M. A.*, VI (1909) 4—5, p. 105, does not make this basic distinction.

⁸ Cf. Jos. Boccuccia, "Quaestio 'de scito et credito' apud scholam franciscanam saec. XIII", *Miscellanea Franciscana*, XXXVIII (1938) 45—46:

II

Seeking to establish the adequate foundation of our true and certain knowledge, Saint Bonaventure considers, following in this the pattern set by Hugh of Saint Victor, three types of knowledge which are possessed with solid and adequate certitude:⁹ the certitudinal knowledge of faith obtained through pious assent to revealed truths accepted on divine authority; the rational certainty of the knowledge of science implying profound understanding of what is believed and adequate rational demonstration based on immutable truth and giving infallible certitude; and the certitude of contemplative knowledge implying full and gratifying insights into the intelligibility of the truth offered. Taking into consideration this diversity of types of certitudes, Saint Bonaventure establishes a hierarchy of steps to be followed in the acquisition of perfect wisdom. In fact, for him, the normal process and order to be followed if one desires to attain to wisdom implies, as a starting point, the stability and certitude of faith, as a means of progressing, the serenity and clearness of the certainty of reason, and, as the point of fulfilment, the sweetness of contemplation. The authority of the Prophet with his "nisi credideritis, non intelligetis" as well as the history of thought with the shortcomings everpresent in philosophers not favored by faith, are there to show the necessity of placing the quest for certainty within and to some extent in dependance of the certitude of faith. Christ, the master of all our knowledge and certitudes bears witness to the propriety of this order of learning when he speaks of himself as the way, the truth and the

"Franciscani saeculi XIII mentalitatem concretam S. Augustini secuti omnia vident ut de facto sunt in natura, non considerant objectum in abstracto, sub tali vel tali aspectu formali, sed materialiter in uno ut est in se . . . S. Thomas autem abstractionismo aristotelico addictus scientiam ejusque objectum ad conceptus abstractos et logice distinctos reducit . . ."

⁹ Cf. *Reb. Theol.*, IV, *Christus Unus*, I, (V. 567): "Triplex namque est gradus cognitionis certitudinalis et rectae, secundum quod dicit Hugo de Sacramentis: 'Isti sunt tres gradus promotionis fidei, quibus fides crescens ad perfectum tendit vel conscendit: primus, per pietatem eligere; secundus, per rationem approbare; tertius, per veritatem apprehendere'. Secundum hoc apparet, quod triplex est modus cognoscendi, quorum primus est per credulitatem piae assensionis, secundus per approbationem rectae rationis, tertius vero per claritatem mundae contemplationis. Primus spectat ad habitum virtutis, quae est fides; secundus ad habitum doni, quod est intellectus; tertius ad habitum beatitudinis, quae est munditia cordis. Cum igitur triplex sit cognitionis differentia, videlicet creditiva, collativa et contemplativa, omnium harum est Christus principium et causa, et ita quod primae est principium in quantum via, secundae in quantum veritas, et tertiae in quantum vita." Cf. Hugh of Saint Victor, *De Sacramentis*, I, X, 4, PL 176. 332.

life: the way by being the master of the certitudinal knowledge acquired by faith, the truth, by being the master of the certitudinal knowledge acquired through scientific comprehension of the intellect and of reason, the life, by being the master of the certitudinal knowledge of clear insight through contemplation. Thus it is that the whole thought of Saint Bonaventure appears to have been developed in a christocentric atmosphere. The difficulties of interpretation of the intellectual attitude of Saint Bonaventure with regard to the quest for a purely rational and natural quest for certainty soon come out when the context of these methodological and hierarchically organized processes towards perfect certainty is taken into consideration. In this text of the Sermon *Christus, unus omnium magister*,¹⁰ we see Saint Bonaventure adding that the second step goes along with the gift of the Holy Ghost of understanding. Yet the consideration of the role of illumination played by Christ as the truth leaves itself open to an interpretation of a purely natural mode of cooperation.¹¹ And the quest for certainty pursued by natural reason itself within the certitude of faith is still powerfully suggested by this text when we see that the Christian thinkers who followed the three hierarchical steps from faith through reason to contemplation were able to achieve contemplation, while the philosophers who ignored this approach failed in their attempt to achieve wisdom. Bringing in the

¹⁰ I, (V. 567), quoted fn. 9. Cf. similar order, III *Sent.*, 35, 1, 3, c., (III. 778): "Dicendum, quod cognitio de Deo sub ratione veri potest haberi secundum triplicem modum: uno modo habetur cognitio de Deo per simplicem assensum; alio modo per rationis adminiculum; tertio modo per simplicem contuitum. Primum est virtutis fidei, cuius est assentire; secundum est doni intellectus, cuius est credita per rationem intelligere; tertium est beatitudinis munditiae cordis, cuius est Deum videre."

¹¹ Cf. *Reb. Theol.*, IV, *Christus Unus*, 6—10, (V. 568—570): "Est etiam magister cognitionis, quae est per rationem, et hoc, in quantum est veritas. Ad cognitionem enim scientialem necessario requiritur veritas immutabilis ex parte scibilis, et certitudo infallibilis ex parte scientis. Omne enim, quod scitur, necessarium est in se et certum est ipsi scienti. Tunc enim scimus, 'cum causam arbitramur cognoscere, propter quam res est, et scimus, quoniam impossibile est aliter se habere.' (7) Requiritur igitur ex parte scibilis veritas immutabilis. Huiusmodi autem non est veritas creata simpliciter et absolute, quia omne creatum vertibile et mutabile; sed veritas creans, quae plenam habet immutabilitatem . . . Cum igitur res habeant esse in proprio genere, habeant etiam esse in mente, habeant esse et in aeterna ratione; nec esse earum sit omnino immutabile primo et secundo modo, sed tantum tertio, videlicet prout sunt in Verbo aeterno: restat, quod nihil potest facere res perfecte scibiles, nisi adsit Christus, Dei Filius et magister . . . (9) Requiritur etiam secundo ad huiusmodi cognitionem certitudo ex parte scientis. Haec autem non potest esse ex ea parte, quae potest falli, vel ex ea luce, quae potest obscurari. Talis autem lux non est lux intelligentiae creatae, sed Sapientiae increatae, quae Christus est . . . (10) Lux ergo intellectus creati sibi non sufficit ad certam comprehensionem rei cuiuscumque absque luce Verbi aeterni."

"nisi credideritis, non intelligetis" of Isaiah,¹² Bonaventure indicates that the proper order of procedure and development starting from the stability of faith, proceeding through the serenity of reason to arrive at the sweetness of contemplation was ignored by the philosophers who, having neglected the introductory step of faith and counting completely and solely on the process achieved by the powers of reason, were in no way in a position to achieve contemplation in the full sense. The excellence of the object to be contemplated so surpasses the power of the weak human mind that faith must enter in to purify and elevate our soul. Would not the purely rational pursuit be doomed to frustrating shortcomings and limitations? Are we to conclude, when we read that "hunc ordinem ignoraverunt philosophi, qui, negligentes fidem et totaliter se fundantes in ratione, nullo modo pervenire potuerunt ad contemplationem;"¹³ that the purely rational pursuit was considered by Saint Bonaventure to be doomed to frustrating shortcomings and limitations unless faith gave a helping hand.

In the *De Donis Spiritus Sancti*,^{13a} after distinguishing the realm of natural reason and the realm of infused faith and differentiating the

¹² Cf. *Ibid.*, 15, (V, 571): "Ex praedictis ergo apparet, quo ordine et quo auctore pervenitur ad sapientiam. — Ordo enim est, ut inchoetur a stabilitate fidei et procedatur per serenitatem rationis, ut perveniatur ad suavitatem contemplationis; quem insinuavit Christus, cum dixit: Ego sum via, veritas et vita. Et sic impletur illud Proverbiorum quarto: 'Justorum semita quasi lux splens procedit et crescit usque ad perfectum diem.' Hunc ordinem tenuerunt Sancti, attendentes illud Isaiae (cap. 7, 9), secundum aliam translationem: 'Nisi credideritis, non intelligetis.' Hunc ordinem ignoraverunt philosophi, qui, negligentes fidem et totaliter se fundantes in ratione, nullo modo pervenire potuerunt ad contemplationem; quia, sicut dicit Augustinus in primo de Trinitate (cap. 2, n. 4), 'mentis humanae invalida acies in tam excellenti luce non figitur, nisi per justitiam fidei emundetur'."

¹³ *Ibid.*

^{13a} IV, 5—12, (V, 474—476): "Scientia philosophica nihil aliud est quam veritatis ut scrutabilis notitia certa. Scientia theologica est veritatis ut credibilis notitia pia. Scientia gratuita est veritatis ut diligibilis notitia sancta. Scientia gloriosa est veritatis ut desiderabilis notitia sempiterna. (6) Primo incipiamus a scientia philosophica. Dico, quod scientia philosophica est veritatis ut scrutabilis notitia certa... Ipse enim describit scientiam philosophicam tripliciter, id est secundum triplicem rationem describit eam, ut naturalem, ut rationalem et ut moralem, scilicet in quantum est "causa essendi, ratio intelligendi et ordo vivendi". In quantum est causa essendi, designat scientiam naturalem; in quantum est ratio intelligendi, significat scientiam rationalem; in quantum est ordo vivendi, describit scientiam moralem... (12) Prima claritas, scilicet scientiae philosophicae, magna est secundum opinionem hominum mundialium; sed de facili eclipsatur, nisi homo caveat sibi a capite et causa draconis. Si aliquid interponatur inter ipsum et solem justitiae, patitur eclipsim stultitiae... Jeremias: 'Stultus factus est omnis homo a scientia sua', scilicet 'occasionaliter', non 'causaliter'. Qui confidit in scientia philosophica et appetiatur se propter hoc et credit, se esse meliorem, stultus factus est, scilicet quando per istam scientiam sine ultiore lumine credit, se apprehendere Creatorem; sicut si homo per candelas

clearness of philosophical science, of theological science, of the gratuitous gift of science and of the science of glory, Saint Bonaventure adds to his analysis of the purely rational level of philosophical knowledge that human reason, developing without the help of the enlightenment of faith is doomed to lead to error, as is evident from the fact that philosophical inquiry lead the philosophers who were deprived of the help of faith to their own downfall and confusion. Philosophy is a worthwhile science and produces valid and certain knowledge. It is, however, but a moment and a way to a higher form of cognition than that of theology. To limit one's research to its finding and to be self-satisfied within this realm is to choose the evils of darkness. The *De Reductione Artium ad Theologiam*,¹⁴ while not emphasizing the negative shortcomings of the

vellet videre caelum vel corpus solare . . . Esto, quod homo habeat scientiam naturalem et metaphysicam, quae se extendit ad substantias summas, et ibi deveniat homo, ut ibi quiescat; hoc est impossibile, quin cadat in errorem, nisi sit adjutus lumine fidei, scilicet ut credat homo Deum trinum et unum, potissimum et optimum secundum ultimam influentiam bonitatis . . . Igitur ista scientia praecipitavit et obscuravit philosophos, quia non habuerunt lumen fidei . . . Philosophia scientia via est ad alias scientias; sed qui ibi vult stare cadit in tenebras."

¹⁴ 6—7, (V. 321—322): "Ex praedictis colligitur, quod licet ex primaria divisione quadruplex sit lumen desursum descendens; sunt tamen sex ejus differentiae: scilicet lumen sacrae Scripturae, lumen cognitionis sensitivae, lumen artis mechanicae, lumen philosophiae rationalis, lumen philosophiae naturalis et lumen philosophiae moralis. Et ideo sex illuminationes sunt in vita ista et habent vesperam, quia omnis scientia destruetur; et ideo succedit eis septima dies requietionis, quae vesperam non habet, scilicet illuminatio gloriae. (7) Unde valde apte possunt reduci sex istae illuminationes ad senarium formationum sive illuminationum, in quibus factus est mundus, ut cognitio sacrae Scripturae primae formationi, scilicet formationi lucis, respondeat; et sic deinceps per ordinem. — Et sicut omnes illae ab una luce habebant originem, sic omnes istae cognitiones ad cognitionem sacrae Scripturae ordinantur, in ea clauduntur et in illa perficiuntur, et mediante illa ad aeternam illuminationem ordinantur. Unde omnis nostra cognitio in cognitione sacrae Scripturae debet habere statum, et maxime quantum ad intellectum anagogiae, per quem illuminatio refertur in Deum, unde habuit ortum. Et ideo ibi completus est circulus, completus est senarius, et propterea status." Cf. *Ibid.*, 26, (V. 325), quotes fn. 5. Cf. B. Trimole, "Deutung und Bedeutung der Schrift De reductione artium ad Theologiam des hl. Bonaventura", *Franz. Stud.*, VIII (1921) 172—189. Cf. p. 181—182: "Aus dieser sinngemäßen, teilweise selbst wörtlichen Wiedergabe des Grund- und Leitgedankens, wie es das in Rede stehende Werkchen durchzieht, ergibt sich: erstens, daß Bonaventura, neben der Theologie und den Studien im weitesten Sinne und Umfange, bis zu den mechanischen Künsten herab, Existenzberechtigung zuerkennt; er leitet ja das ihnen zugrunde liegende und sie ermöglichende Erkenntnislicht vom selben "Vater der Lichter" ab, von dem auch das Licht der Offenbarung herrührt; zweitens, daß Bonaventura diese Kenntnisse natürlicher Art samt und sonders in den Dienst der Theologie und des Schriftstudiums, in den Dienst der übernatürlichen Heilserfassung gestellt wissen will: 'Omnes istae cognitiones ad cognitionem sacrae Scripturae ordinantur . . . (n. 7); omnes cognitiones famulantur theologiae (n. 26)'; drittens, daß Bonaventura die Dienstleistungen, welche die Theologie von seiten der natürlichen Erkenntnisgebiete und Erkenntnisweisen zu erwarten

purely natural lights of mechanical arts, of sense perception and of philosophical science, stresses, however, the positive way they form towards the higher enlightenment of Sacred Scriptures which stands as their crowning point.

Would not the *Itinerarium*,¹⁵ in its emphasis upon the importance of virtue and the good life as necessary conditions for the perfect development of the pursuit of understanding and wisdom suggest the Christian nature of the intellectual attitude required of the philosopher who seeks to attain to perfect wisdom? The three first degrees of the elevation towards perfect wisdom, through the senses, imagination and reason can be pursued with the natural cognitive powers of man and on the level of a purely philosophical inquiry, with nothing more than an extrinsic guidance received from faith.¹⁶ The objects pertaining to the

hat, auf einen ganz besonderen Doppelgrund zurückführt: auf einen ausgesprochenen Exemplarismus seitens der Theologie und der übernatürlichen Offenbarung überhaupt gegenüber der Natur und der natürlichen Erkenntnisgebiete und Erkenntnisweisen; auf einen ebenso pronunzierten Symbolismus seitens der Natur und der aus ihr erhobenen Kenntnisse gegenüber der Offenbarung und der durch sie uns vermittelten Heilswahrheiten (= übernatürliche Ordnung): *multiformis sapientia Dei, quae lucide traditur in sacra Scriptura, occultatur in omni cognitione et in omni natura . . . et ideo ipsa (theologia) assumit exempla et utitur vocabulis pertinentibus ad omne genus cognitionis (n. 26).*"

¹⁵ Cf. *Itin., Prol.*, 4, (V. 296), copied in fn., 6. Cf. *ibid.*, 1, 8, (V. 298), copied in fn., 3. Cf. I. Squadrini, "S. Bonaventura christianus philosophus", *Ant.*, XIV (1941) 260.

¹⁶ Cf. *Itin.*, 3, 6—7, (V. 305—306): "Nam omnis philosophia aut est naturalis, aut rationalis, aut moralis. Prima agit de causa essendi, et ideo ducit in potentiam Patris; secunda de ratione intelligendi, et ideo ducit in sapientiam Verbi; tertia de ordine vivendi, et ideo ducit in bonitatem Spiritus sancti. Rursus, prima dividitur in metaphysicam, mathematicam et physicam. Et prima est de rerum essentiis, secunda de numeris et figuris, tertia de naturis, virtutibus et operationibus diffusivis. Et ideo prima in primum principium, Patrem, secunda in ejus imaginem, Filium, tertia ducit in Spiritus sancti donum. Secunda dividitur in grammaticam, quae facit potentes ad exprimendum; in logicam, quae facit perspicaces ad arguendum; in rhetoricam, quae facit habiles ad persuadendum sive movendum. Et hoc similiter insinuat mysterium ipsius beatissimae Trinitatis. Tertia dividitur in monasticam, oeconomiam et politicam. Et ideo prima insinuat primi principii inascibilitatem, secunda Filii familiaritatem, tertia Spiritus sancti liberalitatem. (7) Omnes autem hae scientiae habent regulas certas et infallibiles tanquam lumina et radios descendentes a lege aeterna in mentem nostram. Et ideo mens nostra tantis splendoribus irradiata et superfusa, nisi sit caeca, manuduci potest per semetipsam ad contemplandam illam lucem aeternam. Hujus autem lucis irradiatio et consideratio sapientes suspendit in admirationem et econtra insipientes, qui non credunt, ut intelligant, ducit in perturbationem . . ." Cf. *ibid.* 4, 5—7, (V. 307): "(7) Ex his autem duobus gradibus mediis, per quos ingredimus ad contemplandum Deum intra nos tanquam in speculis imaginum creatarum, et hoc quasi ad modum alarum expansarum ad volandum, quae tenebant medium locum, intelligere possumus, quod in divina manuducimur per ipsius animae rationalis potentias naturaliter insitas quantum ad earum operationes, habitudines et habitus

realms of metaphysics, physics and ethics can be attained by natural reason enlightened on the natural level by the certain and infallible rules flowing down in the light and rays within the human mind. Only blindness can prevent the adequate knowledge. The presence of faith assures the absence of blindness. And to pass beyond the third step of rational understanding from the creatures and the soul, the illumination received from Christ as well as from Holy Scriptures is required for the intellectual understanding acquired through an insight in the soul. From this degree on, the theological virtues and the gifts of the Holy Ghost become intrinsic elements contributing to understanding. The consideration of the realm of rational inquiry within the whole development flowering into supernaturally given understanding makes it difficult to determine the limits and the possibilities of achievement of rational inquiry pursued on the purely natural level.

In the *In Hexaëmeron*,^{16a} after distinguishing the various types of intellectual visions man can attain to according to the disposition his intelligence is, in whether it be simply in the natural state of being endowed with intellectual powers permitting him to develop purely philosophical and rational elaborations or whether it be elevated by faith, rendered learned by Holy Scriptures or suspended in contemplation, Saint Bonaventure studies the vision of the intellect endowed by nature as such. The concluding tractate dealing with the first order of intellectual vision considers the shortcomings the rational philosopher is subject to, because of the lack of the enlightenment of faith.^{16b} As Squadrini¹⁷ indicates, Saint Bonaventure held that there was a whole realm of realities which man could *de jure* attain by the insight of the natural illumination from the light inserted in his nature, but which

scientiales; secundum quod apparet ex tertio gradu. — Manuducimur etiam per ipsius animae potentias reformatas, et hoc gratuitis virtutibus, sensibus spiritualibus et mentalibus excessibus; sicut patet ex quarto. Manuducimur nihilominus per hierarchicas operationes, scilicet purgationis, illuminationis et perfectionis mentium humanarum, per hierarchicas revelationes sacrarum Scripturarum nobis per Angelos datarum . . .”

^{16a} Cf. *Hex.*, III, 24, (V. 347): “Praeter has est visio sextuplex, quae respondet operibus sex dierum; quibus minor mundus fit perfectus, sicut major mundus sex diebus. Est visio intelligentiae per naturam inditae, et visio intelligentiae per fidem sublevatae, per Scripturam eruditae, per contemplationem suspensae, per prophetiam illustratae, per raptum in Deum absorptae. Ad has sequitur visio optima animae glorificatae, quas omnes habuit Paulus.” cf. *ibid.*, 25—32 for brief remark on each.

^{16b} *Hex.*, VII, 3, (V. 365—366): “Sed adhuc isti in tenebris fuerunt, quia non habuerunt lumen fidei, nos autem habemus lumen fidei.” Cf. *ibid.*, 12, (V. 367): “Isti philosophi habuerunt pennas struthionum, quia affectu non erant anati nec ordinati nec rectificati; quod non fit nisi per fidem.”

¹⁷ Cf. I. Squadrini, “S. Bonaventura christianus philosophus”, *Ant.*, XIV (1941) 103—130; 253—304, cf. p. 113.

the philosophers did not in fact attain to because of the absence of the help of faith in their quest for certainty and which the Christian philosopher can attain because of the help he receives from faith. By right the philosopher could attain to the nine illuminations which enlighten the soul in the order of the truths of things in their essence with regard to the hidden differences of their quiddity as in metaphysics, in their figure with regard to the manifest proportions as in mathematics, in their nature with regard to the mixed properties of the natures as in physics, in the truth of the words with regard to locutions indicating mental concepts as in grammar, with regard to argumentations bringing about assent of the mind, as in logic, with regard to persuasions influencing the feelings of the mind as in rhetoric, in the truth of the mores with regard to modesty in the customary operations, with regard to industry in intellectual speculations, and with regard to justice in political laws as in the respective virtues of the way of life, the intellectual virtues and the virtues pertaining to justice. These nine orders of sciences have been given and illustrated by the philosophers.¹⁸ Yet within each of these

¹⁸ Cf. *Hex.*, V, 22, (V. 357): "Haec sunt novem lumina illustrantia animam, scilicet veritas rerum, vocum, morum: rerum, scilicet essentialium, figurarum, naturarum quantum ad quidditatem differentias occultas, quantum ad quantitatum proportionem manifestas, quantum ad naturarum proprietates mixtas. Prima metaphysica, secundo mathematica, tertio naturalis seu physica. — Veritas vocum tripliciter: quantum ad locutiones, argumentationes, persuasiones; primo, quantum ad locutiones indicantes mentis conceptus; secundo, quantum ad argumentationes trahentes mentis assensus; tertio, quantum ad persuasiones inclinantes mentis affectus; prima grammatica, secunda logica, tertia, rhetorica. — Veritas morum tripliciter: quantum ad modestias, industrias, iustitias: modestias, quantum ad exercitationes consuetudinales; industrias, quantum ad speculationes intellectuales; iustitias, quantum ad leges politicas. Prima virtus consuetudinalis, secunda virtus intellectualis, tertia virtus iustitialis. Has novem scientias dederunt philosophi et illustrati sunt. Deus enim illis revelavit. Postmodum voluerunt ad sapientiam pervenire, et veritas trahebat eos; et promiserunt dare sapientiam, hoc est beatitudinem, hoc est intellectum adeptum; promiserunt, inquam discipulis suis." Cf. *ibid.*, I, 11, (V. 331): "Propositum igitur nostrum est ostendere, quod in Christo sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae et scientiae Dei absconditi, et ipse est medium omnium scientiarum. Est autem septiforme medium, scilicet essentialis, naturae, distantiae, doctrinae, modestiae, iustitiae, concordiae. Primum est de consideratione metaphysici, secundum physici, tertium mathematici, quartum logici, quintum ethici, sextum politici, seu iuristarum, septimum theologi." Cf. analysis of F. Tini-vella, "De impossibili sapientiae adeptione in philosophia pagana juxta 'Collationes in Hexaëmeron' S. Bonaventurae", part two, *Ant.*, XI (1936) 135—186. Cf. also divisions of philosophy in *Red. Art.*, 4, (V. 320—321): "Tertium lumen, quod illuminat ad veritates intelligibiles perscrutandas, est lumen cognitionis philosophicae, quod ideo interius dicitur, quia interiores causas et latentes inquirat, et hoc per principia disciplinarum et veritates naturalis, quae homini naturaliter sunt inserta. Et hoc tripliciter in rationalem, naturalem et moralem. — Et sufficientia potest accipi sic. Est enim veritas sermonum, veritas rerum et veritas morum. — Rationalis veritatem

fields of human inquiry, error was mingled with truth.¹⁹ Beyond this realm of created reality, however, they sought to give the wisdom of the knowledge of God through the elevation of the mind successively to the soul and of the angels to the considerations of the eternal reasons in

sermonum considerat, naturalis veritatem rerum, moralis veritatem morum . . . Sic in ipsa illuminatione philosophiae, quoniam illuminat aut ad cognoscendas causas essendi, et sic est physica; aut rationes intelligendi, et sic est logica; aut ordinem vivendi, et sic est moralis sive practica . . . Et quoniam tripliciter potest aliquis per sermonem exprimere quod habet apud se, ut scilicet notum faciat mentis suae conceptum, vel ut amplius moveat ad credendum, vel ut moveat ad amorem, vel odium: ideo sermocinalis sive rationis philosophia triplicatur, scilicet in grammaticam, logicam et rhetoricam; quarum prima est ad exprimendum, secunda ad docendum, tertia ad movendum. Prima respicit rationem ut apprehensivam; secunda, ut judicativam; tertia, ut motivam. Et quia ratio apprehendit per sermonem congruum, judicat per verum, movet per sermonem ornatum: hinc est, quod haec triplex scientia has tres passiones circa sermonem considerat. Rursus, quoniam, intellectus noster dirigi habet in iudicando secundum rationes formales et hae tripliciter possunt considerari: vel in comparatione ad materiam, et sic dicuntur rationes formales; vel in comparatione ad animam, et sic intellectuales; vel in comparatione ad divinam sapientiam, et sic ideales: ideo naturalis philosophia triplicatur in physicam proprie dictam, in mathematicam et in metaphysicam; ita quod physica consideratio est circa rerum generationem et corruptionem secundum virtutes naturales et rationes seminales; mathematica est circa considerationem formarum abstrahibilium secundum rationes intelligibiles; metaphysica, circa cognitionem omnium entium, quae reducit ad unum primum principium, a quo exierunt secundum rationes ideales sive ad Deum in quantum principium, finis et exemplar; licet inter metaphysicos de hujusmodi rationibus idealibus nonnulla fuerit controversia. Postremo, quia regimen virtutis motivae tripliciter habet attendi, scilicet respectu vitae propriae, respectu familiae et respectu multitudinis subjectae; ideo moralis philosophia triplicatur, scilicet in monasticam, oeconomicam et politicam;" Cf. *Itin.*, 3, 6—7, (V. 305—306), copied in fn., 16. Cf. *Donis*, IV, 6, (V. 474—475), copied in fn., 13a. Cf. *De Epiphania*, *Sermo III*, (IX. 159): "Expone: 'Mulier', anima rationalis, 'habens decem drachmas', id est decem illuminationes, quarum tres principales, scilicet naturalis, moralis et rationalis, et quaelibet istarum habet tres. Naturalis continet physicam, mechanicam et mathematicam; rationalis similiter continet tres: grammaticam, rhetoricam, logicam; moralis tres: monasticam, politicam, oeconomicam, et ultra tres est decima illuminatio, scilicet cognitio divina."

¹⁹ *Hex.*, V. 21, (V. 357): "Sed in his omnibus luxuriata est ratio; luxuriata est metaphysica: quia quidam posuerunt mundum aeternum, quia, si causa aeterna, et effectus aeternus; et isti male senserunt de causa prima. Similiter mathematici primo sciverunt numeros et postea ad influentias et secreta cordium venerunt. Naturales sciverunt et de corporibus et mineralibus et dixerunt: 'Ars imitatur naturam'; et nos scimus secreta naturae: ergo nos faciemus vobis aurum et argentum. Similiter grammatici poesibus et fabulis suis tenuerunt totum mundum, quousque venerunt Sancti contra eos. Similiter logici cum suis sophismatibus et suis falsis positionibus fecerunt mundum insanire. Similiter rhetores ita delectabantur in colore sermonis, ut non aliud esse regnum Dei dicerent; tamen sublata est modo de medio. Ars moralis non ita luxuriata est, quia non in sola speculatione stat; sed scientia juris multum luxuriatur propter lucrum; et causae, quae deberent terminari per jus, modo per allegationem et subtilitatem juris fiunt immortales, cum tamen intentio juris sit causas rescindere." Cf. F. Tinivella, *op. cit.*, part III, p. 277—318.

God.²⁰ But as a matter of fact they fell short of their goal by making basic errors with regard to God as the cause of being, the reason of understanding and the order of living.²¹ With regard to God as the cause of being they rejected creation as an impossibility, as involving contradiction, and denied the fact of it on the basis that the world is of necessity eternal and that prime matter is unproduced. They denied divine Providence, they affirmed that God and the world are one and attributed to creatures properties, powers and sufficiencies which belong to God alone. Against God, as the source of understanding, they held that there were not exemplars of things in God, that God did not know singular and contingent realities, that either he does not illumine in any way the human mind or that he does so only indirectly, that all intellects are to be reduced to one. Against God as the way of life, they held that there were no exemplars of the virtues in God, they denied moral sanctions, they obscured the science of ethics by introducing all kinds of subjective prejudices of philosophers, they did not or did not care to explain sin, but remained in virtues which were naked, uninformed and unsavory. In spite of the natural possibility man has because of the natural light of understanding inserted in his nature to attain to the whole realm of

²⁰ *Hex.*, V. 23—33, (V. 357—359): "Quarta ergo consideratio est, quomodo venerunt ad hoc, in quo lux separata est a tenebris; separando enim se a tenebris, converterunt se ad lucem. Sed hoc ita fit, ut anima convertat se primo super se; secundo, super Intelligentias spirituales; tertio, super rationes aeternas. (24 . . . 32) 33. Primo ergo anima videt se sicut speculum, deinde Angelos sive Intelligentias sicut lumina et sicut medium delativum; sive videt in se sicut in speculo, in intelligentia sicut in medio delativo lucis aeternae et contemperativo; deinde in luce aeterna tanquam in objecto fontano, quantum ad illas sex conditiones dictas, et rationabiliter et experimentaliter et intelligentialiter. — Dum haec igitur percipit et consurgit ad divinum contuitum, dicit, se habere intellectum adeptum, quem promiserunt philosophi; et ad hoc veritas trahit. — Sed tamen per virtutes oportet devenire, sicut fecerunt philosophi; quando viderunt, quod tam alte non posset perveniri nisi per virtutes, converterunt se ad docendum illas, ut fecit Socrates; unde reputat minus bene dixisse, eo quod tantum de illis dixit; sed hoc fecit, quia videbat, quod ad illum intellectum non potest perveniri, nisi anima sit purgata."

²¹ *Hex.*, III—VI, *passim*, (V. 342—364). Cf. *Donis*, VIII, 16, (V. 497): "Tres sunt errores cavendi in scientiis, qui sacram Scripturam et fidem christianam et omnem sapientiam exterminant; quorum unus est contra causam essendi, alius contra rationem intelligendi, et tertius contra ordinem vivendi. Error contra causam essendi est de aeternitate mundi, ut ponere mundum aeternum. Error contra rationem intelligendi est de necessitate fatali, sicut ponere, quod eveniunt de necessitate. Tertius est de unitate intellectus humani, sicut ponere, quod unus est intellectus in omnibus . . . Totum istud est falsum. Primus error refellitur per id quod scriptum est in veteri testamento: In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram. Secundum errorem secundum nihil est de libero arbitrio, nihil valet crux Christi. Secundum tertium non est differentia in merito et praemio, si una est anima Christi et Judae proditoris. Totum est haeticum."

naturally knowable truths which are proportioned to his mind, which he can receive in his mind through intentional assimilation, which he can judge and which can be possessed by his mind, it remains that as a matter of historical fact, the absence of faith has been a great drawback in the pursuit of the quest for understanding. Faith alone can give man an insight into his own weakness and limitations and their causes and make him aware of the doctor and the medicine which will make it possible for him to be cured of his sickness, rectified in the affection of the soul and properly ordered to his end, in order to be purified, to be elevated and rendered godlike as its nature to the image of God warrants. The role of faith in making possible a full development of the quest for certainty consists therefore not only in the state of mind and the intellectual framework created by the certitude it gives the subject and the data of revealed truth it offers. The whole moral disposition of the subject himself is transformed so that he is made capable of developing to the full his natural capacities.²² Through a lengthy analysis of the *In Hexaëmeron* in its *Collationes* IV—VII which treat of the “*Visio intelligentiae per naturam inditae*” and “*ad quid potest extendi nostra intelligentia de se*”, Father Tinivella²³ shows that Bonaventure, in his conception of philosophy and wisdom, taught that it was impossible for pagan philosophers to achieve wisdom in the proper sense because of the absence in them of the influence of faith in their intellectual inquiry. Thus it would appear that the much discussed statement about the different efficacy of the inquiry pursued by those who are enlightened by faith and those who are not blessed with this special form of illumination should be taken in its strongest implications: “*Sed adhuc isti in tenebris fuerunt, quia non habuerunt lumen fidei, nos autem habemus lumen fidei*”.²⁴

²² *Hex.*, II, 3, (V. 337): “*Disciplina autem duplex est: scholastica et monastica sive morum; et non sufficit ad habendam sapientiam scholastica sine monastica; quia non audiendo solum, sed observando fit homo sapiens. Inde in Psalmo de sapientia: ‘Bonitatem et disciplinam et scientiam doce me.’ Scientia enim non habetur, nisi praecedat disciplina; nec disciplina, nisi praecedat bonitas; et sic per bonitatem et disciplinam inest nobis scientia . . . Per istam autem viam sapientiae pauci vadunt, et ideo pauci perveniunt ad veram sapientiam.*”

²³ *Op. cit.*, 27—50, 135—186, 277—318. *Hex.*, IV—VII, (V. 348—368). Cf. *Ibid.*, III, 24—25, (V. 347), copied for 24 in fn., 16a. 25: “*Per primam intelligitur, ad quid potest extendi nostra intelligentia de se. Haec intelligitur per primam diem, in qua facta est lux; unde in Psalmo: ‘Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine. Sine isto lumine indito nihil habet homo, nec fidem nec gratiam nec lumen sapientiae; et ideo divisa est etiam lux a tenebris.*”

²⁴ *Hex.*, VII, 3, (V. 365—366). Cf. *ibid.*, IV, 1, (V. 349): “*Prima visio animae est intelligentiae per naturam inditae. Unde dicit Psalmus: ‘Signa-*

This text brings to mind the highly disputed text of the *Sentences* which indicates how the philosopher is bound to fall into error, if he proceeds without the help of the light of faith: "Et ideo non est mirum si in hujusmodi deficit: Necesse est enim philosophantem in aliquem errorem labi, nisi adjuvetur per radium fidei."²⁵ As in another text of the *Sentences*,²⁶ there appears in the *In Hexaëmeron*²⁷ the suggestion that there are two distinct ways of pursuing intellectual inquiry on the purely natural level: with the aid of faith, as is done in the case of Christians who pursue intellectual inquiry, or, without the aid of faith, as in the case of pagan philosophers. The former attain to truth in a more profound way and with more certainty than do the latter who are doomed to fall into error with regard to some of the most basic truths because

tum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine.' Et hic possent explicari omnes difficultates philosophiae. Philosophi dederunt novem scientias et polliciti sunt dare decimam, scilicet contemplationem. Sed multi philosophi, dum se voluerunt dividere a tenebris erroris, magnis erroribus se immiscuerunt; 'dicentes enim, se esse sapientes, stulti facti sunt'; superbientes de sua scientia, luciferiani facti. Apud Aegyptos densissimae tenebrae erant, sed Sanctis tuis maxima erat lux. Omnes, qui fuerunt in lege naturae, ut Patriarchae, Prophetae, philosophi, filii lucis fuerunt."

²⁵ II *Sent.*, 18, 2, 1, ad, 6 (II. 448). Cf. III *Sent.*, 24, 2, 3, ad 4, (III. 524): "Unde valde parum attingit scientia cognitionem divinatorum, nisi fidei innitatur; quia in una et eadem re apertissimum est fidei quod occultissimum est scientiae; sicut patet de altissimis et nobilissimis quaestionibus, quarum veritas latuit philosophos, scilicet de creatione mundi, de potentia et sapientia Dei, quae latuerunt philosophos et nunc manifeste sunt Christianis simplicibus. Propter quod dicit Apostolus, (Epist. I. Cor. 1, 20) 'stultam fecisse Deum sapientiam hujus mundi; quia omnis sapientia de Deo in via absque fide magis est stultitia quam vera scientia. Deprimit enim perscrutantem in errorem, nisi dirigatur et juvetur per fidei illuminationem; unde per ipsam non expellitur, sed magis perficitur."

²⁶ II *Sent.*, 30, 1, 1, c., (II. 716): "Attendendum est tamen, quod ratio in inquirendo dupliciter potest procedere: aut prout est adjuncta radio fidei, et sic procedit aspiciendo ad causas superiores; aut prout iudicio proprio relicta est, et sic procedit inspiciendo ad naturas et causas inferiores; acquirit enim scientiam per viam sensus et experientiae. Primo modo ratiocinantur doctores catholici et fideles circa ea quae sunt fidei, et secundum hunc modum ratiocinandi multum est hoc consonum rationi, quod Deus in tanta miseria et calamitate, in qua nunc est, hominem a principio non fecerit; immo dicere contrarium magnae impietatis videtur esse pia et sanae menti. Secundo modo ratiocinando processerunt philosophi, qui non aspexerunt in hominis conditione suum principalem Auctorem, sed aspexerunt principia componentia et operationes, quas habet per virtutem naturae; et secundum hunc modum ratio potius discordat veritati catholicae, quam concordet. Et haec est ratio, quare philosophi, qui fuerunt tantae veritates indagatores, non pervenerunt ad lapsus humani cognitionem, quia eis videbatur esse valde rationabile, hominem sic fuisse conditum cum tamen catholicis doctoribus non solum fide, sed etiam rationum evidentialia certitudinaliter ejus contrarium appareat esse verum."

²⁷ *Hex.*, VII, 3, (V. 365—366): "Sed adhuc isti in tenebris fuerunt, quia non habuerunt lumen fidei, nos autem habemus lumen fidei."

of the absence of faith in them to illumine them. As Father Longpré²⁸ has indicated, Saint Bonaventure, long before the crisis of the *In Hexaëmeron* (1273),²⁹ had undertaken with clear insight to denounce the rationalistic methodology developed and used by the philosophers,³⁰ as well as their many errors³¹ with regard to God,³² to the creation of the world,³³

²⁸ "Bonaventure", *D.H.G.E.*, IX (1937) 755: "La signification du magistère bonaventurien vient en dernier lieu du fait que bien avant la bataille de l'*Hexaëmeron*' (1273), le séraphique Docteur a dénoncé avec clairvoyance et la méthode rationaliste des philosophes (Evang. de Saint-Mat, *ibid.*, 48—56) et leurs multiples erreurs sur Dieu (I *Sent.*, dist. XLV, dub. VII, Opera, t. I, p. 813), la création du monde (II *Sent.*, dist. I, p. I, a. I, q. I, et II, et a. 2, q. II, t. II, p. 16—24, 29—31, *ibid.*, dub. II, t. II, p. 37), l'origine de l'âme (II *Sent.*, dist. XVIII, a. 2, q. II, et III, t. II, p. 449—452), l'unité de l'intellect (II *Sent.*, XVIII, a. 2, q. I, t. II, p. 444—448 et dist. XXIV, p. I, a. 2, q. IV, t. II, p. 568), l'action des intelligences séparées sur l'âme (II *Sent.*, dist. XXIV, a. 2, q. IV, t. II, p. 368—371), le nombre des anges (II *Sent.*, dist. XVIII, a. 2, q. I, ad 6, t. II, p. 447), la durée des substances spirituelles (II *Sent.*, dist. II, p. I, a. I, q. I, ad 6, t. II, p. 37) et l'état originel de l'homme (II *Sent.*, dist. XXX, a. I, q. I et II, t. II, p. 716, 719). L'éclat de son intervention en 1267—1273 a trop relégué dans l'ombre ses premières luttes contre le mouvement qui devait aboutir à Siger de Brabant (Gilson, *op. cit.* p. 16).

²⁹ Cf. P. Mandonnet, "Paris et les grandes luttes doctrinales (1269—1272)" *Rev. des Jeunes*, (1290). Jules d'Albi, *S. Bonaventure et les luttes doctrinales de 1267—1277*, Paris, 1923.

³⁰ Cf. Evangeliste de Saint-Béat, *Le Séraphin de l'École, Études sur saint Bonaventure*, Paris, 1900, 48—56.

³¹ Cf. C. Krzanic, *La scuola Francese e l'Averroismo*, Milan, 1929.

³² I *Sent.*, 45, dub., VII, (I. 813): "Respondeo. Dicendum, quod non ideo dicuntur vani, quia aliis tribuerunt, sed quia sic aliis tribuerunt, ut tamen ad causam praecipuam non referrent. Et ideo evanuerunt, quia ad causam primam et praecipuam non venerunt, quae sola est causa simpliciter prima et simpliciter generalissima."

³³ II *Sent.*, I, I, I, I and 2, (II, 16—24). Cf. *ibid.*, 2, 2, (II, 29—31). Cf. *ibid.*, dub., II, q (II, 37): "Omnes istae expositiones verae sunt et catholicae, et per eas eliduntur tres errores circa mundi productionem. Ex prima eliditur error quorundam modernorum philosophantium, qui dixerunt, mundum ex tempore factum, sed mediante Intelligentia, ita quod Deus primo fecit Angelos et cum illis condidit mundum; contra quos est prima expositio. Si enim Deus in principio conditionis creavit mundum, non ergo post Angelos vel Intelligentias, ita quod per illos condiderit mundum; et hic error ortum habet ex illo verbo: 'Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, quasi Deus loquatur Angelis. — Ex secunda expositione eliditur error Aristotelicorum, qui dixerunt, mundum conditum ab aeterno. Si enim in principio temporis factus est ex nihilo, non ergo fuit sine principio; et hic error ortum habuit ex hoc, quod non potuerunt videre, qualiter mundus inceperit, et quare tunc et non ante. — Ex tertia expositione eliditur error tertius Platoniorum, qui dixerunt, principia mundi tria esse aeterna, scilicet Deum, materiam et exemplar. Si enim Deus in Filio sicut per exemplar aeternum condidit de nihilo mundum, non ergo requiritur secundum principium, quod est exemplar, nec tertium, quod sit materia; et hic ortum habuit ex hoc, quod non potuerunt intelligere omnino, quomodo aliquid fiat ex nihilo. — Ex omnibus his eliditur error Manichaeorum, qui posuerunt principia mundi effectiva duo; et iste eliditur per subjectum dictae locutionis: Creavit Deus caelum et terram, lucem et tenebras; et hic error est omnibus vilior. Et habent se gradatim. Nam primus solum errat in eo a quo. Secundus

to the origin of the soul,³⁴ to the unity of the intellect,³⁵ to the

errat in eo de quo, et quando, quia ex aliquo et ab aeterno. Tertius eriat in eo de quo, quia dicit factum esse de materia, non ex nihilo; et in eo per quod, scilicet circa exemplar, quod posuit alius a Deo, ut apparet; et in quando, quia posuit materiam ab aeterno imperfectam. Et iste error est multo vilior quam error Aristotelis, qui posuit ab aeterno materiam fuisse perfectam sua forma. Quartus error Manichaeorum omnibus est abominabilior, quia deficit in primo principio, in quo philosophi communiter concordaverunt, ponens prima duo principia, ac per hoc auferens ordinem et decorem universi, et bonitatem et Dei potestatem. Et hunc errorem inter ceteros non humanam malitiam, sed diabolicam astutiam credo adinvenisse, ut se alterum Deum esse persuadet mentibus peccatorum.

³⁴ *II Sent.*, 18, 2, 2 and 3, (II. 449—452): "Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc triplex est modus dicendi: unus secundum aestimationem aliquorum philosophorum, alter secundum inventionem quorundam haeticorum, tertius secundum instructionem sanctorum Doctorum. Primus modus dicendi est, quod animae simul fuerunt creatae in stellis comparibus, et post, formatis corporibus sibi idoneis, ad haec corpora vivificanda descendunt per lectum caelum et alios orbes planetarum, et postmodum, corruptis corporibus, illuc revertuntur, et postmodum suo loco et tempore iterum descendunt; et cum descendunt, obliviscuntur prius cognitorum, et cum ascendunt, obliviscuntur malorum, quae in corpore habuerunt. Haec autem positio Platonis fuit et suorum sequacium, et hanc multum nititur approbare Macrobius, explanans somnium Scipionis. — Sed vere ista positio plus est somnium quam aliquid dictum authenticum. Primum quidem, quia talis creatio et descensus et ascensus nullam omnino potest habere certitudinem, cum nemo possit hoc convincere ratiocinando, nemo etiam sit, qui possit dicere, se talium recordari. Secundo vero, quia manifestam continet absurditatem: quia dum ponit talem animarum circulationem, ponit, quod anima non sit vera corporis perfectio, cum "proprius actus in propria materia habeat fieri". Ponit etiam, quod nulla possit esse beatitudo, cum illa non sit, nisi ubi est perpetuitas et certitudo, sicut ostendit Augustinus de Trinitate decimo quarto. (14, 20) Secundus modus dicendi est, quod animae humanae simul fuerunt creatae in caelo cum Angelis, utpote quia sunt ejusdem naturae, et postmodum ad suggestionem dei tenebrarum peccaverunt, et merito illius peccati in corpora sunt detrusae tanquam in carceres, ut ibi purgentur, et cum purgatae fuerint, ad caelestem patriam revocentur. — Haec autem positio est haeticorum, qui dicuntur Manichaei, et non solum est contra fidem catholicam, sed etiam contra philosophiam et contra sensibilem experientiam. Contra fidem Catholicam est, cum ponat, animas ante pecasse, quam corporibus essent unitae, cum dicat Apostolus de Jacob et Esau ad Romanos nono: Antequam aliquid boni et mali egissent; ponat etiam, nullam animam damnari finaliter, et ita timorem Dei auferat de corde. — Contra philosophiam est, dum ponit, animas circuire diversa corpora, cum "propria forma in propria materia habeat fieri"; dum etiam ponit, quod corpus comparatur ad animam non sicut perfectibile, sed sicut carcer; quod si verum est, homo non est vera species, cum ex anima et corpore non fiat unum. — Contra rationem et sensibilem experientiam est, quia videmus, animam, quantumcumque bonam, nolle a corpore separari, secundum dicit Apostolus: Nolumus exspoliari, sed supervestiri; quod mirum esset, si ad corpus naturalem aptitudinem et inclinationem non haberet sicut ad suum sodalem, non sicut ad carcerem. Videmus etiam, quod nihil novimus, nisi ea quae, postquam nati sumus, didicimus; quod non esset, si animae nostrae a primordio creatae fuissent et in caelo peccassent; multa enim alia scirent. Quodsi tu dicas, quod mole corporis oppressae obliviscuntur; quaero tunc: quare processu temporis non recordantur aliqua? Tertius modus dicendi est, quod animae non simul

sunt creatae, sed successive producuntur in suis corporibus; et in hoc consenserunt omnes catholici tractatores; et adeo certum est, quod non licet alicui dubitare de animabus aliorum hominum ab Adam. Nam de anima Adae dubitasse videtur Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram, utrum fuerit ante corpus, vel in corpore creata. De istis autem non dubitat, immo improbat, quod ante corpus productae fuerint, duplici ratione movente circa animas aliorum hominum, quarum nulla reperitur in anima Adae. Prima est, quod animae, cum corporibus uniuntur, originalem culpam contrahunt et inficiuntur, ita quod nullam habent culpam actualem; ergo in eis nec meritum nec demeritum potuit praecedere nec liberi arbitrii usus nec deliberatio veniendi vel non veniendi ad corpus. — Alia vero ratio est, quia animae nostrae a sua prima origine sunt ignorantes nec noverunt ista quae per sensus addiscunt; non enim addiscere est reminisci, ut probant Sancti et philosophi. — Et ideo animae nostrae hac duplici de causa non possunt dici ante corpora productae, tum propter ignorantiam, tum propter originalem culpam, quarum neutra fuit in anima Adae, quando in corpus fuit infusa; et ideo magis de illa dubitavit quam de istis. Probabilius tamen est de illa dicere sicut supra ostensum fuit, quod fuerit creata in corpore. De istis autem non solum debemus opinari probabiliter, sed etiam cogimur credere fideliter, quod ante corpora creatae non fuerint; et hoc omnes catholici sentiunt tractatores. Et sic, quando invenitur eorum auctoritas, quae videatur aliud sonare, pie intelligenda est; quia vel loquuntur secundum aliorum opinionem, vel si secundum propriam loquuntur, intelligunt, quod anima, priusquam corpori uniatur, creata est, non ordine temporis, sed naturae. Et sic intelligenda sunt verba Gregorii Nazianzeni et verba Damasceni et verba etiam Augustini in libro de Anima et spiritu, qui dicit, quod concupiscibilitas et irascibilitas prius insunt animae, quam ipsa uniatur corpori. In omnibus enim istis magis notatur ordo naturae quam temporis. — Concedendae sunt ergo rationes ostendentes, quod animae non fuerunt simul creatae." *Ibid.*, 3, (II. 452—453): "Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc est triplex modus dicendi. Quidam namque dixerunt, quod animarum productio est mediante Intelligentia, ut, sicut corpus caeleste ad productionem facit corporis humani, sic etiam Intelligentia ad productionem animae; et hoc plures senserunt philosophi, et sensisse videtur auctor in libro de Causis. — Ratio autem, quae movet eos ad hoc ponendum, fuit et divina unitas, quae non patiebatur, ut Deus immediate produceret multa, et divina immutabilitas, quae non patiebatur, ut Deus produceret nova. — Sed haec tanquam haeretica abjicienda sunt et ostensa sunt esse falsa, supra distinctione prima. Unde verbum illud de Causis tanquam haereticum est respuendum, nisi quis intelligat, quod anima dicitur creari ab Intelligentia in hoc, quod aliquam illuminationem suscipit mediante illa. Intelligentia enim, secundum Philosophum, excedit animam in claritate cognitionis; et ideo dicit quidam philosophus, quod 'anima rationalis creatur in umbra intelligentiae, et sensibilis in umbra rationalis'. Hoc autem dictum est, quia una deficit a perfectione alterius, non quia una producat ab altera. Est et alius modus dicendi, quod animarum productio est per traductionem, ut anima traducatur ex anima, sicut caro ex carne; et sicut ab una candela accenduntur multae, sic ab una anima per sui multiplicationem absque diminutione vivificantur multa corpora. Et de hoc aliquando dubitaverunt catholici tractatores, et Augustinus maxime, sicut patet in libro super Genesim ad litteram, et in libro de libero arbitrio, et in libro Retractionum, ubi etiam dicit, quod non potuit pervenire ad certitudinem istius quaestionis. Ratio autem, quae potissime fecit eum dubitare, fuit transfusio originalis peccati. — Verumtamen ipse Augustinus hanc positionem expresse reprehendit in libro de Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus, cuius auctoritatem Magister ponit in littera, et ipse istum eundem modum improbat super genesim ad litteram; quoniam, si propter originale peccatum anima transfunditur ex anima, aut anima Christi non esset de genere aliarum animarum, aut habuisset originale peccatum, quorum utrumque falsum est et impium. Et ideo est tertius modus dicendi catholicus et verus, quod animae non seminantur,

sed formatis corporibus a Deo creantur et creando infunduntur et infundendo producuntur. — Animarum enim creationem Deus sibi soli debuit reservare, tum propter earum dignitatem, tum propter earum immortalitatem. Propter animarum dignitatem, quia, cum anima sit imago Dei et nata immediate ferri in Deum et beatificari in ipso diligendo eum ex toto corde, totum suum esse immediate debuit ab ipso habere, ut ipsum ex toto corde teneretur diligere. — Decuit etiam hoc propter animarum immortalitatem. Cum enim solus Deus sit, qui habeat vitam in semetipso et vitam indeficientem; solus est, qui potest producere principium vitae perpetuum. Cum igitur res incorruptibilis substantificari non possit in materia transmutabili, et operatio creaturae sit super materiam transmutabilem; impossibile est, aliquam creaturam animam rationalem producere; et ideo ejus productionem Deus sibi soli debuit reservare. Concendendae sunt ergo rationes probantes, quod animae rationales non sint ex traduce, sed a creatione."

⁸⁵ II Sent., 18, 2, 1 (II. 444—448): "Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod in hac quaestione multi philosophantes multa dixerunt falsa et vana. Quidam enim philosophi crediderunt, non solum eandem esse animam in omnibus hominibus, sed etiam in omnibus animalibus. Crediderunt enim, animam non esse aliud quam Deum; et hujus positionis fuit Pythagoras et Varro, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro de Civitate Dei de Varrone. (IV, 32, VII, 6 & 23) Maxime autem hoc putaverunt de anima humana propter sui dignitatem et spiritualitatem quantum ad intellectum agentem; quantum vero ad intellectum possibilem crediderunt esse idem quod hyle, quia anima potest recipere omnia, et ita denudata est a formis omnibus. — Hoc autem ponere non est philosophia, sed manifesta insipientia. Cum enim anima sit variabilis et transmutabilis et bonitatis et malitiae susceptibilis, omnino Deus esse non potest. Cum iterum sit forma nobilissima inter naturales formas, dans actum et complementum corpori et distincta ab aliis formis naturalibus, hyle esse non potest. Alii autem aliter opinati sunt, quod anima humana sive intellectualis, secundum quod intellectualis est, una est in omnibus hominibus, non solum quantum ad intellectum agentem, sed etiam quantum ad intellectum possibilem. — Et ratio, quae movit ad hoc ponendum, fuit ipsius animae immaterialitas et incorruptibilitas. Quia enim immaterialis est et a corpore non dependens, per corpus non potest individuari, cum nec sit corpus nec virtus in corpore, ut dicit Philosophus. Cum sit incorruptibilis, non indiget multiplicari, cum una numero conservari possit. — Et haec fuit positio Commentatoris super librum de Anima, quam etiam vult imponere Aristoteli et trahere ex verbis suis, tum quia ponit mundum aeternum, et ita homines innumerabiles praecesserunt; tum etiam, quia ponit, quod nulla sit substantia spiritualis, quae non habeat corpus movere; quodsi diversae animae essent in diversis hominibus, aliquando cessarent ab actu movendi, cum separantur; essent etiam infinitae actu, cum motus caeli non habuerit principium, secundum Philosophum. — Ad vitandas autem objectiones in contrarium adductas distinguit Commentator tres partes in humana anima. Cujus verba sunt haec super tertium de Anima: "Opinandum est, quod in anima sunt tres partes intellectus, quarum una est intellectus recipiens, secunda autem efficiens, tertia autem factum; et duae istarum sunt aeternae, scilicet agens et recipiens, tertia autem est generabilis et corruptibilis." Animam autem tertiam, quam dicit generabilem et corruptibilem, vocat intellectum passivum; et illud dicit quod nihil aliud est quam imaginatio. Unde postmodum subjungit: 'Intellectus passivus est corruptibilis, et absque hoc nihil intelligitur. Per intellectum autem passivum intelligo virtutem imaginariam'. Unde vult dicere, quod sicut in visu est color, et est lux, et est oculus videns; sic in intellectu se habet, quod species imaginariae sunt sicut color, intellectus agens est sicut lux, intellectus possibilis est sicut oculus. Et sicut ex concursu illorum trium efficitur visus, ita ex concursu illorum trium efficitur intellectus; et sicut ex diversitate vel defectu coloris causatur diversitas vel defectus actus videndi, sic ex diversitate existente in similitudinibus imaginariis vel imaginatione causatur diversitas in intellectu plurium

et defectus etiam actus intelligendi in eodem homine, quia nihil intelligimus nisi in phantasmate. Et pro tanto dicit Philosophus, corrumpi intellectum, quodam interius corrupto; intellectum, inquam non quemlibet, sed adeptum. Et per haec quae dicta sunt, nititur declinare inconvenientia, quae ad hanc opinionem sequuntur. Quantumcumque autem hanc opinionem coloret, pessima est et haeretica. Est enim contra christianam religionem, dum aufert meritariam retributionem, quae non esset, si omnium anima una esset. — Est etiam contra rectam rationem. Planum est enim, quod anima intellectiva, ut intellectiva est, est perfectio hominis, secundum quod homo. Si ergo homines non sunt diversi solum, secundum quod animalia, sed secundum quod homines, non solum habent diversas imaginationes et animas sensibiles, immo etiam diversos intellectus et animas rationales. — Est etiam contra sensibilem experientiam, quoniam diversi homines diversas habent et contrarias cogitationes et affectiones. Quodsi tu dicas, quod hoc venit ex diversitate specierum existentium in imaginatione; hoc nihil est, quia non solummodo diversificantur in his intelligibilibus, quae extrahuntur a sensu, immo etiam in his quae sunt supra omnem imaginationem, sicut sunt virtutes, quae intelliguntur per suam essentiam, non per speciem imaginariam, sicut etiam est ipse Deus, quem quidam diligunt, quidam contemnunt. Haec igitur positionem repudiando, tanquam haeticam et falsam, dicendum est secundum fidem et veritatem, quod diversi homines diversas habent animas rationales, et concedendae sunt rationes hoc probantes." Cf. *ibid.*, 24, 1, 2, 4, (II. 568): "Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est praenotandum, quod variis modis tentaverunt praedecessores nostri assignare differentiam intellectus possibilis ad agentem. Quidam enim dixerunt, quod differunt sicut duae substantiae. Alii dixerunt, quod differunt sicut duae potentiae. Tertio modo dixerunt alii, quod differunt sicut habitus et potentia. Quarto modo dixerunt alii, quod differunt sicut potentia absoluta et comparata. Primus autem modus dicendi, quo dicitur, quod differunt secundum substantiam, dupliciter habet intelligi. — Quidam namque dicere voluerunt, quod intellectus agens sit intelligentia separata; intellectus autem possibilis sit anima corpori conjuncta. Et modus iste ponendi et dicendi fundatus est super multa verba philosophorum, qui posuerunt, animam rationalem illustrari a decima intelligentia et perfici ex conjunctione sui ad illam. — Sed iste modus dicendi falsus est et erroneus, sicut supra improbatum fuit dictinctione octava. Nulla enim substantia creata potentiam habet illuminandi et perficiendi animam, proprie intelligendo; immo secundum mentem immediate habet a Deo illuminari, sicut in multis locis Augustinus ostendit. Alius modus intelligendi est, quod intellectus agens esset ipse Deus, intellectus vero possibilis esset noster animus. Et iste modus dicendi super verba Augustini est fundatus, qui in pluribus locis dicit et ostendit, quod 'lux, quae nos illuminat, magister, qui nos docet, veritas, quae nos dirigit, Deus est', juxta illud Joannis: Erat lux vera, quae illuminat omnem hominem etc. — Iste autem modus dicendi, etsi verum ponat et fidei catholicae consonum, nihil tamen est ad propositum: quia, cum animae nostrae data sit potentia ad intelligendum, sicut aliis creaturis data est potentia ad alios actus, sic Deus, quamvis sit principalis operans in operatione cujuslibet vim activam, per quam exiret in operationem propriam. Sic credendum est indubitanter, quod animae humanae non tantummodo dederit intellectum possibilem, sed etiam agentem, ita quod uterque est aliquid ipsius animae. — Et ideo primus modus assignandi differentiam tanquam ad propositum impertinens omittendus est, quo scilicet dicitur, quod intellectus agens et possibilis differunt sicut duae substantiae: Secundus autem modus dicendi, quo scilicet dicitur, quod differunt sicut duae potentiae, dupliciter potest intelligi, et uno modo false, alio modo vere. Unus modus intelligendi et dicendi est, quod intellectus possibilis sit potentia pure materialis, quae inest animae ex parte suae materiae; intellectus vero agens sit potentia pure formalis, quae inest animae ex parte suae formae. Et hic modus dicendi videtur fundari super verba Philosophi qui dicit, quod 'intellectus possibilis est, quod est omnia fieri; intellectus agens, quod est omnia facere', sicut con-

action of separated intelligences upon the soul,³⁶ to the number of angels,³⁷ to the permanence of spiritual substances,³⁸ and to the original state of man.³⁹ From the very beginning, Saint Bonaventure refused to reason

tingit in forma et materia reperire. — Sed hic modus dicendi non consonat veritati. Si enim intellectus possibilis esset potentia pure passiva et se teneret ex parte materiae, in omnibus posset poni, in quibus est reperire materiale principium. Praeterea, sicut oculus non dicitur visus, sic talis potentia non deberet dici intellectus. Alius vero modus intelligendi est, ut dicatur, quod intellectus agens et possibilis sint duae intellectus differentiae, datae uni substantiae, quae respiciunt totum compositum. Appropriatur autem intellectus agens formae et possibilis materiae, quia intellectus possibilis ordinatur ad suscipiendum, intellectus agens ordinatur ad abstrahendum; nec intellectus possibilis est pure passivus; habet enim supra speciem existentem in phantasmate se convertere, et convertendo per auxilium intellectus agentis illam suscipere, et de ea judicare. Similiter nec intellectus agens est omnino in actu; non enim potest intelligere aliud a se, nisi adjuvetur a specie, quae abstracta a phantasmate intellectui habet uniri. Unde nec possibilis intelligit sine agente, nec agens sine possibili. — Et iste modus dicendi verus est et super verba Philosophi fundatus. Dicit enim, agentem et possibilem esse duas differentias intellectus; unde sicut duo intelligimus necessario in medio, ad hoc quod abstrahatur species ab objecto, videlicet lucem et diaphaneitatem, ita quod per unum abstrahit et per aliud defert et suscipit; sic et in proposito conformiter potest intelligi, ita ad unum actum haec duo concurrere, ut hoc sine illo non habeat operationem suam complete. Tertius modus assignandi differentiam, quod dicitur, quod different sicut potentia et habitus, dupliciter habet intelligi.

³⁶ II *Sent.*, 24, 2, 1, 4, (II. 568—571): "Copied in previous fn.

³⁷ II *Sent.*, 18, 2, 1, ad 6, (II. 447): "Ad illud quod objicitur, quod substantiae spiritualis officium est movere corpus; dicendum, quod illud argumentum dupliciter deficit. Primum quidem, quia propter hoc non est substantia spiritualis principaliter facta. Cessabit enim omnis motus, quod ignoravit Philosophus; unde vana est ratio sua, quando assumsit numerum motorum secundum numerum mobilium et motorum secundum numerum mobilium et motuum; multo enim plures sunt Angeli, quam sint orbes, qui moventur; non enim facti sunt ad hoc, sed ad fruendum Deo. — Deficit etiam in hoc, quod etsi anima separatur a corpore, resumet tamen aliquando corpus suum per resurrectionem; quod etiam Philosophus ignoravit; et ideo non est mirum, si in hujusmodi deficit. Necesse est enim, philosophantem in aliquem errorem labi, nisi adjuvetur per radium fidei."

³⁸ II *Sent.*, 2, 1, 1, 1, ad 6, (II. 57): "Quod quaeritur: in quo genere sit mensura angelicae durationis; aliqui dicunt, quod non est quantitas nisi quantitas virtutis, et ideo non est in genere quantitatis proprie. — Sed si vere mensura est, quomodo non est quantitas vera? Ideo dicunt alii, quod est in genere quantitatis sicut principium. — Si tamen quaeratur, cujus sit principium, cum dicat mensuram diversam a tempore, ut ostensum est; difficile erit assignare. Et ideo sanius potest dici, quod sicut tempus ponitur in substantiis spiritualibus quantum ad affectiones, secundum Augustinum, licet consideratio Philosophi ad illud non conscenderit; sic et mensura ponitur differens specie ab aliis quantitativis, licet de illa non loquatur Philosophus, quia mensuras rerum inferiorum determinare intendebat. Nec ponitur ex hoc in ipso insufficientia; et si etiam poneretur, non esset propter hoc a veritate tramite aliquatenus discedendum."

³⁹ II *Sent.*, 30, 1, 1, (II. 716): "Respondeo: Dicendum, quod absque dubio natura humana in has corruptiones dejecta est merito primae praevaricationis, non instituta a primordio suae conditionis. Hoc enim fidei veritas praedicat, sacrae Scripturae auctoritas confirmat, rationis probabilitas manifestat. Fides hoc clamat et dicit, Filium Dei passum esse, ut nos a

the privilege of complete autonomy and separate sufficiency.⁴⁰ Philosophy is considered as requiring faith to achieve its perfect fulfilment,⁴¹ since without the help of the light of faith, philosophers have fallen into

morte eriperet, inquam nos induxerat primus parens. Sacrae Scripturae auctoritas confirmat, quae dicit Genesis secundo, qualiter homo per culpam inobedientiae poenam mortalitatis incurrerit. Ratio autem hoc manifestat, sicut prius in opponendo monstratum est, tam ex ordine, qui respicit divinam justitiam, quam ex ordine, qui respicit sapientiam, quam etiam ex ordine, qui respicit bonitatem summam." The rest of text copied in fn. 26. Cf. *ibid.*, 2, (II. 719): "... Hoc tamen ignoraverunt philosophi et etiam aliqui haeretici, quia nescierunt attendere, in quo attenditur rectitudo animae et justitia, et pro quanto anima dici debet ad Deum ordinata. Constat igitur quod tota humana natura corrupta est, non solum poenaliter, sed etiam culpabiliter."

⁴⁰ Cfr. A. de Margerie, *Essai sur la philosophie de saint Bonaventure*, Paris, 1855, p. 27—39.

⁴¹ III *Sent.*, 24, 2, 3, (III. 523—524): "Respondeo: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod duplex est cognitio, scilicet apertae comprehensionis et manuductione ratiocinantis. — Si loquamur de scientia apertae comprehensionis, quo modo cognoscitur Deus in patria; sic non compatitur secum fidem, ut simul idem sit scitum et creditum, pro eo quod talis cognitio simpliciter excludit aenigma; et hoc melius apparebit infra, cum agetur de evacuatione virtutum, quare videlicet et qualiter fidei actus per visionem excludatur et evacuetur. Et de hac scientia Sanctorum auctoritates dicunt, et communis opinio magistrorum tenet, hoc esse verum, quod idem non potest esse simul scitum et creditum. Si autem loquamur de scientia, quae est a manuductione ratiocinationis, sic voluerunt quidam dicere, adhuc esse verum, quod non potest simul stare cum fide, quia per talem scientiam assentit intellectus ipsi rei cognitae propter ipsam rationem principaliter, assentit etiam necessario, assentit etiam sicut rei, quae est infra se; cuius contrarium reperitur in fide, quae assentit primae Veritati propter se et voluntarie, elevando rationem super se. Et ideo dixerunt, habitum fidei et scientiae mutuo sese excludere, secundum quod caritas illum amorem excludit, quo quis amat Deum propter temporalia principaliter. Aliorum vero positio est, quod de uno et eodem simul potest haberi scientia manuductione ratiocinationis cum habitu fidei, iuxta quod dicit Augustinus decimo quarto de Trinitate, exponens illud Apostoli: Alii datur per Spiritum sermo sapientiae, alii sermo scientiae: 'Huic scientiae tribuo illud quo fides saluberrima, quae ad veram beatitudinem ducit, gignitur, nutritur, defenditur, roboratur; qua scientia non pollent plurimi fideles, licet habeant fidem'. Et Richardus de sancto Victore dicit, quod 'ad ea quae fidei sunt, non tantum possunt haberi rationes probabiles, sed etiam necessariae, licet eas interdum contingat nos latere'. Unde aliquis credens, Deum esse unum, creatorem omnium, si ex rationibus necessariis incipiat ipsum idem nosse, non propter hoc desinit fidem habere; vel si etiam prius nosset, fides superveniens talem cognitionem non expelleret, sicut per experientiam patet. Ratio autem, quare talis scientia simul potest esse de eodem cum ipsa fide, ita quod una cognitio alteram non expellat, est, quia scientia manuductione ratiocinationis, licet aliquam certitudinem faciat et evidentiam circa divina, illa tamen certitudo et evidentia non est omnino clara, quamdiu sumus in via. Quamvis enim aliquis possit rationibus necessariis probare Deum esse, et Deum esse unum; tamen ipsum divinum esse et ipsam Dei unitatem, et qualiter illa unitas non excludat personarum pluralitatem, non potest, nisi 'per justitiam fidei emundetur.' Unde illuminatio et certitudo talis scientiae non est tanta, quod habita illa, superfluat illuminatio fidei, immo valde est cum illa per necessaria. — Et hujus signum est, quia, licet aliqui philosophi de Deo sciverint multa vera, tamen, quia fide caruerunt, in multis erraverunt, vel etiam defecerunt. — Unde sicut in praecedentibus dictum est, quod fides

error⁴² or mixed error to truth.⁴³ The nature of man and of the truths he seeks to grasp,⁴⁴ explain that philosophical speculation has all to gain in accepting the control and the enlightenment given by faith and the understanding of faith.⁴⁵ Thus it appears that throughout his life,

potest stare cum visione exteriori, quia illa habet conjunctim latentiam circa personam Christi; sic intelligendum est circa habitum fidei et talem modum sciendi, quod possunt se simul in eodem et respectu ejusdem compati."

⁴² Cf. *ibid.*, (II. 523), copied in fn. 41.

⁴³ III *Sent.*, 23, 1, 4, ad 4, (III. 482): "Ad illud quod objicitur, quod certior est cognitio, cui non permiscetur error; dicendum, quod verum est; sed sicut fidei non permiscetur error, ita etiam nec scientiae, in quantum scientia, sed hoc est solum ex defectu a parte cognoscentis. Sic etiam contingit in ipsa fide a parte credentis, sicut patet in fideli, qui propter distortionem intellectus a cognitione fidei labitur in haeresim, dum credulitati verae intermiscet se credulitas falsa. Unde ex hoc non potest concludi, quod fides sit certior quam scientia. Istud tamen verum est, quod doctrina fidei magis veraciter est tradita, quam aliqua scientia philosophica, quia Spiritus sanctus et ipse Christus, qui docuerunt veritatem fidei et sacrae Scripturae, in nullo falsum dixerunt nec in aliquo possunt reprehendi; quod de nullo philosopho arbitror vere posse dici in traditione alicujus doctrinae, immo inveniuntur veris multa falsa permiscuisse."

⁴⁴ II *Sent.*, 18, 2, 1, (II. 446—448), copied fn. 35.

⁴⁵ III *Sent.*, 23, 1, 1, ad 4, (III. 472): "Ad illud quod objicitur, quod quanto aliquid magis est rationabile, tanto magis consonat virtuti perfectae; dicendum, quod rationabile dicitur aliquid dupliciter: aut quia consonum est rationi elevatae et illustratae a lumine Veritatis supernae, aut quia consonum est rationi conversae ad cognitionem sensibilem. Si primo modo dicatur rationabile, non habet instantiam. Si secundo modo dicatur rationabile, falsitatem habet, quoniam frequenter ratio ad sensibilia conversa judicat esse vera quae sunt falsa, et esse bona quae sunt mala, et e converso. Unde multa videntur sibi irrationabilia, quae sunt valde rationabilia, sicut patet: quia multa videntur valde rationabilia Christianis, ut omnino continere et omnino mendicare et similia. Et quantum praecellit iudicium viri iudicium pueri, tantum praecellit iudicium viri Christiani iudicium unius philosophi, et iudicium rationis sursum conversae iudicium rationis ad inferiora depressae. Et ideo hoc non impedit, fidem esse virtutem, quia credit aliqua, quae videntur irrationabilia homini animali — sunt enim rationabilia homini spirituali — immo hoc facit ad rationem virtutis, ut credat sine ratione. Si enim crederet per rationem cogentem, illa credulitas non esset voluntaria, sed necessaria, et sic non esset virtuosa nec meritoria; sicut melius manifestabitur infra." Cf. II *Sent.*, 24, 2, 1, 1, (II. 575): "Est etiam hoc contra experimentum, quia superior non solum habet judicare secundum leges aeternas, sed etiam habet judicare secundum lumen proprium, et secundum lumen sibi ab inferiori acquisitum. Et quamvis aspiciendo ad leges aeternas non peccet judicando, tamen secundum ea quae percipit a sensibus, vel etiam secundum lumen sibi datum et innatum, potest deficere et errare, maxime in statu naturae lapsae. Esto enim, quod sibi proponatur credibile et aliquis articulus fidei, utpote articulus de Trinitate et Unitate, cum iste non solum repugnet sensui et imaginationi, sed etiam discrepet a naturali iudicio rationis; si noster intellectus secundum lumen proprium, vel aspiciendo ad partes inferiores judicaret, deficeret et discredere et peccaret." IV *Sent.*, 10, 2, 2, 1, (IV. 235): "Si ergo quaeratur ratio, per quam intelligatur, vel utrum sit intelligibile; dicendum, quod est loqui de intellectu nostro, ut est humanus, vel ut est fidelis. Si ut est humanus; sic intelligit conversus ad imaginationem et sensum et judicat secundum causas intrinsecas et inferiores. Et ideo deficit in assentiendo, quia non assentit nisi secundum

Saint Bonaventure had a clear consciousness of the necessity and importance for the Christian believer to pursue his quest for certainty within the framework of the certitude of faith and of the data of revealed truth. In the *Sentences*,⁴⁶ written in his early years, Saint Bonaventure distinguishes two different ways of pursuing rational inquiry: the Catholic doctors and believers pursue their inquiry with their reason enhanced by the enlightenment of faith and with an eye to the superior causes, while the philosophers proceed through reason left to its own judgment and acquire science from the senses and experience by the insight into inferior natures and causes. As a result of this intellectual attitude, the philosophers fall short in their search for some of the most basic truths, while the Catholic doctors perceive the truth under consideration not only through faith but also with the certainty of rational evidence: "Cum tamen catholicis doctoribus non solum fide, sed etiam rationum evidentia certitudinaliter ejus contrarium appareat esse verum."⁴⁷ Thus the quest for certainty ("rationum evidentia certitudinaliter") pursued by the Catholic doctors and the believers within the certitude of faith ("ratio in inquirendo . . . prout est adjuta radio fidei") brings in results which are quite different from those of the quest

manuductionem, quae ortum habet ab imaginatione et sensu. Item, quia judicat secundum causas intrinsecas et creatas, et ita comparando potentiam continendi ipsius hostiae ad potentiam continendi passive ipsius corporis; et quia invenit repugnantiam et improporcionabilitatem: ideo contradicit in ratiocinando. Et ita iste articulus dicitur esse supra intellectum et contra intellectum, secundum quod est intellectus humanus. — Si autem loquamur de intellectu, secundum quod est fidelis; sic dicendum, quod assentit secundum dictamen fidei et secundum regulam veritatis aeternae; ideo sufficit in assentiendo et concordat in ratiocinando. Intellectus enim fidem habens statim credit, ex quo hoc propositum est sibi, scilicet quod Christus esset sub speciebus illis, et hoc adjutus lumine fidei. Similiter concordat in ratiocinando, quia aspicit ad causas superiores. Sic enim dicit intellectus: Deus potest facere omne quod est congruum; et fides assumit: congruum est, quod caro Christi exponatur in cibum; et ideo ratio concludit, quod Deus hoc possit ibi facere. Item, intellectus dicit, quod Veritas non potest dicere falsum; et fides assumit: Veritas dixit: Hoc est corpus meum, et praecepit, ut diceretur: ergo dixit verum. Cum ergo sit in nobis duplex intellectus, scilicet fidelis et humanus; ideo sentimus in nobis aliquando collutationes; fidelis tamen intellectus praevallet sibi, ut est humanus, quia elevat ipsum extra animalitatem; attamen non ita elevat, quod comprehendat, ut meritum fidei integrum maneat. Et hoc patet: quia intellectus humanus dicit, quod impossibile est, quod majus contineatur a minori; et fidelis respondet, quod verum est localiter, et corpus Christi magnum non est ibi localiter, sed sacramentaliter; et quamvis illud sit impossibile, tamen potest esse Deo possibile. Et quia nescimus, quid Deus possit, mutato modo essendi; ideo, licet intellectus sibi praevaleat, tamen nondum comprehendit. Et sic patent rationes ad utramque partem. Primae enim procedunt de intellectu, secundum quod humanus, et secundae de intellectu, secundum quod fidelis.

⁴⁶ II *Sent.*, 30, 1, 1, c., (II. 716), copied fn. 26.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

for certainty pursued by the philosophers along purely natural lines of reason left to its own resources ("ratio in inquirendo . . . prout iudicio proprio relicta est").

This emphasis laid by Saint Bonaventure on the necessity of having recourse, either directly or indirectly, to the certitude of faith and the data of revelation as necessary elements which enter to constitute the proper intellectual background and framework for the efficacious inquiry of some of the most basic truths has lead many historians of mediaeval thought to bring out these remarks as suggesting an anti-Aristotelian attitude, an anti-philosophical approach and a theological and mystical tendency on the part of Saint Bonaventure with regard to intellectual inquiry. The very character of the intellectual attitude towards rational inquiry brings in the problem of the exact meaning, value and propriety of a purely philosophical undertaking in the quest for certainty. The Christocentric and theologically minded way of thinking found exemplified in numerous remarks with regard to the capacity of natural intellectual powers and to the possibility of achieving rational certainty with regard to some of the most basic truths would lead one to think that the thought of Saint Bonaventure was imbued with theologism. What is the relationship between philosophy and the Christian wisdom man is said to be striving for as to his perfection. Would the terms philosophy and philosopher have been used in the works of Saint Bonaventure to refer exclusively to pagan philosophers deprived of all supernatural help in their purely rational inquiries or to a separated and autonomous philosophy, while the terms Christian wisdom and Catholic doctors would be used exclusively with reference to the theological wisdom developed on the purely rational level by Christian believers seeking understanding through a quest for certainty pursued within the state of the absolute certitude of faith and the framework of the data of revealed truths, but achieving fully rational evidence with regard to the whole of knowable reality whether it be in fact revealed or not? Whether we have here the existence of an autonomous philosophy, of an heteronomous philosophy or simply of a theological wisdom is the question at hand. Was the intellectual inquiry pursued by the believer seeking understanding to be considered as a true philosophy specifically rational in its nature, as a Christian philosophy at once truly rational and truly Christian or as a way of thinking in which reason has but subalternate and ministerial functions with regard to revealed truths held on faith? The very essence of philosophical inquiry is here at stake.

In the various definitions given of philosophy in contradistinction to theology and mystical experience, we see philosophy defined along lines which would definitely suggest the purely natural level of rational inquiry achieved in human sciences. In the *Sentences*,⁴⁸ philosophy appears as a purely speculative understanding based on principles of reason and acquired about any creature. In the *De Reductione Artium ad Theologiam*,⁴⁹ the interior light of philosophical knowledge is said to illumine man seeking in his inquiry of intellectual truths the interior and hidden causes, through the principles of discipline and of natural truth, which are naturally inserted in man. In the *De Donis Spiritus Sancti*,⁵⁰ philosophical science appears to bear upon truths allowing for inquiry that will give certitudinal knowledge. In some of his *Sermons*,⁵¹ Saint Bonaventure brings out the Aristotelian definition of science as a certain knowledge through the causes of the reality known and the

⁴⁸ III *Sent.*, 35, 1, 2, c. (III. 776): "Quaedam (scientia) est, quae consistit in intellectu pure speculativo; et haec est fundata super principia rationis, et haec est scientia acquisita de quacumque creatura, sicut scientia humanae philosophiae."

⁴⁹ 4, (V. 320); copied in fn. 18.

⁵⁰ IV, 5, (V. 474): "Scientia philosophica nihil aliud est quam veritatis ut scrutabilis notitia certa. Scientia theologica est veritatis ut credibilis notitia pia. Scientia gratuita est veritatis ut diligibilis notitia sancta. Scientia gloriosa est veritatis ut desiderabilis notitia sempiterna."

⁵¹ *Dominica XXII post Pent.*, I, (IX. 441): "Unde nullus debet vocari et dici magister nisi solus Christus. Et ratio est, quia nullus potest docere, res esse scibiles alteri, nisi sit immutabilitas ex parte scibilis, certitudo sive infallibilitas ex parte scientis. 'Omne enim, quod scitur, secundum Philosophum, necessarium est in se sine mutabilitate, et certum est ipsi scienti. Tunc enim scimus, cum causam arbitramur cognoscere, propter quam res est, et scimus, quoniam ipsius est causa, et quoniam impossibile est aliter se habere'. Ex parte enim creaturae cujuscumque non est immutabilitas. Unde cum res habeant esse in proprio genere et humana mente et in aeterna ratione, et earum esse sit mutabile primo et secundo modo, eo quod omne creatum vertibile, et immutabilitas solum sit in Filio Dei, qui est ars et ratio omnium viventium; necessario sequitur, quod res scibiles nullo modo habeant immutabilitatem, nisi prout sunt in Verbo aeterno; ergo nullus potest docere nec etiam facere, res fore scibiles vere, nisi adsit Filius Dei. — Secundo ad hoc, ut aliquis possit docere, requiritur certitudo et infallibilitas ex parte scientis, quae non potest esse ex ea luce, quae potest obfascari; et talis est lux intelligentiae creatae. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus: 'Nam, sicut terra, nisi luce illustrata, videri non potest; sic quae in disciplinis traduntur, quae quisquis intelligit verissima esse nulla dubitatione concedit, credendum est, ea non posse intelligi, nisi a Christo, sole spirituali illustrentur.' — Merito igitur soli Christo et non alii attribuenda est auctoritas officii, ut singulariter unus Magister dicatur, eo quod ipse est fontale principium et origo cujuslibet scientiae humanae. Unde sicut unus est sol, tamen multos radios emittit; sic ab uno Magistro, Christo, sole spirituali, multiformes et diversae scientiae procedunt; et quemadmodum multiplices et distincti rivuli ab uno fonte egrediuntur, unus tamen est fons, qui in tot rivulos sine sui defectibilitate (se) multiplicat; sic ab uno fonte aeterno, ab uno Magistro, Christo, sine sui defectibilitate egrediuntur rivuli diversarum scientiarum." Cf. *Reb. Theol.* IV, *Christus Unus*, 6—10, (V. 568—570). copied in fn., 11.

requirements for certainty of the immutability in the object known and the infallibility in the knowing subject. The Aristotelian notion of science is associated with the basic epistemological theme of Christ, the sole master of all our scientific knowledge. Christ alone can assure the immutability on the part of the object and the infallibility on the part of the subject. In the *In Hexaëmeron*,⁵² Christ is said to be the treasure-house of the wisdom and science of the hidden God and the means to all science. Consequently "ab illo incipiendum necessario, si quis vult venire ad sapientiam christianam." Christ is the means of knowing the essence of things which the metaphysician studies, the nature of things which the physicist studies, the distance of things which the mathematician studies, the transmission of thought which the logician studies, the modesty of the way of life which the moralist studies, the justice in human relationship which the politician and the jurist study and the concordance or order of the whole which the theologian studies.⁵³ Thus, Christ, through the theory of exemplarism and illumination, is made to be the source of all intelligibility in being for the object to be known and of perspicacity in understanding for the knowing subject.⁵⁴ The key-position held by the theory of divine exemplarism and divine illumination in the metaphysics and the epistemology of Saint Bonaventure make for difficulties in the interpretation of the intellectual attitude which fostered such a world-view. This theocentric and Christocentric conception of the world of being and of the realm of knowing brings in the problem of the possibility, propriety and meaning of a purely natural intellectual inquiry in the quest for the understanding of the whole of reality, especially when we see Bonaventure state that the pagans, because of the absence of faith in them, have missed the point on the most basic and worthwhile problems which could be

⁵² I, 10—11, (V. 330—331), copied in fn. 18. Detailed analysis, *ibid.*, 12—39, (V. 331—335). Cf. *Ibid.*, XII, 5, (V. 385): "Item, quia ipse doctor est, docet infallibiliter et certificat sic, quod impossibile est, aliter se habere. Secundum sententiam omnium doctorum Christus est doctor interius, nec scitur aliqua veritas nisi per eum, non loquendo, sicut nos, sed interius illustrando; et ideo necesse est, ut habeat clarissimas species apud se, neque tamen ab alio acceperit. Ipse enim intimus est omni animae et suis speciebus clarissimis refulget super species intellectus nostri tenebras; et sic illustrantur species illae obtenebratae, admixtae obscuritati phantasmatum, ut intellectus intelligat. Si enim scire est cognoscere, rem aliter impossibile se habere; necessarium est, ut ille solus scire faciat, qui veritatem novit et habet in se veritatem."

⁵³ *Ibid.*, I, 11, (V. 331). Detailed analysis, *Ibid.*, 12—39 (V. 331—335).

⁵⁴ Cf. J.-M. Bissen, *L'exemplarisme divin selon saint Bonaventure*, Paris, Vrin, 1929.

grasped by natural reason concerning God and his works: "Deprimit ergo perscrutantem in errorem, nisi dirigatur et juvetur per fidei illuminationem".⁵⁵

III

Prof. Gilson,⁵⁶ in his basic work on the philosophy of Saint Bonaventure, grasped the far-reaching consequences of the peculiar intellectual attitude shown by Saint Bonaventure in the pursuit of rational inquiries. As a result, he has elaborated what he⁵⁷ himself has accepted to call a mutilated theology in his effort at trying to determine the basic elements of the philosophical thought of Saint Bonaventure. The basic interpretation of Prof. Gilson was accepted by many historians⁵⁸ of Bonaventurian thought such as Longpré, Tinivella, Squadrini, Veuthey and others, who recognized the unity of the thought of St. Bonaventure and its basically Christian and Augustinian background. In spite of the theoretical distinction between philosophy and theology, it remains that on the practical level of exercise the pursuit of the quest for certainty on the philosophical level cannot be considered as allowing for complete autonomy, independance and separation from the influence of faith. Their characterization of it as a Christian philosophy, however, fostered the much debated question of the meaning, possibility and

⁵⁵ III *Sent.*, 24, 2, 3, ad 4, (III. 524).

⁵⁶ Et. Gilson, *La philosophie de saint Bonaventure*, 1st ed., Paris, Vrin, 1924; 2nd ed., 1943.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 2nd ed., 1943, p. 409: "Voir sur ce point l'importante discussion de Mr Fern. Van Steenberghen, dans *Siger de Brabant d'après ses œuvres inédites*, t. II, pp. 459—464, avec sa conclusion: "En résumé, nous croyons que M. Gilson a eu tort de présenter comme 'la philosophie de saint Bonaventure' un exposé mutilé de sa théologie" (p. 463). Nous acceptons entièrement ce reproche. La philosophie de saint Bonaventure n'est effectivement qu'un moment de sa théologie. Nous demandons seulement qu'on ne pose pas le problème en fonction du seul saint Bonaventure ou de son historien, car il se pose à propos de tout ce que les théologiens du moyen âge ont dit en philosophie. Bref, c'est le problème rebattu de la philosophie chrétienne qui se pose sous une autre forme. On admet que "la philosophie de saint Thomas incorporée dans sa Somme théologique est exactement aussi hétéronome que celle de saint Bonaventure" (p. 462). Il faudrait donc cesser de parler même d'une philosophie de saint Thomas d'Aquin, ou, du moins, de s'inspirer de ses œuvres théologiques pour en parler, ce qui la réduirait à n'être qu'un commentaire littéral d'Aristote. Les seuls philosophes du moyen âge seraient alors les averroïstes latins; peut-être même pas tous. Quoi qu'il en soit de ce dernier point la question même met en cause la possibilité intrinsèque de l'existence de philosophies incluses dans les théologiens médiévaux; on ne saurait, sans proposer d'abord une solution générale du problème, dire qui a tort ou raison dans chaque cas particulier."

⁵⁸ Cf. the works already quoted.

propriety of a philosophy which would be Christian in its nature.⁵⁹ The whole interpretation of Prof. Gilson, however, was violently attacked and rejected as an unjustifiable approach. Father Mandonnet,⁶⁰ realizing the importance of the Christocentric and supernatural character of the tendencies of Saint Bonaventure's way of thinking concluded that Saint Bonaventure had in fact produced but a theology and in no way a philosophical elaboration carried through on the purely natural level of rational inquiry. Whether the approach implied a Christian philosophy as Prof. Gilson suggested or simply a theology as Father Mandonnet thought, it remained that in both cases the particular turn given the intellectual attitude was due to the direct influence of the Augustinian way of thinking which Saint Bonaventure embraced fully. E. Smeets^{60a} labelling of the thought of Saint Bonaventure as a "péri-

⁵⁹ Cf. B. Baudoux, "Quaestio de philosophia christiana", *Ant.*, XI (1936) 487—552.

⁶⁰ "L'augustinisme Bonaventurien", *Bull. Thom.*, II (1926) (48)—(54). Cf. 52: "M. Gilson s'efforce de nous montrer en B. un philosophe, alors qu'il n'y a qu'un théologien, et le cas de s. B. n'est pas autre que celui de s. Augustin et de tous ses véritables disciples. Pour les Pères et plus spécialement pour l'évêque d'Hippone, il n'y a qu'un problème humain, celui du salut par la révélation chrétienne; le reste n'est rien, ou presque rien. Dans un pareil exposé de la foi la philosophie n'intervient que pour des fins auxiliaires et fort secondaires. Le point primordial, le point de départ qui domine tout, c'est la foi et la théologie. Or, c'est le cas de le dire ici: Major pars trahit ad se minorem. Sous le titre de philosophie de s. B., M. G. se trouve avoir présenté sa théologie, et si cette théologie comporte l'utilisation d'une philosophie plus ou moins matériellement considérable, elle ne reste pas moins en droit une partie accessoire et secondaire. Pour rendre intelligible la philosophie de B., il faut partir de ses principes et de ses vues théologiques, car c'est là seulement que le rôle et la nature de l'élément philosophique devient intelligible et peut se justifier." Cf. *ibid.*, p. 53: "C'est pourquoi s. Augustin et s. Bonaventure ne sont pas à proprement parler des philosophes, mais des théologiens, et leur philosophie ne pouvant s'entendre qu'en fonction de leur théologie, c'est de cette dernière qu'il faut partir. C'est pourquoi écrire en titre: "la philosophie de s. Bonaventure", c'est déjà s'engager quelque peu dans une équivoque. Il faudrait dire: la doctrine théologico-philosophique de s. B." Cf. *ibid.*, 54: "Qui ne voit, sans plus ample informé, que si Bonaventure nie la légitimité de la distinction formelle entre la philosophie et la théologie, pratiquement au moins, dans sa pensée et ses écrits, ce double objet ne peut se distinguer formellement." Cf. A. D. Sertillanges, *Le Christianisme et les philosophies*, Paris, Aubier, n. d., I, p. 364.

^{60a} "Bonaventure", *D.T.C.*, II (1905) 979: "Un péripatétisme nuancé d'augustinisme". Cf. Gilson, *La Philosophie de saint Bonaventure*, 2nd ed., Paris, Vrin., 1943, p. 352, fn.: "Ce n'est guère répondre aux intentions de saint Bonaventure que de définir sa pensée: "Un péripatétisme nuancé d'augustinisme." Cf. F. Van Steenberghen, (A. Forest, F. Van Steenberghen, M. de Gandillac), *Le mouvement doctrinal du XI^e au XIV^e siècle*, Paris, Bloud & Gay, 1951, p. 233: "Il faut donc rejeter la formule 'augustinisme' et même la formule 'augustinisme aristotélisant' pour caractériser la philosophie bonaventurienne. On pourrait accepter l'expression 'aristotélisme augustinisant', pour marquer l'orientation de la pensée du saint docteur vers une synthèse augustinienne plutôt que vers d'autres formes du néoplatonisme;

patétisme nuancé d'augustinisme" was rejected by Prof. Gilson as not answering to the intentions of Saint Bonaventure. Prof. Van Steenberghen⁶¹ saw fit to reject the hypothesis of Prof. Gilson to the effect that in the thought of Saint Bonaventure there was really a distinction between the realm of reason and the realm of faith although in the order of exercised development there was to be no separation between faith and reason since reason on its own could not achieve the perfection in knowledge man strove to realize. For Prof. Van Steenberghen,^{61a} there was not only in theory, but also in the order of realization a distinction between the two realms. Father Mandonnet would have minimized to a too great extent the philosophical value of Bonaventure's contributions. Fully rationally developed elaborations were to be found realized in Bonaventure and were used to clarify theological inquiries. These purely philosophical elements, however, were not to be found realized in a system or a synthesis, but remained in the state of dispersed elements within the whole of the theological speculation which they served and enhanced. Prof. Van Steenberghen in his later book,⁶² concludes that

mais cette formule présente l'inconvénient de passer sous silence d'autres influences néoplatoniciennes, en particulier celle d'Avicébron, qui est pourtant considérable. (fn. 1: La formule 'aristotélisme augustinisant' rejoint celle que l'on trouve sous la plume de E. Smeets dans l'article Bonaventure du *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*: "Son système philosophique, comme celui qui, de son temps, était accrédité dans les écoles, peut être appelé à bon droit un péripatétisme nuancé d'augustinisme.")

⁶¹ Cf. *Siger de Brabant, II, Siger dans l'histoire de l'aristotélisme*, Louvain, Inst. Sup. de Phil., 1942, 446—464. Cf. also *id.*, *Le mouvement doctrinal du XI^e au XIV^e siècle*, Paris, Bloud & Gay, 1951, p. 227, fn. 2: "On voit par tout ceci que Bonaventure n'admet pas seulement la distinction théorique de la philosophie et de la théologie, mais l'exercice distinct des deux disciplines par le penseur chrétien. C'est ce que n'a pas vu S. Brounts (*Siger van Brabant*, p. 332, n. 28), ni, avant lui, E. Gilson, (*La philosophie de saint Bonaventure*, 2e édit., p. 76—100 et 378—396)."

^{61a} F. Van Steenberghen, *Siger de Brabant, II, Siger dans l'histoire de l'aristotélisme*, Louvain, Inst. Sup. de Phil., 1942, 459—464.

⁶² *Le mouvement doctrinal du XI^e au XIV^e siècle*, Paris, Bloud & Gay, 1951, p. 221, fn. 1; "M. Gilson (*op. cit.*) et, après lui, divers historiens franciscains (Longpré, Tinivella, Squadrini, Veuthey et d'autres) ont fort bien mis en relief l'unité de la pensée bonaventurienne et son caractère foncièrement chrétien et augustinien; mais ils n'ont pas suffisamment souligné, à notre avis, le progrès réalisé par saint Bonaventure par rapport à saint Augustin en définissant la structure interne complexe de la sagesse chrétienne et en offrant ainsi des principes de solution au problème intellectuel le plus délicat du XIII^e siècle; ces mêmes historiens ne rendent pas non plus la pensée exacte du saint docteur en lui attribuant l'idée d'une "philosophie chrétienne"; nous allons voir que saint Bonaventure distingue parfaitement la philosophie, œuvre de pure raison, et l'usage que le théologien doit faire de la philosophie dans l'élaboration scientifique de la science sacrée, ou le chrétien dans l'acquisition personnelle de la sagesse chrétienne, qui est une sagesse théologique." Cf. p. 227—230. Cf. p. 228: "Bref, comme tous les scolastiques orthodoxes, saint Bonaventure estime que, pour un penseur chrétien, la philosophie ne

the thought of Saint Bonaventure, as far as the rational inquiry is concerned, should be considered neither as a Christocentric philosophy, nor as an heteronomous philosophy as philosophy, nor as a philosophy which would be essentially a Christian philosophy, nor as a complete and self-sufficient wisdom. It is to be considered simply as a stage in the acquisition of perfect wisdom. Following the tradition established by the editors of the Quaracchi critical edition of the works of Saint Bonaventure,⁶³ Prof. Van Steenberghen considered that the background for these philosophical elements were not to be considered as derived from the Augustinian tradition. The Augustinian influence was to be limited to the theological elaborations. On the philosophical level, Aristotle and the neoplatonists were the main sources of influence. Father Thonnard⁶⁴ rejecting the position of Prof. Gilson with the Christo-

saurait plus constituer une sagesse complète, suffisante, encore moins une sagesse de vie; elle ne peut plus être qu'une étape dans l'acquisition de la sagesse chrétienne. Mais, s'il a fortement souligné cet aspect capital des choses, il n'est jamais question chez lui d'une philosophie 'christocentrique', d'une philosophie 'hétéronome' comme philosophie ou d'une philosophie essentiellement chrétienne."

⁶³ Cf. Also G. Boztkovic, *S. Bonaventurae doctrina de gratia et libero arbitrio*, Balneis, Marianis, 1919, p. XIII—XX. Zach. Van de Woestyne, "De indole anselmiana theodiceae S. Bonaventurae", *Ant.*, I (1926) 6, fn. 2.

⁶⁴ "Augustinisme et Aristotélisme au XIII^e siècle", *Année Théologique*, V (1944) 461—466. Cf. 463: "La pensée philosophique de saint B. est, à notre avis, plus qu'un éclectisme: elle est un véritable essai de synthèse et un franc retour vers l'augustinisme authentique . . .". Cf. 463: "Au plan philosophique, c'est la méthode théocentrique qui veut tout expliquer par l'influence divine. S. B. retrouve ainsi l'inspiration profonde de l'augustinisme authentique: la philosophie de la participation où tout s'explique par Dieu . . .". Cf. p. 464: L'exemplarisme, telle est, à notre avis, la doctrine éminemment augustinienne et accessible à la raison, qui unifie la pensée de s. B. et caractérise sa 'vision du monde' . . .". Cf. p. 466: "Il reste pourtant, à notre avis, que l'œuvre bonaventurienne contient vraiment cet essai de synthèse augustinienne, organisée autour du centre de perspective de l'exemplarisme. Le docteur séraphique forme ainsi comme le trait d'union reliant les doctrines de l'augustinisme théologique avec le système philosophique d'un augustinisme qui va bientôt s'affirmer en réaction et en face du thomisme. Incontestablement son œuvre a une valeur avant tout théologique; mais bien comprise, elle nous permet de saluer en saint Bonaventure un grand philosophe authentiquement augustinien." Cf. B. A. Luyckx, *Die Erkenntnislehre Bonaventuras*, *B.G.P.M.A.*, 23 (1923) IX—X: "Bonaventura hat sich über das erkenntnistheoretische Problem eine ganz andere Ansicht gebildet. Er war eine äußerst konservativ gerichtete Persönlichkeit; der konservative Zug ist eine seiner hervorstechenden Eigenschaften. Eine überaus große Ehrerbietung vor dem großen Kirchenlehrer Augustinus insbesondere beseelte ihn, und er folgte ihm als der Hauptautorität sowohl auf philosophischem wie auf theologischem Gebiet . . . Man glaube nicht, dieses demütige Festhalten am Hergebrachten habe den hl. Bonaventura gehindert, seinen Werken ein eigentliches, persönliches Gepräge zu geben; im Gegenteil, er ist nur ein begeisterter Anhänger der Schule geblieben, in der er herangereift war, der platonisch-augustinianischen Richtung; ganz besonders im erkenntnistheoretischen Problem. Mit der gesamten platonisch-augustinianischen Richtung: ganz besonders im erkenntnistheoretischen Problem."

centric philosophy interpretation, the position of Mandonnet with the pure theology interpretation and the position of Van Steenberghen with the eclectic neoplatonizing aristotelianism interpretation, saw in Saint Bonaventure an authentically augustinian philosophical synthesis, centered on the theory of exemplarism.

Putting aside the interpretations of Prof. Gilson and of Prof. Van Steenberghen, Father Patrice Robert⁶⁵ sees fit to consider the thought

⁶⁵ "Le problème de la philosophie bonaventurienne" *Laval théol. et phil.*, VI (1950) 145—163, VII (1951) 9—58. Cf. p. 162—163: "Les conclusions de l'éminent historien (Van Steenberghen) de Siger de Brabant concernant la caractère de la philosophie bonaventurienne nous semblent donc prématurée et peu fondée historiquement. Pour réussir dans cette tentative d'intégrer saint Bonaventure dans le mouvement général de l'aristotélisme médiéval, il eut fallu d'abord tenir compte des témoignages non équivoques du saint docteur sur sa propre doctrine, puis montrer, par l'analyse doctrinale de son œuvre, l'inconsciente et cruelle illusion que le maître franciscain aurait nourrie à cet égard. La tâche, nous le concevons parfaitement, n'eût pas été facile, mais elle s'imposait. Serait-il téméraire de croire qu'elle aurait conduit M. Van Steenberghen à des constatations quelque peu différentes? Pour l'heure, la seule conclusion légitime de son enquête nous semble celle-ci: "Vis-à-vis d'Aristote, l'attitude de saint Bonaventure dans les Sentences ne respire ni la défiance, ni l'hostilité, ni la réprobation; elle est faite d'estime, de respect et de sympathie. Il évite autant qu'il le peut d'opposer l'aristotélisme à l'orthodoxie chrétienne ou à la pensée de saint Augustin; il pousse au maximum l'interprétation bienveillante du Philosophe et s'applique même à l'excuser de ses erreurs quand elles sont incontestables" (II. 458). A l'encontre de ce que soutient M. E. Gilson, l'aristotélisme n'est donc pas uniquement pour le Docteur Séraphique "une doctrine condamnée" ou une erreur qu'il juge. L'aristotélisme est en effet beaucoup plus que cela pour lui. Il est la plus haute expression de la pensée antique et la plus parfaite explication de l'univers jamais conçues par la raison humaine laissée à ses seules lumières. Nous sommes reconnaissants à M. Van Steenberghen de l'avoir mis en relief." Cf. p. 56—57: "Aucun des textes évoqués par M. Gilson ne semble donc offrir un appui solide à son opinion sur la nature de la philosophie bonaventurienne. Ni dans les *Collationes in Hexaëmeron*, ni dans les *Collationes de Donis Spiritus Sancti*, ni dans aucun autre de ses ouvrages, le maître franciscain ne parle de l'insuffisance de la raison dans le domaine qui lui est propre, ou d'une philosophie dont l'essence comme telle serait de ne pas se suffire à elle-même et de requérir l'irradiation d'une lumière plus haute, celle de la foi, pour mener à bien ses propres opérations. Absolument rien dans son œuvre ne permet non plus d'inférer qu'après avoir reconnu comme réelle la distinction entre la philosophie et la théologie, il l'ait ensuite niée comme illégitime et ait professé que 'lorsqu'il s'agit d'un objet transcendant à la raison humaine, on peut et même l'on doit le savoir et le croire à la fois et sous le même rapport'. Loin d'être 'une réflexion de la raison guidée par la foi et une interprétation de l'univers ou des êtres donnés dans l'expérience prise du point de vue de ce que la révélation permet à notre raison d'en dire,' la vraie philosophie n'est autre, pour le Docteur Séraphique comme pour son grand contemporain saint Thomas d'Aquin, que la connaissance des êtres et de leurs causes du point de vue de ce que la raison en peut connaître par ses propres forces et suivant ses propres méthodes: *scientia philosophica nihil aliud est quam veritatis ut scrutabilis notitia certa*.' Comme telle, elle est antérieure à la théologie et aussi autonome à son égard que la raison l'est par rapport à la foi et la nature par rapport à la grâce. Ce qui ne veut pas dire, toutefois, que la philosophie soit la science la plus

of Saint Bonaventure as containing a purely naturally developed philosophical synthesis following the Augustinian tradition. This he establishes through a lengthy analysis of text in refutation of the thesis held by Prof. Gilson and by Prof. Van Steenberghen.

Father Angelico da Vinca⁶⁶ realizing that Father Veuthey⁶⁷ and

noble et la plus parfaite qu'il soit possible à l'homme d'acquérir ici-bas. Précisément parce que son objet propre est la connaissance de l'univers et de ses causes, elle ne peut, dans l'état d'élévation de l'homme à l'état surnaturelle et dans l'état de déchéance originelle dans lequel il naît, donner à l'homme ni les connaissances ni les moyens nécessaires à la poursuite et à l'obtention de sa fin ultime. Suffisante dans le domaine qui lui est propre, la philosophie ne l'est donc plus en fonction de la destinée humaine. C'est là le sens profond et unique du procès que saint Bonaventure intente dans ses dernières œuvres, à l'activité naturelle de notre intelligence. Pour connaître la nature même de Dieu, son action dans le monde et surtout dans l'âme, l'homme a besoin d'une science confortée par la foi. Loin de s'opposer l'une à l'autre, philosophie et théologie apparaissent ainsi comme deux activités de l'intelligence essentiellement complémentaire l'une de l'autre, ayant chacune son objet, ses principes et ses méthodes propres, mais contribuant chacune pour sa part à diriger l'homme vers sa fin ultime et vers la possession du bien infini pour lequel il est créé." Cf. p. 57: "Par voie de conséquence, on ne saurait sans imprudence, dans l'état actuel de nos connaissances, caractériser la philosophie bonaventurienne autrement que ne le fait le Maître franciscain lui-même. Or, même lorsqu'il cite Aristote avec la plus manifeste complaisance, c'est d'Augustin que saint Bonaventure se réclame expressément et constamment tant dans sa doctrine philosophique que dans sa doctrine théologique, jusqu'à plus ample informé, on nous permettra donc de considérer la philosophie de saint Bonaventure essentiellement et fondamentalement comme un augustinisme médiéval, sans aucun doute fortement influencé par l'aristotélisme néoplatonisant de son milieu doctrinal, mais non spécifiquement caractérisé par lui." Fr. Robert in an earlier work had followed the interpretation of Prof. Gilson in making of St. Bonaventure's thought an heteronomous philosophy. Cf. *Hylémorphisme et devenir chez saint Bonaventure*, Montreal, 1936, p. 6—8: "Lorsqu'on parle du Docteur Séraphique, il est deux traits de sa physionomie qu'il ne faut jamais perdre de vue: son traditionalisme et son dogmatisme. (Cf. L. de Carvalho e Castro, O.F.M., *Saint Bonaventure*. — *Le Docteur Franciscain*, Paris, 1923, p. 165—171; Jules d'Albi, O.M.Cap., *Saint Bonaventure et les luttes doctrinales de 1267—1277*, Paris-Tamaines, 1923, p. 82—85) et son dogmatisme théologique. (Cf. De Carvalho e Castro, *op. cit.*, p. 191—216; Et. Gilson, *La Philosophie de S. Bonaventure*, Paris, 1929, ch. II et XV.) L'un et l'autre, d'ailleurs, se compénètrent profondément. Ses notions de matière et de forme, Saint Bonaventure n'en a pas à lui seul le mérite et la responsabilité: il les tient d'Alexandre de Halès et d'Augustin. Il les accepte et les approfondit parce que, mieux que celles que lui présente l'aristotélisme renaissant, elles satisfont aux exigences et aux tendances intimes de son tempérament théologique, parce qu'elles lui paraissent mieux sauvegarder et expliquer le donné révélé qu'il pose, plus que tout autre, comme norme positive de ses spéculations philosophiques. En un mot, l'hylémorphisme bonaventurien est surtout théologique; c'est ce qu'il ne faut jamais perdre de vue, même, lorsqu'on l'envisage surtout du point de vue philosophique."

⁶⁶ "L'aspetto filosofico dell'Aristotelismo di S. Bonaventura", *Collezione Franc.*, XIX (1949) 5—44. Cf. p. 5: "E' noto come la presente questione ha dato ansa a giudizi contrastanti, sostenuti talvolta da polemiche ancora aperte; et questo non solo in un passato lontano, ma anche ai giorni nostri.

C'è infatti chi vuol pensare in S. Bonaventura un genuino aristotelico omogeneo in tutta la sua vita, come L. Veuthey, O.F.M. Conv., e P. Pelagius da Zamayon, O.F.M. Cap., e chi invece ammette una mentalità bonaventuriano-aristotelica in evoluzione, culminante in un acre anti-aristotelismo, come il compianto P. Amedeo Teetaert da Zedelgen. Chi dei due ha ragione? In questo campo di contesa vuol gettare un po' di luce una nuova tesi, che tira le sue conclusioni, senza preconcetti, oggettivamente, dopo aver interrogato S. Bonaventura nelle sue opere." Cf. p. 13: "Da questa esposizione risultano i caratteri fondamentali della filosofia bonaventuriana: 1. -relazione assoluta con la fede, perché la ragione rilasciata a sé stessa è impari a costruire una filosofia; 2. — rapporto necessario a una finalità: l'amor di Dio. La filosofia chiusa in sé è un controsenso, perché rimane monca e sterile; deve quindi essere un punto di passaggio, un mezzo per un fine. Togliere questi due caratteri significa coprire lo spirito di S. Bonaventura e l'anima della sua filosofia. Con queste due note caratteristiche, S. Bonaventura viene a condannare formalmente lo spirito della filosofia aristotelica. E' proprio infatti di questa l'assoluta indipendenza della fede, per cui vale la sola ragione, senza bisogno di alcuna illuminazione. La fede non ha per Aristotile nessuna importanza. E' ovvio calcolare quanta distanza esista fra questi due filosofi, se si confrontano i loro rapporti di anima, di spirito e di mentalità...". Cf. p. 42—44: "Possiamo dunque concludere: 1. S. Bonaventura rigetta Aristotile non in linea di principio, ma in quanto non risponde alle sue tendenze cristiano-francescane. 2. S. Bonaventura materialmente è un aristotelico secundum quid, cioè parzialmente ed il suo aristotelismo va gradatamente diminuendo. Queste nostre asserzioni ci sembra che il Santo stesse le esprima quando nell'Hexaëmeron dice: "Sequamur autem nos eum (Aristotelem) in quibus bene dixit, non in eis in quibus fuit tenebrosus, quae nescivit vel quae celavit". In *hexaëm.*, ed. Delorme, visio I, coll. III, no 5, p. 92.) Si comprende bene tutta la portata di questa frase se si pensa che anche per S. Bonaventura, Aristotile rimase 'oscuro' in parecchie e gravissime questioni, riguardo a Dio e ai nostri futuri destini. Con diverso criterio bisogna giudicare l'aristotelismo di S. Bonaventura formalmente preso: l'anima che informa la filosofia bonaventuriana è radicalmente opposta a quella di Aristotile e rimane immutata in tutta la sua vita. Figlio genuino del Serafico d'Assisi ha fissa dinanzi agli occhi la meta da raggiungere. S. Francesco infatti, fedele interprete dello spirito della Chiesa, forgia il suo ideale, ispirandosi alla più schietta praticità: "spirito d'orazione e di devozione"... (44) S. Bonaventura prende anche qualche teoria di Aristotile, che per sé non è opposta allo spirito di S. Francesco, ed anche perché alcune teorie erano entrate nel patrimonio comune nella filosofia cristiana. In definitiva possiamo concludere che S. Bonaventura invece di evolvere avvicinandosi ad Aristotile come fece S. Tommaso, si stabilisce sempre più nella sua vecchia posizione, e, condannando la corrente innovatrice, fa vedere che lo spirito che anima la sua filosofia è radicalmente opposto a quelle del Filosofo. Esso si mantiene identico tanto nel Commentario alle Sentenze (1252) come nell'Hexaëmeron (1273), un anno prima della sua morte."

⁶⁷ S. *Bonaventurae philosophia christiana*, Rome 1943, p. XI: "Minime tamen Seraphicus ignorabat aut deprimebat Aristotelem. Immo legenti praesertim quatuor magna volumina ejus Commentarii in Sententias, nimia potius videtur pars Philosopho concessa in hoc opere theologico. Aristotelis principia et sententiae frequentissime afferuntur ejusque auctoritas semper magna habetur nisi de iis agatur, in quibus manifeste Philosophus erravit: ... 'Sequamur autem nos eum (Aristotelem) in quibus bene dicit, non in eis in quibus fuit tenebrosus, quae nescivit, quae celavit.' (In *Hexaëm.*, I, III, n. 5, ed. Delorme, 92). 'Ille excellentior inter Philosophos' dixerat cum commentabatur Sententiae. (II. Sent., d. 1, p. 1, q. 2, (II. 32) ..." p. XIII: "Uti jam patet, et melius patebit in toto discursu nostrae expositionis, Bonaventura non eadem qua Aristoteles incedit via. Nec tamen ei oppositum, sicut nec Sancto Thomae. In plurimis sane conveniunt, et, ubi discordant, generatim non sibi invicem contradicunt, sed vias diversas sequuntur quae

Father Pelagio da Zamayon⁶⁸ held that Saint Bonaventure had adopted the genuine Aristotelian positions in an homogeneous way throughout his life, while Father Amedeo Teetaert da Zedelgen⁶⁹ held that Saint Bonaventure had held an attitude which showed an evolution going from a sympathetic attitude toward Aristotle to an acrimonious anti-Aristotelianism, reconsidered the whole material and analysed the texts under the various leading notions of philosophy. He concluded that, if we consider the thought materially for the ideas accepted, we see in Saint Bonaventure the existence of an Aristotelian influence which progressively diminishes as time goes on. Formally with regard to the spirit and the most basic notions we must hold that in Saint Bonaventure there was in the realm of philosophical elaborations throughout his life homogeneously an anti-Aristotelian attitude. Saint Bonaventure assimilates from Aristotle only what is consonant to the spirit of Franciscan thought and which enters directly in the patrimonium of Christian philosophy. Father Veuthey⁷⁰ himself has shown since how the funda-

ad invicem miro modo sese complent ad integram veritatem inveniendam et ad integram philosophiam constituendam, ad mentem quoque humanam integre et harmonice evolvendam perficiendamque."

⁶⁸ "L'aristotelismo di S. Bonaventura ed altre caratteristiche della filosofia", *Italia Franc.*, XIX (1944) 31—49.

⁶⁹ *Collectanea Franc.*, XII (1942) 575.

⁷⁰ *Les divers courants de la philosophie augustino-franciscaine au moyen âge*, *Bibli. Pont. Athe. Ant.*, VII (1951) 633—640. Cf. 634: "S. Bonaventure est pleinement augustinien: contre l'autonomie et l'autosuffisance aristotéliennes de la philosophie pure, il défend la nécessité de fait et de droit de la compléter par la théologie. De fait: à cause du péché originel et de l'obscurcissement de l'intelligence, l'homme a besoin de la lumière de la révélation pour ne pas tomber dans l'erreur. De droit: l'objet de la philosophie, qui est la connaissance de l'Être en soi et la fin de l'homme, soit la béatitude, échappe, en dernière analyse, à la puissance de la raison humaine, parce que cette connaissance et cette béatitude s'achèvent dans le surnaturel. D'où la nécessité, selon S. Bonaventure, de ne pas séparer la philosophie de la théologie et de compléter l'une par l'autre. Et c'est bien là un point de vue augustinien et chrétien opposé à l'autonomie et à l'autosuffisance aristotéliennes de la philosophie. Point de vue qui dépend évidemment de la lumière de la révélation et de la considération concrète de l'être et de l'homme en opposition à la considération abstraite d'Aristote. De même, tous les autres éléments que nous avons reconnus comme caractéristiques de l'augustinisme, se retrouvent pleinement chez S. Bonaventure: l'identité substantielle de l'âme et de ses facultés qui n'en sont pas des accidents comme pour Aristote, mais lui appartient substantiellement "per reductionem". La primauté de la volonté est évidente dans la prépondérance donnée à l'amour sur l'intelligence, à l'affectivité et à la mystique sur le raisonnement et la clarté conceptuelle et rationnelle. Comme chez S. Augustin l'âme, pour S. Bonaventure, jouit d'une grande autonomie par rapport au corps; elle a sa propre activité; elle est en somme toute l'activité de l'homme; dès lors sa connaissance essentiellement active, qu'il s'agisse de la connaissance sensible ou de la connaissance intellectuelle. S. Bonaventure n'exclut pas le raisonnement, la connaissance conceptuelle, mais tout son esprit est dominé par l'intuition à la fois intellectuelle et affective; et parce que l'amour est

mental thought of Saint Bonaventure is radically anti-Aristotelian and basically Augustinian, as the theory of illumination clearly indicates. In line with the interpretation given by both Prof. Gilson and Father Veuthey, Father Angelico da Vinca⁷¹ holds that for Saint Bonaventure philosophy of itself is unable to attain to the full knowledge of its object and pursue its ways without falling into error. For adequate knowledge and full certainty, the inquirer must be enlightened by faith. As a consequence, philosophy is considered by Saint Bonaventure as a step towards a higher form of learning. Father Longpré⁷² considers the thought

essentiellement expérimental, il donne la primauté à la connaissance d'expérience sur la connaissance rationnelle et conceptuelle; à l'intuition concrète sur la conception abstraite; à l'intériorité intuitive, affective et expérimentale, sur la connaissance extérieure et sur la connaissance rationnelle qui doit céder le pas à l'amour: 'Ubi deficit intellectus, ibi proficit affectus. Non est perfecta cognitio sine dilectione. (*Sent.*, III, d. 31, a. 3, q. 1, con., (III. 689). *Sent.*, I, d. 10, q. 2, f. 1. (I. 197) Tout cela est pleinement augustinien et en pleine antithèse avec l'esprit aristotélicien d'autonomie de la philosophie, de la primauté de l'intelligence sur la volonté, de l'abstrait sur le concret, de l'abstraction sur l'intuition, de la logique sur l'amour. Mais ce qui caractérise l'augustinisme, nous l'avons dit, c'est la doctrine de l'illumination. C'est par là qu'Aristote s'est séparé de Platon, qu'un aristotélicien se distingue d'un platonicien."

⁷¹ *Op. cit.* 11—13. The Summarium of page 5 is for fn. 66. Cf. p. 5 "Summarium: Ut aliquod conferatur ad dirimendum quaestionem a quibusdam recentioribus agitatam de aristotelismo S. Bonaventurae, operibus S. Doctoris inspectis et examinatis, distinctionem materialem et formalem inducendam esse arbitramur ad rectum iudicium de hac re ferendum. Itaque praemittitur notio philosophiae a S. Bonaventura tradita, ex qua eruitur tum ejus relatio ad fidem, tum ejus finis qui ad amorem Dei tendit. — Exinde examini subijciuntur ejus commentaria in Sententias, in quibus multae inveniuntur sententiae sensu aristotelico prolatae; paucissimae vero contra Philosophum exponuntur. — Contrarium autem contingit in opusculo In Hexaëmeron, in quo omnino paucae doctrinae sensu aristotelico retinentur, major vero earum pars contra opinionem ipsius Philosophi dilucidantur et solvuntur. Hoc loco explicatur etiam distinctio seu diversitas a S. Bonaventura exposita inter utramque philosophiam, scil. christianam et paganam. Ex praesenti dissertatione has conclusiones erui possunt: 1) quod doctrina philosophica S. Bonaventurae (praesertim in Commentario ad Sententias, si materialiter inspicitur) aliquo modo aristotelica dici potest, quamvis haec nota gradatim in ejus operibus minuat; 2) si autem formaliter consideratur (praecipue in *Hexaëmeron*) radicaliter seu essentialiter antiaristotelica dicenda est."

Cf. p. 13 copied in fn. 66. Cf. p. 11: "La scienza filosofia è via ad altre scienze, e chi si vuol fermare ivi cade nelle tenebre. E questo è vero non solo della scienza speculativa ma anche di quella pratica, perché non può sapere l'uomo ciò che è utile o dannoso senza aiuto superiore. Con ragione E. Gilson ci fa notare che l'essenza della filosofia di Bonaventura è di non essere che un semplice punto di passaggio, una tappa in un lungo biaggio e il primo momento d'un pellegrinaggio dell'anima verso Iddio. Perché S. Bonaventura estende questo carattere anche alla teologia. Infatti, come la filosofia è fra la pura fede e la teologia, questa a sua volta non è che un passaggio fra la filosofia e il dono della Scienza e questo non è che un punto di passaggio fra la teologia e la gloria del Paradiso."

⁷² "Bonaventure", *D.H.G.E.*, IX (1937) 741—788., Cf. 751—755. Cf.

of Saint Bonaventure as the adequate and final synthesis of mediaeval Augustinianism under the sign of Assisi. Saint Bonaventure fully acquainted with Aristotelian thought and fully aware of the errors of philosophers, recognizes the distinction that exists between the realms of reason and of faith, philosophy and theology, but rejects the Aristotelian rationalism which would pretend to be able to achieve fulfilment of truth and certainty without the aid of faith and the complementing knowledge of theology. Augustinianism and Aristotelianism came to represent in the thirteenth century two radically different intellectual attitudes in intellectual inquiry.⁷³ The believing Christian seeking understanding took a very different approach according to his tendency to embrace the Augustinian or the Aristotelian position. It has been sug-

751: Au confluent de tous ces courants d'idées, très informé aussi de la pensée d'Aristote et des philosophes qu'il utilise largement . . . saint Bonaventure élabore la synthèse définitive de l'augustinisme médiéval sous le signe d'Assise . . ." 753: "Aussi dès ses premiers écrits saint Bonaventure rejette le rationalisme aristotélien comme méthode et fixe nettement l'attitude qui allait être celle de l'École franciscaine jusqu'à Duns Scot. . . unissant l'intuition à la spéculation . . . Pour la même raison et parce qu'il est attentif à la fin de la philosophie et des sciences qui est de rendre le monde intelligible en fonction de la théologie contemplative . . . refuse d'admettre l'autonomie complète de la raison . . . La philosophie ne s'achève pas sans le secours de la foi . . . L'histoire en fournit la preuve . . . sans lumière de la foi, philosophes ont erré et mêlé erreur à la vérité . . . impossible qu'il en soit autrement . . . La spéculation philosophique a dont tout intérêt à accepter le contrôle et l'illumination de la foi et de l'"Intellectus fidei". (N. B. copied from notes taken not from text itself). Cf. R. Guardini, *Die Erlösungslehre des hl. Bonaventura*, Düsseldorf, 1921, p. 193: "(Augustin sei für Bonaventura) der Lehrer, dessen Autorität endgültig ist und an dessen Worten nicht gedeutelt werden darf." Cf. L. Meier, "Bonaventuras Selbstzeugnis über seinen Augustinismus", *Franz. Stud.*, XIV (1930) 342—355; cf. p. 355: "So ist keine Rede davon, daß Bonaventura in seiner Stellung zu Augustinus irgendwie fehlgegangen wäre. Trotz größter Hochschätzung für den großen Afrikaner wahr er sich durchweg seine geistige Freiheit und erweist sich als ein Forscher von unbestechlicher wissenschaftlicher Ehrlichkeit, getreu seinem Grundsatz: 'Ne amore hominis veritati fiat praejudicium'. Seine Augustinuskennntnis beruht auf ausgedehnter Lektüre des Originals und dringt vor bis zu einer sachkundigen und geistvollen Gesamtwürdigung der einzelnen Schriften sowohl wie des Gesamtorganismus von Augustins literarischem Nachlaß. Dadurch wird er bei der Interpretation einzelner Stellen vor Einseitigkeit und Ungerechtigkeit bewahrt. Die Grenzen von Augustins Autorität werden klar erkannt und gewahrt."

⁷³ Cf. Ehrle: "Der Augustinismus und Aristotelismus in der Scholastik gegen Ende des XIII. Jahrhunderts", A.L.K.G., V(1889) 603. *Id.*, "John Peckham über den Kampf des Augustinismus und Aristotelismus in der 2. Hälfte des XIII. Jahrhunderts", *Zeit. Kath. Theol.*, XIII (1889) 172 ff. M. Grabmann, *Die philos. u. theol. Erkenntnislehre des Kardinals Matth. v. Aquasparta*, Wien, 1906, p. 78 and p. 85. *Id.*, *Thomas v. Aquin*, 4th ed., München, 1920, 116—123. A. Daniels, *Quellenbeiträge und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Gottesbeweises im XIII. Jahrhundert*, B.G.P.M.A., VIII (1909) 145 ff. J. Hessen, *Augustinische und thomistische Erkenntnislehre*, Paderborn, 1921, p. 55—57, p. 60.

gested by Prof. Van Steenberghe⁷⁴ that the basic source of controversy lay not in the opposition within Christian schools of thought of an Augustinian philosophy and an Aristotelian philosophy, but between the Christian and the pagan approach. Yet it must be kept in mind that Augustine represented the Christian way of thinking while Aristotle represented the purely natural and pagan way of thinking.

Father Schwendinger,⁷⁵ realizing along with Grabmann, Hessen,

⁷⁴ *Siger de Brabant*, II, 1942, p. 442: La rapide évocation que nous avons faite du mouvement théologique entre 1230 et 1250 autorise une conclusion générale touchant la pénétration de l'aristotélisme à la Faculté des arts, la plupart des théologiens, ou du moins les plus réputés, consultent et exploitent les écrits d'Aristote et ceux des autres philosophes payens dont ils peuvent disposer. Il se crée peu à peu une atmosphère favorable à l'étude de la philosophie payenne et à son utilisation en théologie, malgré quelques résistances, qui semblent avoir été particulièrement sensibles chez les Dominicains, ainsi qu'il résulte des plaintes amères d'Albert le grand. Cependant la philosophie dont usent ces théologiens manque de cohérence; c'est un aristotélisme encore mal assimilé, auquel sont mêlés des apports étrangers assez disparates, mais qu'on peut grouper sous l'étiquette très vague d'"éléments néoplatoniciens", empruntés surtout à saint Augustin, à Avicenne, et à Avicébron, parfois à Proclus (Liber de causis) et à Averroès. L'idée d'un conflit entre une "philosophie augustinienne" et une "philosophie aristotélicienne" est absolument étrangère à ces esprits; pour eux, "la philosophie" signifie le savoir transmis par Aristote et les autres philosophes grecs ou arabes; s'ils entrevient la possibilité d'un conflit, s'ils enregistrent le fait d'une divergence d'esprit ou de doctrines, c'est entre "la philosophie" d'une part, qui a été l'œuvre des penseurs payens, et la sagesse chrétienne d'autre part, sagesse scientifiquement élaborée par les théologiens depuis l'âge des Pères, sagesse qui intègre toutes les sciences humaines dans son unité supérieure et dans laquelle les écrivains antérieurs au XIII^e siècle voyaient, à l'exemple de saint Augustin, la philosophie dans sa plus haute signification, la philosophie des chrétiens." Cf. *ibid.*, p. 730: "En somme, le grand conflit qui domine l'histoire de la pensée au XIII^e siècle n'est pas celui de l'augustinisme et du thomisme entendus comme deux synthèses philosophiques; c'est l'opposition de l'esprit théologique et de l'esprit philosophique; c'est la lutte du christianisme contre le paganisme, représenté surtout par la philosophie d'Aristote. Si l'œuvre commencée par Albert le Grand et consommée par Thomas d'Aquin a une portée historique incalculable, c'est parce que ces esprits clairvoyants ont su resoudre harmonieusement ce redoutable conflit en créant, pour la première fois dans le monde chrétien, une philosophie à la fois respectueuse des exigences d'une méthode strictement rationnelle et des requêtes de l'esprit chrétien." Cf. F. Ehrle, "*L'Agostinismo et l'Aristotelismo nella scolastica del secolo XIII*", *Xenia thomistica*, III Rome, 1925, p. 517—588. Cf. esp. p. 530, p. 549—550. Cf. P. Robert, "Saint Bonaventure, Defender of Christian Wisdom", *Franc. Stud.*, III (1943) 159—179.

⁷⁵ "Die Erkenntnis in den ewigen Ideen nach der Lehre des hl. Bonaventura", *Franc. Stud.*, XV (1928) 243—244. Cf. p. 244: "Es ist nicht leicht zu verstehen, daß ein solch hervorragender Kenner des hl. Bonaventura und des scholastischen Denkens überhaupt wie P. I. Jailer immer wieder die volle Harmonie zwischen St. Thomas und Bonaventura findet und betont. Denn mitten in P. Jailers Forschartätigkeit fällt die des Kardinals Ehrle, der wiederholt auf die Lehrunterschiede und Gegensätze und auf den Kampf gegen Thomas sogar im eigenen Ordenslager hingewiesen hat. Ganz unbegreiflich möchte man es finden, daß selbst noch in den letzten Jahren Vogt in nicht zu verkennender Anlehnung an de Wulf bei unserem Kirchen-

Luyckx, the irreducible positions taken by the followers of the Augustinian school, as exemplified by Saint Bonaventure, and by the followers of the Aristotelian school of thought, as realized in Thomas Aquinas, wonders how it was possible for a person with the experience of I. Jeiler⁷⁶ to have considered the two tendencies as allowing full harmony and concord. Others like Ehrle,⁷⁷ Vogt,⁷⁸ De Wulf⁷⁹ and Kleutgen⁸⁰ followed suite in reducing the opposition between the two positions. Father Longpré,⁸¹ regretting this damaging effort at useless and unjustifiable reconciliations, indicates the awareness found in mediaeval thinkers like Peter Olivi, John Peckham, Roger Marston, Matthew of Aquasparta as well as in Bonaventure of the incompatibility of the two interpretations and recognizes that modern mediaeval historians like von Hertling, F. Sassen, B. Jansen, B. Luyckx and M. Rosenmöller have

lehrer genau die Lehre des hl. Thomas entdeckt. Charakteristisch ist all diesen Konkordanzbestrebungen, daß man, ohne dem hl. Thomas Gewalt anzutun, die Texte des hl. Bonaventura in das Prokrustesbett der Lehre des Aquinaten zwingen will." References are to M. Grabmann, *Thomas v. Aquin*, 4th, ed., p. 121 ff., *Id.*, *Erk.-Lehr. d. Matth. v. Aquasp.*, p. 70. J. Hessen, *Aug. u. Thom. Erk.-Lehr.*, p. 55 ff. *Id.*, *Die Begründung der Erkenntnis nach Thom. Erk.-Lehr.*, p. 55 ff., *Id.*, *Die Begründung der Erkenntnis nach d. hl. August.*, B.G.P.M.A., XIX (1916) 98. B. Luyckx, p. 208, 213, 220, 223.

⁷⁶ *Dissertatio praevia, De humanae cognitionis ratione anecdota...*, Quaracchi, 1883, p. 6 ff., p. 34—40. *Id.*, "Der Ursprung und die Entwicklung der Gotteserkenntnis im Menschen." *Der Katholik*, LVII (1877) 113—147, 224—269, 337—353. Cf. also *Scholion* and remarks in the critical edition of Quaracchi. Cf. *Scholion* for I *Sent.*, 3, 1, 1, 1, (I. 70—71). Cf. p. 71: "Hanc quaestionem integram, additis aliis documentis ineditis tum ipsius Bonav., tum trium ejusdem discipulorum, nempe Matthaei ab Aquasparta, Joan. Pechami et ejusdam Eustachii... quo tum sententia S. Doctoris penitus declarabitur, tum demonstrabitur, B. Albertum M. aliosque antiquos omnino cum ipso Seraphico consentire, nec S. Thom. in re principali contrarium docere." Cf. *Scholion* for II *Sent.*, 24, 1, (II. 571): "Haec quaestio magni momenti est, ut recte intelligatur S. Bonaventurae doctrina de ratione cognitionis humanae. Accurate etiam hic recensentur variae illius actatis de hac re opiniones, magna ex parte erroneae. Insuper manifeste ostenditur, S. Doctorem ab aliis principalibus Scholasticis in hac doctrina non discrepare nisi in modo loquendi, vel in re exigui momenti. Communis autem Scholasticorum doctrina tenebat haec principia."

⁷⁷ *Zeit. Kath. Theol.*, VII (1883) 40 ff.; *Zeit. Kath. Theol.*, XIII (1889) 174—193, esp. 186.

⁷⁸ *Franz. Stud.*, IX (1922) 148.

⁷⁹ *Histoire de la philosophie médiévale*, 6th, ed., Paris, Vrin, vol. 2, p. 120: "(Referred to in the Eisler trans., p. 273)

⁸⁰ *Die Philosophie der Vorzeit*, 2nd ed., Innsbruck, 1878, vol. 1, p. 86 ff.

⁸¹ "Saint Augustin et la pensée franciscaine", *France Franc.*, XV (1932) 26—27: "L'abstraction aristotélicienne ne rend aucunement raison de la certitude, de l'infailibilité et de la nécessité des jugements et des premiers principes. En cette matière, l'attitude de s. Bonaventure est nettement marquée et rien n'est plus regrettable que l'effort complètement inutile parfois tenté pour réduire le contenu de l'illumination augustinienne et bonaventurienne au rationalisme aristotélicien."

stressed the historical fact of the two irreconcilable tendencies of mediaeval thought and the properly Augustinian attitude of Saint Bonaventure.

The great variety of basic interpretations as to the meaning of the intellectual attitude of Saint Bonaventure brings us to a feeling of the hopelessness of any effort of presenting in an adequate way the historical reality as it was realized. The diversity of interpretations given does not arise from superficiality or ignorance on the part of the historians involved. They are on the contrary very much aware of the criticism their positions are open to and stress that their own interpretation is in opposition to that given by others and is called for by the profound meaning of the texts analysed. An awareness of the content of the various interpretations offered is already very useful to indicate the possibilities of meanings that can be worked out of the texts under study. It is generally agreed upon that Saint Bonaventure did criticize philosophical enterprises, especially when undertaken by thinkers not favored by faith. He clearly indicates the necessity of supplementing the efforts of human rational inquiries with the contributions of faith. This criticism was considered by some historians to have been very harsh, pessimistic of man's capacity of knowing and anti-intellectualist, (Gilson, Longpré, Tinivella, Squadrini) by others to have been realistic and founded in historical facts, though not indicative of an anti-intellectualist attitude (Van Steenberghen) and finally by others still to have been normal and easy to explain (Robert . . .). The various texts containing criticisms of philosophical inquiries pursued independently of the framework of the certitude of faith and the data of revealed truths have been closely analysed in the effort at determining the intellectual attitude characteristic of Saint Bonaventure. The problem of knowledge has been intensely worked out from the metaphysical, epistemological and psychological points of view (Lutz, Luyckx, Schwendinger . . .). It has not, however been too extensively studied in connection with the problem of the intellectual attitude taken by Saint Bonaventure as a Christian believer seeking understanding. One wonders if it would not be a rewarding experiment to try to establish the exact intellectual attitude of Saint Bonaventure by studying the problem of knowledge itself with regard to the diverse kinds of certitudes recognized by Bonaventure and to the theory of knowledge advocated as a basis of certitudinal knowledge. The very possibility of a purely natural intellectual undertaking will be brought out and its necessary relationship to revealed truths and the certitude of faith will be more clearly suggested. The analysis of the exigencies flowing from the nature both of man and of

faith would thus bring out the intellectual attitude one is to take as a believing Christian seeking understanding and would explain the evaluation and criticisms of Saint Bonaventure made about philosophy and philosophers. We would thus see to what extent the intellectual attitude of Saint Bonaventure implied a full awareness of the necessity of pursuing a quest for certainty within the framework of the certitude of faith and the data of revealed truths if one is to attain to full knowledge in total certainty with perfect wisdom.

IV

One of the basic problems in the determining of the thought of Saint Bonaventure with regard to the meaning, value and propriety of an intellectual quest for certainty undertaken by a believing Christian consists in the coordination of the solution of two difficulties: that of the distinction of the realms of faith and reason, theology and philosophy in their constitutive characteristics and that of the separation of these two realms in the very pursuit of the quest for absolute certainty. The answer to these two questions has to be determined if we are to understand the nature of a quest for certainty pursued within the framework of the certitude of faith and the data of revealed truths.

The type of certitude possessed serves as a means of distinguishing adequately diverse modes of knowledge. We thus find in Saint Bonaventure diverse types of certitude according to the truth assented to and according to the mode of consideration and of bringing about of the assent given in the firmness of total assurance. Various modes of evidence naturally cause various modes of certitude. In fact, other is the clear evidence obtained through philosophical sciences, other the clear evidence obtained in the theological sciences, other the clear evidence obtained through the gratuitous gifts of science and wisdom, other the clear evidence obtained in the science of the beatific vision.⁸² Other is the necessary, cogent and irresistible force of demonstrated and understood truths which brings about on its own intelligible value a solid certitude which being caused by naturally arrived at truths through means of natural reason left to its own power is called rational or demonstrated certainty; other is the certitude of faith based on the authority which stands as a guarantee of the truth and necessity of what is offered to assent; other is the certitude of interior illumination which through the gifts of understanding and science gives stabilizing insight into

⁸² *Donis*, IV, 3, (V. 474), copied in fn. 50.

the truth believed; other is the certitude of persuasion brought about by the consideration and the gathering of efficacious and congruent reasons that enlighten us as to what is believed.⁸³ Thus man in his quest for understanding for intimate and requiting insights into the truths that serve as a basis for his intellectual and moral life will pursue his ways within or out of the framework of the data and certitude of faith obtained on the basis of authority to achieve the certainty of understanding either through demonstrative and purely rationally developed means, "certitudo demonstrationis", through supernaturally illuminating means, "certitudo interioris illuminationis", or through persuasive means of arguments of convenience, "certitudo persuasionis". Thus in our consideration of the quest for certainty in Saint Bonaventure, we must delineate what kind of certitude is arrived at: whether it is that of the philosopher achieving certainty with the sole means of reason, whether it is that of the faithful achieving certitude of faith with the acceptance of revealing authority expressing itself in the Holy Scriptures, whether it is that of the mystic achieving understanding through the certitude given by illuminating gifts of science and understanding, whether it is that of the theologian acquiring within the certitude of faith the certainty of convincing arguments as found in the works of the Fathers and Christian thinkers. Man in his pursuit for as great a certitude as he can acquire must take advantage of all the means at his disposal, to obtain the greatest assurance possible on each point according to the subject-matter and the circumstances, preferring here the certainty of demonstrated truths, there the certitude of authoritative revelation, seeking greater enlightenment while remaining within the assurance of the certitude of faith either through interior supernatural illumination or through theological exterior persuasion. Thus it is that the books which are to be used in the acquisition of knowledge are the Holy Scriptures, through which are received the truths revealed by God and believed through faith, the books of the Fathers and of the Masters of Sentences for theological doctrines and the books of the teachings of the

⁸³ In *Johan., Prooem.*, 10, 2, 1., (VI. 243): "Dicendum, quod quadruplex est certitudo, scilicet demonstrationis, auctoritatis, internae illuminationis et exterioris persuasionis. Prima certitudo est, cui resisti non potest; in illa cogitur homo assentire, velit nolit; et ideo talis certitudo, ubi dominatur, evacuat fidem. Alia est certitudo auctoritatis, et haec fidem generat; unde Augustinus "Quod credimus debemus auctoritati". Tertia est certitudo illuminationis interioris, et haec fidem perficit et consummat. Quarta est persuasionis, quando homo fidelis rationes assignat congruentiae et efficaciae, ut quod credit intelligat; et haec certitudo fidem consequitur. Nam rationes hujusmodi fideli sunt optimae et efficaces, infideli vero prorsus inutiles et infirmæ."

"artists" and the philosophers for purely rationally developed and acquired truths.⁸⁴

It thus appears that beside the realm of the certitude of faith and Holy Scriptures, there is the whole realm of knowledge requiring the undertaking of a rational quest for understanding and evidence. And in this effort at understanding, the direct cooperation of faith is required in some cases, while in other cases the rational inquiry pursues its ways on its own.^{84a} Thus beside the certitude of theological science and of the wisdom found in books of the Christian doctors, which is brought about through the mutual cooperation of faith and reason, there is a whole realm of the certitudinal knowledge of reason and of philosophical sciences, which results from the workings of natural reason left to its own powers.⁸⁵ Thus the whole realm of reality which reason undertakes to understand covers the whole realm of the modes of being which are attainable either by reason left to its own powers or through the help of divine revelation.

These considerations clearly suggest that for Saint Bonaventure as for Saint Albert the Great and Saint Thomas Aquinas,⁸⁶ there is full awareness of the basic differences that lie between the realms of reason and philosophy, on the one hand, and of faith and theology, on the other hand. The certain knowledge that comes from both are clearly diversified by the differences in the mode of acquiring knowledge and in the way of assenting to the truths offered.⁸⁷ There definitely is, in Saint Bonaventure, a clear-cut distinction between what belongs to the domain of reason and what belongs to the domain of faith.⁸⁸ The certitude

⁸⁴ *Hex.* XIX, 6, (V. 421): "Modus studendi... Ordo diversimode traditur a diversis; sed oportet ordinate procedere, ne de primo faciant posterius. Sunt ergo quatuor genera scripturarum, circa quae oportet ordinate exerceri. Primi libri sunt sacrae Scripturae... Secundi libri sunt originalia Sanctorum; tertii, Sententiae magistrorum; quarti, doctrinarum mundalium sive philosophorum."

^{84a} *II Sent.*, 30, 1, 1, c., (II. 716), copied in fn. 26.

⁸⁵ *Donis*, IV, 5, (V. 474), copied in fn. 50.

⁸⁶ Cf. Et. Gilson, *La philosophie de saint Bonaventure*, 2nd ed., Paris, Vrin, 1943, p. 80: "Le problème de la distinction entre la foi et la théologie d'une part, la raison et la philosophie d'autre part, se résout donc aussi simplement dans la doctrine de saint Bonaventure que dans celle d'Albert le Grand et de saint Thomas d'Aquin."

⁸⁷ *III Sent.*, 35, 1, 2, c., (III. 776), copied in fn. 48.

⁸⁸ *Scientia Christi*, IV, c., (V. 23): "Cum dicitur, quod omne, quod cognoscitur certitudinaliter, cognoscitur in luce aeternarum rationum, hoc tripliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo, ut intelligatur, quod ad certitudinalem cognitionem concurrunt lucis aeternae evidentia, tanquam ratio cognoscendi tota et sola. — Et haec intelligentia est minus recta, pro eo quod secundum hoc nulla esset rerum cognitio nisi in Verbo; et tunc non differret cognitio viae a cognitione in proprio genere, nec cognitio naturae

of faith is quite other than that of reason. For the certitude of faith based as it is on authority is a result of hearing and pious acceptance so that it does not give of itself a clear and precise insight in the value of cogency of the object presented to the mind's consideration. The certainty which is the result of intellectual or rational speculation and insight offers the knowable object in its naked truth so that the firmness of assent is caused by the force of the intelligibility making impossible for the knower not to accept the value of the truth offered. Such a certitude is called according to the case "*certitudo speculationis*",⁸⁹ "*certitudo intelligentiae*"⁹⁰ "*certitudo rationis*",⁹¹ "*certitudo demonstrationis*",⁹² "*certitudo scientiae*".^{92a} This type of certainty is achieved through human endeavour carried through by the sole means of natural reason and brings full insight into the necessity of evidently seen truths which brings about the firm assent excluding all doubts, all possibility of refutation and contradiction.⁹³ On the other hand, the certitude which is the result of a free assent through the influence of the will bears upon an object which is worth believing in because its truth transmitted by teaching is adhered to because of the worthiness and the authority of the one who stands at the back of it. This certitude is called "*certitudo fidei*",⁹⁴ "*certitudo adhaesionis*",⁹⁵ "*certitudo*

a cognitione gratiae, nec cognitio rationis a cognitione revelationis, quae omnia cum sint falsa, nullo modo est ista via tenenda."

⁸⁹ *III Sent.*, 23, 1, 4, (III. 480—482), cf. the whole text. For the aspect "*certitudo speculationis*", cf. p. 482: "*Si autem loquamur de certitudine speculationis, quae quidem respicit ipsum intellectum et nudam veritatem; sic concedi potest, quod major est certitudo in aliqua scientia quam in fide, pro eo quod aliquis potest aliquid per scientiam ita certitudinaliter nosse, quod nullo modo potest de eo dubitare nec aliquo modo discredere nec in corde suo ullo modo contradicere, sicut patet in cognitione dignitatum et primorum principiorum.*"

⁹⁰ *Myst. Trin.*, 1, 1, ad 8, (V. 50—51): "*Nihil certius tenemus, quam quod fide comprehendimus; dicendum, quod illud est verum de certitudine adherentiae, non de certitudine intelligentiae.*"

⁹¹ *Brev.*, *Prol.*, 5, 3, (V. 207): "*Quoniam igitur hi modi narrativi non possunt fieri per viam certitudinis rationum, quia particularia gesta probari non possunt, ideo, ne Scriptura ista tanquam dubia vacillaret, ac per hoc minus moveret loco certitudine rationis providit Deus huic Scripturae certitudinem auctoritatis, quae adeo magna est, quod omnem perspicacitatem humani ingenii superexcellit. Et quia non est certa auctoritas ejus qui potest fallere vel falli; nullus autem est qui falli non possit et fallere nesciat nisi Deus et Spiritus sanctus; hinc est, quod ad hoc, quod Scriptura sacra modo sibi debito esset perfecte authentica, non per humanam investigationem est tradita, sed per revelationem divinam.*"

⁹² *In Joah.*, *Proem.*, 10, ad 1, (VI. 243), copied fn. 83.

^{92a} *III Sent.*, 23, 1, 4, (III. 480—482). Cf. complete text.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

adhaerentiae",⁹⁶ "certitudo auctoritatis".⁹⁷ Thus we have in faith a type of certitude which by its origin, its basis and the assent it warrants is really distinct from that of reason.⁹⁸

From all that has been said in the preceding considerations it appears that for Saint Bonaventure faith plays a prominent part in the intellectual inquiry towards certainty and that reason has a valuable role within the realm of faith. It also appears that the kinds of certitudinal cognition acquired through reason alone and through faith are specifically other in each case. Thus Christian wisdom whether philosophical or theological results from a particular quest for certainty pursued within the certitude of faith. But then one rightfully wonders what is the exact relationship between the knowledge caused by purely natural means and the knowledge acquired and adhered to on the basis of divine revelation or enlightenment. In fact, do not the restrictions Saint Bonaventure imposes on the self-sufficiency of reason make us wonder about the possibility of a truly rational mode of certitude? Does he not warn us in speaking of the shortcomings of the philosophers that their failures are due to the absence of a knowledge held through faith?⁹⁹ And on account of the impossibility of finding immutable truths in creatures because of their natural changeableness, and infallible certitude in the knower because of the natural weakness of the intellect, does Saint Bonaventure not conclude with Saint Augustine to the necessity of divine cooperation in the acquisition and stable possession of certitude in knowledge?¹⁰⁰ Saint Bonaventure strongly stresses the absolute necessity of having recourse to the superior elements of eternal rules existing in the eternal truth which God is.¹⁰¹ The very certitude man acquires in all types of knowledge requires divine illumination as its ultimate basis and indispensable condition. To what extent this is

⁹⁶ *Myst. Trin.*, I, I, ad 8, (V. 50—51), copied in fn. 90.

⁹⁷ *In Joah. Prooem.*, 10, ad 1, (VI. 243), copied in fn. 83. *Brev., Prol.*, 5, 3, (V. 207), copied in fn. 91.

⁹⁸ *Brev., Prol.*, 5, 3, (V. 207), copied in fn. 91.

⁹⁹ *Hex.*, VII, 3, (V. 366): "Sed adhuc isti in tenebris fuerunt, quia non habuerunt lumen fidei, nos autem habemus lumen fidei."

¹⁰⁰ *Reb. Theol. IV, Christus Unus*, 10, (V. 570), copied in fn. 11. *Scientia Christi*, IV, 1., (V. 22): "Omne, quod cognoscitur certitudinaliter, cognoscitur in luce aeternarum rationum."

¹⁰¹ *Scientia Christi*, IV, c., (V. 23): "Et ideo est tertius modus intelligendi, quasi medium tenens inter utramque viam, scilicet quod ad certitudinalem cognitionem necessario requiritur ratio aeterna ut regulans et ratio motiva, non quidem ut sola et in sua omnimoda claritate, sed cum ratione creata, et ut ex parte a nobis contuita secundum statum viae . . . Quod autem mens nostra in certitudinali cognitione aliquo modo attingat illas regulas et incommutabiles rationes, requirit necessario nobilitas cognitionis et dignitas cognoscentis."

possible and required and how this does actually take place is the problem that must be solved for an adequate understanding of the problem of the quest for certainty in the Middle Ages as pursued by Saint Bonaventure. And then the question remains to know to what extent natural knowledge is actually realized in such a conception of the problem of knowledge. To give an answer to these problems would be to show the characteristic attitude and the particular mode of realization of the quest for certainty within the certitude of faith as carried on by Saint Bonaventure.

It is thus generally agreed that there is in Saint Bonaventure a clear-cut conception of the distinction between the realm of faith and the realm of reason. The problem which presents a basic difficulty is that of the separation of the two realms in the properly philosophical inquiries, if such a thing is possible at all. The whole problem at hand, is to know if for Saint Bonaventure a Christian's philosophy is a Christian philosophy and to establish the consequences the solution given to this problem has in the development of the quest for certainty. Historians of Bonaventurian thought are in profound disagreement on this point. A consideration of the very process and methodology Saint Bonaventure suggests for the pursuit of the quest for certainty brings up the question about the possibility of the total separation of the two theoretically distinct realms of certitudinal knowledge in the actual order of exercise. The nature of the process and methodology advocated for the quest for certainty will depend upon the theory of knowledge accepted. The possibility of a purely natural philosophical inquiry will depend upon the possibility of attaining with man's natural powers the objects of the inquiry. The way these objects of inquiry are present to the mind, the way they can be apprehended and judged, the way they can be ascertained and assented to, the way they can bring about full certainty on account of their own nature, on account of man's intellectual capacity and on account of the adequate proportion between the object known and the knowing subject, all these aspects constitute some of the elements which are to be determined before an adequate solution can be given to the problem of the meaning, possibility and propriety of a quest for certainty. The respective contribution of the object known, whether it be in itself below, within or above man's soul, the knowing subject himself and of a higher influence have to be gauged and compared to delineate the way in which the quest for certainty is to be pursued. The Christian has through his faith a higher means of attaining to some of the most basic truths which serve to constitute an adequate world vision.

The solution to the problem of the necessity, the possibility and the congruousness of having this supernatural means of knowledge make a direct or indirect contribution to our human quest for rational certainty presupposes solved the problem of the nature and the value of our natural way of knowing the whole of reality under its various modes of realization.

V

In the analysis of the intellectual attitude taken in the quest for certainty one should justify and explain how it is that we can attain to certainty and what is the value of such a knowledge. For a concerted effort to achieve the certainty of our knowledge, requires that one establishes not only the process by which knowledge is actually acquired but also what are the underlying causes which assure us that knowledge can be and is source of full and indestructible certainty. The whole doctrine of illumination through the eternal reasons is brought about as the only consequent theory that will serve as the metaphysical hypothesis that will furnish an adequate and satisfactory explanation to our daily experience of the acquisition and possession of certitude based on immutable and infallible certainties. The full meaning and import of this theory is unfortunately shrouded under the veils of obscurity in spite of the recurrence of many clear-cut affirmations. Rosenmöller¹⁰² suggests that the whole theory of illumination with the role of the world of ideas, the function of the metaphysics of light and the necessity of a contact with the world of ideas and the eternal rules in God remains an unsolved mystery. On the one hand, the world of ideas appears as the object of our knowledge while, on the other hand, the vision of the essence of God is denied man during his life on earth. Yet the eternal art and the divine world of ideas is identical to God's essence. The reconciliation of these factors which are brought in for the solution of the problem of the truth and the certainty of our knowledge seems rather hopeless.

¹⁰² *Religiöse Erkenntnis nach Bonaventura*, B.G.P.M.A., 25 (1925) 26: "Es liegt offenbar über der Lehre von der Berührung der göttlichen Ideenwelt ein unlösbares Geheimnis. Einerseits ist die Ideenwelt Gegenstand unserer Erkenntnis. Andererseits schauen wir Gottes Wesenheit hier auf Erden nicht. Und doch ist die *ars aeterna* identisch mit der Wesenheit Gottes. Die schwierigen philosophischen und theologischen Fragen, die sich hier ergeben, haben Augustin und Bonaventura nicht restlos gelöst. Aber sie dürfen sich darauf berufen, daß all unsere Beziehungen zum geheimnisvollen Gott geheimnisvoll verhüllt sind. Auch der *concursum generalis* ist ein Geheimnis. Und ist nicht auch das Erkennen ein Geheimnis, das trotz allen Nachsinnens immer nur geheimnisvoller wird?"

The comprehensive and detailed study of Father F. Schwendinger¹⁰³ shows how the consideration of the theory of knowledge elaborated by Bonaventure has lead to basically diverse and contradictory interpretations. An analysis of the still accepted interpretations given to the theory of illumination in the scholarly writings of such eminent historians of Bonaventurian thought as K. Werner,¹⁰⁴ J. Jeiler,¹⁰⁵ G. Palhories,¹⁰⁶ E. Portalié,¹⁰⁷ E. Lutz,¹⁰⁸ J. Eberle,¹⁰⁹ B. Luyckx,¹¹⁰ B. Rosenmöller,¹¹¹ E. Gilson,¹¹² J. M. Bissen,¹¹³ L. Veuthey¹¹⁴ makes it clear that the problem of the theory of knowledge in Saint Bonaventure is far from being a settled one. The accusations that have been levelled against it as being a form of ontologism¹¹⁵ suggest the importance of determining the exact meaning of this theory of illumination for an understanding of the intellectual attitude of Saint Bonaventure in the quest for certainty. The very meaning of the quest for certainty is at stake also as a result of the various interpretations of the character of the theory of illumination. This theory has been made by some to suggest a sheer metaphysical order serving as a natural background and foundation for our actual scientific knowledge, (De Wulf¹¹⁶). It has been construed by others to bring out the ideogenic role in the acquisition of our notions, (Luyckx¹¹⁷). Finally, it has been shown to be required simply for the certification of our certitudinal knowledge, (Gilson¹¹⁸). The texts of Saint Bonaventure present us with a clear-cut and definite

¹⁰³ "Die Erkenntnis in den ewigen Ideen nach der Lehre des hl. Bonaventura". *Franz. Stud.*, XV (1928) 69—95, 193—244; XVI (1929) 29—64.

¹⁰⁴ *Die Psychologie und Erkenntnislehre des Joh. Bonaventura*. Vienna, 1876.

¹⁰⁵ "Der Ursprung und die Entwicklung der Gotteserkenntnis im Menschen. Eine dogmatische Studie über die betreffende Lehre des hl. Bonaventura und anderer Meister des dreizehnten Jahrhunderts." *Der Katholik*, 57 (1877) 113—147, 225—269, 337—353. *Id.*, *De humanae cognitionis ratione anecdota quaedam*, Quaracchi, 1883, *Dissertatio Praevia*. *Id.*, Scholion and footnotes in the critical edition of Quaracchi.

¹⁰⁶ *Saint Bonaventure*, Paris, 1913.

¹⁰⁷ "Augustinisme", *D.T.C.*, I (1903) 2268 ff.

¹⁰⁸ *Die Psychologie Bonaventuras*, *B.G.P.M.A.*, VI (1909) IV—V.

¹⁰⁹ *Die Ideenlehre Bonaventuras*, Freiburg in B., 1911.

¹¹⁰ *Die Erkenntnislehre Bonaventuras*, *B.G.P.M.A.*, 23 (1923) III—IV.

¹¹¹ *Religiöse Erkenntnis nach Bonaventura*, *B.G.P.M.A.*, 25 (1925) III—IV.

¹¹² *La philosophie de s. Bonaventure*, Paris, Vrin, 1943.

¹¹³ *L'exemplarisme divin selon saint Bonaventure*, Paris, Vrin, 1929.

¹¹⁴ *S. Bonaventurae Philosophia Christiana*, Rome, 1943.

¹¹⁵ For a discussion of Saint Bonaventure as an ontologist, cf. B. A. Luyckx, *op. cit.*, p. 242—254.

¹¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 120.

¹¹⁷ B. A. Luyckx, *op. cit.*, p. 200—234. Cf. Ueberweg-Geyer, *Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie*, 1928, p. 394.

¹¹⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 304—324.

statement of this or that aspect of the solution. The confusion and mystery arise as soon as we try to bring together these various aspects within the bounds of a self-sufficient and organized theory and especially as soon as we try to explain away the difficulties and justify the meaning, value and propriety of this explanation. It becomes important to bring together the various elements which contribute to a worthwhile solution, even if the last word cannot be said about it. Thus it is that to probe the meaning and to determine the value and the consequences of the theory of divine illumination in Saint Bonaventure will prove useful in showing how and to what extent the quest for certainty is realized and realizable in such a system, even though some of the difficulties might still remain unsolved.

Saint Bonaventure, in elaborating the methodology which serves as a background to the development of man's thought and life, indicates the various types of cognitive activities, the various kinds of knowledge obtained and the consequent modes of certitude achieved. We have seen already how the various degrees of evidence or of clearness in the object of assent, and the various sources which bring the intelligibility of the truth under consideration, cause various modes of knowledge, certitude and science.¹¹⁹ It is important to realize that in the theory of knowledge of Saint Bonaventure there is a basic correlation between the concepts of light, truth and knowledge.¹²⁰ The epistemology and the general theory of knowledge is closely connected with the basic metaphysical pattern which is imbued with the impact of the role of light. The whole theory of divine illumination under all its aspects and with its various levels is elaborated along lines which presuppose a theory of light as the explanatory hypothesis which serves as principle of solution for the problem of the nature and possibility of knowledge of the various levels of cognitive activity.

Thus the *De Reductione Artium ad Theologiam*¹²¹ brings out how man in his effort at acquiring truth and at fulfilling his desire for achieve-

¹¹⁹ *Donis*, IV, 3, (V. 474). In *Joah.*, *Prooem.*, IV, 2, (VI. 243). copied in fn. 82 and 83.

¹²⁰ I *Sent.*, 3, 1, 1, 1, fund., 2, (I. 68): "Omnis cognitio spiritualis fit ratione lucis, et ratione lucis increatae." I *Sent.*, 9, dub. 7, (I. 190): "Lux habet in se naturam manifestandi; et ita respicit cognitionem."

¹²¹ *Red. Art.*, 1, (V. 319): "Licet autem omnis illuminatio cognitionis interna sit, possumus tamen rationabiliter distinguere, ut dicamus, quod est lumen exterius, scilicet lumen artis mechanicae; lumen inferius, scilicet lumen cognitionis sensitivae; lumen interius, scilicet lumen cognitionis philosophicae; lumen superius, scilicet lumen gratiae et sacrae Scripturae. Primum lumen illuminat respectu figurae artificialis, secundum respectu formae naturalis, tertium respectu veritatis intellectualis, quartum et ultimum respectu veritatis salutaris."

ments is enriched with various types of light which make it possible for him to perfect himself.¹²² Man thus is able to achieve his perfection through the external light of mechanical skill with regard to the arts and crafts, through the lower light of sense-perception with regard to natural forms, through the inner light of philosophical knowledge with regard to intellectual truths and through the higher light of grace and Sacred Scriptures with regard to the saving truth.¹²³ Thus is found a hierarchy of illuminating lights which enhance man's capacity of knowing and of grasping the truths which will perfect him. Thus, as a starting point, there is the first light which enlightens the mind with regard to artificial forms for the appreciation and development of the arts and crafts which are, in their results, exterior to man and intended to supply the needs of his body. The whole realm of mechanical skills and arts carry on through the help of this light. Above this order, there is the lower light which is the light of sense-perception and which enables us to discern and to know natural forms which are at the basis of our sense cognition. This form of knowledge begins from the material object and requires corporeal light to be produced. This is the realm of sense cognition realized through the five exterior senses. Beyond this is the interior light of philosophical knowledge which guides men in the investigation of intelligible truths which constitutes the whole philosophical realm of cognition. It includes intellectual truth with regard to problems of rational philosophy in grammar, logic and rhetoric, of natural philosophy in physics, mathematics and metaphysics, of moral philosophy with regard to the individual, the family and the state. Beyond all these is the light of Sacred Scriptures which illumines the mind for the understanding of saving truth and which is called higher as leading to the manifestation of truths which are beyond reason and as being not acquired by human research but inspired and infused. And under this light proceed the doctors who specialize in reasoning with regard to truth of faith, the preachers who excell in expounding to others truths with regard to morals and the contemplatives who achieve the fulfilment of both the knowledge of truths of faith and the perfection of the way of life. The great masters with regard to these are Augustine and Anselm for the reasoning doctors, Gregory and Bernard for preaching and Dionysius and Richard of Saint Victor for contemplation. Hugh of Saint Victor

¹²² *Ibid.*,

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 1, (V. 319), copied in fn. 121. *Ibid.*, 6—7, (V. 321—322), copied in fn. 14. *Ibid.*, 22, (V. 325), copied in fn. 14. Cf. chart of these distinctions in E. T. Healy, *Saint Bonaventure's De Reductione Artium ad Theologiam*, St. Bonaventure College, 1939, p. 66.

achieved excellence in the three realms. The importance of the theory of illumination as a background for the explanation of man's cognitive activity appears in the divisions given in the *De Donis Spiritus Sancti*,¹²⁴ where Saint Bonaventure sharply distinguishes between the innate light of natural reason or judicatory power impressed in the rational creature with regard to the possible intellect as well as to the agent intellect and the infused light of faith superadded through grace for the good of man. Following upon the enlightenment assured by the light of natural reason, we have the clearness of the evidence of philosophical science which unfolds itself in the philosophical sciences of the rational order, of the natural order and of the moral order. Following upon the enlightenment assured by the illumination of faith comes the clearness of the science of theology, of the gratuitous science of the gift of the Holy Ghost and of the rewarding science of the life of Glory. In the *In Hexaëmeron*,¹²⁵ Saint Bonaventure speaks of this level of understanding as of a series of illuminations realized in the metaphysician, in the physicist, in the mathematician, in the logician, in the moralist and in the political scientist. Saint Bonaventure crowns the series of illuminations with that of the theologian.

If we compare the four types of certainties that characterized respectively the philosopher, the faithful, the mystic and the theologian¹²⁶ and the four lights that enhanced the capacity of man in perfecting himself,¹²⁷ we see that the third light is proper to the philosopher while the fourth light illumines the believer, the mystic and the theologian. In fact, this fourth light of the Sacred Scriptures teaches what is to be believed concerning the Divinity and the Incarnation, the pattern of human life to be followed and the union of the soul with God to be achieved. The light of faith offers the principles from which can develop theological wisdom. The Christian wise man will develop a knowledge according to these three aspects of saving truth and thus will be termed dogmatic, moral and mystical theology. Thus through the light of philosophical thought we obtain philosophical evidences and certainties, through the light of grace and Holy Scriptures, we obtain theological evidence and certainties as well as evidences and certitudes of faith and of the illuminating gifts of the Holy Ghost of intellect and science. Below all these are the lights perfecting man for artistic creation and for sense-perceptions.

¹²⁴ *Donis*, IV, 6—12, (V. 474—476), copied in fn. 13a.

¹²⁵ *Hex.*, I, 11, (V. 331), copied fn. 18.

¹²⁶ *In Joah.*, *Prooem.*, 10, 2, 1., (VI. 243), copied in fn. 83.

¹²⁷ *Red. Art.*, I, (V. 319), copied in fn. 121.

Now in the Bonaventurian theory of divine illumination stated as essential requirements for the possession of certainty in knowledge, we see that if all certitudinal knowledge requires a form of divine illumination and judgment through the light of eternal reasons, there must, however, be a judgment based on other elements beside the eternal light. For the principles possessed in virtue of one's own light as well as the principles received from a lower light enter as elements in the judgment ascertaining the value of our certitudinal knowledge.¹²⁸ Saint Bonaventure thus maintains that on the level of the purely natural truths, knowledge is achieved in the eternal reasons through the natural judicatory power of reason while in the field of supernatural truths and features, knowledge requires to be achieved the gift of a supernatural revelation.¹²⁹ The context of most of these classifications contain references to the shortcomings of reason left on its own and the need of being helped if it is expected to achieve certainty. The meaning of divine illumination on the various levels of its modes of realization must therefore be determined adequately if we are to have a proper evaluation of the quest for certainty man is able to pursue. Thus in the study of the basis of the certainty found in various modes of knowledge we must determine the extent of the contribution of the created and of the uncreated elements whose mutual cooperation is required in all certitudinal knowledge. And within created elements, we must determine the respective contribution of the principles perceived through the light proper to the state or the type of knowledge involved and of the principles acquired from the lower light of sense-perception. In the *In Hexaëmeron*,¹³⁰ Saint Bonaventure analyses the knowledge acquired through the vision of the intellect. Intellectual vision is considered as the activity of man's intelligence endowed by its natural powers, elevated by faith, rendered

¹²⁸ *II Sent.*, 24, 2, 1, c., (II. 575), copied fn. 45.

¹²⁹ *Scientia Christi*, IV, ad 21, (V. 26): "In rationibus aeternis naturalia cognoscuntur naturali iudicatorio rationis, supernaturalia vero et futura non nisi dono revelationis supernae." *Myst. Trin.*, I, 2, (V. 55—56): "Lux vera, quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum. Illuminat autem dupliciter, scilicet per lumen inditum et per lumen infusum, ex quorum luminum concursu habitus fidei tanquam argumentum elicitur ad credendum. Deum esse trinum, et consequentia omne verum, quod pertinet ad christianae religionis cultum. Et hoc patet sic. Per lumen enim naturaliter homini a Deo inditum et signatum tanquam lumen divini vultus unicuique dictat ratio propria, quo de primo principio sentiendum est altissime et piissime; altissime, quod a nullo; piissime, quia cetera ab ipso. Et in hoc concordant Christiani, Judaei et Saraceni et etiam heretici . . . quod, inquam, ita sit et ita sentiatur, hoc non sentiatur, hoc non dictat lumen inditum per se, sed lumen infusum, ex quo cum lumine indito colligitur, quod de Deo sentiendum est . . ."

¹³⁰ *Hex.*, III, 23—24, (V. 347), copied in fn. 16a.

learned by Scriptures, held in suspense by contemplation. Man's intelligence can also be considered as illumined by prophecy, as absorbed through rapture in God and as glorified, separated or reunited to the body.

Thus we should determine in their hierarchical succession the certainty given through the lower light of the senses, through the interior light of natural reason in philosophical sciences, through the light of faith and Holy Scriptures in theological science, through the light of the gratuitous gift of the Holy Ghost of science in contemplation and through the light of glory in beatific vision, to which could be added the certainty possessed through the light of prophecy and through the illumination of the absorption in raptures. We should also bring out the mutual influence and assistance realized by these various levels of understanding. It is always important to keep in mind that, in his concrete approach to reality, Saint Bonaventure always considers the whole man, as he actually is, to be the subject of operation. The man who is more perfected by the various types of virtues and knowledges could very well exercise the lower type of operation in a better way than the man who is not perfected by higher perfections. It thus becomes useful to delineate the intrinsic and extrinsic role or contribution achieved by the higher levels upon the lower levels. The question of science and wisdom appears to be of great importance in determining the value and efficacy of intellectual inquiry. This is clearly suggested when we find Saint Bonaventure stating that Plato thought on the level of wisdom while Aristotle thought on the level of science. What Plato did not achieve and what Aristotle could not achieve, Augustine did achieve since in taking into consideration the world above as Plato had done and the world below as Aristotle had done he fulfilled the conditions for both wisdom and science.^{130a} Would it be that the philosopher left to his own powers will achieve at most the perfection of science based upon created reasons, while only

^{130a} *Reb. Theol.*, IV, *Christus Unus*, 18—19, (V. 572): "Unde quia Plato totam cognitionem certitudinalem convertit ad mundum intelligibilem sive idealem, ideo merito reprehensus fuit ab Aristotele, non quia male diceret ideas esse et aeternas rationes, cum eum in hoc laudet Augustinus; sed quia despecto mundo sensibili, totam certitudinem cognitionis reducere voluit ad illas ideas; et hoc ponendo, licet videretur stabilire viam sapientiae, quae procedit secundum rationes aeternas, destruebat tamen viam scientiae, quae procedit secundum rationes creatas; quam viam Aristoteles e contrario stabiliebat, illa superiore neglecta. Et ideo videtur, quod inter philosophos datus sit Platoni sermo sapientiae, Aristoteli vero sermo scientiae. Ille enim principaliter aspiciebat ad superiora, hic vero principaliter ad inferiora. Uterque autem sermo, scilicet sapientiae et scientiae, per Spiritum Sanctum datus est Augustino tanquam praecipuo expositori totius Scripturae, satis excellenter, sicut ex scriptis apparet."

the Christian philosopher endowed with faith and orientated to higher truths will be able to achieve at once science by his awareness of and respect for the whole of creation and wisdom by his awareness of and his attachment to higher truths in the eternal reasons. Thus although Aristotle may be considered as the most excellent among philosophers, read pagan and non-Christian thinkers,¹³¹ Saint Augustine, however, should be considered as the most profound and best metaphysician, read as a Christian thinker.¹³² It is easy to see why Saint Bonaventure had such a high respect for Aristotle as a philosopher, who, in spite of his many errors, achieved perfection in technical expression and with regard to so many fundamental conclusions, while at the same time showing a greater reverence and attachment to Saint Augustine, who, as a theologian, also achieved greater insights in philosophical problems than any one else. In showing the value of philosophical inquiry even for a Franciscan Friar, Saint Bonaventure stresses that Saint Augustine treated very profoundly most of the philosophical truths which are found elaborated in the works of philosophers. Saint Augustine is said to have stressed the value of rational analysis within the certitude of faith. Many truths which were not taught by philosophers nor found in the sayings of philosophers were discovered by the theologians and the Fathers and can be learned through an assiduous study of their writings.¹³³ As a consequence, the Fathers and the theologians are to play a prominent role as authorities and guides in our intellectual inquiry. The primary place occupied by the Augustinian tradition and influence is here obvious. Augustine, the Fathers and the theologians have given an example of the worthiness of intellectual inquiry and offer us a wealth of sound philosophical doctrines. Thus even for a Franciscan learning and intellectual inquiry can be sought for and followed. From the simple and direct knowledge acquired through the senses and intellectual perception, through rational inquiry and philosophical pursuit, through the certitude of faith and the wisdom of theology, to the life of gifts and of contemplation, the Christian is called upon to develop his natural powers of understanding and reasoning and to correspond to grace in faith and the infused gifts in order to acquire a more solid certitude and a profounder insight of the whole realm of reality, natural and supernatural. To understand the intellectual attitude of Saint Bonaventure and the relationship which exists between the different realms of knowl-

¹³¹ *II Sent.*, I, I, I, 2, r. (II. 22).

¹³² *II Sent.*, 3, I, I, 2, r. (II. 98).

¹³³ *Ep. de Trib. Quaest.*, 12, (VIII. 335—336).

edge we should see how these various modes of knowledge actually take place and are realized. Man, endowed with a soul having been made able to possess in a way the whole of the universe of beings and to synthesize within its activity the influence exerted upon it from below through abstraction in the Aristotelian manner, from above through exemplarism and illumination in the Platonic manner and from within through the activity of the soul in its natural powers, thus achieves the perfection of knowledge on these various levels about the whole of the universe of being. The nature and the extent of the contribution of each factor should be analysed closely to determine adequately the general pattern of the process of acquiring certainty. Each order of science keeping its own methodology, the problem is to know the actual contribution of the inferior sciences which serve the higher sciences and the extent to which the sciences of physics and metaphysics which theology uses according to their own methodology are actually bettered because of the contact with a higher wisdom while remaining autonomously what they are as natural knowledges, or, whether in being bettered they are not transformed into an heteronomous thought no longer purely philosophical. By determining this we will obtain a clearer conception of the intellectual attitude which stood behind the quest for certainty in Saint Bonaventure.

To begin with the soul possesses no similitudes, forms or ideas of any object of knowledge. It is fully in the pure naked state of the *tabula rasa*.¹³⁴ The whole of truth about reality has to be acquired one way or another from scratch as it were. Being present to itself, the soul can know itself as such directly by sheer presence without any need of a similitude.¹³⁵ This knowledge is posited as prerequisite to any further knowledge.¹³⁶ It is had by intuition through direct insight into the self. Man awakening to the whole world of reality is faced with the microcosm of the sensible universe. It is through the five exterior senses that this world of sensible realities is apprehended by man.¹³⁷ The objects existing

¹³⁴ *I Sent.*, 17, 1, 4, (I. 301). *II Sent.*, 3, 2, 1, fund. 4 & 5, (II. 118). *II Sent.*, 39, 1, 2, c., (II. 904). *IV Sent.*, 49, 1, 2, ad 1—3, (IV. 1004).

¹³⁵ *Scientia Christi*, 2, ad 11, (V. 10). *Myst. Trin.*, 1, 1, fund. 10, (V. 46). *I Sent.*, 3, 2, 1, 3, c., (I. 86).

¹³⁶ *Hex.*, V, 24, (V. 357). *II Sent.*, 25, 1, 1, c., (II. 593). Cf. F. Schwendinger, "Die Erkenntnis . . .", *Franz. Stud.*, XV (1928) 80.

¹³⁷ *Itin.*, II, 2, (V. 300): "Notandum igitur, quod iste mundus, qui dicitur macrocosmus, intrat ad animam nostram, quae dicitur, minor mundus, per portas quinque sensuum, secundum ipsorum sensibilibus apprehensionem, oblectionem et dijudicationem." For analysis of sense perception cf. B. A. Luyckx, *Die Erkenntnislehre Bonaventuras*, B.G.P.M.A., 23 (1923) 13—39. Et. Gilson, *La philosophie de saint Bonaventure*, 2nd ed., Paris, Vrin, 1943, 281—291. F. Schwendinger, *loc. cit.*, 81—85.

outside of the mind in the whole sensible reality, present themselves in their sensible similitudes or species, through the medium of the sense organs, to the sense powers which bring to man's awareness the perception of them.¹³⁸ It is through the proper light of sense perception that apprehension of sensible realities whether they be proper or common, whether they be of the exterior or of the interior senses actually take place.¹³⁹ The theory of light is a basic principle of explanation of the possibility of the necessary contact between the object known and the knowing subject which is required for the realization of knowledge.¹⁴⁰ The efficacy of light within the object known and the knowing subject make possible the fulfilment of the four requirements for knowledge: proportion, union or reception, judgment and informing of subject by object.¹⁴¹ According to Saint Bonaventure's cosmology, the whole sensible and material world of physical reality, whether endowed with life or not, is informed by light. Light is universally realized as a form of a very active character which imbues every particular form to conserve it in being, to give it the capacity of acting and to keep it in its dignity and excellence.¹⁴² The presence of light in the sense object in its very being and in the knowing subject through the sense organs makes for the possibility of a mutual penetration and therefore of the union which will produce knowledge.¹⁴³ The similitude or species, which is nothing else but the object in its efficacious influence, becomes by intentional assimilation the knowing subject, and the knowing subject, through the transformation affected by the similitude becomes the object itself. The whole act of sense perception implies two distinct and complementary acts, the act of reception of the object through the sense organ by intentional assimilation and the act of judgment made by the sense power upon the receptive and transforming stages of the act of sensing.¹⁴⁴ The act of sense knowledge is at once passive through the

¹³⁸ *Itin.*, II, 4, (V. 300). *Brev.*, IV, (V. 227). *II Sent.*, 8, 2, 3, c., (II. 228).

¹³⁹ *Itin.*, II, 4—5, (V. 300—301). *II Sent.*, 24, 2, 2, 1, c., (II. 578). For division and nature of the four inner senses, cf. E. Lutz, *op. cit.*, 96—101. B. A. Luyckx, *op. cit.*, 28—37.

¹⁴⁰ *IV Sent.*, 49, 2, 2, 3, 2, fund. 2, (IV. 1020). *Scientia Christi*, II, c., (V. 8).

¹⁴¹ *I Sent.*, 3, 1, 2, 4, obj. 2, (I. 67—68).

¹⁴² *II Sent.*, 13, 2, 2, ad 5, (II. 321). Cf. *ibid.*, 3, 2, (II. 328—329).

¹⁴³ *Red. Art.*, 3, (V. 320): *Secundum lumen, quod illuminat nos ad formas naturales apprehendendas, est lumen cognitionis sensitivae, quod recte dicitur inferius, quia cognitio sensitiva ab inferiori incipit et fit beneficio lucis corporalis.*"

¹⁴⁴ *II Sent.*, 8, 1, 3, 2, ad 7, (II. 223): "Dicendum quod ista duo sunt in sensu, videlicet receptio et iudicium, receptio est principaliter ratione organi, sed iudicium ratione virtutis. In sensu autem corporeo sic est receptio

reception of the similitude in the organ and active through the combined transformation of the sense organ and the sense power through the intentional assimilation achieved in reaction to the reception of the sensible species.¹⁴⁵ The first moment of the act of sense cognition is called by Saint Bonaventure "receptio," to stress the passive transformation of the knowing subject as it is molded into the object by intentional assimilation through the similitude or the species. The sense organ, as a material reality, allows itself to be transformed by the similitude or the species received from the object outside the senses, but as a living organ animated by the cognitive power, it adapts itself to the new form received to make possible the intentional assimilation. This aspect of the first act is called protensio to stress the active as well as the passive nature of the act by which the knowing subject becomes intentionally the object through natural assimilation.¹⁴⁶ Intuition is applied to this first act to stress the cognitive nature of this act which finds its completion through the intentional assimilation of the object, presented to the knower through the similitude which by its union to both the organ and the sense power brings about a new perception in which the knower reverts this similitude to the concrete and singular object.^{146a} The terms reception, protention and intuition are used to signify the various aspects of the first reaction of the knowing subject to the influence of the object

in organo, quod est receptio pariter et in virtute et sic est iudicium virtutis illius in organo, quod non praeter organum et ideo tam receptio quam iudicium est totius conjuncti." II *Sent.*, 25, 2, 1, 6, c., (II. 623). IV *Sent.*, 43, 1, 6, ad 5, (IV. 895).

¹⁴⁵ IV *Sent.*, 50, 2, 1, 1, fun. 4, (IV. 1045). *Ibid.*, 2, c., (IV. 1046).

¹⁴⁶ I *Sent.*, 19, dub. 4, (I. 334): "Quidam dicunt sic, quod per defectionem producitur aliquid de materia per formae praexistentis corruptionem, sicut ex grano frumenti herba; per protensionem producitur aliquid per praexistentis formae permanentiam et inductionem formae artificialis, sicut vas fit de argento; per derivationem, quod producitur per praexistentis formae permanentium sola locali mutatione, ut rivus ex fonte et lacus ex rivo." III *Sent.*, 14, 1, 3, ad 6, (III. 305): "Ad hoc respondendum est quod etsi ad perfectionem cognitionis aliquo modo concurrat non solum passio, sed etiam actio; non tamen concurrat actio, quae quidem fit per aliquam influentiam vel impressionem ipsius cognoscentis in cognoscibile, sed solum per quamdam protensionem. Sicut etiam patet in dilectionem, cum amo aliquem, anima amando aliquo modo agit, nihil tamen influit in amatum, nec dilectum aliquid patitur vel recipit ab amante: sic intelligendum est in cognitione."

^{146a} *Red. Art.*, 8, (V. 322): "Nullum enim sensibile movet potentiam cognitivam, nisi mediante similitudine, quae egreditur ab objecto, sicut proles a parente; et hoc generaliter, realiter vel exemplariter est necesse in omni sensu. Illa autem similitudo non facit completionem in actu sentiendi, nisi uniatum cum organo et virtute; et cum unitur, nova fit perceptio, et per illam perceptionem fit reductio ad objectum mediante similitudine illa. Et licet non semper objectum sentiatur, semper tamen, quantum est de se, gignit similitudinem, cum est in sua completionem."

exercises through the similitude which by intentional assimilation transforms the subject to render it disposed to achieve the perception of the reality in its sensible characteristics.¹⁴⁷ A spontaneous judgment made through the particular sense powers expresses man's awareness of the source and correspondence in the singular reality of what he has apprehended and perceived. This judgment of the senses consists in the awareness of the contingent singular object as present and known. This is achieved by the whole knowing subject through the combined passivity and activity of the sense organ and the sense powers.

Man thus acquires the knowledge of the sensible world first of all in as much as through the external senses he receives within his soul similitudes which make it possible for him to grasp and perceive singular material objects. He acquires beyond this, a value knowledge of the sensible realities received, apprehended and perceived in as much as through the internal senses he perceives the beauty, the goodness or the evil attached to what he first perceived. Beyond these two steps which through similitudes bring to the soul the knowledge of these aspects of external sensible reality, there is a third step, called the "dijudicatio", which effects by abstraction and purification the passage of the sensible species, received through the senses, into the intellectual power.¹⁴⁸ Man through the external senses perceives proper and common sensibles and realizes that this object is productive of such a sensation, through the internal senses he perceives that the objects apprehended are beautiful, advantageous or damaging. The intuition of the material reality through assimilation of the subject and the object constitutes a knowledge which grasps the object, underlying the various qualities offered to the senses, in the global presentation without being sharply delineated or free from affective influences. Sense knowledge directly attains the object in its particular and singular qualitative features and not in its nature. The universal essence or nature of what is perceived is not directly apprehended as such in the direct act of reception and judgment

¹⁴⁷ Cf. A. Pisvin, *L'intuition sensible selon S. Bonaventure*, *Bibli. Pont. Athe. Ant.*, VII (1951) 374: "En résumé, les termes protensio, receptio, intuitus ont une signification identique fondamentale: c'est le premier acte du sujet connaissant qui réagit sous l'influence d'un objet quel qu'il soit. Cependant, protensio marque mieux l'action de la puissance cognitive, receptio insiste davantage sur la passivité du sujet, intuitus est plus spécifiquement un terme de connaissance."

¹⁴⁸ *Itin.*, II, 6, (V. 301): "Dijudicatio igitur est actio, quae speciem sensibilem, sensibiliter per sensus acceptam introire facit depurando et abstrahendo in potentiam intellectivam. Et sic totus iste mundus introire habet in animam humanam per portas sensuum secundum tres operationes praedictas." II *Sent.*, 8, 2, 1, 3, c., (II, 228).

which combined constitute the act of sensation of a singular material reality. The grasping of the very essence or ratio of these realities perceived requires a third act which by abstracting and purifying the species received through the senses will render possible an insight into the natures considered. This act will bring the intellectual power itself in contact with the realities apprehended and known through the senses. Through this act of abstracting and purifying discernment, sense perception is perfected beyond its own level and becomes a means and a foundation to a higher mode of knowing, no longer determined within the limitations and restrictions of the changeable, contingent singular order of reality. And since it is always the whole man in his soul who knows, there is a true continuity from one level to the other, the whole process tending naturally to achieve a greater and greater perfection.

Thus a first step in the acquisition of knowledge through sense perception we have the cooperation of the proper light of sense perception and the similitudes received from external sensible things. The whole realm of the realities grasped by sense knowledge is very important not only for the pursuit of daily life but also because the whole realm of sciences dealing with the material reality take their object by abstraction from the senses. The completion of the acquisition of knowledge of physical realities requires beyond the level of apprehension and of enjoyment the level of discernment by which the universal, abiding and necessary characteristics underlying the singularity, the mutability and the contingency elements in these material and particular realities are brought out to man's understanding.

But when it comes to the acquisition of certitudinal knowledge with regards to the senses, it appears that for Saint Bonaventure the proper light of sense perception is not of itself sufficient. The very mutability and changeability of the objects require a stable and infallible norm that will assure our judgment with regard to our sense perceptions. He is clear and definite on this point of the necessity of having recourse to the infallible and immutable light of eternal laws in God to assure the certainty of what is perceived.¹⁴⁹ The eternal reasons appear at this

¹⁴⁹ *Itin.*, II, 9, (V. 301—302): "Si enim dijudicatio habet fieri per rationem abstrahentem a loco, tempore et mutabilitate, ac per hoc a dimensione, successione et transmutatione, per rationem immutabilem et incircumscriptibilem et interminabilem: nihil autem est omnino immutabile, incircumscriptibile et interminabile, nisi quod est aeternum; omne autem quod est aeternum, est Deus, vel in Deo: si ergo omnia, quaecumque certius judicamus, per hujusmodi rationem dijudicamus; patet quod ipse est ratio omnium rerum et regula infallibilis et lux veritatis, in qua cuncta relucunt infallibiliter, indelebiter, indubitanter, irrefragabiliter, indijudicabiliter, incom-

point to be absolutely necessary on the one hand to make possible the discernment which will produce abstraction to obtain adequate intellectual knowledge of what is perceived by the senses and on the other hand to ascertain that the knowledge acquired through the senses warrants true and absolute certainty.¹⁵⁰

If, beyond the level of sense perception and the realm of physical realities attainable by the natural light of the senses, we consider the range of reason and the natural attainments and the philosopher's field of achievements, we find that there is a whole realm of intelligible truths proportioned to man's capacity of knowing which he understands through a natural light inserted in his nature.¹⁵¹ This interior light renders intelligible truths of the intellectual order and makes man able to grasp the essences and natures of physical realities, their hidden causes and principles as well as purely intelligible truths immediately or mediately discovered or grasped. Humanly acquired philosophical science is naturally based on the principles which reason itself perceives, either through abstraction from the physical reality or by intellectual insight.^{151a} To what extent can man know either the material realities below him, himself and what is in his soul or what is above him, the spiritual realities,

mutabiliter, incoarctabiliter, interminabiliter, indivisibiliter et intellectualiter. Et ideo leges illae, per quas judicamus certitudinaliter de omnibus sensibilibus, in nostram considerationem venientibus; cum sint infallibiles et indubitabiles intellectui apprehendentis, sint indebiles a memoria recolentis tanquam semper praesentis, sint irrefragabiles et indijudicabiles intellectui judicantis, quia, ut dicit Augustinus "nullus de eis sed per illas"; necesse est, eas esse incommutabiles et incorruptabiles tanquam necessarias, incoarctabiles tanquam incircumsriptas, interminabiles tanquam aeternas, ac per hoc indivisibiles tanquam intellectuales et incorporeas, non factas, sed increatas, aeternaliter existentes in arte aeterna, a qua, per quam et secundum quam formantur formosa omnia; et ideo nec certitudinaliter judicari possunt nisi per illam quae non tantum fuit forma cuncta producens, verum etiam cuncta conservans et distinguens, tanquam ens in omnibus formam tenens et regula dirigens, et per quam dijudicat mens nostra cuncta, quae per sensus intrans in ipsam."

¹⁵⁰ For opinion to the contrary, cf. F. Schwendinger, *op. cit.*, XV (1928) 205.

¹⁵¹ *Hex.*, IV, 6, (V. 349): "Visio ergo intelligentiae per naturam inditae, ut convertitur ad res . . . ad quid potest extendi nostra intelligentia de se." *Red. Art.*, 4, (V. 320): "Tertium lumen, quod illuminat ad veritates intelligibiles perscrutandas, est lumen cognitionis philosophiae, quod ideo interius dicitur, quia interiores causas et latentes inquirat, et hoc per principia disciplinarum et veritatis naturalis, quae homini naturaliter sunt inserta." *Donis*, VIII, 3, (V. 496): "Anima autem nostra habet supra se quoddam lumen naturae signatum, per quod habilis est ad cognoscenda prima principia." For an analysis of the psychological make up of man, cf. E. Lutz, *Die Psychologie Bonaventuras*, B.G.P.M.A., VI (1909). B. A. Luyckx, *Erkenntnislehre Bonaventuras*, B.G.P.M.A., 23 (1923). F. Schwendinger, "Die Erkenntnis. . .", *Franz. Stud.*, XV (1928) 69—75.

^{151a} *III Sent.*, 35, 1, 2, c., (III. 776), copied in fn. 48.

the angels and God by means of his natural powers of knowing alone? It is important in determining the methodology of the quest for certainty to establish to what extent these various truths can be arrived at by abstraction from the senses or by intuition of the self through the natural intellectual light of man without further contribution from God on the natural level through the natural intellectual illumination or on the supernatural level through grace, faith and the gifts. This natural light with which the intellect of man is naturally endowed is called the "naturale iudicatorium".¹⁵² The problem is to establish to what extent it should be considered sufficient to fulfil certain types of knowledge that are achievable by man in his proper status.¹⁵³ Can it be said that through this natural power man is able of himself to expel doubts, to free himself from ignorance and to direct his judgments intelligently on the level of speculative knowledge as well as on the level of practical knowledge?

In the acquisition of knowledge there is to be taken into consideration, beside this light naturally possessed by man in order to judge and evaluate his knowledge, the presence of the object in the mind through a species. In fact, knowledge consists essentially in the union of the knower and the knowable,¹⁵⁴ by the assimilation of the knowing subject and the known object,¹⁵⁵ achieved in intentional contact through the medium of the similitudes or species.¹⁵⁶ It appears that in such a conception of cognition, the mode of union through intentional assimilation requires the contribution of the object known with the species or similitude by which it is assimilated to the knowing subject as such and of the knowing

¹⁵² *In Evang. Lucae*, 12, 84, (VII. 334): "Insertum est enim homini naturale iudicatorium, per quod dirigitur ad videndum et eligendum."

¹⁵³ *Myst. Trin.*, I, 1, ad 1, 2, 3, (V. 50). "Ipse enim intellectus intra se habet lumen sufficiens ex propria conditione, per quod posset dubitationem istam longius propulare et se ab insipientia eripere."

¹⁵⁴ *I Sent.*, 3, 1, 1, 1, (I. 67) Quadruplex suppositio, quam necesse est esse in cognitione, scilicet proportionem, unionem sive receptionem, iudicium et informationem. Intellectus enim non intelligit nisi quod est sibi proportionabile, et quod sibi aliquo modo unitur et de quo iudicat, et a quo acies intelligentiae informatur... Ex prima suppositione... necesse est, esse proportionem cognoscentia ad cognoscibile... ex secunda... necesse est esse unionem cognoscibilis ad cognoscentem ita quod unum sit in altero... ex tertia ad cognitionem necesse est intellectum cognoscentem informari a cognito, sed omne quod alterum informat, aut informat per essentiam aut per similitudinem." *III Sent.*, 14, 1, 1, ar. 1 & c., (III. 295—297). *Myst. Trin.*, III, 1, 9, (V. 72). Cf. F. Schwendinger, *op. cit.*, XV (1929) 76.

¹⁵⁵ *III Sent.*, 14, 1, 1, c., (III. 297). *Scientia Christi*, V, fund. 10, (V. 29). *Scientia Christi*, II, fund. 4, (V. 7). *I Sent.*, 39, 1, 1, arg. 4, (I. 685). Cf. J. Eberle, *Die Ideenlehre Bonaventuras*, Freiburg i. B., 1911, p. 14.

¹⁵⁶ *I Sent.*, 35, 1, 1, c., (I. 601). *Scientia Christi*, 3, ad 11, (V. 10). *I Sent.*, 31, 2, 1, ad 1, (I. 554). *I Sent.*, 6, 3, ad 4, (I. 130).

subject with its natural powers of assimilation and of knowing. The similitude acquired is the similitude of the form of the object known and establishes the same form in its existence in the soul.¹⁵⁷ Thus in the acquisition of knowledge there is a cooperation of the light naturally possessed by men and which is called the "naturale judicatorium" and of "species" or similitudes acquired through the senses. The resulting knowledge is either immediate when the evidence is such that immediately the mind can judge of its value or mediate when a process of reasoning is required to establish that evidence. And man thus naturally endowed with a judicatory light enriched by the acquired species, can of himself perceive the evidence of the truth offered to the mind for assent.¹⁵⁸ But is the functioning of the judicatory light and the contribution of the abstracted similitude to be understood to extend beyond the realm of the material universe? Could not the whole realm of immaterial realities be apprehended more directly by intuitive knowledge through divine illumination or the influence of eternal ideas?

¹⁵⁷ I *Sent.*, 37, 2, dub. 4, (I. 665)

¹⁵⁸ II *Sent.*, 39, 1, 2, c., (II. 903): "Et propterea est tertius modus dicendi, quod habitus cognitivi quodam modo sunt nobis innati et quodam modo acquisiti, non tantum loquendo de cognitione in particulari et de cognitione conclusionum, sed etiam de cognitione principiorum. Cum enim ad cognitionem duo concurrant necessario, videlicet praesentia cognoscibilis et lumen, quo mediante de illo judicamus, sicut videmus in visu, et de praecedenti auctoritate innuit Augustinus; habitus cognitivi sunt quodam modo nobis innati ratione luminis animae inditi, sunt etiam quodam modo acquisiti ratione speciei; et hoc quidem verbis Philosophi et Augustini concordat. Omnes enim in hoc concordant, quod potentiae cognitivae sit lumen inditum, quod vocatur naturale judicatorium; species autem et similitudines rerum acquiruntur in nobis mediante sensu, sicut expresse dicit Philosophus in multis locis; et hoc etiam experientia docet. Nemo enim unquam cognosceret totum, aut partem, aut patrem, aut matrem, nisi sensu aliquo exteriori speciem ejus acciperet; et hinc est quod 'amittentes unum sensum necesse habemus unam scientiam amittere'. Illud autem lumen sive naturale judicatorium dirigit ipsam animam in judicando tam de cognoscibilibus quam de operabilibus. Sed hoc attendendum est praecipue, quia, sicut inter cognoscibilia quaedam sunt valde evidentialia, sicut dignitates et prima principia; quaedam sunt minus evidentialia, sicut conclusiones particulares; sicut et in operabilibus quaedam sunt maxime evidentialia, uptote illud: 'quod tibi non vis fieri, alii ne feceris', et quod Deo obtemperandum est, et consimilia. Quemadmodum igitur cognitio primorum principiorum ratione illius luminis dicitur esse nobis innata, quia lumen illud sufficit ad illa cognoscenda, post receptionem specierum, sine aliqua persuasione superaddita, propter tibi evidentialiam: sic et primorum principiorum moralium cognitio nobis innata est, pro eo quod judicatorium illud sufficit ad illa cognoscenda. Rursus, quemadmodum cognitio particularium conclusionum scientiarum acquisita est, pro eo quod lumen nobis innatum non plene sufficit ad illa cognoscenda, sed indiget aliqua persuasione sufficit ad illa cognoscenda, sed indiget aliqua persuasionem et habilitationem nova; sic etiam intelligendum est ex parte operabilium, quod quaedam sunt agenda, ad quae tenemur, quae non cognoscimus nisi per instructionem superadditam."

The exact meaning to be attributed to this process is subject to many difficulties and misinterpretations. When speaking of man's capacity for the acquisition of knowledge, we must always keep in mind the distinction between the problem of the genesis of knowledge and that of the value of the knowledge acquired. The type of light under consideration is also of first importance to determine the way it comes to be known and the justification of the certainty it warrants. The mode of knowledge realized about material objects is quite different from the mode of knowledge realized about the soul, what is in the soul, angels and God. Intellectual knowledge is acquired in totally different ways on the level of the inferior reason concerned with the natural universe and on the level of the superior reason concerned with the mind and spiritual realities.¹⁵⁹ When Aristotle says that all cognition is from the senses, he obviously means this for knowledge obtained through abstracted similitudes, not with regard to other types of cognition.¹⁶⁰ In fact, the knowledge man has of his soul does not require an abstracted similitude, nor for that matter a similitude at all. The union and the assimilation is had through the essence of the knower who is also the known in this case.¹⁶¹ Thus Saint Bonaventure speaks of a knowledge acquired through abstracted similitudes or species and of a knowledge acquired through innate similitudes or species. The assimilation of the knower and the known may be realized not only through reception of a similitude from the senses, but also directly and immediately through the essence, the presence and the truth of the known.¹⁶² Thus the level of the inferior

¹⁵⁹ II *Sent.*, 24, 1, 2, 2, (II. 563—565).

¹⁶⁰ II *Sent.*, 39, 1, 2, c., (II. 904): "Ex his patet responsio ad illam quaestionem, qua quaeritur, utrum omnis cognitio sit a sensu. Dicendum est, quod non. Necessario enim oportet ponere quod anima novit Deum et se ipsam et quae sunt in se ipsa, sine adminiculo sensuum exteriorum. Unde si aliquando dicat philosophus, quod 'nihil est in intellectu, quod prius non fuerit in sensu' et quod 'omnis cognitio habet ortum a sensu'; intelligendum est de illis quae quidem habent esse in anima per similitudinem abstractam; et illa dicuntur esse in anima ad modum scripturae. Et propterea valde notabiliter dicit Philosophus, quod in anima nihil scriptum est, non quia nulla sit in ea notitia, sed quia nulla est in ea pictura vel similitudo abstracta. Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus in libro de Civitate Dei; 'Inseruit nobis Deus naturale iudicarium, ubi quid sit lucis, quid tenebrarum, cognoscitur in libro lucis, qui veritas est, qui veritas in corde hominum naturaliter est impressa.'" III *Sent.*, 33, 2, ad 3, (III. 715). II *Sent.*, 19, 1, 1, fund. 7, (II 459). II *Sent.*, 25, 1, 1, c., (II. 593). II *Sent.*, 3, 2, 1, fund. 2, (II. 118).

¹⁶¹ *Scientia Christi*, II, ad 11, (V. 10). Cf. F. Schwendinger, *op. cit.*, XV (1928) (85—90). I *Sent.*, 17, 1, 1, c., (I. 301).

¹⁶² *Scientia Christi*, II, ad 12, (V. 10). I *Sent.*, 17, 1, 4, c., (I. 301). I *Sent.*, 3, 1, 1, fund. 3, (I. 68). *Scientia Christi*, IV, fund. 23, (V. 19). *Myst. Trin.*, II, 1, fund. 3, (V. 59). For the notion of truth as object, I *Sent.*, 19, 1, 4, fund. 4, (I. 348). I *Sent.*, 35, 1, fund. 2, (I. 600). II *Sent.*, 17, 1, 2, ad 4, (II. 415). IV *Sent.*, 49, 2, 1, 3, fund. 2, (IV. 1020). *Scientia Christi*, II fund. 1, (V. 6).

reason and the level of the superior reason constitute two ways of acquiring knowledge which are totally different in the objects considered, the means used and the act made.¹⁶³ Thus it appears that we have here a combination of two basically opposed traditions with regard to the process of acquiring knowledge. In fact, in establishing this theory of knowledge, Saint Bonaventure brings in the authority both of Augustine who stands through the Middle Ages as the inspirer of the theory of illumination and of Aristotle who stands through the Middle Ages as the inspirer of the theory of abstraction.¹⁶⁴

Tradition offered two extreme positions in the establishment of a theory of knowledge that would guarantee the formation of man's certitudinal knowledge: Plato had made a laudable contribution by stating that the foundations of all our worthwhile certitudinal knowledge lay in separate and intelligible ideas subsisting apart from the world of sensible reality. His unforgivable shortcoming was his complete neglect and his profound disregard of the world of sensible realities. This both Aristotle and Augustine harshly blamed. But Aristotle with all his respect for the world of sensible reality as the source and radical foundation of all our knowledge was also blamable in Augustine's mind for leaving aside the contribution of the separate world of intelligibility which he flatly rejected. In all his wisdom, Saint Augustine had, according to Saint Bonaventure, at least,¹⁶⁵ successfully combined and organized the two poles of the theory of knowledge constituted by the dialectic of Plato and the empiricism of Aristotle in order to furnish the truly adequate solution of the problem of the actual and total foundation of our certitudinal knowledge.¹⁶⁶ Thus we can easily surmise that in Saint

¹⁶³ Cf. B. A. Luyckx, *Die Erkenntnislehre Bonaventuras*, B.G.P.M.A., 23 (1923) 39—46.

¹⁶⁴ II *Sent.*, 39, 1, 2, c., (II. 903), copied in fn. 158.

¹⁶⁵ Cf. Jean Rohmer, "La théorie de l'abstraction dans l'Ecole Franciscaine", *A.H.D.L.M.A.*, III (1929) 142.

¹⁶⁶ *Reb. Theol.*, IV, *Christus Unus*, 18, (V. 572): "Unde licet anima secundum Augustinum connexa sit legibus aeternis, quia aliquo modo illud lumen attingit secundum supremam aciem intellectus agentis, et superiorem portionem rationis: indubitanter tamen verum est, secundum quod dicit Philosophus, cognitionem generari in nobis via sensus memoriae et experientiae, ex quibus colligitur universale in nobis, quod est principium artis et scientiae. Unde quia Plato totam cognitionalem certitudinalem convertit ad mundum intelligibilem sive idealem, ideo merito reprehensus fuit ab Aristotele: non quia male diceret, ideas esse et aeternas rationes, cum eum in hoc laudet Augustinus; sed quia, despecto mundo sensibili, totam certitudinem cognitionis reducere voluit ad illas ideas; et hoc ponendo, licet videretur stabilire viam sapientiae, quae procedit secundum rationes aeternas, destruebat tamen viam scientiae, quae procedit secundum rationes creatas; quam viam Aristoteles e contrario stabiliebat, illa superiore neglecta. Et ideo videtur quod inter philosophos datus sit Platoni sermo sapientiae.

Bonaventure we will have at once a theory of illumination by separated ideas, norms and laws in the Platonic fashion with this specification clearly made by Saint Augustine that they are to be identified with the intelligible world of divine ideas,¹⁶⁷ and a theory of abstracted knowledge based on the Aristotelian principle that the senses stand as the origin and foundation of all knowledge, which implies in a way a theory of abstraction.

Thus in Saint Bonaventure we have a form of the theory of abstraction according to which similitudes or species are acquired from the senses and a form of self-sufficiency in knowledge according to which the mind by its own enlightening powers perceives and judges the value of its knowledge. Through sense perception, the similitudes acquired are purified and abstracted to be developed into intellectual species. This is done by the act of discernment or judgment which corresponds to a form of judicatory abstraction through the power of a natural judicatory light "lumen naturale judicatorium" and the act of discernment or of separation "dijudicatio".

And the problem arises immediately to know what is the meaning and the functioning of a theory of abstraction in Saint Bonaventure. For we have first of all the affirmation that in knowledge are properly required the species or similitudes, acquired through senses, and the judicatory light "lumen naturale judicatorium" by which we judge the knowable objects present.¹⁶⁸ But how does the act of discernment, "dijudicatio" which by purifying and abstracting the sensible species makes them to enter into intellectual apprehension actually operate and take place: "Dijudicatio igitur est actio, quae speciem sensibilem, sensibilibiter per sensus acceptam introire facit depurando et abstrahendo in potentiam intellectivam."¹⁶⁹ This definition of the act of discernment recalls the definition of the agent intellect through its functioning: "Intellectus noster agens lumen est, dum se convertit super phantasmata, abstrahit et depurat et hoc modo illuminat."¹⁷⁰ Are we entitled to consider this act of discernment as a form of true abstraction in the traditional Aristotelian sense and to conclude that on this point Bona-

Aristoteli vero sermo scientiae. Ille enim principaliter aspiciebat ad superiora, hic vero principaliter ad inferiora. Uterque autem sermo, scilicet sapientiae et scientiae, per Spiritum Sanctum datus est Augustino, tanquam praecipuo expositori totius Scripturae, satis excellenter, sicut ex scriptis ejus apparet."

¹⁶⁷ Augustine, *Retractiones*, I, 3, PL 32. 589.

¹⁶⁸ II *Sent.*, 39, 1, 2, c., (II. 903), copied in fn. 158.

¹⁶⁹ *Itin.*, 6, (V. 301).

¹⁷⁰ II *Sent.*, 10, 2, 2, arg. 3, (II. 265). Cf. II *Sent.*, 3, 2, 2, 1, (II. 119). II *Sent.*, 24, 1, 2, 4, c., (II. 569—570). Cf. F. Schwendinger, *op. cit.*, 82—85.

venture is truly Aristotelian?¹⁷¹ Or are we to conclude that in the Bonaventurian theory of knowledge the appeal to Aristotle stresses the fact of the necessity of the senses as a starting point of all our knowledge about material realities without however implying that the mode of acquisition is by an abstraction in the Aristotelico-Thomistic sense?¹⁷² The word abstraction is used in reference to this basic step of our knowledge. And "judicare" or "judicatio" is said to be in the Augustino-Bonaventurian thought what "abstrahere" or "abstractio" is in the Aristotelico-Thomistic thought.¹⁷³ They may both represent an equivalent

¹⁷¹ Cf. J. Hessen, *Augustinische und thomistische Erkenntnislehre*, Paderborn, 1921, 55. B. A. Luyckx, "Erkenntnislehre . . .", *B.G.P.M.A.*, 23 (1923) 13. To the contrary, cf. F. Schwendinger, "Die Erkenntnislehre . . .", *Franz. Stud.*, XV (1928) 84—85.

¹⁷² Cf. Jean Rohmer, *op. cit.*, p. 161: "Sa doctrine de l'intelligence, faculté de jugement, n'avait que faire d'une fonction d'abstraction. Il se sert de ce terme pour désigner le cas spécial du jugement appliqué au donné sensible, le distinguant par là du jugement en général qui peut s'exercer en dehors d'elle, et c'est là — croyons-nous — toute sa raison d'être chez Bonaventure."

¹⁷³ Cf. Et. Gilson, *La Philosophie de saint Bonaventure*, Paris, Vrin, 1943, p. 321: "C'est qu'aussi bien la présence des raisons éternelles n'est pas seulement requise pour expliquer la fixité de la plus humble connaissance, elle est en quelque sorte impliquée dans l'opération même par laquelle nous la formons. Ce point, auquel on prête généralement peu d'attention, est peut-être celui qui nous ouvre la perspective la plus profonde sur la conception bonaventurienne de l'intellect agent. Dès l'époque du Commentaire, en effet, le Docteur Séraphique emploie le terme aristotélicien d'abstractio pour désigner l'opération par laquelle l'intellect élabore en intelligible les données sensibles de la connaissance; mais dès ce moment aussi nous le voyons employer indifféremment au même usage l'expression aristotélicienne abstrahere et l'expression augustinienne judicare (*Itin.*, II, 6, (V. 301). Or, il est clair que si l'abstraction bonaventurienne coïncide avec le jugement augustinien, elle va nous apparaître comme une coopération bien différente de l'acte simple par lequel l'intellect agent d'Aristote informe l'intellect possible de l'espèce sensible qu'il vient de rendre intelligible. L'abstraction de saint Bonaventure contiendra nécessairement, quoique à l'état d'implication, un jugement qui dégagera l'universel du particulier et qui, faisant intervenir le nécessaire et l'immuable en posant l'universel, supposera par le fait même l'intervention des raisons éternelles et de Dieu. C'est d'ailleurs, si l'on y prend garde, ce que confirme expressément l'*Itinerarium*. La connaissance débute par une perception qui implique un premier jugement de la faculté de sentir; elle se prolonge par un jugement du sens commun qui caractérise l'objet comme sain ou nuisible; mais elle s'achève par un troisième jugement qui déclare pourquoi la perception sensible nous plaît ou nous déplaît. Or, porter un tel jugement, c'est simplement transformer du sensible en intelligible et mettre à la place d'une perception l'idée d'un objet. L'impression de beauté, de salubrité ou de plaisir que nous avons ressentie en le percevant s'explique dès le moment même où son idée se forme en nous, car il n'est capable de causer ces impressions qu'en raison de la proportion de ses parties et de la proportion du tout à l'organe qui le perçoit. Qui dit proportion ou égalité se place d'emblée hors des grandeurs, des dimensions, des successions et des mouvements; l'idée du corps est donc bien une idée parce qu'elle résulte d'une abstraction, mais cette abstraction résulte elle-même d'un discernement de l'esprit qui met à part l'élément local,

and parallel stage of thought at the junction of the world of sensibles and of the world of intelligibles. But are they equivalent and what is their relative and proper implications? We may well wonder what is the reality hidden behind the following words of Saint Bonaventure: "Cum species pervenit ad intellectum, novum genus abstractionis exigitur et aliud genus luminis".¹⁷⁴

It would seem that this new type of abstraction, operating under the guidance of a new light becomes a form of judgment, an act of discernment in which the process is one of induction in which the universal is not taken out of the singulars in an abstracting insight which would draw the university virtually contained therein. It is more a question of separation, of gathering through observation and enlightenment the universal which must stand as a counterpart or a guarantee for what is realized in the sensible reality. And in that operation is taken into account not only the sensible reality and the sensible species possessed, but also the true similitudes of things possessed in the soul and which represent within the soul the eternal and immutable norms of all reality. In fact, the proper fulfilment of intellectual knowledge required the existence of a proportion between the object known and the knowing subject, a union of the two by the reception of the object in the subject, a judgment of the subject with regard to the object and an information of the subject by the object.¹⁷⁵ The whole of these prerequisites are to be achieved through intentional assimilation.

But granting that, according to experience reinforced by the authority of Aristotle and Augustine, the acquisition of knowledge and the judgment on its value rests on the acquisition of species and similitudes from the senses and on the efficiency of the natural light of man's natural powers of knowing, it remains an object of doubt whether or not the soul of man of itself is endowed with the sufficient degree of stability, of permanence, of infallibility to be or to possess the rule sufficiently immutable, necessary and indubitable that would be able to justify and guarantee a judgment made with full certainty about what

temporel, et mobile de la perception sensible pour n'en retenir que l'immuable, le non-spatial, l'intemporel et par conséquent le spirituel: 'dijudicatio igitur est actio quae speciem sensibilem, sensibiliter per sensus acceptam, introire facit depurando et abstrahendo in potentiam intellectivam' *Itin.*, II, 9 (V. 301—302). Dès lors, c'est bien la formation même de l'idée générale qui suppose l'action des raisons éternelles. Jamais une pensée finie, appliquant ses seules ressources à du sensible, ne pourrait en tirer de l'intelligible, c'est-à-dire de l'immuable et du nécessaire que ne contiennent ni cette pensée ni son objet."

¹⁷⁴ *II Sent.*, 24, 1, 2, 4, ad 2, (II. 570).

¹⁷⁵ *I Sent.*, 3, 1, 1, 1, (I. 67), copied in fn. 154.

is acquired through sense knowledge or about our reasonings. And if our intellect, because of its mutability, its instability, its lack of purity, of actuality, of completeness, of absoluteness, is unable to perceive adequately by its own powers the truth, the necessity, the intelligibility and irrefutability of the terms, of the propositions, of the reasonings under consideration, it becomes necessary to seek elsewhere than in the soul of man and in the things which are by nature mutable, the rule, the norm or the reason that will stand as a guarantee and a basis to justify and explain our firm judgments with regard to these. True understanding in the order of terms is had in perceiving each through a perfect definition, in the order of proposition in knowing with certainty the truth of what is said, in the order of reasoning in seeing the necessary connection and inference that is had between the conclusion and the premisses that_{to}^{us} are given as its basis.¹⁷⁶

But in the case of a true comprehension of a definition, there is required a resolution or a return to the first and most stable terms that will serve as the ultimate and undestroyable basis for our present definition. Since all created beings are defective and incomplete, it is necessary to have recourse to a being who is totally, completely, absolutely and purely being. And this can be no other than the eternal and absolute being in which are the reasons of all other things. It would thus appear that even on the level of apprehension and definition there is a role played by the eternal ideas to assure the value of the knowledge acquired.¹⁷⁷ In the order of the propositions, it is also necessary to find an immutable truth that will assure the necessity and the impossibility of being otherwise of the truth expressed in the enunciation. Since our minds are essentially mutable, it remains necessary to have recourse to an immutable being, source of all our certainties. Finally, the very perception of the necessary and cogent character of the illation between the premisses and the conclusion especially in contingent matters and with reference to non-existing realities, requires that in an immutable

¹⁷⁶ *Itin.*, III, 3, (V. 304): "Operatio autem virtutis intellectivae est in perceptione intellectus terminorum, propositionum et illationum. — Capit autem intellectus terminorum significata, cum comprehendit, quid est unumquodque per definitionem . . . Intellectus autem propositionum, tunc intellectus dicitur veraciter comprehendere, cum certitudinaliter scit, illas veras esse; et hoc scire est scire, quoniam non potest falli in illa apprehensione . . . Intellectus vero illationis tunc veraciter percipit noster intellectus, quando videt, quod conclusio necessario sequitur ex praemissis."

¹⁷⁷ To the contrary, cf. F. Schwendinger, "Die Erkenntnis . . .", *Franz. Stud.*, XV (1928) 207. B. A. Luyckx, *Erkenntnis* . . ., *B.G.P.M.A.*, 23 (1923) 229 suggests that in this case we have more a judgment than a simple apprehension.

being there exists the reasons of each being and its natural tendency to another. Thus it is only through the knowledge of an indefectible being and through the enlightenment received from such a being that we can expect to obtain certainty in our knowledge. A being realizing the fulness of immutable truth and infallible certainty alone will be able to stand as a guarantee of all humanly acquired and possessed certainty.¹⁷⁸ Thus it appears that certainty in knowledge implies a conjoined cooperation of eternal truth through a form of illumination that will give some knowledge and insight of the immutable and infallible rules and reasons in God: "Ex quo manifeste apparet, quod conjunctus sit intellectus noster ipsi aeternae veritati, dum non nisi per illam docentem nihil verum potest certitudinaliter capere."¹⁷⁹

We are thus faced, in trying to justify the basis of our certitudinal knowledge whether through sense perception or through intellectual cognition, with the difficulty of explaining the ever-present theme of divine illumination as the indispensable condition for the certainty of our knowledge, even if it is acquired through the proper light of sense perception or the proper light of rational understanding.¹⁸⁰ Thus it is

¹⁷⁸ *Itin.*, III, 3, (V. 304): "Non venit intellectus noster ut plene resolvens intellectum alicujus entium creatorum, nisi juvetur ab intellectu entis purissimi, actualissimi, completissimi, et absoluti; quod est ens simpliciter et aeternum, in quo sunt rationes omnium in sua puritate. Quomodo autem sciret intellectus, hoc esse ens defectivum et incompletum, si nullam haberet cognitionem entis absque omni defectu. Et sic de aliis conditionibus prae-labitis . . . Scit enim, quod veritas illa non potest aliter se habere; scit igitur, illam veritatem esse incommutabilem. Sed cum ipsa mens nostra sit commutabilis, illam sic incommutabiliter relucens non potest videre nisi per aliquam lucem omnino incommutabiliter radiantem, quam impossibile est esse creaturam mutabilem. Scit igitur in illa luce, quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum, quae est lux vera et Verbum in principio apud Deum . . . Hujusmodi igitur illationis necessitas non venit ab existentia rei in materia, quia est contingens, nec ab existentia rei in anima, quia tunc esset fictio, si non esset in re; venit igitur ab exemplaritate in arte aeterna, secundum quam res habent aptitudinem et habitudinem ad invicem secundum illius aeternae artis repraesentationem. Omnis igitur, ut dicit Augustinus de Vera Religione, vere ratiocinantis lumen accenditur ab illa veritate et ad ipsam nititur pervenire."

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁰ *Reb. Theol.*, IV, *Christus Unus*, 10, (V. 569): "Lux ergo intellectus creati ibi non sufficit ad certam comprehensionem rei cujuscumque absque luce Verbi aeterni." *Donis*, VIII, 12—20, (V. 496—498). Iste intellectus, qui est janua considerationum scientialium, partim est a dictamine naturae, id est a lumine interiori; partim ex frequentia experientiae; sicut a lumine interiori; partim ex frequentia experientiae; sicut a lumine exteriori; et partim ex illustratione lucis aeternae, sicut a lumine superiori . . . Et quantumcumque homo habeat naturale judicium bonum et cum hoc frequentiam experientiae, non sufficiunt, nisi sit illustrando per divinam influentiam . . . Tangit certitudinem sapientialem, scientialem et intellectualem. Sed unde est ista certitudo? Certe a Deo . . . Nullus certitudinaliter illuminatur nisi per ipsum . . . Ratio autem intelligendi est (Deus); quia certificantur per

that the whole of philosophical sciences, whether the domain of natural philosophy in metaphysics, mathematics or physics, or the domain of rational philosophy, in grammar, logic or rhetoric, or finally moral philosophy for the individual, familial and political life, require as a guarantee and a means to certainty the enlightenment of the rays of the eternal law. Their necessity and their infallibility depend upon the necessity and infallibility of eternal reasons and laws.¹⁸¹ This is not only true of the speculative order of knowledge about reality, it is also true in the practical knowledge with regard to the direction of actions as to the notion of good and as to the laws according to which one is to act.¹⁸² Thus it is through a full resolution or return to the eternal truths or reasons or laws that our knowledge in the order of speculation or of the order of operation will effectively achieve the indispensable certainty.

Speaking of resolution, Saint Bonaventure speaks of two types, the full resolution and a resolution which would not go all the way.^{182a} Now this resolution or return to the first being and to the eternal reasons as the condition for perfect certitudinal knowledge must be explained for it is on it that would seem to rest the very possibility of achieving successfully the quest for certainty and the means of establishing various degrees of value of certainty, perfect and imperfect. The meaning and the possibility of a return to the eternal reasons has to be established.

One thing that is clear is that the functions of the light and the ratio of eternal truths in the acquisition of our certainty and of the light and

ipsum intelligentiae super transmutabilitatem naturae . . . Sic ergo intellectus humanus habet rationem apprehendentis et judicantis, intellectum possibilem et agentem; nec potest iste intellectus sufficienter illuminari sine adminiculo superioris et altioris lucis."

¹⁸¹ *Itin.*, III, 7, (V. 305): "Omnes autem hae scientiae habent regulas certas et infallibiles tanquam lumina et radios descendentes a lege aeterna in mentem nostram."

¹⁸² *Ibid.* - "Judicium autem certum de consiliabilibus est per aliquam legem. Nullas autem certitudinaliter judicat per legem, nisi certius sit, quod illa lex recta est, et quod ipsam judicare debet; sed mens nostra judicat de se ipsa: cum igitur non possit judicare de lege, per quam judicat; lex illa superior est mente nostra, et per hanc judicat, secundum quod sibi impressa est. Nihil autem est superius mente humana, nisi solus ille qui fecit eam: igitur in judicando deliberativa nostra pertingit ad divinas leges, si plena resolutione dissolvat."

^{182a} *I Sent.*, 28, dub. 1, (I. 504): "Et hoc potest esse dupliciter; aut intellectu resolvente plene et perfecte, aut intellectu deficiente et resolvente semiplene. Intellectu resolvente semiplene, potest intelligi aliquid esse, non intellectu primo ente. Intellectu autem resolvente perfecte, non potest intelligi aliquid, primo modo non intellectu." Cf. A. Engemann, "Erleuchtungslehre, Resolutio und Reductio nach Bonaventura". *Wissenschaft und Weisheit*, (1934) 211-242.

reason of created truth is resolved in a cooperation of both factors involving the influence of both. What is clear is that man is endowed with natural powers permitting him to acquire knowledge and that in the actual process of knowing and acquiring certainty there intervenes the indispensable factor of divine illumination.¹⁸³

While in the case of infused knowledge it would appear quite simple and warranted that this cooperation be had, the question arises to determine exactly how this cooperation of the divine light, eternal reasons and uncreated truth with the human light, natural and created truth is possible and how it is actually effected and achieved in our actual process of acquiring certainty.¹⁸⁴ And if we add that "et Deus dicitur docere non inspirando sive infundendo, sed cooperando lumini dato et conservando illud,"¹⁸⁵ we realize that we do not have to do with gratuitously infused grace, but a cooperation on the natural order. Saint Bonaventure furthermore warns us that this cooperation of the divine eternal uncreated reasons, laws and truths, although on the natural order involves more than the general concursus of God as first cause of all being and activity.¹⁸⁶ Thus the only conclusion which is quite clear in the consideration of all these texts is that the solution of the problem of the possibility and of the means of acquiring certitude and of fulfilling a quest for certainty involves the cooperation of the human and of the divine, the one naturally requiring and implying the other.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸³ *Scientia Christi*, IV, ad 7, (V. 25): "Ad illud quod objicitur a Philosopho quod intelligimus cum continuo et tempore, et quod habemus intellectum possibilem et agentem, et de experientia cognitionis humanae, dicendum quod hoc possit ad nostram intelligentiam concurrere lumen et rationem veritatis creatae: sed tamen . . . non excluditur lux et ratio veritatis aeternae."

¹⁸⁴ II *Sent.*, 28, 2, 3, ad 6, (II. 690): "Nullus potest aliquid addiscere nisi Deus doceat. Hoc enim non dicitur quia omnis cognitio sit infusa, sed quia lumen creatum non potest perficere operationem suam absque cooperatione luminis increati, per quod illuminatur omnis homo qui venit in hunc mundum."

¹⁸⁵ II *Sent.*, 7, 2, 1, 1, ad 6, (II. 191).

¹⁸⁶ *Scientia Christi*, IV, fund. 34, (V. 20—21): "Item, secundum omnes sanctos Deus dicitur esse doctor omnis scientiae: aut igitur quia generaliter cooperatur omni intellectui, sicut et aliis creaturis, aut quia donum gratiae infundit, aut quia intellectus in cognoscendo ipsum attingit. Si quia generaliter cooperatur: ergo ita diceretur docere sensum, sicut intellectum: quod absurdum est. Si quia donum gratiae infundit; ergo omnis cognitio erit gratuita vel infusa, nulla ergo acquisita, vel innata; quod absurdissimum est. Restat ergo, quod hoc dicitur, quia intellectus noster ad ipsum attingit tanquam ad lumen mentium et rationem cognoscendi omne verum."

¹⁸⁷ *Scientia Christi*, IV, 3, (V. 24): "Sicut in operibus creaturae non excluditur cooperatio creaturis, sic in ratione cognoscendi creata non excluditur ratio cognoscendi increata, sed potius includitur in eadem." *Reb.*

Thus ever-present in the mind of Saint Bonaventure are the two authorities that are always to be taken into account of whenever any discussion on the problem of the acquisition and certification of knowledge is under consideration: Saint Augustine with his theory of illumination implying a turning to the eternal norms in order to guarantee the certainty and value of our knowledge and Aristotle with his theory of the fundamental role of sense perception implying the contribution of the senses, memory and experience in order to gather into ourselves the universals that serve as principles in our arts and sciences. But in this cooperation between the achievements of natural reason and the influence of the eternal light would it be correct to say that the similitudes of things and the created principles acquired and arrived at by the natural power of human reason actually furnish only the content of the knowledge itself without contributing directly to the certainty and the infallibility of the knowledge acquired.¹⁸⁸ This role would be fulfilled by divine illumination only. The genesis and acquisition of knowledge itself would thus be achieved by human reason alone, while the certainty and the infallibility of the acquired or arrived at knowledge would be based upon the eternal reasons and would require divine illumination to be realized. The role of the one would be as important as the role of the other. If the contribution of the divine ideas is to be taken into consideration for the very begetting of knowledge,¹⁸⁹ it should be considered in the order

Theo., IV, *Christus Unus*, 18, (V. 572): "Unde licet anima, secundum Augustinus, connexa sit legibus aeternis, quia aliquo modo illud lumen attingit secundum supremam aciem intellectus agentis et superiorem portionem rationis, indubitanter tamen verum est, secundum quod dicit Philosophus, cognitionem generari in nobis via sensus, memoriae et experientiae e quibus colligitur universale in nobis, quod est artis et scientiae."

¹⁸⁸ *Scientia Christi*, IV, ad 15 and ad 22, (V. 25—26). Ad 15: "Quia non omnino distincte videmus illas rationes in se, ideo non sicut tota ratio cognoscendi: sed requiritur cum illis lumen creatum principiorum et similitudinem rerum cognitarum, ex quibus propria ratio cognoscendi habetur respectu cujuslibet cogniti". Ad 22: "Dicendum, quod in statu viae non cognoscitur in rationibus illis aeternis sine velamine et aenigmate propter divinae imaginis obscuracionem. Ex hoc tamen non sequitur, quod nihil certitudinaliter cognoscatur et clare, pro eo quod principia certa, quae aliquo modo sunt media cognoscendi, licet non sine illis rationibus, possunt perspicere et sine velamine a nostra mente videri... Si tamen diceretur quod nihil in hac vita scitur plenarie, non esset magnum inconveniens."

¹⁸⁹ *Hex.*, XII, 5, (V. 385): "Item, quia ipse doctor est, docet infallibiliter et certificat sic, quod impossibile est, aliter se habere. Secundum sententiam omnium doctorum Christus est doctor interius, nec scitur aliqua veritas nisi per eum, non loquendo, sicut nos, sed interius illustrando; et ideo necesse est, ut habeat clarissimas species apud se, neque tamen ab alio acceperit. Ipse enim intimus est omni animae et suis speciebus clarissimis refulget super species intellectus nostri tenebrosas; et sic illustrantur species illae obtenebratae, admixtae obscuritati phantasmatum, ut intellectus intelligat.

of the general influence exercised in all created activity.¹⁹⁰ Father Schwendinger¹⁹¹ holds that in the domain of sense perception and of simple apprehension as well as of definition the role of the immediate contact and direct influence of the eternal ideas do not enter into play. Thus it is that the content of ordinary knowledge would be had as such without a special form of illumination. Only in the case of certainty in knowledge and in every case, does the influence of divine illumination come in as a necessary factor. Luyckx^{191a} on the contrary considers that the theory of illumination applies throughout the realm of knowledge for any cognition as such as well as for the very certainty of the knowledge acquired.

The question of the source of our certitudinal knowledge is bluntly presented by Saint Bonaventure, with the basic difficulty, that his solution of the problem offers, contained in the very formulation of the problem: "Utrum quidquid a nobis certitudinaliter cognoscitur cognoscatur in ipsis rationibus aeternis?"¹⁹² It is thus that in the *De Scientia Christi*, Saint Bonaventure approaches the problem of the universal foundation of all our certitudinal knowledge. In entering upon the discussion of this problem, Saint Bonaventure presents both sides of the contradictory positions, giving a long list of authorities and explanatory reasons that would establish the basic foundations that support the affirmative solution or the basic opposing factors that destroy its value.¹⁹³ The basic foundations that establish a background for the actual theory developed by Saint Bonaventure are constituted by the authoritative statements of Saint Augustine and of other thinkers of the past from Aristotle to Isaac of Stella and including Origen, Ambrose, Gregory the Great, the Glossa Ordinaria and Anselm of Canterbury. Necessary and cogent reasons taken from Augustine and others establish the rational foundation for the theory. After quoting a dozen or so texts of Saint

Si enim scire est cognoscere, rem aliter impossibile se habere; necessarium est ut ille solus scire faciat, qui veritatem novit et habet in se veritatem."

¹⁹⁰ I *Sent.*, 45, 2, 2, c., (I. 807). II *Sent.*, 24, 1, 2, 4, c., (II. 568): "Cum animae nostrae data sit potentia ad intelligendum, sicut aliis creaturis data est potentia ad alios actus, sic Deus, quamvis sit principalis operans in operatione cujuslibet creaturae, dedit tamen cuilibet vim activam, per quam exiret in operationem propriam. Sic credendum est indubitanter, quod animae humanae non tantummodo dederit intellectum possibilem, sed etiam agentem, ita quod uterque est aliquid ipsius animae." II *Sent.*, 28, 2, 3, c., (II. 690).

¹⁹¹ F. Schwendinger, "Die Erkenntnis. . .", *Franz. Stud.*, XVI (1929) 61.

^{191a} B. A. Luyckx, "Erkenntnis. . .", *B.G.P.M.A.*, 23 (1923).

¹⁹² *Scientia Christi*, IV, (V. 17).

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*, IV, (V. 17—22). Cf. B. Rosenmöller, *Religiöse Erkenntnis nach Bonaventura*, *B.G.P.M.A.*, XXV (1925) 30—32.

Augustine, Saint Bonaventure concludes: "Ex his auctoritatibus Augustini manifeste patet, quod omnia sciuntur in rationibus aeternis".¹⁹⁴ Furthermore, taking as source-reference five basic texts of Saint Augustine and ^{re-}assuring us that the doctrine is found dispersed in Saint Augustine's texts, Saint Bonaventure constructs a series of necessary reasonings that bring to the same conclusion: to have adequate understanding and absolute certainty in knowledge, it is necessary that the eternal truth illumines the knower, that the knower considers his knowledge in relation to the eternal norms and that he be helped by the eternal reasons themselves.¹⁹⁵ If we add to this array of texts and arguments brought forth in favor of the necessity of divine illumination, the series of texts brought forth to prove that "lux ergo intellectus creati sibi non sufficit ad certam comprehensionem re cujuscunque absque luce Verbi aeterni",¹⁹⁶ we have full assurance that Saint Bonaventure was basing his theory of divine illumination on the teachings of Saint Augustine of whom he here speaks of as "de tanto Patre et Doctore maxime authentico inter omnes expositores sacrae Scripturae."¹⁹⁷ Authoritative texts and convincing arguments based on the impossibility of such a divine illumination or insight of the divine eternal reasons, on the untruth of its indispensability and the impropriety of its taking place fail to prevent Saint Bonaventure from concluding that "omne, quod cognoscitur certitudinaliter, cognoscitur in luce aeternarum rationum."¹⁹⁸

Thus it is that for Saint Bonaventure divine illumination is required to serve the justifying foundation of all our certitudinal knowledge. But this is had in a very special way, which Saint Bonaventure determines quite clearly as to the basic factors.¹⁹⁹ This text contains the essence of the meaning of the theory of illumination: "Ad certitudinalem cognitionem necessario requiritur ratio aeterna ut regulans et ratio motiva, non quidem ut sola et in sua omnimoda claritate, sed cum ratione creata, et ut ex parte a nobis contuita secundum statum viae."²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁴ *Scientia Christi*, IV, fund. 8, (V. 18).

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, IV, fund. 24 — 26 — 27, (V. 19—20): "Ergo nihil potest intelligi, quin ipse sua aeterna veritate immediate illustret intelligentem . . . Ergo nihil certitudinaliter cognoscitur, nisi applicetur ad regulam aeternam . . . Ergo impossibile est, quod aliquid ab ipsa cognoscatur certitudinaliter, nisi ab illis aeternis rationibus adjuvetur."

¹⁹⁶ *Reb. Theo.*, IV, *Christus Unus*, 10, (V. 569—570).

¹⁹⁷ *Scientia Christi*, IV, c., (V. 23).

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, (V. 22).

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, (V. 23): "Ad certitudinalem cognitionem necessario requiritur ratio aeterna ut regulans et ratio motiva, non quidem ut sola et in sua omnimoda claritate, sed cum ratione creata, et ut ex parte a nobis contuita secundum statum viae."

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

Elsewhere we find the same theory expounded in the following words: "Quod autem dicatur ratio intelligendi, sane intelligendum est, non quia sit intelligendi ratio sola, nec nuda, nec tota."²⁰¹

Thus by refusing to the eternal reasons and uncreated truths the sole and full role in the acquisition of our knowledge, Saint Bonaventure excludes the confusion that would ensue as to the proper distinction of various types of knowledges that have characteristic modes and contribute in their own proper way to the acquisition of some specific aspect of reality through some specific type of knowledge for man in some specific state.²⁰² In fact, man, as a creature made to the image of God, is able to attain in one way or another to the eternal norms and reasons as to the foundation of all his truths and certainties. But he does so in a way which is proper to that state in which he actually is.²⁰³ Thus it is that in the state of wayfarer, where man has lost his deiformity, the proper way of attaining to eternal reason is in part and obscurely as in a mirror so that abstracted species or similitudes gathered from things are required as proper and distinct factors for knowing in the acquisition of knowledge and even in attaining the divine laws and norms, truths and reasons that serve as the ultimate foundations that justify and establish our certainties.²⁰⁴ Thus it appears that to have a whole picture of the principles that serve as a basic foundation for all our certitudinal knowledge we must include not only the natural light of the intellect but also the divine illumination of the eternal reasons as well as the elements received from the senses.²⁰⁵

²⁰¹ *Reb. Theol.*, IV, *Christus Unus*, 18, (V. 572).

²⁰² *Scientia Christi*, IV, c., (V. 23): "Uno modo, ut intelligatur, quod ad certitudinalem cognitionem concurrunt lucis aeternae evidentia, tanquam ratio cognoscendi tota et sola. — Et haec intelligentia est minus recta, pro eo quod secundum hoc nulla esset rerum cognitio nisi Verbo; et tunc non differret cognitio viae a cognitione patriae, nec cognitio in Verbo a cognitione in proprio genere, nec cognitio naturae a cognitione gratiae, nec cognitio rationis a cognitione revelationis; quae omnia cum sint falsa, nullo modo est ista via tenenda."

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, IV, c., (V. 24): "Concedendum est igitur, sicut rationes ostendunt et Augustini auctoritates expresse asserunt, quod in omnicertitudinali cognitione rationes illae cognoscendi a cognoscente attinguntur, licet aliter a viatore et aliter a comprehensore, aliter a sciente et aliter a sapiente, aliter a prophetante et aliter a communiter intelligente."

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, "Ideo cum his attingit rerum similitudinem abstractas a phantasmate tanquam proprias et distinctas cognoscendi rationes, sine quibus non sufficit sibi ad cognoscendum lumen rationis aeternae, quamdiu est in statu viae."

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, ad. 7 — 8 — 9. (V. 25): "Ad illud quod obijcitur de Philosopho, quod intelligimus cum continuo et tempore, et quod habemus intellectum possibilem et agentem, et de experientia cognitionis humanae; dicendum, quod hoc ponit, ad nostram intelligentiam concurrere lumen et

Thus, Saint Bonaventure, in trying to explain and justify man's capacity to achieve certainty indicates that man through the inferior portion of his soul will attain to the elements below him which implies the interplay of abstractionistic elements, the natural light of man and the essence of created truths and through the superior portion of his soul will attain to the elements above him which are the eternal reasons and the divine light of truth and which as regulating and moving reason ascertain the absolute value of our certainty.

The problem of determining the exact meaning of the quest for certainty is to determine the relative and proper contributions of the divine and the human elements. And in speaking of the contribution of the divine eternal reasons or laws we must clearly determine what it means to say that the eternal reasons serve as rules and moving principles for our certitudinal knowledge: "ratio aeterna ut regulans et ratio motiva"²⁰⁶ and that to fulfil the conditions for the ascertaining of the certainty of our certitudinal knowledge it is necessary not only to have regulation through these eternal reasons as had in the mind, but through the eternal reasons as they are above the mind and as attained by the mind: "Quod autem mens nostra in certitudinali cognitione aliquo modo attingat illas regulas et incommutabiles rationes."²⁰⁷ And this "aliquo modo attingere" undoubtedly is to be explained through the "non ut sola et in sua omnimoda claritate, sed cum ratione creata, et ut ex parte a nobis contuita secundum statum viae."²⁰⁸ An exact understanding of the implication of these statements will reveal the actual theory of divine illumination through the enlightenment by the eternal reasons as a condition of acquiring absolute certainty in the thought of Saint Bonaventure.

But before determining how this divine illumination takes place, let us see briefly why it is absolutely necessary to have recourse to divine illumination as the indispensable condition for our certitudinal knowledge.

VI

The absolute necessity of such a divine illumination from the eternal rules and the uncreated reasons in God stems from the nobility of certitudinal knowledge which requires on the part of the object known

rationem veritatis creatae; sed tamen . . . , non excluditur lux et ratio veritatis aeternae quae sunt infra, superiori nihilominus portione attingente quae sunt supra."

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, (V. 23).

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, (V. 23).

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

absolute immutability and on the part of the knower perfect infallibility and from the dignity of man as a rational spirit to the image of God which implies that man has a superior reason through which he is to the image of God, which adheres to the eternal rules through which he judges and defines all things that he defines with certainty.²⁰⁹ The very notion of science or of scientific knowledge also implies these same requirements.²¹⁰ Thus by very definition the knowledge which is had with certitude requires that it bears on an object which is true and which will remain true: thus necessary truths are the objects assented to with certitude. But the whole of the created world by its very nature is subject to change and to becoming other than it is. There must be principles or foundations that will assure immutability to the truths assented to. Now beings have existence in the nature of things in the universe outside the human mind and divine intelligence, in the mind of man and in the eternal being of God. But the inherent mutability of existence in external reality and of the human mind in which things also exist makes the consideration of things in themselves or in the human mind utterly insufficient to guarantee the necessity and immutability of truth required on the part of the knowable. Thus unless the objects are attained in a certain way in the mind of God as in eternal reasons or in eternal norms knowledge will be doomed to uncertainty because of the lack of the character of necessity and immutability on the part of the knowable object.²¹¹

The necessity of having recourse to the eternal reason and truth as the only sufficiently immutable and stable basis that will guarantee the certainty of our knowledge, does not exclude other factors that come

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, (V. 23—24): "Quod autem mens nostra in certitudinali cognitione aliquo modo attingat illas regulas et incommutabiles rationes, requirit necessario nobilitas cognitionis et dignitas cognoscentis. Nobilitas, inquam, cognitionis, quia cognitio certitudinalis esse non potest, nisi sit ex parte scibilis immutabilitas, et infallibilitas ex parte scientis... Ipsum etiam requirit dignitas ex parte scientis... Quoniam igitur certitudinalis competit spiritui rationali, in quantum est imago Dei, ideo in hac cognitione aeternas rationes attingit." Cf. F. Schwendinger, "Die Erkenntnis in..." *Franz. Stud.*, XV (1928) 215—220.

²¹⁰ *Reb. Theol.*, IV, *Christus Unus*, 6, (V. 568—569): "Ad cognitionem enim scientialem necessario requiritur veritas immutabilis ex parte scibilis, et certitudo infallibilis ex parte scientis. Omne enim, quod scitur, necessarium est in se et certum est ipsi scienti. Tunc enim scimus, 'cum causam arbitramur cognoscere, propter quem res est, et scimus, quoniam impossibile est aliter se habere.'"

²¹¹ *Scientia Christi*, IV, c., (V. 23—24): "Unde cum res habeant esse in mente et in proprio genere et in aeterna arte, non sufficit ipsi animae ad certitudinalem scientiam veritas rerum, secundum quod esse habent in se, vel secundum quod esse habent in proprio genere, quia utrobique sunt mutabiles, nisi aliquo modo attingat esse, in quantum sunt in arte aeterna."

in to serve as means of ascertaining our knowledge. In fact, since man in the present state of wayfarer does not have a full and overt view of the eternal reasons in their over-powering and fully enlightening certainty, recourse must be had to the created light of the first principles and the similitudes of things known which serve as the proper foundation of our knowledge of things.²¹² Thus these various elements enter into cooperation to make possible the fulfilment of our certitudinal knowledge each according to its own efficiency.²¹³ Thus it is that man is naturally endowed with the light for sense perception and the light for rational understanding of reality. Yet although reason does not fail in its judgment while it keeps in reference to the eternal rules, it will, however, fail for as much as it considers sensible realities or judges through its natural and innate light.²¹⁴ Thus the very mutable and contingent nature of man makes of these lights insufficient and fallible means to acquire a completely ascertained knowledge. Thus he must have recourse to the infallible light of the eternal mind. Thus for certitudinal knowledge recourse to the divine eternal reason is required in order that through the absolutely infallible divine light be given absolute infallibility to the knower and through the absolutely immutable divine truth, be granted absolute immutability to the object known.²¹⁵ Once one has admitted that the inherent immutability of things in themselves and in the mind whose nature is also mutable make it indispensable to suppose as a metaphysical hypothesis at least that it is the truth of things as realized in the divine mind that serves as the necessary basis for the immutability of the truths assented to and that it is through an enlightenment from the eternal truth and eternal light which guarantees our certainty, the whole difficulty con-

²¹² *Ibid.*, ad. 15, (V. 25): "Dicendum, quod quia non omnino distincte videmus illas rationes in se, ideo non sunt tota ratio cognoscendi; sed requiritur cum illis lumen creatum principiorum et similitudine rerum cognitarum, ex quibus propria ratio cognoscendi habetur respectu cujuslibet cogniti."

²¹³ *Ibid.*, ad 23—26, (V. 26): "Anima autem secundum suum supremum habet respectu ad superiora, sicut secundum suum inferius ad haec inferiora, cum sit medium inter res creatas et Deum; et ideo veritas in anima habet respectum ad illam duplicem veritatem, sicut medium ad duo extrema, ita quod ab inferiori recipit certitudinem secundum quid, a superiori vero recipit certitudinem simpliciter."

²¹⁴ *II Sent.*, 24, 2, 1, c., (II. 575), copied in fn. 45.

²¹⁵ *Scientia Christi*, IV, c., (V. 23). "Veritas autem creata non est immutabilis simpliciter, sed ex suppositione: similiter nec lux creaturae est omnino infallibilis in propria virtute, cum utraque sit creata et prodierit de non esse in esse. Si ergo ad plenam cognitionem fit recursus ad veritatem omnino immutabilem et stabilem et ad lucem omnino infallibilem; necesse est, quod in hujusmodi cognitione recurratur ad artem supremam ut ad lucem et veritatem; lucem, inquam, dantem infallibilitatem scienti, et veritatem dantem immutabilitatem scibili."

sists in trying to explain the "aliquo modo" according to which these eternal truths serving as guarantees for created truths are attained. Saint Bonaventure overtly excludes the interpretation that God would cooperate in our certitudinal knowledge not in as much as the created knower would attain to the eternal reason, but that he would attain only to the influence or efficiency as a cooperation to human operation whether in the general influence exercised toward all creatures or through the special influence exercised through the means of grace. There is more to it than that, for man is more than other creatures since he is to the image of God and we are seeking an adequate explanation on the natural level of rational certainty whether innate or acquired.²¹⁶ Thus the enlightenment given by God in his cooperation to our certitudinal knowledge appears to be more than the sheer creation of our spiritual nature as endowed with the natural light of the human intellect "lumen naturale iudicatorium" through which the first principles are perceived in their truth or the light of the interior senses which make possible the reception of species and similitudes.²¹⁷ There is more to it than that.

Since man is to the image of God it follows that the special type of cooperation involved on the part of God will imply a moving and a regulating of man's reason in the elaboration of certitudinal knowledge, which implies the natural influence of the inferior and the superior reason. This is achieved in as much as man attains to the eternal reasons or norms. Divine illumination as a requirement for certitudinal knowledge resolves itself for the creature to a mode of attaining to the eternal reasons or norms which serve as motivating and regulating norms for our necessary and infallible knowledge with regard to objects known to be necessarily as they are.²¹⁸ Since this type of divine cooperation is founded on the fact that man is to the image of God, the greater the realization of God in the creature, the greater will be the enlightenment and the insight into the eternal ideas in God. Man as a nature is to the image of God. This nature is never lost. Therefore there is always a certain way in which the creature attains to the eternal reasons in God. And according to the plenitude of deformity or conformity of the realization of the image in man to God, there will be a greater intensity and plenitude in the way of attaining the eternal reasons in God. Thus before

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, (V. 23).

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, V., c., (V. 29): "In omni certitudinali cognitione rationes illae cognoscendi a cognoscente attinguntur, licet aliter a viatore et aliter a comprehendente, aliter a sciente et aliter a sapiente, aliter a prophetante et aliter a communiter intelligente."

the fall, man, in the state of innocence, could attain to the eternal ideas in part but not enigmatically; after the fall, man in the state of fallen nature, attains to the eternal ideas in part and enigmatically through a mirror as it were, while in the life of glory, man, in the state of glorified nature, will have full deiformity and consequently full insight into the eternal reasons. The greater deiformity achieved in the state of fallen and redeemed nature also serves as a basis for a greater or lesser degree of the way of attaining to the eternal norms. The whole quest for certainty as an effort to achieve Christian wisdom is based on this principle of the greater enlightenment which corresponds to a greater degree of deiformity. Thus a greater amount of certainty will be acquired when the soul is more wholly what it should be to the image of God. In the state of fallen and redeemed nature, we find a cooperation between what is attained through the inferior reason, the similitudes abstracted from the phantasm which serve as proper and distinct reasons for the acquisition of knowledge of things and what is effected through the superior reason, the eternal reason, which are the norms and rules according to which all that is judged and defined with certainty is thus judged or defined. The way of attaining to the eternal reasons is said to be in part and by a contuition. The eternal reason, which regulates and serves as a motivating reason for our certitudinal knowledge is said to exercise that role not alone and totally but with the cooperation of the created reason, since in the state of wayfarer, man requires abstracted similitudes as a condition for knowing, and in as much as it is known to us in part by a contuition which is proper to our state of wayfarer.

A difficulty arises in this conception of divine illumination based on the fact that man as the image of God attains to the eternal ideas in knowing himself as the image of God, when we see Saint Bonaventure stating that although it belongs to reason to achieve knowledge of the soul in its nature, it takes faith to know the soul as the image of God.²¹⁹ Would not this make of the theory of illumination a theological solution to the problem rather than a philosophical one. It would appear that that is so, if we are speaking of a perfect knowledge of the adequate image that the soul is of God, which leads to our seeing the Trinity of God through it.²²⁰ The knowledge of the soul as the image of God to assure our certainty would not necessarily be that perfect.

²¹⁹ I *Sent.*, 3, 1, 4, ad 4, (I. 76). Cf. I. Jeiler, "Der Ursprung . . .", *Der Katholik*, 57 (1877) 246.

²²⁰ I *Sent.*, 3, 2, 2, 3, c., (I. 93). Cf. F. Schwendinger, "Die Erkenntnis . . .", *Franz. Stud.*, XV (1928) 216, fn. 130.

VII

The difficulty remains of how we can actually attain to these eternal reasons or norms which serve as the indispensable rule and reason for all our knowledge fulfilled in certainty.²²¹ In speaking of attaining, "attingere", to the eternal reason, Saint Bonaventure uses many equivalent or parallel expressions:²²² "continuare",²²³ "inhaerere",²²⁴ "applicare",²²⁵ "praesenter habere",²²⁶ "videre",²²⁷ and "contueri".²²⁸ Such expressions, used to determine as much as possible the way in which there is the indispensable relationship between the soul of man and eternal reasons in God is actually established in order to fulfil the conditions for certainty, might be misleading and prejudice Saint Bonaventure's solution rather than clarify it. The cooperation of God in the acts of the human intellect have a special character. For beside the general cooperation given by God as first efficient cause of all beings and operations, there is here in the cooperation in acts finding their fulfilment in certainty a special type of cooperation which does not as such imply the efficient causality of God but rather the cooperation of God as first exemplary cause.²²⁹ In treating with the problem of diverse cooperation to our certitudinal knowledge by divine illumination through the eternal

²²¹ *Scientia Christi*, VII, c., (V. 48): "Haec autem similitudines sive rationes aeternae sunt, a quibus manat omnis certitudo cognitionis creatae."

²²² Cf. J.-M. Bissen, *L'exemplarisme divin selon saint Bonaventure*, Paris, Vrin, 1929, p. 215.

²²³ *Scientia Christi*, V, c., (V. 29): "Quia tamen ipsa influentia non habilitat nec elevat, nisi continuetur cum luce aeterna tanquam cum principio movente et ratione dirigente . . ."

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, IV, c., (V. 24): "Haec autem portio superior (animae) est illa, in qua est imago Dei, quae et aeternis regulis inhaerescit et per eas quidquid definit certitudinaliter iudicat et definit."

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, IV, fund. 26, (V. 20): "Nihil recte et certitudinaliter cognoscitur, nisi applicetur ad regulam, quae nullo modo potest obligari . . ."

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, V, c., (V. 29): "Ad certitudinem cognitionis non sufficit lucis aeternae influentis sine sui praesentia, pro eo quod nihil creatum potest animam perfecta certitudine stabilire, quousque pertingat ad veritatem immutabilem."

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, IV, ad 5—6, (V. 25): "Neuter (Gregorius et Dionysius) neget, quin illud lumen verum . . . a nostris mentibus attingatur, sed quod in hac vita nondum plene videtur."

²²⁸ *Ibid.*, IV, c., (V. 23): "Ut ex parte a nobis contuita secundum statum viae."

²²⁹ Cf. J.-M. Bissen, *L'exemplarisme divin selon saint Bonaventure*, Paris, Vrin, 1929, p. 241, fn. 1. Bissen refers to I. Jeiler, *op. cit.*, p. 252. *De Scientia Christi*, IV, fund. 3, (V. 17): "Si tu dicas, quod ex hoc non sequitur, quod in veritate vel in rationibus, sed quod a rationibus videamus; contra: Augustinus duodecimo Confessionum: 'Si ambo videmus, verum esse quod dicis, et ambo videmus, verum esse quod dico; ubi, quaeso, id videmus? Nec ego in te, nec tu in me, sed ambo in ipsa quae supra mentes nostras est incommutabili veritate!'"

reasons, Saint Bonaventure excludes the theory that the meaning of divine illumination implies simply the general cooperation realized for every creature or the special gratuitous cooperation through the infusion of the gift of faith. The only solution possible is that we attain to God as the light of our minds and the "ratio" of our knowing the truth.²³⁰ Saint Bonaventure emphasizes that they are not attained simply as the effect or action of the divine influence on the soul of man, but that they are attained as superior rules and judging norms not as had by the mind but in the eternal reason.²³¹ Thus, if man does not plant an obscuring impediment between his soul and the rays of the eternal truth he is bound to attain and see these eternal truths which stand as the indispensable foundation for his certitudinal knowledge.²³² Saint Bonaventure tells that God is not the only one who knows through these reasons and similitudes of things which exist in God, but also those who look or behold them in him.²³³ And conceding that man can so concentrate as to apply himself fully and exclusively to the perceiving of the eternal reasons, yet we must realize that he still in such a case does not achieve an insight implying full evidence and clarity.²³⁴

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, IV, fund. 34, (V. 20—21): "Item, secundum omnes Sanctos Deus dicitur esse doctor omnis scientiae; aut igitur quia generaliter cooperatur omni intellectui, sicut et aliis creaturis, aut quia donum gratiae infundit, aut quia intellectus in cognoscendo ipsum attingit. Si quia generaliter cooperatur; ergo ita diceretur docere sensum, sicut intellectum; quod absurdum est. Si quia donum gratiae infundit; ergo omnis cognitio erit gratuita vel infusa, nulla ergo acquisita, vel innata; quod absurdissimum est. Restat ergo, quod hoc dicitur, quia intellectus noster ad ipsum attingit tanquam ad lumen mentium et rationem cognoscendi omne verum."

²³¹ *Ibid.*, IV, c., (V. 23): "Alio modo, ut intelligatur, quod ad cognitionem certitudinalem necessario concurret ratio aeterna quantum ad suam influentiam, ita quod cognoscens in cognoscendo non ipsam rationem aeternam attingit, sed influentiam ejus solum. — Et hic quidem modus dicendi est insufficiens secundum verba beati Augustini, qui verbis expressis et rationibus ostendit, quod mens in certitudinali cognitione per immutabilem et aeternam regulas habeat regulari, non tanquam per habitum suae mentis, sed tanquam per ea quae sunt supra se in veritate aeterna. Et ideo dicere, quod mens nostra in cognoscendo non extendat se ultra influentiam lucis increatae, est dicere, Augustinum deceptum fuisse, cum auctoritates ipsius exponendo non sit facile ad istum sensum trahere."

²³² *Itin.*, III, 3, (V. 304): "Ex quo manifeste apparet, quod conjunctus sit intellectus noster ipsi aeternae veritati, dum non nisi per illam docentem nihil verum potest certitudinaliter capere. Videre igitur per te potes veritatem, quae te docet, si te concupiscentiae et phantasmata non impendant et se tanquam nubes inter te et veritatis radium non interponant."

²³³ *I Sent.*, 35, 1, 1, c., (V. 601): "Deus . . . habet in se rationes et similitudines rerum, quas cognoscit in quibus non tantum ipse cognoscit, sed etiam aspicientes in eum."

²³⁴ *II Sent.*, 23, 2, 3, ad 6, (II. 215): "Concedo tamen nihilominus, quod oculi aspectus in Deum figi potest, ita quod ad nihil aliud aspiat; attamen non perspiciet vel videbit ipsius lucis claritatem."

A disputed point in the interpretation of the theory of illumination of Saint Bonaventure as implying an immediate contact with God, an attaining to the eternal reasons and norms to guarantee our certitudinal knowledge consists in establishing whether the eternal ideas are grasped or attained as a known object "quod" or simply as a means which certifies our certainty, as a "medium quo".²³⁵ Are we to conclude with Palhoriès²³⁶ and Portalié²³⁷ that the whole doctrine remains rather indefinite and obscure as to its true meaning as is inevitable in the Augustinian traditional presentation of it? The analysis and development in an Aristotelian terminology and framework of a theory of knowledge based on the Augustinian conception of the higher intellect enlightened through divine illumination inevitably makes for difficulties of interpretation. It would appear at first glance that the texts do suggest a seeing of the eternal reasons in themselves to assure certainty since the accusative is used: "videre rationes aeternas". Yet Jeiler²³⁸ suggested that we should say that certainty is achieved by a knowledge through the eternal reasons ("per rationes aeternas") rather than in the eternal reasons ("in rationibus aeternis") to avoid suggesting the erroneous notion that the eternal reasons are attained as an object "quod" when they serve to certify our certainty. For Luyckx²³⁹ the eternal reasons are known as object "quod" only through an act of reflection. In their role for the certification of certainty they remain a "medium quo" and are not grasped as objects. Schwendinger²⁴⁰ feels there is no reason to doubt the exact meaning of the theory of divine illumination. The exact meaning is to be taken in the sense of the object "quod" and not of "medium quo". The basic thesis of the fourth question of the *De Scientia Christi*^{240a} definitely reads as if the eternal ideas are perceived as objects even if they are attained in part and obscurely only. While Luyckx²⁴¹ holds that the pure act of God as the perfect being is said by Saint Bonaventure to be the first and best known certainty in the sense of "medium quo" and not in the sense of "object quod", Schwendinger²⁴² holds that this perfect being is first grasped by the intellect as object "quod" and

²³⁵ Cf. F. Schwendinger, "Die Erkenntnis . . .", *Franz. Stud.*, XVI (1929) 29—48.

²³⁶ "La théorie de l'intelligence chez St. Bonaventure", *R.S.P.T.*, 1912, 479, 481, 488.

²³⁷ "Augustinisme", *D.T.C.*, I (1903) 2514.

²³⁸ "Der Ursprung . . .", *Der Katholik*, 57 (1877) 260.

²³⁹ *Die Erkenntnislehre . . .*, *B.G.P.M.A.*, 23 (1923) 224, 275.

²⁴⁰ "Die Erkenntnis . . .", *Franz. Stud.*, XVI (1929) 33.

^{240a} *Scientia Christi*, IV, c., (V. 24).

²⁴¹ *Op. cit.*, 232, 247 ff.

²⁴² *Op. Cit.*, 34—35.

not as "medium quo". Rosenmöller²⁴³ considers that it is at once as medium quo and as object quod that the perfect esse is the first known for the intellect. While Luyckx²⁴⁴ in stressing the subjective side considers the knowledge of and contact with the eternal ideas as a case of medium quo, Schwendinger²⁴⁵ in stressing the objective side, realized that the eternal reasons must be grasped as object "quod" if the certainty of our knowledge is truly to be certified. For Luyckx²⁴⁶ we have here an immediate irradiation from God himself by way of formal causality and of medium quo and not by way of efficient causality and object quod known. For Gilson²⁴⁷ God communicates the necessary immutability and infallibility through the immediate influence of the eternal reasons influencing the mind by their presence in the mind not, however, as known objects but as "means of knowing".

As is to be expected there is not in the grasping of the eternal ideas a question of a direct and immediate insight into the eternal reasons as realized in God. Saint Bonaventure is clear on this. Only in the beatific vision and in special cases of extraordinary illumination can we expect to have this.²⁴⁸ But this impossibility of an immediate and overt view of the eternal reasons, does not imply that man is reduced to probability and uncertainty. In fact, in spite of the round about way of attaining to the eternal reasons, man still can through other means ascertain his knowledge, even if he can without inconvenience acknowledge to the fact that man does not fully and clearly comprehend the truths offered.²⁴⁸ Is divine illumination accomplished in as much as the eternal reasons

²⁴³ *Religiöse Erkenntnis nach Bonaventura*, B.G.P.M.A., XXV (1925) 11 ff.

²⁴⁴ *Op. cit.*, 213 and 216.

²⁴⁵ *Op. cit.*, 36.

²⁴⁶ *Op. cit.*, 246—249.

²⁴⁷ *La Philosophie de saint Bonaventure*, Paris, Vrin, 1924. p. 376—387.

²⁴⁸ *I Sent.*, 23, 2, 3, c., (I. 543—545). *Scientia Christi*, IV, ad 15, (V. 25): "Quia non omnino distincte videmus illas rationes in se, ideo non sicut tota ratio cognoscendi: sed requiritur cum illis lumen creatum principiorum et similitudinem rerum cognitarum, ex quibus propria ratio cognoscendi habetur respectu cujuslibet cogniti." *Reb. Theol.*, IV, *Christus Unus*, 18, (V. 572). "Rursus, si esset ratio nuda et aperta, non differet cognitio viae a cognitione patriae, quod quidem falsum est, cum illa sit facie ad faciem, haec autem per speculum et in aenigmate; quia nostrum intelligere secundum statum viae non est viae phantasmate."

^{248a} *Scientia Christi*, IV, ad 2, (V. 25): "Dicendum, quod in statu viae non cognoscitur in rationibus illis aeternis sine velamine et aenigmate propter divinae imaginis obscuracionem. Ex hoc tamen non sequitur, quod nihil certitudinaliter cognoscatur et clare, pro eo quod principia certa, quae aliquo modo sunt media cognoscendi, licet non sine illis rationibus, possunt perspicere et sine velamine a nostra mente videri... Si tamen diceretur quod nihil in hac vita scitur plenarie, non esset magnum inconveniens."

and similitudes shine upon the mind in such a way that the mind possesses the first principles which as immutable, indubitable and unjudgeable norms or rules exist in the soul as a result of the participation within the soul of the immutable, indubitable and unjudgeable divine and eternal rules or norms and which serve as necessary and unchangeable norms or rules to serve as a criterion of all human judgments, these rules or norms have their value foundation in the eternal light and lead to it, but do not cause it to be seen itself.²⁴⁹

Thus we attain to the eternal ideas not in themselves but in as much as they are reflected in the first principles. It is through these that the eternal reasons are attained in a way which guarantees the full certainty of our knowledge. The absolute certainty and infallibility which derives in our knowledge from our attaining the eternal reasons in their fullness of certainty in as much as they are reflected in the first principles shows that it is not through created truth, which of its nature is defectible, but through the eternal truth. Thus it is that the eternal reasons move us to a knowledge of certainty with the cooperation of the truth of the principles.²⁵⁰

At this point, it appears that we do not perceive the eternal reasons as realized in God through an overt and evident insight. In this sense the way of attaining God cannot be said to be by an immediate and overt view of the eternal reasons in God. We can in no way speak of an imme-

²⁴⁹ *Hex.*, II, 9—10, (V. 337—338): "Haec igitur apparet immutabile in regulis divinarum legum, quae nos ligant. Regulae istae mentibus rationalibus insipientes sunt omnes illi modi, per quos mens cognoscit et iudicat id quod aliter esse non potest, utpote quod summum principiorum summe venerandum; quod summo vero summe desiderandum et diligendum. — Et haec sunt in prima tabula; et in his apparet sapientia, quod ita certa sunt, quod aliter esse non possunt. — Hae regulae sunt infallibiles, indubitabiles, iudicabiles, quia per illas est iudicium, et non est de illis. Et ideo clara est haec sapientia. — Sunt etiam incommutabiles, incoarctabiles, interminabiles; et ideo nunquam maerescit. Sic enim certae sunt, ut nullo modo sit eis contradicere 'nisi ad exterius rationem', secundum Philosophum, in libro primo Posteriorum. Hae enim radicanter in luce aeterna et ducunt in eam, sed non propter hoc ipsa videtur. Nec est dicendum quod fundatur in aliqua luce creata, utpote in aliqua Intelligentia, quae illuminet mentes; quia cum illae regulae sint incoarctabiles, quia mentibus omnium se offerunt, tunc sequeretur quod lux creata esset incoarctabilis et esset actus purus, quod absit."

²⁵⁰ *Scientia Christi*, IV, ad 16, (V. 25): "Ratio aeterna non sola movet ad cognoscendum, sed cum veritate principiorum, non specialiter de se, sed generaliter in statu viae: et ideo non sequitur, quod ipsa sit nobis nota secundum se, sed prout relucet in suis principiis et in sua generalitate, et sic quodam modo est nobis certissima, quia intellectus noster nullo modo potest cogitare, ipsam non esse; quod quidem non potest dici de aliqua veritate creata."

mediate vision of God as the means of ascertaining irrevocably the certitudinal value of our knowledge.²⁵¹

Yet, if there is not an immediate insight or perception, we must still exclude the conception held by John de la Rochelle²⁵² and Robert Grosseteste²⁵³ of a mediate illumination through the angels.²⁵⁴ The role the angels can play is one of disposing and of preparing the human soul to the efficacious influence of God. They themselves do not exercise the efficient influence of illuminating as secondary causes.²⁵⁵ And all this is based on the idea that man, who is to the image of God, is able to attain to the eternal reasons.²⁵⁶ Thus the angels can be nothing but ministering and disposing agents. God remains the immediate agent of illumination.²⁵⁷

Now to explain the way in which the eternal reasons and the divine

²⁵¹ II *Sent.*, 23, 2, 3, c., (II. 543). *Scientia Christi*, IV, ad 23—26, (V. 26—27).

²⁵² Cf. Otto Keicher, "Zur Lehre der ältesten Franziskanertheologen von 'intellectus agens'", *Festgabe für Fr. von Hertling*, Freiburg, 1913, p. 178. G. M. Manser, "Johann von Rupella", *Jahr. Phil. Spek. Theol.*, (1912) 23—24.

²⁵³ Et. Gilson, "Pourquoi saint Thomas a critiqué saint Augustin", *A.H.D.L.M.A.*, I (1926—1927) 93.

²⁵⁴ Cf. J.-M. Bissen, "*L' exemplarisme divin selon Saint Bonaventure*", Paris, Vrin, 1929, 188. B. A. Luyckx, "*Die Erkenntnislehre Bonaventuras*", *B.G.P.M.A.*, XXIII (1923) 64—65. II *Sent.*, 1, 2, 2, 2, de 1, (II. 46). *Ibid.*, 24, 2, 2, 1, ad 3, (II. 557). I *Sent.*, 2, 1, 3, ad 1, (I. 75). II *Sent.*, 10, 3, 2, c., (II. 272). N.B. for first text (II. 46): "Nam Deus immediate influit in mentem, et ipsa mens immediate a prima veritate formatur."

²⁵⁵ II *Sent.*, 3, 2, 2, 2, ad 6, (II. 124): "Inter mentem et Deum non cadit medium in ratione causae efficientis, vel influentis, cadit tamen medium manuductionis, quod tamen non habet rationem medii proprie, quia magis subservit potentiae cognoscendi, quam praesit." This text should be used to explain the following one: *Hex.*, V, 27, (V. 258): "Sunt virtutes in angelis ad animas rationales, per quas regunt homines. Sunt enim delatores luminum et elevatores intellectuum ad suscipiendas illuminationes. Est ergo in eis virtus delativa, quia sunt quaedam lumina et quoddam pervium, et contemperant in se nobis divinum radium, ut proportionetur nobis. — Secundo modo est in eis virtus elevativa, qua nos aptant per condensationem et sublevationem ad illum radium suscipiendum, non tanquam perficientes."

²⁵⁶ II *Sent.*, 3, 2, 2, 2, ad 6, (II. 124): "Spiritus vero rationes, qui sunt vivificatores et motores corporum, sic habent gradum et ordinem, ut tamen secundum suum supremum a Deo immediate perficiantur et formentur: et hoc est propter rationem imaginis, per quam immediate sunt ipsius Dei capaces."

²⁵⁷ *Donis VIII*, 15, (V. 497): "Visiones istae descenderunt a Patre lumen, et Angelus adjuvat intellectum Danielis, ut capiat lucem Dei et per hanc intelligat. Dicit glossa, quod intellectus per naturam habet vim intelligendi, secundum quod discernitur homo a pecore; sed solus Deus illuminat perfecte. Verum est, quod homo ministratiter et adminiculat per Angelum instruitur, sicut patuit in Daniele; sed effective solus Deus habet potestatem super ipsam animam rationalem, quia ipsa immediate a Deo formatur. Ipse enim illuminat omnem hominem. Unde si angelus sic illuminat, sicut ille qui fenestram aperit, dicitur illuminare domum."

light is attained or participated in order to ascertain fully and adequately our certitudinal knowledge, Saint Bonaventure speaks of seeking the eternal truths by contuitio in the eternal light as in an "objectum fontanum", which constitutes the intellect in a state of perfection making it an "intellectum adeptum", adept to the realization of certainty.²⁵⁸ Thus through a metaphysical hypothesis we arrive at knowing the eternal light as the "objectum fontanum" which must necessarily be posited if we are to explain and justify the certitudinal knowledge of immutable and infallibly known truths. Is this the exact meaning Saint Bonaventure has in mind when he suggests that in attaining to the eternal reasons in a certain way, "aliquo modo" only?²⁵⁹ Is the act of contuitio which Saint Bonaventure posits as the act in which, according to our present state, we attain in part as in a mirror the eternal reason which we cannot actually attain in all its clearness, to be reduced to the conceiving of a metaphysical hypothesis or to the realization of the necessity of affirming the eternal reason as an "objectum fontanum" presupposed to justify our certainty?²⁶⁰ Should we say that the theory of illumination serves to express the metaphysical basis for our certainty and that the metaphysical basis exists without necessarily being consciously grasped in the very process of knowing and of attaining certainty itself? As Prof. De Wulf²⁶¹ expresses it the cooperation of God in knowledge would have nothing to do with an ideogenic function or with efficient causality. The causality exercised would be of the order of exemplarity or of formal causality based on the presence of God in the soul through the image which man is of God. The knowledge of this relationship between the creature and God and the acceptance of this undisputable fact of the

²⁵⁸ *Hex.*, V, 33, (V. 359): "Primo ergo anima videt se sicut speculum, deinde Angelos sive Intelligentias sicut lumina et sicut medium delativum; sive videt in se sicut in speculo, in Intelligentia sicut in medio delativo lucis aeternae et contemplativo; deinde in luce aeterna tanquam in objecto fontano quantum ad illas seu condiciones dictas, et rationabiliter et experimentaliter et intelligentialiter. — Cum haec igitur percipit et consurgit ad divinum contuitum, dicit se habere intellectum adeptum, quam promiserunt philosophi; et ad hoc veritas trahit. Sed tamen per virtutem oportet devenire, sicut fecerunt philosophi . . . quia videbat, quod ad illum intellectum non potest perveniri, nisi anima sit purgata." Cf. *Hex.*, VI, 1, (V. 360): "Item, quod vidit, id est, videre fecit per contemplationem sapientialem, illuminando animam in se tanquam in speculo, in Intelligentia tanquam in medio delativo, in luce increata tanquam in objecto fontano, secundum illas sex condiciones, quas imprimit menti; et secundum has consurgit anima in illam lucem ratiocinando, experiendo, intelligendo."

²⁵⁹ *Scientia Christi*, IV, c., (V. 23—24).

²⁶⁰ *Hex.*, V, 23, (V. 359). *Ibid.*, VI, 1, (V. 359).

²⁶¹ *Histoire de la philosophie médiévale*, 6th ed., Paris, Vrin, 1936, vol. 2, p. 120—121. Cf. to the contrary the opinion that there is not a question of an "ordo metaphysicus", F. Schwendinger, *op. cit.*, XVI (1929) 48.

presence of God in the soul would render easy the activity of the mind, since it would act with the confidence that the divine ideas remain the metaphysical basis which guarantees the value of our certitudinal knowledge without substituting themselves to man's abstractive activity nor entering within the constitutive elements of cognition. Divine examplarism and divine illumination through the eternal reasons would serve as the objective or metaphysical bases which would explain, justify and account for the truth and the certainty of our knowledge. Man would thus acquire the assurance that the knowledge he possesses is true and certain. This is achieved by an awareness of the fact that the totally immutable and stable truth and the totally infallible light serve as a justifying basis for our certitudinal knowledge rather than by a conscious awareness of the eternal truth and light itself as present to the mind. The eternal reason, norms and rules would become objects of metaphysical reflection through reasoning and hypothesis rather than of direct knowledge attaining them in themselves. Is this the meaning to be given to this basic text which in succinct expressions seem to be the official solution of Saint Bonaventure: "Ad certitudinalem cognitionem necessario requiritur ratio aeterna ut regulans et ratio motiva, non quidem ut sola et in sua omnimoda claritate, sed cum ratione creata, et ut ex parte a nobis contuita secundum statum viae."²⁶² If so how is this contuition actually realized by man in his present status and what is its exact meaning?²⁶³

Are we to conclude with Prof. Gilson that this description of divine illumination through divine principles contains the only complete solution philosophy has to establish the basis of certainty: "All certain knowledge involves the attainment by the intellect of an eternal principle or a divine idea, not as a known object, but as that which moves and controls knowledge; not in isolation but apprehended by "contuition" in the principles elaborated by the intellect and in the created essences which imply it without revealing it; not in all its clearness, but in the obscure and enigmatic signs of the corporeal or spiritual substance which suggests it to us."²⁶⁴ Or are we to conclude that the

²⁶² *Scientia Christi*, IV, c., (V. 23).

²⁶³ Cf. J.-M. Bissen, "De la contuition", *Et. Franc.*, 46 (1934) 559—569.

²⁶⁴ Cf. Et. Gilson, *The Philosophy of Saint Bonaventure*, tr. Iltyd Tretlowan and Frank Sheed, N.Y., Sheed and Ward, 1938, p. 402: "This description of illumination by the eternal principles contains also, according to St. Bonaventure, the only complete reply that philosophy can give to the problem of the basis of certitude; all certain knowledge involves the attainment by the intellect of an eternal principle or a divine idea, not as a known object, but as that which moves and controls knowledge; not in iso-

meaning of divine illumination in the acquisition of certainty is as described by Bissen?²⁶⁵ The "ratio aeterna" is to be considered as "regulans et motiva", the word "attingere" and the equivalent expressions are to be understood to mean see. God is not the agent intellect in the full sense, but only in the sense that He helps the natural power by being the rule and director of the intellectual activity. The influence is not exercised by having God continually impressing "species" upon the soul. He has impressed "a conditione" the soul with the similitudes of the eternal reasons. These innate similitudes are the highest principles according to which all other truths are judged and to which they are referred to to be certified. This applies to the truth of the first principles as well as to abstracted knowledge. The truths of the first principles are different from that of the innate principles as similitudes of the eternal reason in as much as the first principles are acquired from the senses and experience while the similitudes of the eternal reasons are directly impressed by God into the soul. These similitudes within the soul are created and their truth also created. To give infallibility and immutability to these created innate similitudes it is necessary that the created soul receive upon these similitudes the rays and enlightenment from the First Truth, towards which the eternal reasons direct the insight of the

lation but apprehended by "contuition" in the principles elaborated by the intellect and in the created essences which imply it without revealing it; not in all its clearness, but in the obscure and enigmatic signs of the corporeal or spiritual substance which suggests it to us." French ed., Paris, Vrin, 1943, p. 324.

²⁶⁵ Cf. J.-M. Bissen, *L'exemplarisme divin selon saint Bonaventure*, Paris, Vrin, 1929, p. 267: "La 'ratio aeterna' est 'regulans et motiva'; le mot 'attingere' et ses synonymes ont le sens de voir; Dieu n'est pas l'intellect agent dans le sens propre du mot, mais simplement en ce sens qu'il donne à la faculté naturelle un secours comme règle et directeur; il ne confère pas à chaque instant les impressions des raisons éternelles qui seraient les 'species' intelligibles, mais il a imprimé 'à conditione' les similitudes de ces raisons dans l'âme; ces similitudes innées sont les principes les plus hauts auxquels toute autre vérité est ramenée et comparée; vérité des principes premiers aussi bien que vérité provenant des sens; la vérité des principes premiers se distingue de celle des similitudes innées des raisons éternelles en ce que les termes des premiers principes sont tributaires des sens et de l'expérience, tandis que la vérité des similitudes ne l'est pas, puisqu'elle vient directement de l'impression que Dieu en a faite dans l'âme. Mais ces similitudes sont créées, leur vérité, en tant qu'elles se trouvent dans l'âme, est créée également; pour donner à cette vérité infallibilité et immutabilité, il faut, de toute nécessité, que l'âme est créée également; pour donner à cette vérité infallibilité et immutabilité, il faut, de toute nécessité, que l'âme reçoive sur ces similitudes le rayonnement de la vérité première, vers la vue de laquelle les raisons éternelles elles-mêmes dirigent l'âme. Lorsque l'esprit perçoit — toujours imparfaitement en cette vie — la vérité des raisons éternelles brillant dans et sur leurs similitudes créées, il atteint de quelque manière des raisons."

soul. The mind perceiving, imperfectly in this life, it is true, the truth of the eternal reasons shining in and upon the created similitudes, thus attains in a way to these eternal reasons. Should we say on the contrary with Veuthey²⁶⁶ that the seeing in the eternal reasons is nothing else for the intellect but to operate in relation to being and its value, that is with regard to its adequate object? By doing this the intellect in perceiving through abstraction the natures and quiddities of things knows them in their abstraction from the concrete singularity in which they exist and grasps them in their relation to the perfect being. By its very nature the intellect in perceiving the concrete singular reality is able to understand them in themselves and in their absolute perfection and being, that is in reference to the eternal reasons. Thus it is in the realities grasped and not in God that the eternal reasons are attained to certify our knowledge. The contuition or intuition involved is analogical, founded in the created things and terminating in God, who is intimately present in the soul, but perceived according to the present status of man, not in himself and face to face but in the finite subject and created reality. Thus is realized the necessary knowledge of the eternal reasons without the implication of ontologism and direct vision in God. Whether we explain the theory of illumination by a presupposed metaphysical order which justifies the certainty of our knowledge through the necessity

²⁶⁶ Cf. Leo Veuthey, *S. Bonaventurae Philosophia Christiana*, Rome, 1943, p. 73—74: "Cognoscere in rationibus aeternis est igitur omnino possibile, immo necessarium; cum conceptus et judicia nostra sint necessaria et immutabilia, oportet ea in rationibus fundari necessariis et immutabilibus. Ceterum videre in rationibus aeternis nihil aliud dicit nisi intellectum operari in relatione ad ens et ad valores entis, ex natura sua, eo quod objectum adaequatum ejus est ens et quidditates seu valores entis. Ens autem et valores entis in concreto sunt et — in unitate absoluta ejus — rationes essendi omnium rerum. Cum igitur intellectus res percipit quidditates earum cognoscit abstrahendo a subjecto singulari, i. e., illas ad valores earum in absolute referens, ipsa actuazione intellectus qui est in potentia ad omnes rationes entis et actuatur in relatione ad illas sub actione primaria objecti singularis et terminativa objecti absoluti: 'Intellectus vero, sive circa creaturam sive circa Creatorem negotietur semper refertur ad rationes aeternas, ad quas per creaturas etiam elevat contemplandas." Cf. *ibid.*, p. 79: "Haec cognitio analogica vocatur intuitio seu contuitio, eo quod se refert ad objectum concretum, quod tamen modo humano attingitur, ideo ut in mente humana, non vero ut in Deo. Contuitio enim omnino respondet naturae cognitionis humanae; fundatur in re sensibili, sed virtute extensionis intellectus ad ens et absolutum, ascendit ad rationem entis rei correspondentem in absoluto. Si autem non in ratione entis determinata quietatur, sed ad ens ut tale terminatur, quod est objectum adaequatum intellectus, cognoscitur Ens absolutum." Cf. *ibid.*, p. 79: "Haec contuitio, seu intuitio analogica, fundata in rebus creatis et terminans in Deum, intellectui intime praesentem, sed perceptum 'secundum statum viae', non vero in se et facie ad faciem, propter statum intellectus humani in subjecto finito est immunis ab omni ontologismo."

found in reality presented to our knowledge, whether we explain it through a theory of regulating and moving influence which suggest the connection existing between our knowledge and the eternal reasons, whether we show the insight of the mind to be realized by an enlightenment of the innate similitudes of the eternal reason in the soul with the result that the mind through this perception of the eternal reasons shining upon and in the similitudes attains in a way the eternal reasons themselves, or, whether we consider the analogical knowledge develop through a recognition of the underlying value of being and its relationship to an absolute as the means of assuring the attainment to the eternal reasons without having a clear vision of them in God, in every case we have interpretations made on the basis of the analysis of texts and with supporting proofs from the works of Saint Bonaventure himself. In any case we are always seeking to find what are the effects which properly lead to the realization of the necessity of positing the eternal truth as the guarantee of the certainty of our knowledge. And if the effects are the certainty of our knowledge itself, should we not simply say that it is not by attaining to the eternal reason that we obtain to certainty, but simply that some influence of the eternal reasons is required either by a direct influence of cooperation or as exterior and background foundation that do not actually enter into our consciousness when we actually proceed to a knowledge of reality with certainty? It is clear that we must avoid the error of thinking that the contuition of the eternal reason is simply the realization of them through their influence as realized in knowledge. Saint Bonaventure excludes that conception. That there is in natural knowledge an immediate though general influence of God as a first cause is evident. That in supernatural knowledge there can be special influence through mediate and created elements is also clear. What is important to realize is that there is more to it than that. In knowing with certainty, the divine and eternal reasons are said to be attained by the knower though, it is true, not immediately in their full clearness and overt essence, but in part, as through a mirror and obscurely by contuition so that they exercise their regulating power and serve as moving reasons, it is true, not as the sole and total source of certainty, yet in as much as they are attained, not as had in the soul, but as rules existing in the eternal truths above the soul.²⁶⁷

²⁶⁷ *Scientia Christi*, IV, c., (V. 23): "Alio modo, ut intelligatur, quod ad cognitionem certitudinalem necessario concurrat ratio aeterna quantum ad suam influentiam, ita quod cognoscens in cognoscendo non ipsam rationem aeternam attingit, sed influentiam ejus solum. Et hic quidem modus dicendi

And since man is to the image of God, it follows that the type of cooperation involved is that of regulating and of motive reason, not through the general causality of God as principle and cause of all realities or the special elevation through infused grace of God as author of gifts.²⁶⁸ It appears that this function of regulation and motive reason which the eternal reasons play in the certainty of knowledge is realized not in the order of efficient causality or in as much as man in attaining to these eternal reasons as objects and as motivating reasons, possesses the norms and the rules with which to judge and to base the affirmation he has about reality, these norms and these rules not being the sole and the total basis which prompts the human mind to assent for they do not exclude the indispensable play of the natural light of man and naturally innate or acquired knowledge.²⁶⁹ And always, he affirms that in as much as man is to the image of God it follows that God cooperates with him in as much as the eternal reasons serve as regulating norms or as motivating reasons in as much as they are attained by the human mind which make them enter as basic elements with other elements to achieve the certainty sought for.²⁷⁰

est insufficiens secundum verba beati Augustini, qui verbis expressis et rationibus ostendit, quod mens in certitudinali cognitione per incommutabiles et aeternas regulas habeat regulari, non tanquam per habitum suae mentis, sed tanquam per eas quae sunt supra se in veritate aeterna. Et ideo dicere, quod mens nostra in cognoscendo non extendat se ultra influentiam lucis aeternae, est dicere Augustinum deceptum fuisse, cum auctoritatem ipsius exponendo non sit facile ad istum sensum trahere; et hoc valde absurdum est dicere de tanto Patre et Doctore maxime authentico inter omnes expositores sacrae Scripturae."

²⁶⁸ *Reb. Theol.*, IV, *Christus Unus*, 16—17—18, (V. 571—572): "In his autem (operationibus creaturae), quae sunt ipsius, inquantum est imago, sicut sunt actiones intellectuales, quibus anima percipit ipsam veritatem immutabilem, cooperatur sicut objectum et ratio motiva . . . quod autem dicatur ratio intelligendi, sane intelligendum est, non quia sit intelligendi ratio sola, nec nuda, nec tota . . . Postremo, si esset ratio tota, non indigeremus specie et receptione ad cognoscendas res; quod manifeste videmus esse falsum, quia, amittentes unum sensum, necesse habemus amittere unam scientiam. Unde licet anima secundum Augustinum connexa sit legibus aeternis, quia aliquo modo illud lumen attingit secundum supremam aciem intellectus agentis et superiorem portionem rationis; indubitanter tamen verum est, secundum quod dicit Philosophus cognitionem generari in nobis via sensus, memoriae et experientiae, ex quibus colligitur universale in nobis, quod est principium artis et scientiae."

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁰ *Scientia Christi*, IV, c., (V. 24): "In opere vero, quod est a creatura per modum imaginis, cooperatur Deus per modum rationis moventis; et tale est opus certitudinalis cognitionis, quod quidem non est a ratione inferiori sine superiori. Quoniam igitur certitudinalis cognitio competit spiritui rationali, quantum est imago Dei, ideo in hac cognitione aeternas rationes attingit. Sed quia in statu viae non est adhuc plene deiformis, ideo non attingit eas clare plane et distincte; sed secundum quod magis vel minus ad deiformitatem accedit, secundum hoc magis vel minus eas attingit, semper

Consequently the eternal reasons are attained though not immediately and in their overt intelligibility. They are attained by a *contuitio*. Is this *contuitio* more than a metaphysical hypothesis? And does the metaphysical hypothesis require that it be possessed before our attaining to certainty or is it simply a *post factum* reflexive finding. Since the *contuitio* appears as a prerequisite to the knowledge with certainty, it seems necessary to say that the metaphysical hypothesis, as offering the "*objectum fontanum*" of our *contuitio* would have to be presupposed to our certitudinal knowledge. In fact, would not the very perception of the metaphysical hypothesis which constitutes the *contuitio* of the eternal reason as the basis of all our certainty, be the cause that our intellect become perfected and rendered apt, "*intellectum adeptum*" to attain to the full certainty desired by all philosophers?

The meaning of the *contuitio* "*ex parte*" of the eternal reasons as the norm of our certainty and the implication of *contuitio* as an indispensable metaphysical hypothesis is made more difficult to delineate when we realize that it is only the man of wisdom who in attaining the eternal reasons knows that he is doing so. The man of science when he has certitudinal knowledge attains of necessity the eternal reasons, but he does so without knowing that he does.²⁷¹ It is evident that the man of science as well as the man of wisdom achieves certainty in his knowledge. But to achieve certainty he must attain to the eternal reasons as the indispensable rule or norm of our certitudinal knowledge. Yet in the case of science, the knower attains to the eternal reasons without knowing that he does. The problem also comes up with the sinner who in spite of his wickedness must possess certainty. Yet only the pure of heart and the holy can make such a return upon themselves as to attain beyond the certainty of the first principles of the mind the eternal reason.²⁷² In the same sense we read elsewhere, with reference

tamen aliquo modo, quia nunquam potest ab eo ratio imaginis separari . . . In statu vero naturae lapsae caret deformitate et habet deformitatem, ideo attingit eas ex parte et in aenigmate."

²⁷¹ *Ibid.*, ad 19, (V. 26): "Ad illud quod objicitur, quodsi in illis (aeternis) rationibus cognoscimus, quod omnis cognoscens est sapiens: dicendum quod non sequitur, quia attingere rationes illas non facit sapientem, nisi quis in eis quiescat et sciat, se illas attingere, quod quidem spectat ad sapientem. Hujusmodi enim rationes attinguntur ab intellectibus scientium ut ductivae, sed ab intellectibus sapientium ut reductivae et quietativae. Et quia pauci sunt, qui isto modo illas attingant, ideo pauci quidem sunt, qui illae rationes sciant se attingere; immo quod plus est, pauci sunt, qui velint hoc credere, quia difficile videtur intellectui ad aeterna contemplanda nondum elevato, quod ita habeat Deum praesentem et propinquum, cum tamen dicat Paulus Actuum decimo septimo, quod non longe est ab unoquoque nostrum."

²⁷² *Ibid.*, ad 23—26, (V. 27): "Nam illa veritas simpliciter incommuta-

to the actual influence of divine illumination, that it causes truth in knowledge, without itself being known as in the case of the sinner.²⁷³ Now if the eternal reasons can be attained without the one who attains them knowing it and if they are attained in such a way that certainty is assured to the knowing person, we may well ask how they are attained and if it is not as implied as a metaphysical hypothesis that they actually serve as a rule and norm to our certitudinal knowledge. They would thus exercise their function as actually metaphysically present though not consciously seen.²⁷⁴

Is this contuition of the eternal reasons achieved on the purely natural plane? We have seen that the direct view of the eternal reasons as they are in God is not achievable without the grace of the elevation of the beatific vision. Thus it is not a matter of directly being put face to face with God. Contuition is thus to be used not only of the type of intuition that requires supernatural aid and direct influence.²⁷⁵

The intuition involved in our problem of the knowledge of the eternal reasons by intuition is therefore of a special type which is other than the

bilis perspicue videri non potest, nisi ab illis qui intrare possunt ad intimum silentium mentis, ad quod nullus peccator pervenit, sed ille solus, qui est summus amator aeternitatis."

²⁷³ *In Johan.*, I, 12, (VI. 249): "Et vita erat lux hominum. Hic tangitur quarta conditio, quae est, quod est aliis cognitione praesens; ideo dicitur lux hominum, quia homines illuminat et videre facit; unde in Psalmo: 'Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine'. Sine quod lumine non est videre, sicut dicit Augustinus, quia sicut non videt oculus, nisi a luce corporali illuminetur; sic non videt intellectus, nisi a luce spiritualissima illustratur. Et licet omnibus cognitionem praebeat, non tamen omnibus praebeat cognitionem sui, quia peccatores per ipsam cognoscunt et ipsam non comprehendunt. Ideo dicit: Et lux in tenebris lucet, cum peccatores facit vera cognoscere; et tenebrae eam non comprehenderunt; quia infidelitatis tenebris obcaecati non cognoscunt."

²⁷⁴ *Itin.*, V, 4, (V. 309): "Mira igitur est caecitas intellectus, qui non considerat illud quod prius videt et sine quo nihil potest cognoscere. Sed sicut oculus intentus in varias colorum differentias lucem, per quam videt cetera, non videt, et si videt, non advertit; sic oculus mentis nostrae, intentus in entia particularia et universalia, ipsum esse extra omne genus, licet primo occurrat menti, et per ipsum alia, tamen non advertit. Unde verissime apparet, quod 'sicut oculus mentis nostrae ad manifestissimae naturae'; quia assuefactus ad tenebras entium et phantasmata sensibilibus, cum ipsam lucem summi esse intuetur, videtur sibi nihil videre; non intelligens, quod ipsa caligo summa est mentis nostrae illuminatio, sicut, quando videt oculus puram lucem, videtur sibi nihil videre."

²⁷⁵ *II Sent.*, 3, 2, 2, *fund.*, 6, (II. 123): "Impossibile est quod aliquis oculus perveniat ad cognitionem luminis solaris nisi per immissionem radiorum solis quantumcumque habeat alia lumina; ergo impossibile est, quod aliquis ad contuitum supernae lucis perveniat per illuminationem aliquam naturalem, vel acquisitam, nisi Deus suae luminositatis radium immittat; sed immisio haec non est nisi per gratiam; ergo impossibile est, quod aliqua creatura, quantumcumque nobilia, divinam lucem in se ipsa per naturam cognoscat."

intuition of God in himself and which is achieved in as much as God is attained in his interior effect in the soul.²⁷⁶ That God is thus present in the soul as a result of efficient causality is quite understandable.²⁷⁷ Thus the soul perceives the inspiration effected in the soul by God and in knowing this it can ascertain its knowledge through a knowledge of the effect actually present in the soul, without for all that perceiving in full evidence the cause of this effect. So it could be said to have an intuition of God in as much as it perceives God as the cause of the effect it knows.²⁷⁸ Thus it is in as much as God is present to the soul through his influence upon the soul in the illumination by the eternal light that divine illumination is efficacious in the acquisition of our certainties. Both the presence in and the influence upon the soul of the eternal light are required to assure the workings of the criterion of eternal reasons.²⁷⁹ It is thus in the combination of the presence and the influence of the divine eternal light with regard to the soul of man that we can expect to realize certainty and attain to the eternal reasons. Now the type of presence

²⁷⁶ II *Sent.*, 23, 2, 3, c., (II. 544): "Unde si quae auctoritates id dicere inveniuntur, quod Deus in praesenti ab homine videtur et cernitur, non sunt intelligendae, quod videtur in sua essentia, sed quod in aliquo effectui interiori cognoscitur..."

²⁷⁷ II *Sent.*, 8, 2, 1, 4, c., (II. 231): "Immisio dicit actum cujus affectus terminatur in eo quod intus est. Hunc autem actum dupliciter potest dicere respectu illius effectus: aut sicut causae principaliter agentis et efficientis, aut sicut excitantis et impellentis. Primo modo proprie accipitur; et sic competit soli Deo respectu animae: ipse enim solus est, qui per modum principalis agentis potest in ejus intimis cogitationes et affectiones gignere et formare."

²⁷⁸ In *Johan.*, VI, 78, (VI. 331): "Proprie locutio Dei inspiratio Dei est... Haec inspiratio effectus Dei est in anima; hunc effectum potest anima in se ipsa cognoscere, quamvis non plene cognoscat, a quo est. Unde dicendum, quod illam inspirationem et videt et audit, sed tamen ex hoc non sequitur, quod videat Deum."

²⁷⁹ *Scientia Christi*, VII, epil., (V. 42): "Non solum requiritur lucis aeternae praesentia, sed etiam lucis aeternae influentia." *Ibid.*, V., c., (V. 29—30): "Ad certitudinem cognitionis non sufficit lucis aeternae influentia sine sui praesentia, pro eo quod nihil creatum potest animam perfectam certitudine stabilire, quousque pertingat ad veritatem sapientiam et infallibilem lucem. Sic est intelligendum, quod ad sapientialem cognitionem non sufficit illius lucis aeternae praesentia sine sui influentia, non propter defectum ex parte sui, sed propter defectum ex parte nostri, pro eo quod intelligentia creata non pertingit ad illam fontalem sapientiam, nisi sit deiformis effecta, ac per hoc elevata et habilitata; elevata supra se et habilitata in se. Ideo necessarium est, quod detur aliquid ei veniens desuper, quod tamen sit proportionale et ei inhaerens; hanc autem vocamus lucis aeternae influentiam; et quia animam ad sapientiam habilitat, vocatur sapientia creata. Quia tamen ipsa influentia non habilitat nec elevat, nisi continetur cum luce aeterna tanquam cum principio movente et ratione dirigente et fine quietante; ideo non sortitur rationem sapientiae ex se, sed ratione ejus a quo fluit, secundum quod dirigit et ad quod ducit; et haec est sapientia increata."

involved when it is based upon efficient causality and efficacious influence is not that of physically uniting presence but through the virtue or the efficacious power exercising itself in the patient.²⁸⁰ Now this influence being more than the general influence exercised by God with reference to all creatures and less than the special influence exercised by God with reference to all creatures he endowes with grace, consists in attaining to the eternal reasons and to God as the light of our minds and the cause or explanation of our knowledge.²⁸¹ Are we to say that it is the intimate presence in the soul which makes the soul to become adept to see the eternal reasons as an "objectum fontanum" in as much as by this intimate presence of God within the soul is implied an interior illumination of the dull species naturally acquired by the intellect from the senses by the eminently clear species of God intimately present in the soul?²⁸² Is it thus through a return upon ourselves as images of God, that we are to reach the eternal reasons, as an "objectum fontanum" of all our certainties, for as much as they are found reflected in the soul which they enlighten to give the necessary evidence and clarity of truth required to assure our certainties?²⁸³ Remembering that God is within us as the illuminating sun certifying all our knowledge in stability and certainty are we to know the eternal reasons by an introspection?²⁸⁴

²⁸⁰ *I Sent.*, 37, 1, 1, 1, fund., 2, (I. 638): "Sed omne quod influit in ali- quid, est illi praesens secundum virtutem."

²⁸¹ *Scientia Christi*, IV, fund. 34, (V. 20—21): "Item, secundum omnes Sanctos Deus dicitur esse doctor omnis scientiae; aut igitur quia generaliter cooperatur omni intellectui, sicut et aliis creaturis, aut quia donum gratiae infundit, aut quia intellectus in cognoscendo ipsum attingit. Si quia generaliter cooperatur; ergo ita diceretur docere sensum, sicut intellectum; quod absurdum est. Si quia donum gratiae infundit: ergo omnis cognitio erit gratuita vel infusa, nulla ergo acquisita, vel innata; quod absurdissimum est. Restat ergo, quod hoc dicitur, quia intellectus noster ad ipsum attingit tanquam ad lumen mentium et rationem cognoscendi omne verum."

²⁸² *Hex.*, XII, 5, (V. 385): "Item, quia ipse doctor est, docet infallibiliter et certificat sic, quod impossibile est, aliter se habere. Secundum sententiam omnium doctorum Christus est doctor interior, nec scitur aliqua veritas nisi per eum, non loquendo, sicut nos, sed interior illustrando; et ideo necesse est, ut habeat clarissimas species apud se, neque tamen ab alio acceperit. Ipse enim intimus est omni animae et suis speciebus clarissimis refulget super species intellectus nostri tenebrosas; et sic illustrantur species illae obtenebratae, admixtae obscuritati phantasmatum, ut intellectus intelligat. Si enim scire est cognoscere, rem aliter impossibile se habere; necessarium est ut ille solus scire faciat, qui veritatem novit et habet in se veritatem."

²⁸³ *Itin.*, III, 1, (V. 303): "Manuduxerunt nos usque ad hoc, ut ad hoc reintraremus, in mentem scilicet, in qua divina relucet imago . . . ad nosmetipsos intrantes . . . conari debemus per speculum videre Deum: ubi ad modum candelabri relucet lux veritatis in facie nostrae mentis."

²⁸⁴ *Donis*, VIII, 15, (V. 497): "Ratio autem intelligendi est, quia certificatur per ipsum intelligentiae super transmutabilitatem naturae . . . secundum quod (Deus) est ratio intelligendi, intrat in animam ut sol intelligentiae. Iste est sol, qui omnes illuminat."

Is it by a return unto ourselves that we will find God and thus recognize the eternal reasons which are the inevitable criterion for our certainties?²⁸⁵ What in this context is the true implication of the following text, in which the simply incommutable truth is none other than the eternal reasons and God which are above the mind?²⁸⁶ One of the functions of memory, the first intellectual power man is endowed with, comes to mind with regard to the inner-presence of the incommutable light and eternal rules.²⁸⁷

Now this presence and the intimate inward union of God and the soul must not be taken as a form of ontologism. God can be the cause of our knowledge in the line of the formal causality only as the exemplar cause constituting the reason of our knowing.²⁸⁸ Thus the influence and the presence of God in the soul does not imply the existence of God as a perfective form of the soul.²⁸⁹ Saint Bonaventure is clear on the impossibility of conceiving God as the form of the soul whether as regard its being or its perfecting by added being. The relation of God to the soul as the light, the truth or the intimately present is one which is not had on the level of the formal cause or on the level of substantial unity. In the union, diversity remains and thus precludes unity in being.²⁹⁰ Thus the spiritual light which is God is the perfection of no creature whatsoever although

²⁸⁵ II *Sent.*, 8, 2, 2, c., (II. 226—227): "Illabi aliquid alicui importat, quod illud intimum sit ei et quod intime operetur in illo: nihil autem tale est respectu animae nisi solus Deus; ideo solus divinus spiritus animae potest illabi. In anima namque idem est intimum et supremum; et hoc patet, quia secundum sui supremum maxime approximat Deo, similiter secundum sui intimum; unde quando magis redit ad interiora, tanto magis ascendit et unitur aeternis. Et quia 'solus Deus superior est mente humana' secundum sui supremum, solus Deus potest menti esse intimus; et ideo illabi, spiritui rationali est divinae substantiae proprium."

²⁸⁶ *Scientia Christi*, V., ad 23—26, (IV. 27): "Nam illa veritas simpliciter incommutabilis perspicue videri non potest, nisi ab illis qui intrare possunt ad intimum silentium mentis, ad quod nullus peccator pervenit, sed ille solus, qui est summus amator aeternitatis."

²⁸⁷ *Itin.*, III, 2, (V. 304): "Ex tertia habetur, quod ipsa habet lucem incommutabilem sibi praesentem, in qua meminit invariabilium veritatem. — Et sic per operationes memoriae apparet, quod ipsa anima est imago Dei et similitudo adeo sibi praesens et eum habens praesentem, quod eum actu capit et per potentiam 'capax ejus est et particeps esse potest'."

²⁸⁸ III *Sent.*, 14, 1, 1, ad 1, (III. 297).

²⁸⁹ III *Sent.*, 14, 2, 1, ad 1, (III. 308).

²⁹⁰ I *Sent.*, 17, 1, 1, 1, fund. 3, (I. 293): "Ex Deo et anima non potest fieri unum." *Scientia Christi*, V, fund. 5, (V. 29): "Deus nullius creaturae est forma perfectiva quantum ad esse; ergo nec quantum ad bene esse." I *Sent.*, 17, 1, 1, 1, fund. 2, (I. 293): "Omnis forma rei creata est creata: Deus enim nullus est forma perficiens." II *Sent.*, 26, 1, 2, fund. 2, (II. 634): "Deus nullius potest esse forma perficiens, quamvis possit se habere in ratione formae exemplaris."

through its influence it perfects creatures.²⁹¹ The presence of the eternal light into the soul is not realized in the order of formal causality which would imply a form of union in being of God and the creature, but rather in the order of efficient causality through the presence in the soul of the effect or the exercising efficiency or a created gift.²⁹² And is this created gift as the effect of the influence giving participation in the cause as the light of the soul and the reason of our knowledge to be considered as the created gift of created wisdom?²⁹³ Is the influence had in divine illumination of all knowledge to be considered as an immediate and special action — not a mediate and general action — of God on the soul²⁹⁴ or as the effect of that action that is an “habitus mentis” which is an interior disposition standing as the created term of the irradiation of the influence of the eternal reasons.²⁹⁵

Saint Bonaventure often discusses the problem of innate and acquired habitus of the mind. Since we are seeking for the basis of our

²⁹¹ II *Sent.*, 17, 1, 1, ad 6, (II. 412—413): “Lux enim spiritualis, quae Deus est, cum sit simplicissima, non potest esse perfectio rerum diversarum naturarum.”

²⁹² *Myst. Trin.*, III, 1, ad 11, (V. 73): “Dupliciter dicitur aliquid participari, scilicet secundum formam, sicut genus participatur a speciebus; vel secundum influentiam, sicut causa participatur a suis effectibus... hoc autem modo non dicitur divinum esse participari secundum plus et minus, sed solum secundo modo; et hoc non possit diversitatem in ipso participato, sed in eo, per quod fit illa participatio, scilicet in aliquo dono creato.”

²⁹³ *Scientia Christi*, V, ad 8, (V. 30): “Sapientia potest alicui uniri multipliciter, vel sicut hypostasis unitur naturae substantificatae in ipsa, vel sicut ratio et lux cognoscendi unitur cognoscenti illuminato per ipsam... sed secundo modo... mediante dono sapientiae creatae, quae est tanquam lux informativa ipsius animae, reddens eam deiformem et habilem ad conueniendam lucem sapientiae increatae.”

²⁹⁴ Cf. J.-M. Bissen, *L'exemplarisme divin selon saint Bonaventure*, Paris, Vrin, 1929, p. 198. Et. Gilson, *La philosophie de saint Bonaventure*, Paris, Vrin, 1943, p. 322, fn. I: “M. Palhoriès, *op. cit.*, p. 50, aperçoit ici, ‘un point faible et une certaine incohérence dans la théorie du saint Docteur’, parce qu’il nous interdit de concevoir l’action directrice de Dieu ‘comme une simple action de l’intelligence divine sur la nôtre’ et refuse cependant que Dieu nous soit présent par son essence même. L’incohérence de saint Bonaventure se ‘réduit’ à celle de l’interprétation que l’on en propose, car 1^o sa doctrine ne nie pas l’action de l’intelligence divine sur la nôtre, mais nie au contraire, que cette action se ramène à celle d’une influence, soit immédiate, mais générale (concours divin), soit spéciale, mais médiate et créée (grâce divine); c’est donc bien d’une action immédiate qu’il s’agit; 2^o saint Bonaventure ne nie pas que Dieu nous soit présent, mais bien qu’il nous soit connaissable par son essence, ce qui est tout différent. L’action immédiate en nous d’un être purement intelligible qui nous est intimement présent est une thèse qui n’a rien que de métaphysiquement cohérent, et c’est même son immédiateté qui fait nier à saint Bonaventure cette thèse atténuée: ‘Ex hoc non sequitur quod in veritate vel in rationibus, sed quod a rationibus videamus’ (*Scientia Christi*, fund. 3, (V. 17).” *Id.*, *La Philosophie au moyen âge*, Paris, Vrin, 1947, p. 446.

²⁹⁵ J.-M. Bissen, *op. cit.*, 202.

certainty and since we have indicated that it should be found in a way within man we have to consider that we are seeking for the basis of our knowledge in infallibly established truth. Now truth implies in reference to knowledge the passing of a judgment. Now in any judgment are implied notions. For example in the judgment of 'parents are to be honored', the notions of parent, father, mother are involved. Thus in reference to our certitudinal knowledge we may consider the origin of the concept or notions involved. It appears that all our knowledge is not taken from the senses.²⁹⁶ There thus exists a problem of divine illumination with regard to the possession of the notions themselves within the mind. But even in the process of acquiring abstracted notions there is involved for the knowledge of these notions a form of resolution to the eternal reasons. For in knowledge beside the knower and the abstracted knowable, there is required a conversion of the one upon the other. Now this implies a judgment which to be fully certain implies the coming into play of the eternal reasons and truths.²⁹⁷ But there is also the point of view of judgment which is paramount for the knowledge of truth in certainty. In this we see that with regard to the first principles although the mind requires the abstraction from the senses to acquire the similitudes of the things, yet the mind, through the "lumen naturale judicatorium" is able to grasp the truth involved and to pass judgment.²⁹⁸ But when it comes to our certitudinal knowledge it appears that divine illumination is required as the ultimate basis of what is apprehended as far as notions go, and what is judged, as far as propositions go.²⁹⁹

Man through knowledge partakes in a way of the whole of reality.

²⁹⁶ II *Sent.*, 39, 1, 2, c., (II. 904): Ad illam quaestionem, qua quaeritur, utrum omnis cognitio sit a sensu, dicendum est, quod non. Necessarii enim oportet ponere, quod anima novit Deum et se ipsam et quae sunt in se ipsa, sine adminiculo sensuum exteriorum. Unde si aliquando dicat philosophus, quod 'nihil est in intellectu, quod prius non fuerit in sensu' et quod 'omnis cognitio habet ortum a sensu'; intelligendum est de illis quae quidem habent esse in anima ad modum scripturae."

²⁹⁷ *Scientia Christi*, IV, ad 12, (V. 125): "Ad cognitionem nihil plus requiritur nisi cognoscens et cognoscibile et conversio hujus super hoc; dicendum, quod haec conversio includit iudicium; iudicium autem certum non fit nisi per legem certam et injudicabilem . . . et ideo hic includitur ratio et veritas aeterna."

²⁹⁸ II *Sent.*, 39, 1, 2, c., (II. 903): Habitum etiam innatum dicit respectu luminis directivi; habitum nihilominus acquisitum respectu speciei ipsius cognoscibilis. Naturale enim habeo lumen, quod sufficit ad cognoscendum, quod parentes sunt honorandi, et quod proximi non sunt laedendi; non tamen habeo naturaliter mihi impressam speciem patris, vel speciem proximi."

²⁹⁹ *Donis*, VIII, 20, (V. 498): "Sic ergo intellectus humanus habet rationem apprehendentis et judicantis, intellectum possibilem et agentem; nec potest iste intellectus sufficienter illuminari sine adminiculo superioris et altioris lucis."

Now realities have diverse forms of existence. They in fact exist in the outside world of reality as distinct beings, in the soul of beings who know them and in the eternal art. Realities exist in the soul of man either on the natural level as innate or acquired, as present in themselves in experimental knowledge or through similitudes in speculative knowledge or on the supernatural level as infused through grace or on the glorified level as present through special elevation achieved through the light of glory.³⁰⁰ Thus in the discussion of the basis of our certitudinal knowledge with regard to realities we may consider each reality of which we are seeking to ascertain a firm knowledge, we may seek the foundation of certainty in the realities in themselves as existing outside the mind of the knower and of the creature and of God, in their mode of existence in the mind of the knower in their mode of existence in the eternal art as the eternal reasons or truths. As a matter of fact realities are said to be true either in themselves, in their mode of existence in the mind and in the truth of the divine mind. Now the soul in acquiring certitude about realities, placed as it is between the world of created realities and God achieves through its lower part turned to realities inferior to itself a certitude which is relative conditional or *secundum quid* while it achieves through its higher part turned to realities above itself, in the eternal truths of God, a certitude which is absolute and unconditional.³⁰¹ Now to talk of receiving from the superior truths in the mind of God the assurance of the absolute certainty of our knowledge is to say that the condition for our perfect certitude is divine illumination. Now divine illumination implies more than the turning towards the divine reasons to ascertain our knowledge. It implies a certain presence and influence of these eternal reasons in the mind judging.

³⁰⁰ *Brev.*, Prol., 3, (V. 205): "Nam cum res habeant esse in materia, habeant esse in anima per notitiam acquisitam, habeant etiam esse in ea per gratiam, habeant esse in ea per gloriam et habeant esse in arte aeterna, philosophia quidem agit de rebus, ut sunt in natura, seu in anima secundum notitiam naturaliter insitam, vel etiam acquisitam; sed theologia, tanquam scientia supra fidem fundata et per Spiritum sanctum revelata, agit et de eis quae spectant ad gratiam et gloriam et etiam ad Sapientiam aeternam."

³⁰¹ *Scientia Christi*, IV, ad 23—26, (V. 26—27): "Veritas tamen significata illud potest significari vel secundum quod est in materia, vel secundum quod est in anima, vel secundum quod est in arte divina, vel certe omnibus his modis simul. Veritas enim in signo exteriori signum est veritatis, quae est apud animam, quia 'voces sunt notae earum passionum, quae sunt in anima'; anima autem secundum suum supremum habet respectum ad superiora, sicut secundum suum inferius ad haec inferiora, cum sit medium inter res creatas et Deum; et ideo veritas in anima habet respectum ad illam duplicem veritatem, sicut medium ad duo extrema, ita quod ab inferiori recipit certitudinem secundum quid, a superiori vero recipit certitudinem simpliciter."

How do realities exist in the soul of the knower if they can exist in the mind of the knower under diverse modes relatively to the point of view of the inferior part or the superior part of the soul? Now it appears that things are known either through an experimental cognition of a reality possessed or connatural or through a form of speculative knowledge. Now speculative knowledge is achieved either in as much as the very essence of the reality is attained or in as much as the reality is attained through a similitude. Now this similitude may be either infused, innate or acquired. To know something through similitudes that are infused or innate is to know something in the Eternal Truth. Thus at this point we have an indication that divine illumination as implying a knowledge in the eternal reasons will be realized not in experiential cognition, nor in knowledge through created essences, nor in knowledge achieved through acquired similitudes from the senses, but in the case of supernatural knowledge, through infused similitudes and in the case of natural knowledge, through innate similitudes. But we must go further and realize that innate similitudes are of two kinds. Some are sheer similitudes, as that of a stone which are like pictures representing reality. Some are similitudes which involve a truth itself in themselves. They are impressions in the soul of supreme truths.³⁰²

If we complement this text with another of the same type, we can realize that divine illumination must be understood as implying that through innate ideas, which are truths and similitudes of the divine eternal reasons in as much as they are actually impressions made upon the human mind by the eternal light of divine illumination, that we

³⁰² I *Sent.*, 17, 1, 1, 4, c., (I. 301—302): "Cognitione experientiae non cognoscitur caritas nisi ab habente; cognitione vero speculationis certum est cognosci caritatem etiam a non habente. Modus autem hujus cognitionis non potest esse per caritatis essentiam nec per similitudinem a sensibus acquisitam; ergo necesse est, quod sit per similitudinem infusam, vel innatam. Utraque autem, quae sic cognoscuntur ab homine, dicuntur ab Augustino cognosci in Veritate aeterna, aut quia Veritas cognitionem infundit, ut Prophetis, aut quia a conditione imprimit, secundum illud: 'Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine, etc.' Caritas autem non cognoscitur a peccatoribus per speciem infusam; ergo oportet, quod per innatam cognoscatur. Species autem innata potest esse dupliciter: aut similitudo, quod etiam quaedam veritas in se ipsa. Prima species est sicut pictura; et ab hac creata est anima nuda. Secunda species est impressio aliqua summae veritatis in anima, sicut verbi gratia animae a conditione sua datum est lumen quoddam directivum et quaedam directio naturalis; data est etiam ei affectio voluntatis. Cognoscit igitur anima, quid sit rectitudo, et quid affectio, et ita, quid rectitudo affectionis; et cum caritas sit hoc, cognoscit caritatem per quendam veritatem, quae tamen veritas est similitudo caritatis; et tunc recte habet rationem similitudinis, dum accipitur ab intellectu; habet tamen rationem veritatis, prout est in anima."

attain to the divine reasons and thus achieve the sought for basis for all our certainties.³⁰³

Thus we see that it is through innate species that we attain to the eternal reasons to assure ourselves of absolute certainty. These innate species must be distinguished from the similitudes gathered from sense perception as well as from the first principles. The first principles formed and assented to by the mind once the species gathered from sense perception have their own truth, which make of them proper foundations of knowledge.³⁰⁴ All knowledge does not come from the senses. The whole world of material reality enters the soul through five senses.³⁰⁵ But the notions of God, of the soul and of what is in the soul are not obtained through the services of the senses.³⁰⁶ Are we to conclude therefore with Bissen³⁰⁷ that the influence of God and the eternal reasons

³⁰³ *Scientia Christi*, IV, fund. 23, (V. 19): "Item, cum impius homo cognoscit iustitiam, aut cognoscit eam per sui praesentiam, aut per similitudinem acceptam ab extra, aut per aliquid, quod est supra; sed non per ejus praesentiam, cum illa non sit praesens ei; non per speciem acceptam ab extra, cum non habeat similitudinem abstrahibilem per sensum; ergo necesse est, quod cognoscat illam per aliquid aliud, quod est supra intellectum suum; pari ratione et omnia alia cognoscibilia spiritualia, quae cognoscit. Ergo si impius cognoscit in rationibus aeternis, multo fortius alii. Si dicas, quod cognoscit eam per effectum; objicitur contra hoc; quia quod nullo modo cognoscitur, nescitur, quid ab eo efficiatur — si enim nescio, qui sit homo, nunquam scio, quid fiat ab homine — ergo si prius non habetur notitia de iustitia, nunquam sciatur, quod hoc vel illud fiat ab illa. Restat ergo, quod cognoscatur in ratione aeterna. — Similiter potest, argui de qualibet forma intelligibili substantiali, ac per hoc de omni cognitione certitudinali."

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, ad 15, (V. 25). *Ibid.*, ad 22, (V. 26).

³⁰⁵ *Itin.*, II, 2, (V. 300).

³⁰⁶ *II Sent.*, 39, 1, 2, ad quaest. incid., (II. 904): "Necessario enim oportet ponere, quod anima novit Deum et se ipsam et quae sunt in se ipsa, sine adminiculo sensuum exteriorum." *I Sent.*, 3, 1, 1, 1, ad 5, (I. 70): "Deus est praesens ipsi animae et omni intellectui per veritatem; ideo non est necesse, ab ipso abstrahi similitudinem, per quam cognoscitur; nihilominus tamen, dum cognoscitur ab intellectu, intellectus informatur quadam notitia, quae est velut similitudo quaedam non abstracta, sed impressa, inferior Deo, quia in natura inferiori est, superior tamen anima, quia facit ipsam meliorem." *II Sent.*, 3, 2, 2, ad 4, (II. 123): "Cognoscuntur autem Deus . . . per influentiam luminis connaturalis potentiae cognoscenti, quod est similitudo quaedam Dei non abstracta, sed infusa, inferior Deo quia in inferiori natura."

³⁰⁷ J.-M. Bissen, *L'exemplarisme divin selon saint Bonaventure*, Paris, Vrin, 1929, p. 208: "Pour résumer maintenant le tout: ce que, dans le paragraphe précédent, nous avons appelé influence, a été précisé ici comme un effet intérieur, comme des impressions de la Vérité première, des similitudes, des espèces innées — parfois, mais improprement appelées infuses — que l'âme trouve en elle et qui sont distinctes des premiers principes. L'âme les a en elle en tant qu'elle est l'image de Dieu car elle les garde par la mémoire qui est la première des facultés dans lesquelles cette image se révèle. Aucune connaissance n'est supérieure en dignité à celle que nous avons par ces vérités; et tout autre, qu'elle soit acquise par les sens, ou qu'elle soit le fruit de la propre activité de l'âme . . . Cet effet créé, ces similitudes informantes, sont les principes par lesquels les raisons dirigeront l'intelligence et leur impulsions."

in the acquisition of certainty is to be identified with the impressions of the first Truth made as interior similitudes, as innate species, called sometimes although improperly infused species, which the soul finds in itself as interior created effects distinct from the first principles of knowledge? This solution presents serious difficulties.

We have established the conditions for our certitudinal knowledge in showing that the divine truth communicates to our knowledge something of its infallibility and of its necessity without, however, implying any intuition of the divine essence in itself.³⁰⁸ Yet, it is a basic point of doctrine in Saint Bonaventure that we do attain to the eternal reasons and that we see the certitudinal value in the eternal reasons. The way the divine illumination actually takes place implies the exclusion of any intermediary agent or enlightening intelligence between God and the soul in the efficacious act of divine illumination; it also implies that the divine notion of illumination manifests itself by impressing or having impressed in our souls some species which are truths representing within the soul the first truth and for knowledge in the intellect the similitudes of knowable realities.³⁰⁹ Thus the intuition or contuition of the eternal reasons is had without direct and overt vision, but through indirect and imperfect vision in the participated eternal reasons within the soul.³¹⁰

With all this emphasis upon divine illumination and the role of God as the sun that enlightens man in his acquisition and certification of

³⁰⁸ *Scientia Christi*, IV, ad 22, (V. 26). Cf. Et. Gilson, *La philosophie de saint Bonaventure*, Paris, Vrin, 1943, p. 324: Cette description de l'illumination par les raisons éternelles contient aussi la seule réponse complète que la philosophie puisse apporter au problème du fondement de la certitude: toute connaissance certaine requiert que l'intellect atteigne une raison éternelle ou l'idée divine, non à titre d'objet connu, mais à titre de moteur et de régulateur de la connaissance; non pas seule, mais appréhendée par contuition dans les principes élaborés par l'intellect et dans les essences créées qui la supposent sans la laisser voir; non pas dans toute sa clarté, mais dans le signe énigmatique et obscure de la substance corporelle ou spirituelle sous laquelle nous la devinons. Les deux conditions que nous nous étions imposées pour résoudre le problème de la certitude se trouvent intégralement respectées: la vérité divine communique à notre connaissance quelque chose de son infallibilité et de sa nécessité, sans que cependant la moindre intuition de l'essence divine vienne nous transformer dès cette vie en citoyens de l'au-delà.

³⁰⁹ Cf. J.-M., Bissen, *op. cit.*, 209.

³¹⁰ *Scientia Christi*, VI, c., (V. 34): "Ad cognitionem cujuscumque creaturae perfectam et certitudinali concurret non tantum lucis aeternae praesentia, sed etiam lucis aeternae influentia; non tantum sapientia aeterna, verum etiam notitia animae impressa; non tantum veritas causans, verum etiam veritas informans. Cum igitur anima Christi et qualibet anima, quae Deum cognoscit, cognoscat secundum mensuram influentiae Verbi et notitiae intus informantis mentem; hujusmodi autem verbum et notitia, cum habeat esse creatum, ac per hoc limitatum, non possit divinae sapientiae adaequari."

certitudinal knowledge we might wonder if Saint Bonaventure does not give to God the function of agent intellect, actually making of God the agent intellect for all men who have knowledge.³¹¹ Saint Bonaventure is clear on the point of rejecting the notion that God would be the intellect agent of the soul. In each soul there is an active power that assures the exercise of knowledge. In the very creation of man, there is given him in the natural being an agent intellect.³¹² Consistency within the thought of Saint Bonaventure excludes interpretations of certain texts to the contrary.³¹³ And the fact that for perfect and absolutely certitudinal knowledge there is required a higher enlightenment does not exclude that there is within the soul itself an agent intellect naturally endowing it to be able to know by itself.³¹⁴

The basic element in the theory of divine illumination consists in this that Christ, the eternal Word of God, stands as the source of all truth and certitude, as the interior master of all science and wisdom.³¹⁵ The whole of the Hexaëmeron and of the Sermon on the text of the Gospel, "Unus est magister vester, Christus" purports to show that Christ is the source of all understanding and the teacher of all learning.³¹⁶ Christ the master possessing all truths and knowledges appears as the sole truth perceptible by the creature and the indispensable means of acquiring certain knowledge.³¹⁷ And Christ, the illuminator, as the

³¹¹ *Donis*, VIII, 15, (V. 497): "Secundum quod (Deus) est ratio intelligendi intrat in animam ut sol intelligentiae. Iste est sol, qui omnes illuminat."

³¹² *II Sent.*, 24, 1, 2, 4, (II. 568): "Cum animae nostrae data sit potentia ad intelligendum, sunt aliis creaturis data est potentia ad alios actus, sic Deus, quamvis sit principalis operans in operatione cujuslibet creaturae, dedit tamen cuilibet vim activam, per quam exiret in operationem propriam. Sic credendum est indubitanter, quod animae humanae non tantummodo dederit intellectum possibilem, sed etiam agentem, ita quod uterque est aliquid ipsius animae."

³¹³ *II Sent.*, 24, 1, 2, 4, c., (II. 568). *Scientia Christi*, IV fund. 32, (V. 20). These texts and modes of interpretation are discussed in J.-M. Bissen, *op. cit.*, p. 228 ff.

³¹⁴ *Donis* VIII, 20, (V. 498): "Sic ergo intellectus humanus habet rationem apprehendentis et judicantis intellectum possibilem et agentem; nec potest isti intellectus sufficienter illuminari sine adminiculo superioris et altioris lucis."

³¹⁵ *In Johan.*, I, 12, (VI. 249): "Verbum est aliis cognitionem praebens; ideo dicitur lux hominum, quia homines illuminat et videre facit."

³¹⁶ *Hex.*, I, 11, (V. 331): "Propositum igitur nostrum est ostendere, quod in Christo sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae et scientiae Dei absconditi, et ipse est medium omnium scientiarum." *Reb. Theol.*, IV. *Christus Unus*, (V. 567): "Unus est magister noster, Christus, Matthaei vigesimo tertio. In verbo isto declaratur, quod est fontale principium illuminationis cognoscitivae, Christum videlicet... Ipse Christus est autem fons omnis cognitionis rectae."

³¹⁷ *Hex.*, I, 13, and 14, (V. 331—332): "Haec (secunda persona) est ergo veritas sola mente perceptibilis, in qua addiscunt angeli, Prophetae, philosophi vera, quae dicunt... Nec aliquo modo aliqua veritas sciri potest nisi per illam veritatem (sc. Christum)."

source principle of all knowledge-giving illumination appears as the true illuminating sun for the created intelligence.³¹⁸ Thus it appears clearly that in the indispensable recourse to divine illumination achieved by a certain way of attaining to the eternal reasons subsisting eternally and immutably in God, Christ, the second person of the Trinity, must be posited as the source principle and the origin "fontale principium et origo" of all our knowledge.^{318a}

VIII

For a full understanding of the theory of knowledge elaborated according to the requirements of divine illumination as indispensable means of attaining to certainty in the truth under consideration, it is of primary importance to determine indubitably that God exists, since He stands as the source of all certainties. The contention throughout the discussion of the problem of the basis of our certitudinal knowledge is that since our certitudinal knowledge is by its very nature immutable, necessary, eternal and infallible, it necessarily follows that there exists a cause of this knowledge in its certainty which is immutable, necessary, eternal and infallible.³¹⁹ By reason of his immutability and of his intelligibility God appears as the ultimate foundation for our certitudinal knowledge, and by reason of his intimate presence to the soul, God also appears as the first cause and indispensable prerequisite for all our knowledge.³²⁰ With all the intimacy and immanence of the presence of

³¹⁸ *In Sap.*, V. (VI. 139): "Christus autem dicitur sol, quia sol dicitur quasi solus lucens; Christus autem singulariter lucet, id est prae omnibus aliis tanquam lux mundi et oculus; Johannis primo: 'Ipse lux erat, quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum;' etiam illuminatione cognitionis naturalis. — Sol autem intelligentiae dicitur, quia solo oculo intelligentiae lux ejus apprehenditur, qui per ejus radium, scilicet per spiritum intellectus, intelligentia illuminatur." *Dom. II Adven.*, Sermo V. (IX. 51): "Ipse in quantum lux omnium scientiarum et luminum nos illuminet, . . . in quantum Verbum universarum rationum viventium nos irradiet et erudiat."

^{318a} *Dom. XXII p. Pent.*, Sermo I, (IX. 442): "Merito igitur soli Christo et non aliis attribuenda est auctoritas officii, ut singulariter unus Magister dicatur, eo quod ipse est fontale principium et origo cujuslibet scientiae humanae. Unde sicut unus est sol, tamen multos radios emittit; sic ab uno Magistro, Christo, sole spirituali, multiformes et diversae scientiae procedunt."

³¹⁹ *Scientia Christi*, IV, per totum, (V. 17 ff). *Itin.*, II, 9, (V. 301—302). *Ibid.*, III, 3, (V. 304).

³²⁰ *Scientia Christi*, IV, *fund.* 31, (V. 20): "Anima nata est converti super intelligibile quod est extra, et super intelligibile quod est intra, et super intelligibile quod est supra. Conversio autem ad intelligibile quod est extra est minime simplex; ad intelligibile vero quod est intra, est magis simplex ad intelligibile quod est supra, est maxime simplex, quia illud est ei magis intimum quam ipsa sibi. Sed quanto aliquid simplicius tanto prius; ergo

God within the soul, it would appear that He is by his very nature inaccessible.³²¹ It should be said, however, that this inaccessibility of the divine light and of the divine being refers to a comprehensive knowledge which would give a full insight into the whole nature of God. This is beyond man's reach in the present state. This limitation, however, does not exclude the apprehensive knowledge of God which does not imply an insight of the full nature but rather a grasping of the truth of the things offered to consideration in its evidence.³²² Although creatures cannot be expected to grasp God by comprehending him, i. e. by understanding him in his totality, it remains that creatures can apprehend that God exists and that He is present, i. e. achieve the awareness of his existence and of his presence. In fact, to comprehend God as He is in his totality would imply that the creature stands to the creator in a relation of proportion of equality and parity in nature. The finite character of the creature excludes any such possibility with reference to God as the infinite Being. But to apprehend God, to be aware of his presence and of his existence much less is required. An order of proportion of compatibility, adaptability or assimilation is sufficient. This is realized in man. In concluding that God is knowable to the creature, and at that in a most evident way, as long as no impediment or deficiency is introduced on the part of the knowing intellect,³²³ Saint Bonaventure takes into consideration that God in himself as the supreme light is the most knowable to our minds. The soul furthermore is by its very nature open to the knowledge of everything by assimilation of all realities. It is especially capable of grasping God, in as much as the soul is the image and the similitude of God. As a consequence, the infinite distance between God and man from the point of view of nature and being is diminished if considered from the point of view of intelligibility or

naturaliter est prior conversio animae super ipsam veritatem sibi intimam quam super seipsam, vel vera extrinseca; ergo impossibile quod aliquid cognoscat, nisi illa summa veritate praecognita."

³²¹ *Hex.* XII, 11, (V. 386): "Haec lux est inaccessibilis, et tamen proxima animae, etiam plus quam ipsa sibi."

³²² *I Sent.*, 3, 1, 1, 1, (I. 69): "Dicendum, quod est cognitio per comprehensionem et per apprehensionem. Cognitio per apprehensionem consistit in manifestatione veritatis rei cognitae; cognitio vero comprehensionis consistit in inclusione totalitatis. Ad primam cognitionem requiritur proportio convenientiae; et talis est in anima respectu Dei, quia quodam modo est anima omnia, per assimilationem ad omnia, quia nata est cognoscere omnia et maxime est capax Dei. Quantum ad cognitionem comprehensionis requiritur proportio aequalitatis et aequiparentiae; et talis non est in anima respectu Dei, quia anima est finita, sed Deus est infinitus; et ideo hanc non habet."

³²³ *Ibid.*: "Concedendae sunt igitur rationes, quod Deus sit cognoscibilis a creatura et etiam clarissime cognoscibilis, quantum est de se, nisi aliquid esset impediens vel deficiens ex parte intellectus."

knowledge. For on the level of intelligibility there is compatibility between the soul and God in that both are intelligible and in that the soul of man as spiritual is open to the whole of intelligible reality. The basic reason, on the part of the soul, why God is so knowable to man is the fact of his intimate presence to the soul and to the mind which he informs through truth by imprinting upon it knowledge.³²⁴ The basic reason on the part of God why God is so knowable to man is the fact of his simplicity which makes it possible to apprehend him entirely and to be aware of his entirety, of his whole being, by coming into contact with him in one point or aspect, without requiring that He be comprehended in his totality in the infinite implications of his being.³²⁵ But granting that God is most knowable and that the soul is most able to attain to God, we many still wonder how man in his state of wayfarer does actually grasp or apprehend God and what is the value of such a knowledge from the point of view of content and of certainty. The full implications of a text such as the following would enlighten us on this problem.³²⁶

A characteristic mark of Saint Bonaventure's way of thought with regards to the existence of God is the full awareness of the fact that the existence of God is a truth which is indubitable and absolutely certain in that it carries with it the full evidence requiring assent. This truth is thus easy to grasp since it is evident not only in itself, but also in comparison to the intellect which considers it and to the medium used in proving it. As a consequence of the effective evidence involved in this truth, that God exists, it follows that unless some impediment is introduced to blurr and lessen this evidence, one is able to have an undubitably certain knowledge that God is. The natural tendency of man's reason is such that man naturally knows that God exists in such a way that there is no place for doubt.³²⁷ The evidence of this truth may be more or less blurred by reason of an error of conception, when the meaning of the word God is not fully nor correctly understood as it should and

³²⁴ *Ibid.*, ad 3, (I. 69).

³²⁵ *Ibid.*, ad 5, (I. 70).

³²⁶ *I Sent.*, 8, I, 1, 2, c., (I. 154): "Intellectus autem noster deficit in cogitatione divinae veritatis quantum ad cognitionem, quid est, tamen non deficit quantum ad cognitionem, si est. Unde Hugo: 'Deus sic ab initio cognitionem suam in homine temperavit, ut sicut nunquam, quid esset, poterat comprehendi, ita nunquam, quia esset, poterat ignorari'. Quia ergo intellectus noster nunquam deficit in cognitione Dei, si est, ideo nec potest ignorare, ipsum esse simpliciter, nec cogitare non esse."

³²⁷ *Myst. Trin.*, I, 1, c., (V. 49): "Primo modo dubitabile dicitur aliquod verum, quia deficit ei ratio evidentiam sive in se, sive in comparatione ad intellectivum apprehensivum. Nullo autem istorum modorum deest certitudo isti vero, quod est Deus esse."

could be, by reason of an error of reasoning, when the injustice and evil found in the world are taken to imply that there is no God, or by reason of an error with regard to conclusions when the reasoning development with regard to God is not carried through to the full.³²⁸ Thus it is that, under the power of these misleading implications and defects of reason, a man can conclude or avoid asserting to the truth that God is. But should one be well aware and unimpeded by objects of reason, one is bound by defining, reasoning and carrying through his conclusions correctly to acquire through the normal activity of the mind indubitable certainty with regard to God's existence.³²⁹

A proper consideration of the problem would make us realize that it is impossible to think with assent that the divine being does not exist. Error is possible with regard to the essence of what God is. Absolute and undeniable evidence is not had with regard to this. But with regard to the existence of God, it must be admitted that this truth normally allows of no denial. A defect on the part of the object assented to could come from its lack of presence or from its lack of evidence. But God is omnipresent being everywhere, always and being totally everywhere and always: "Deus autem est semper, et ubique et totus semper et ubique; ideo non potest cogitari non esse."³³⁰ God is also fully evident in himself and in the way of proving his existence: "Sed divini esse veritas est evidens et in se et in probando"³³¹; in himself, for as much as He is the supreme truth which is "ipsum esse, quo nihil melius cogitari potest"³³² and in the way of proving his existence for as much as all truth and creature indicate his existence and all rightly directed intellect implies the impression of the knowledge of God and the direction from this impressed knowledge.³³³ Affirmative as well as negative propositions lead to the same conclusion. Thus it is that on the part of the object it becomes impossible to deny that God exists. The only way in which one can be misled in judging and assenting to truth with regard to God's

³²⁸ *Ibid.*

³²⁹ *Ibid.*, "Et ideo, si accipiatur indubitabile, prout privat dubitationem per rationis decursum; Deum esse est verum indubitabile, quia sive intellectus ingreditur intra se, sive egreditur extra se, sive aspiciat supra se; si rationaliter decurrit, certitudinaliter et indubitanter Deum esse cognoscit."

³³⁰ *I Sent.*, 8, 1, 2, 2, c., (I. 154).

³³¹ *Ibid.*

³³² *Ibid.*

³³³ *Ibid.* 155: "Nec tantum habet evidentiam ex se, sed etiam ex probatione, quoniam divinam veritatem esse probat et concludit omnis veritas et natura creata, quia si est ens per participationem et ab alio, est ens per essentiam et non ab alio. Probat etiam ipsam et concludit omnis intelligentia recta, quia omni animae ejus cognitio est impressa, et omnis cognitio est per ipsam."

existence would be through a false notion possessed with regard to God. Because of this false conception which either mistakes creatures for God or implies no God as object of beatitude, it may follow that one is lead to assent to the proposition that God is not.³³⁴ Although this truth that God exists is so indubitable and unavoidable that one cannot if he thinks properly, deny it, Saint Bonaventure still finds it of use to determine and develop, in a convincing way, the various reason which show that this truth, that God is, is indubitable and warrants absolute certainty.

In the *De Mystério Trinitatis*,³³⁵ Saint Bonaventure proves that the truth expressed when we say that God is, is indubitable by bringing forth three ways of proceeding: either by showing that all truth which is impressed in all the minds of men is actually indubitable; or by establishing that all truth which all creatures proclaim, is indubitable; or finally by proving that all truth which is in itself most certain and evident is by nature indubitable.³³⁶ Thus is known that God exists because there is impressed in our minds the notion of God, because all realities clearly indicate that He exists and because that fact is most certain and most evident. In this we have an elaboration of the pattern of proofs found in the *Sentences* which as we have just seen are based on the unescapable presence of God and evidence of his existence in himself and in the way of proving it.³³⁷

The strength of the first proof lies in the theory that all men naturally possess in their soul the truth that God exists. The notion of God's existence is impressed in all minds and all minds naturally possess that truth. A simple reflection upon ourselves will indubitably show that God does exist. Saint Bonaventure consequently establishes through authority and cogent reasonings that all rational minds have the truth, that God exists, impressed in them.³³⁸ Authoritative texts taken from John

³³⁴ *Ibid.*: "Concedendum est igitur, quod tanta est veritas divini esse, quod cum assensu non potest cogitari non esse nisi propter ignorantiam cogitantis, qui ignorat, quid est quod per nomen Dei dicitur."

³³⁵ *Myst. Trin.*, I, 1, (V. 45).

³³⁶ *Ibid.*: "Quaeritur ergo primo, utrum Deum esse sit verum indubitabile? Et quod sic, ostenditur triplici via. Prima est ista: omne verum omnibus mentibus impressum est verum indubitabile. — Secunda est ista: omne verum, quod omne creatum proclamat, est verum indubitabile. — Tertia est ista: omne verum in se ipso certissimum et evidentissimum est verum indubitabile."

³³⁷ *I Sent.*, 8, 1, 1, 2, c., (I. 154—155).

³³⁸ *Myst. Trin.*, I, 1, (V. 45): "Prima ista: omne verum omnibus mentibus impressum est indubitabile . . . Circa igitur primam viam sic proceditur et ostenditur tum auctoritatibus quam rationibus, quod Deum esse sit omnibus mentibus rationalibus, impressum."

Damascenus, Hugo of Saint Victor, Boethius, Augustine and Aristotle are brought forth to establish the exactitude of this argument. John Damascenus clearly asserts: "Cognitio existendi Deum naturaliter nobis inserta est."³³⁹ Hugh of Saint Victor asserts that the knowledge of God is thus given us that man cannot ignore that God exists.³⁴⁰ Boethius, Augustine and Aristotle have texts that imply of necessity that the truth that God is be impressed or inserted in the mind of man and that it cannot be ignored.³⁴¹ The existence in man of the love of wisdom, of his desire for beatitude and peace, his hatred of falsehood and his love for truths as well as the proper knowledge of the soul which it has of itself all warrant the conclusion that the existence of God is an indubitable truth because that truth is inserted or impressed in the soul of each man.³⁴² In fact, since desire always presupposes a certain knowledge of the object of desire it follows necessarily that the desire for wisdom, beatitude and peace could not be had unless at least some kind of knowledge of the supreme wisdom,³⁴³ of the supreme good,³⁴⁴ and of the immutable being³⁴⁵ were present in the soul of man. All this implies that the knowledge that God is also impressed or inserted on the mind of man: "ergo si talis appetitus sine aliquali notitia esse non potest, necesse est, quod notitia qua scitur, summum bonum sive Deum esse, sit inserta ipsi animae."³⁴⁶ The hatred for falsehood also implies the love of truth and the love of truth implies that the knowledge of the first truth, upon which depend all other truths, be inserted in the human mind.³⁴⁷ Finally, since the soul has inserted in itself the knowledge of itself in such a way that it is present to itself and knowable to itself and since God is more present to the soul than the soul itself and more knowable to it, it follows that the knowledge of God is inserted in the soul itself.³⁴⁸ The

³³⁹ *Myst. Trin.*, I, 1, fund. 1, (V. 45). Cf. John Damascenus, *De fide Orthodoxa*, I, 3, PG 94. 794: "Insitum nobis a natura est." *Ibid.*, I, 1, PG 94. 790: "Nemo quippe mortalium est, cui non hoc ab eo naturaliter insitum sit, ut Deum esse cognoscat."

³⁴⁰ *Myst. Trin.*, I, 1, and 2, (V. 45). Cf. Hugh of Saint-Victor, *De Sacramentis*, I, 3, 1, PL 176. 217: "Deus enim sic ab initio notitiam sui ab homine temperavit, ut sicut nunquam quid esset totum poterat comprehendere, sic quia esse nunquam prorsus posset ignorari."

³⁴¹ *Myst. Trin.*, I, 1, fund. 3—4, (V. 45)

³⁴² *Myst. Trin.*, I, 1, 10, (V. 45): "His igitur rationibus ostenditur, quod Deum esse sit menti humanae indubitabile, tanquam sibi naturaliter insertum; nullus enim dubitat nisi de eo de quo non habet certam notitiam."

³⁴³ *Ibid.*, I, 1, fund. 6, (V. 46).

³⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, fund. 7, (V. 46).

³⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, fund. 8, (V. 46).

³⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, fund. 7, (V. 46).

³⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, fund. 9, (V. 46).

³⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, fund. 10, (V. 46): "Item, inserta est animae rationali notitia sui, eo quod anima sibi praesens est et se ipsa cognoscibilis; sed Deus prae-

soul is united to God through truth possessed and through the intimate presence of God in the soul.³⁴⁹

The intimate presence of God as impressed in the soul implies a certain type of knowledge which is neither acquired through the senses, nor infused through the grace of God.³⁵⁰ Saint Bonaventure's theory of knowledge as implying the existence in the soul of notions not acquired through the senses, thus also implies that in the demonstration of the existence of God, there is, because of the intimate presence of impressed or inserted truths in the soul, an impossibility of denying or not being aware of the existence of God and consequently the absolute indubitability and certainty of the truth involved in the fact that God does exist.³⁵¹

It should probably be worth remarking that in all these texts in which this first way is actually elaborated there is no mention of an idea of God being impressed or inserted upon or into the soul or mind of man. All these texts talk about a knowledge "notitia" or "cognitio" about God, which is inserted, innate, impressed within the soul. Thus, it is that the idea of God as referred to his essence is not as such possessed as innate with the consequent result that many fundamental errors were and are committed with reference to the nature of God and accidentally as a consequence about his existence. But truths about God and knowledge about God are said to be innate or inserted in the soul of man. And it is on the inneity of the knowledge about these truths that this first way of determining the indubitability of the fact of the existence of God is taken. Thus it is that all we see within us helps to make evident the innateness of the knowledge of God which although incomplete as regard

sentissimus est ipsi animae et se ipso cognoscibilis; ergo inserta est ipsi animae notitia Dei sui."

³⁴⁹ *I Sent.*, I, 3, 2, c., (I. 41): "Solut Deus est qui perfectissime coniungitur. Nam coniungitur secundum veritatem et intimitatem. Solut enim Deus propter summam simplicitatem et spiritualitatem illabatur animae, ita quod secundum veritatem est in anima et intimior animae quam ipsa sibi. Omnes enim has quatuor rationes ad unam reducuntur, scilicet ad hanc, quia nata est anima ad percipiendum bonum infinitum quod Deus est; ideo in eo solo debet quiescere et eo frui."

³⁵⁰ *I Sent.*, 3, I, I, I, ad 5, (I. 70): "Dicendum, quod Deus est praesens ipsi animae et omni intellectui per veritatem: ideo non est necesse, ab ipso abstrahi similitudinem, per quam cognoscatur; nihilominus tamen, dum cognoscitur ab intellectu, intellectus informatur quadam notitia, quae est velut similitudo quaedam non abstracta, sed impressa, inferior Deo, quia in natura inferiori est, superior tamen anima, quia facit ipsam meliorem."

³⁵¹ *Myst. Trin.*, I, I, c., (V. 45): "Est enim certum ipsi comprehendenti, quia cognitio huius veri innata est menti rationali, in quantum tenet rationem imaginis, ratione cuius insertus est sibi naturalis appetitus et notitia et memoria illius, ad cuius imaginem facta est, in quem naturaliter tendit, ut in illo possit beatificari."

the nature of God, is nevertheless so cogent and undeniable that it excludes all doubt and assures full certainty.

The second way of determining how it is undubitable that God does exist is based on the principle that all truth, which is proclaimed and indicated by every creature is a truth which is to be accepted as indubitable: "Omne verum, quod omnis creatura proclamat, est verum indubitabile."³⁵² By considering the creatures and by applying to them the principle of causality we can follow a process which will take us up from the consideration of creatures to the realization of the necessity of positing the existence of God.³⁵³ This process is called for because of the adaptability of it since all creatures proclaim the existence of God and since the weakness of our mind makes it necessary to proceed from creatures to show that God exists.³⁵⁴

As a background to this process of proof are to be found absolutely necessary and certain truths proper to the conditions of being in the relation of caused beings and causing beings.³⁵⁵ Thus it is that ten evidently cogent and overtly known conditions or suppositions make it clear that God does exist.³⁵⁶ Self-evident conditions and modes of realization of creatures immediately bring our mind to realize that corresponding to the deficiencies in the creature are the perfections of the same order in the creator.³⁵⁷ An analysis of the various series given as indicat-

³⁵² *Ibid.*

³⁵³ *Hex.*, V, 28, (V. 358): "Ipse intellectus, considerans conditiones entis secundum relationem causae ad causatum, transfert se ad effectum ad causae et transit ad rationes aeternas."

³⁵⁴ *I Sent.*, 3, 1, 1, 2, c., (I. 72): "Dicendum, quod, quia reluctet causa in effectu, et sapientia artificis manifestatur in opere, ideo Deus, qui est artifex et causa creaturae, per ipsam cognoscitur. Et ad hoc duplex est ratio, una est propter convenientiam, alia propter indigentiam; propter convenientiam, quia omnis creatura magis ducit in Deum quam in aliquod aliud; propter indigentiam, quia, cum Deus tanquam lux summe spiritualis non possit cognosci in sua spiritualitate ab intellectu quasi materiali, indiget anima cognoscere ipsum per creaturam."

³⁵⁵ *Hex.*, V, 28, (V. 358): "Differt causa a causatis: quia prima causa est ens primum, causatum est productum; causa prima est ens simplex, causatum compositum; causa prima est ens purum, et causatum permixtum; causa prima est ens fixum, et causatum variatum; causa prima est ens absolutum, et causatum alligatum; causa prima est ens perfectum, causatum diminutum. Haec ergo sunt certissima."

³⁵⁶ *Myst. Trin.*, I, 1, c., (V. 46): "Quod autem omnis creatura clamat, Deum esse, ostenditur ex decem conditionibus et suppositionibus per se notis."

³⁵⁷ *Myst. Trin.*, *Ibid.*, fund., 20, (V. 46—47): "Quod autem omnis creatura clamat, Deum esse, ostenditur ex decem conditionibus et suppositionibus per se notis. Prima est ista: si est ens posterior, est et ens prius. — Item si est ens ab alio, est ens non ab alio. — Item, si est ens possibile, est ens necessarium. — Item, si est ens respectivum, est ens absolutum. — Item, si est diminutum sive secundum quid, est ens simpliciter. — Item, si

ing the content of this proof show that it matters little what starting point is chosen. The unavoidable deficiency not only from the accidental point of view in relation to determined properties, but rather essentially in beings which are by nature inadequate and incapable of self-sufficiency serves as basis for the argumentation. All creatures thus proclaim the existence of God because of their deficiency in their shortcomings which imply a perfect being to correct this lack and because of their fulfilment which requires a perfect being which will grant them these perfecting properties.³⁵⁸ The principle of causality being applied, it becomes easy to see how the deficiencies in the effect lead to the perfection in the cause. From the imperfection and finitude of creature we come to the perfection and infinity of God. From the dependence in being, operation and purpose we come to a first cause. From compositeness of creatures we come to the simplicity of God. From the presence of potentiality in creatures we come to a being who is pure act. From the nobility in creatures we come to the awareness of a first unmoved mover. From the relativity and contingency of the creature we come to the notion of an absolute and necessary being. The ten conditions Saint Bonaventure uses are the following: "ens posterius, ens ab alio, ens possibile, ens respectivum, ens diminutum sive secundum quid, ens propter aliud, ens per participationem, ens in potentia, ens compositum" and "ens mutabile". As a result he sees the necessity of positing that God exists as the "ens prius, ens non ab alio, ens necessarium, ens absolutum, ens simpliciter, ens propter se ipsum, ens per essentiam, ens in actu, ens simplex, ens immu-

est ens propter aliud, est ens propter se ipsum, alioquin nihil esset bonum.— Item, si est ens per participationem, est ens per essentiam. — Item, si est ens in potentia, est ens in actu. — Item, si est ens compositum, est ens simplex. — Item, si est ens mutabile, est ens immutabile."

³⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, c., (V. 49). Cf. Et. Gilson, *The Philosophy of Saint Bonaventure*, tr., New York, Sheed & Ward, 1938, p. 123—124: "So that if reason, armed with the principle of causality, sets out to develop the manifold relations binding cause and effect, any reflection on any property of the thing caused leads at once to the cause. Now things are quite obviously imperfect and finite, hence caused; but if there is anything that is brought into being, there must be a first being, for effect implies cause; if there is anything that is dependent upon another for its origin, its operations and its purpose, there must be a being that exists by itself, of itself and for itself; if there is a being that is composite, there must be, as the source of its existence, a being that is simple, — for composition is an absence of simplicity; if there is a being compounded of potentiality and actuality, there must be one that is pure actuality, for nothing created is pure actuality; if there is a being in motion, there must be one unmoved, for motion is based upon the relative immobility of the elbow, the motion of the elbow on the fixity of the shoulder, and so on; if there is relative being, there must be an absolute for every creature is in some genus or other; but what represents only one of the genera of being can account neither for itself nor for being; so that there must be an absolute being whence all others derive such being as they have."

tabile".³⁵⁹ A reading and a collating of the texts in the *In Hexaëmeron*,³⁶⁰ bring out how these ten aspects of reality in its created and dependent status lead the mind to the consideration of the uncreated and self-sufficient being.

The true meaning of these texts must not be overlooked. One must keep in mind the actual value and profound roots of this type of argumentation implying a process of elevation from the creatures, from the consideration of the conditions and the properties of being as realized in creatures and God, through the application of the principle of causality and the consequences it implies for the cause and the caused, to the realization of the necessity of assenting to the truth that God exists. These proofs would appear to be metaphysical in that they are considering in all beings that man encounters the implications for these beings resulting from the fact that they are endowed with certain conditions of being which imply imperfection and thus require a perfect being as a cause. The lack of systematic organization of the proofs and

³⁵⁹ *Myst. Trin.*, I, 1, fund. 2, (V. 46—47).

³⁶⁰ *Hex.*, X, 12—18, (V. 378—379): "Consideratur etiam haec veritas quasi in quodam speculo, quod confortat aut dat visum. Omnis enim creatura concurret ad hoc speculum faciendum et jungitur in hoc speculo secundum viam ordinis, originis, completionis. Primo tripliciter: secundum rationem posterioris ad prius, inferioris ad superius, temporis ad aevum et aevi ad aeternitatem . . . Secundum ordinem ergo causalitatis, dignitatis et finis omnia declarant, esse primum, summum et ultimum, scilicet in ratione finiendi. Hoc ergo secundum rationem ordinis. Alio modo omnis creatura dicit, Deum esse secundum rationem originis: ut si est ens creatum, est ens increatum; et si est ens per participationem, est ens per essentiam; et si est ens per compositionem, est ens per simplicitatem; si est ens per multiformitatem, est ens per uniformitatem vel identitatem . . . Tertio modo, ratione completionis. Si est esse potentiale, est esse actuale; si est esse mutabile, est esse immutabile; si est esse secundum quid, est esse simpliciter; si est esse dependens, est esse absolutum; si est esse in genere, est esse extra genus. Haec igitur speculationis ordinis, originis et completionis ducunt ad illud esse primum, quod repraesentant omnes creaturae. Hoc enim nomen scriptum est in omnibus rebus; et sunt haec conditiones entis, super quas fundantur certissimae illationes." *Ibid.*, V, 32, (V. 359): "Quando anima videt hoc familiarius, primo ratiocinando, secundum experiendo, tertio intelligendo; ibi potest quiescere. Unde ratiocinando infert per oppositum; si est, posterius, est prius; si est compositum, est simplex, etc.; Per viam rationis sic. Si est ens productum: ergo est ens primum, quia effectus ponit causam. Si enim est ens ab alio, secundum aliud et propter aliud: ergo est ens a se, secundum se et propter se. Item, si est ens permixtum, necesse est, esse ens fixum. Item si dare alligatum; ergo et absolutum. Item, si ens diminutum, necesse est, esse ens perfectum . . . Et sic fertur intelligentia ratiocinando. Experimentaliter, quia primationes non cognoscuntur nisi in positione causae, et illa sex dicuntur per modum defectus et privationis. Fertur similiter experiendo sic: productum respectu primi defectivum est; similiter compositum respectu simplicis; similiter permixtum respectu puri, et sic de aliis; ergo dicunt privationes . . . Intentionaliter, quia non possunt latere animam, ut primum esse, esse, simplex esse est etc. . ."

the indifference displayed in the choice of the starting point should be taken as implying not so much an inadequacy and inconsistency in the thought of Saint Bonaventure as an avowed intention of simply indicating that the existence of God is so clearly proclaimed and attested by all creatures that it is irrelevant to draw out explicitly demonstrative arguments. If the mind is suddenly made aware of what it really is all about, it would immediately be confronted by the glaring evidence of the fact that God exists. The process therefore has for sole purpose to make the mind aware of what is most evident. The ever-omni-presence of God and the unescapable evidence of the fact that He exists render irrelevant scientific process from the known to establish the truth of what is not yet known by means of cogent reasonings. To bring to the attention of the seeker, various beings and various aspects of reality which proclaim the existence of God is the purpose of these proofs. And it is thus by bringing to the mind the fact that reality under its various metaphysical aspects that is to say its various aspects as a being clearly proclaims the evident truth that God exists.³⁶¹

The consideration of sensible realities is furthermore but the occasion to place before the mind intelligible necessities which suggest the inescapable evidence that God exists. It appears that in this second way of realizing the evidence and indubitability of the truth that God exists is to be considered as twofold. A first group is elaborated in the metaphysical plane of being as being and with the consideration of the conditions, properties and implications of being as being. This would include the *De Mystério Trinitatis*, q. I, a. 1,³⁶² *In Hexaëmeron*, coll. V, n. 28—32,³⁶³ the *In Hexaëmeron*, coll. X, n. 10—18,³⁶⁴ *Sentences* b. I, d. 8.³⁶⁵ All these texts contain an essentially metaphysical analysis based on the properly metaphysical properties of being which in their own way all proclaim the necessity and the fact of the existence of God.

Another type of process which is along the lines of this second way to the existence of God in that it starts from creatures to attain the creator is exemplified in the elaboration found in the *Itinerarium*³⁶⁶ where realities as sensible are taken into account and serve as a starting point

³⁶¹ *Myst. Trin.*, I, 1, fund. 20, (V. 47): "Ex his igitur decem suppositionibus necessariis et manifestis inferitur, quod omnes entis differentiae sive partes inferunt et clamant, Deum esse. Si ergo omnes tale verum est verum indubitabile; ergo necesse est quod Deum esse sit indubitabile verum."

³⁶² *Ibid.*, fund. 11—20, and concl., (V. 46—47, 49).

³⁶³ (V. 358—359).

³⁶⁴ (V. 378—379).

³⁶⁵ (I. 154—155).

³⁶⁶ I, 2, (V. 297). *Ibid.*, II, 13, (V. 303).

to lead through various stages, to the knowledge about God. These proofs however are not aimed directly at exhibiting that God exists but rather to show how different characteristics of God as conceived by us can be gathered from the whole of realities. The elaborations of all these determinations of God also guide us naturally to affirm that He is.³⁶⁷

This process also involves a progressive progress from external realities, to internal realities of the soul to the superior reality which God is. And on each of the levels considered, man finds the proclamation that God exists with some specific characteristics brought out.³⁶⁸ To what extent is the pre-knowledge of God as the most perfect being, simple, purely actual, immutable, necessary³⁶⁹ and absolute being presupposed in this second way is not too clear. Saint Bonaventure often stresses that to know the imperfect one must know the perfect and the lack involved.³⁶⁹ But the problem always remains to determine to what extent it is less the actual knowledge of the perfect and the lack involved which is implied than the actually imperfect being which metaphysically implies a perfect, realizing fully the partially realized perfection. The preexisting knowledge of God is always in Saint Bonaventure a problem, for it is not always easy to distinguish an implicit, virtual or implied knowledge from an actual knowledge.³⁷⁰ This could refer us to the first way. We could thus say that the second way could be reduced to the first way as implying it.³⁷¹ But to what extent it implies that it has been previously gone through is an open question. It would seem possible to say that the first way is not implied as actually elaborated or already achieved, although it is in a way presupposed. The whole of the second

³⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, II, 13, (V. 303): "Ex quibus omnibus colligitur, quod invisibilibus Dei a creatura mundi, per ea quae facta sunt intellecta, conspiciuntur; ita ut qui nolunt istud advertere et Deum in his omnibus cognoscere, benedicere et amare inexcusabiles sint, dum nolunt transferri de tenebris in admirabile lumen Dei."

³⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, I, 2, (V. 297): "Ad hoc, quod perveniamus ad primum principium considerandum, quod est spiritualissimum et aeternum et supra nos, oportet nos transire per vestigium, quod est corporale et temporale, et extra nos, et hoc est deduci in via Dei; oportet, nos intrare ad mentem nostram, quae est imago Dei aeviterna, spiritualis et intra nos, et hoc est ingredi in veritate Dei; oportet, nos transcendere ad aeternum, spiritualissimum, et supra nos, aspiciendo ad primum principium, et hoc est laetari in Dei notitia et reverentia maiestatis."

³⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, III, 3, (V. 304): "Quomodo autem sciret intellectus hoc esse ens defectivum et incompletum, si nullum haberet cognitionem entis absque omni defectu?" Cf. *Hex.*, V, 30—32, (V. 359).

³⁷⁰ *Hex.*, V, 30, (V. 359): "Et 'si omnis cognitio fit ex praeexistenti cognitione'; ergo necessario intelligentia experitur in se, quod habeat aliquod lumen per quod cognoscat primum esse."

³⁷¹ Cf. Ft. Gilson, *La philosophie de saint Bonaventure*, 2nd ed., Paris, Vrin, 1943, 107—108.

way could thus be conceived as a process by which what is seen without taking heed of becomes consciously seen and is actually grasped.³⁷² The great value of the second way rests exactly in this that it awakens the mind to the realization that God exists and that that truth is absolutely undeniable. The emphasis that any part of being can be used to show that God is the first being actually existing has a value also if we come to consider the descending or unfolding process by which all the properties of the supreme being are unrolled. For, once the mind of man has been awakened and his attention has been recalled and concentrated to realize consciously in its full evidence the undeniable truth that God is and that He is full being, it follows that it can call upon the other primary attributes of God in his being.³⁷³

And we come to the third way of showing that the truth involved in God is absolutely undeniable, based as it is on the immediate and self-sufficient evidence of the truth that God exists.³⁷⁴ Authoritative texts from Saint Anselm and Saint Augustine bear witness to the value of this proof. Other reasons based on dialectical principles are also brought about to establish this third way.³⁷⁵ After having stated a text in which Saint Anselm affirms that should he desire not to believe that God exists, he would still be unable not to understand that He exists.³⁷⁶ Saint Bonaventure offers the famous Anselmian proof for the existence

³⁷² *Itin.*, V, 4, (V. 309): "Mira igitur est caecitas intellectus, qui non considerat illud quod prius videt et sine quod nihil potest cognoscere. Sed sicut oculus intentus in variis colorum differentias lucem, per quam videt cetera, non videt, et si videt, non advertit; sic oculus mentis nostrae, intentus in entia particularia et universalia, ipsum esse extra omne genus, licet primo occurrat menti, et per ipsum alia, tamen non advertit."

³⁷³ *Ibid.*, 5—6, (V. 309): "Vide igitur ipsum purissimum esse, si potes, et occurrit . . . Esse igitur, quod est esse purum et esse simpliciter et esse absolutum, est esse primum, aeternum, simplicissimum, actualissimum, perfectissimum et summum unum. Et sunt haec ita certa, quod non potest ab intelligente ipsum esse cogitari horum oppositum, et unum horum necessario infert aliud. Nam quia simpliciter esse, ideo simpliciter primum; quia simpliciter primum, ideo non est ab alio factum, nec a se ipso potuit, ergo aeternum. Item, quia primum et aeternum, ideo non ex aliis, ergo simplicissimum. Item, quia primum, aeternum et simplicissimum, actualissimum; ideo perfectissimum; tali omnino nihil deficit, neque aliqua potest fieri additio. Quia primum, aeternum, simplicissimum, actualissimum, perfectissimum; ideo summe unum . . . Unde si Deus nominat esse primum, aeternum, simplicissimum, actualissimum, perfectissimum; impossibile est, ipsum cogitari non esse, nec esse nisi unum solum."

³⁷⁴ *Myst. Trin.*, I, 1, (V. 46—47): "Tertia est ista: omne verum in se ipso certissimum et evidentissimum est verum indubitabile. . . Hoc idem monstratur tertia via sic. Omne verum, quod est adeo certum, quod non potest cogitari non esse, est verum indubitabile; sed Deum esse est hujusmodi; ergo etc. Prima per se nota est, secunda ostenditur multipliciter."

³⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, fund. 1—29, (V. 47—48). *Ibid.*, c., (V. 49).

³⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, fund. 21, (V. 47).

of God: God is that than which no greater can be thought. But that which is such that it cannot be thought not to exist is greater or truer than that which can be thought not to exist. Consequently, since God is that than which no greater can be thought, God cannot be thought not to exist.³⁷⁷ Once one is made to know either through reasoning or through experience the signification of the word God, one immediately realizes that God cannot be thought as non-existent, that the affirmation of the existence with reference to God is absolutely necessary, undeniable, self-evident and most certain. Even the notion of God acquired through faith³⁷⁸ or through the common experience of man, of their naturally possessed notion of God,³⁷⁹ can serve to make it impossible for man to deny God's existence.³⁸⁰ The truth that God is is just as self-evident as that of a first principle, for in both cases the predicate is included within the subject. Consequently God in his perfection requires existence so that He must naturally be considered as existing.³⁸¹ The truth involved in the divine *esse* is so self-evident that it warrants immediate assent.³⁸² The very thought of God brings to mind the necessity of affirming his existence. Reasoning and experience both make us aware of the actual presence of God to our soul. Now since that real presence is not had by an abstracted or constructed concept, but through the influence of God himself, it follows that in realizing the necessity of positing God's existence once we think of God, we are not passing from the logical order of concepts or ideas to that of the ontological order of reality outside the mind. In fact the adequation of the mind and the real outside the mind is one which is on the ontological level. Thus it is that the immediate self-evidence of the fact that God exists consists in the realization of the necessary connection between two modes of ontological reality,

³⁷⁷ *Myst. Trin.*, fund. 22, (V. 47): "Item, hoc ipsum probat Anselmus sic; Deus est quo nihil majus cogitari potest; sed quod sic est, quod non potest cogitari non esse, verius est, quam quod cogitari potest non esse; ergo si Deus est quo nihil majus cogitari potest, Deus non poterit cogitari non esse." Cf. I *Sent.*, 8, 1, 2, c., (I. 165).

³⁷⁸ *Myst. Trin.*, I, 1, fund. 21, (V. 47).

³⁷⁹ I *Sent.*, I, 8, 1, 1, fund. 1, (L. 153).

³⁸⁰ *Hex.*, V, 31, (V. 359): "Sic igitur, his praesuppositis, intellectum intelligit et dicit, primum esse est, et nulli vere esse convenit nisi primo esse, et ab ipso omnia habent esse, quia nulli inest hoc praedicatum nisi primo esse. Similiter simplex esse est simpliciter perfectum esse; ergo est quo nihil intelligitur melius. Unde Deus non potest cogitari non esse, ut probat Anselmus."

³⁸¹ *Myst. Trin.*, I, 1, c., (V. 49): "Est etiam illud verum certissimum secundum se, pro eo quod est verum primum et immediatissimum, in quo non tantum causa praedicati clauditur in subjecto, sed id ipsum est omnino esse, quod praedicatur, et subjectum, quod subjicitur."

³⁸² I *Sent.*, 8, 1, 1, 2, c., (I. 153).

the connection between the real existence of God in our soul by his intimate presence and the real existence of God outside the soul as obviously implied and inevitably discoverable. The metaphysical theory of the intimate presence of God to the soul, based on the noetic correspondance of intelligibles in intellectual knowledge serves as the basic presupposition and justification of the proof of God through the immediate evidence involved in the truth that God exists.³⁸³ The presence in the soul of the notion of God, necessarily implies God's existence. This necessity is such that the very consideration of the fact that God is God, necessarily makes us realize that if God is God, God exists.³⁸⁴ The necessity of the object as implying absolute identity of essence and existence and as implying because of its perfection the fact of existence is with the metaphysical theory of the intimate presence of God to the soul, the true foundation of this third way. It renders out of place Guanilo's objection with regard to the imperfect being that is an ideal island, than which no greater can be thought. An island, which by nature denotes an imperfect being than which no greater can be thought which is the mark of a perfect being is a contradiction in itself. It is otherwise when God, the perfect being is involved.³⁸⁵

The implications of truth, as already developed by Saint Augustine,³⁸⁶ are also taken into consideration to lead us to the same inevitable conclusion that God does exist.³⁸⁷ The affirmation of truth in particular and especially in general leads us to the inevitable necessity of affirming the existence of the First Truth, which God is, as the indispensable source and condition for truth. The very negation of truth and of the First Truth implies the existence of the First Truth, since otherwise we could not express a truth.³⁸⁸ No truth can be seen except through the

³⁸³ Cf. comparison of sense knowledge and intellectual knowledge, I *Sent.*, I, 3, I, ad 2, (I. 39).

³⁸⁴ *Myst. Trin.*, I, I, fund. 29, (V. 48): "Si Deus est Deus, Deus est; sed antecedens est adeo verum quod non potest cogitari non esse; ergo Deum esse est verum indubitabile."

³⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, ad 6, (V. 50).

³⁸⁶ *Sol.*, I, 8, 15, PL 32. *Ibid.*, I, 15, 27, PL 32. *Ibid.*, II, 2, 2, PL 32. *Ibid.*, 15, 28, PL 32.

³⁸⁷ *Myst. Trin.*, I, I, fund. 25—26, (V. 47).

³⁸⁸ I *Sent.*, 8, I, I, 2, c., (I. 155): "Probat ita ipsam (scil. existentiam Dei) et concludit omnis propositio affirmativa. Omnis enim talis aliquid ponit; et aliquo posito ponitur verum; et vero posito ponitur veritas quae est causa omnis veri." Cf. *Hex.*, XI, II, (V. 378): "Deum esse primum, manifestum est quia ex omni propositione tam affirmativa quam negativa, sequitur Deum esse, etiam si dicas: Deus non est, sequitur, si Deus non est: quia omnis propositio infert se affirmativam et negativam, ut si Socrates non currit, verum est Socratem non currere." Cf. *Myst. Trin.*, I, I, fund. ad 5, (V. 50).

first truth and the truth through which every truth is caused is an indubitable truth; consequently, since the first truth is God, God's existence is indubitable.³⁸⁹ Furthermore, it is only through the divine light that the human mind can apprehend eternal truths and draw certain and necessary conclusions and the intellect can apprehend no truth with certainty except under the guidance of truth itself.³⁹⁰ The whole theory of knowledge of Saint Bonaventure implies this affirmation of the existence of the source of light which is necessary for the mind's attainment of certitude, the light which illumines all men coming in the world. The whole theory of illumination conceived as the necessary metaphysical hypothesis solely able to explain our certitudinal knowledge thus requires that God, the source of all truth and of all illumination, does exist.³⁹¹

IX

If we consider carefully the development of thought in the presentation of the theory of knowledge and of the demonstration of the existence of God in the thought of Saint Bonaventure, we could be struck by the fact that the whole process was carried through on the purely natural level, with the sole use of rational insights, analyses and demonstrations, without the direct appeal to faith or authority as intrinsic factors of the argumentation. Yet the whole of the theory of knowledge and the demonstration of God's existence offer basic cases of fundamental philosophical subjects of inquiry. Apparently the quest for certainty with regard to the theory of knowledge and the existence of God was carried through on the purely natural level of the rational process leading to insights into the evidence of the truths sought for. And it would also appear that as a matter of fact certainty has been arrived at with these purely natural means. The next step would be to keep on developing those demonstrations which end into the evidence of the truth sought for and the certainty of the assent given. It would appear that the

³⁸⁹ *Myst. Trin.*, I, 1, fund 25, (V. 47).

³⁹⁰ *I Sent.*, 8, 1, 1, 2, fund. 4, (I. 153): "Intellectus noster nihil intelligit nisi per primam lucem et veritatem, ergo omnis actio intellectus, quae est in cogitando aliquid non esse, est per primam lucem; sed per primam lucem non contingit cogitare non esse primam lucem sive veritatem; ergo nullo modo contingit cogitare, primam veritatem non esse."

³⁹¹ *Itin.*, III, 2, (V. 303). *Hex.*, IV, 1, (V. 349): "Lux animae veritas est. Haec lux nescit occasum. Ita enim fortiter irradiat super animam, ut etiam non possit cogitari non esse nec exprimi, quin homo sibi contradicat; quia, si veritas non est, verum est, veritas non esse; ergo aliquid est verum; et si aliquid est verum, verum est, veritatem esse; ergo si veritas non est, veritas est." *Myst. Trin.*, I, 1, fund. 26, (V. 47). *Hex.*, X, 11, (V. 378).

theoretical distinction in the order of specification between the realm of reason and the realm of faith does effectively survive in the practical order of the exercise of the quest for certainty itself. In the thought of Saint Bonaventure, philosophy as a discipline of the purely natural order developed by natural reason on its own, exists both in theory and in practice apart from faith and independently of it. Yet if the demonstrative process and rational analysis were carried through with purely rational principles and data, with the use of natural means and arguments only, to give rational evidence and certainty, it remains that the whole inquiry was pursued by a man who pursued his thought within the framework of the data of revealed truths and the state of the certitude of faith. The thinker, as a concrete individual, remains a believer enriched with the data of revealed truths and stabilized in the certitude of faith. If neither the data nor the certitude possessed enter within the realm of philosophical inquiry as intrinsic elements and functions to make of the results an heteronomous philosophy, it remains that they contribute to the enhancing of the intellectual inquiry by creating an atmosphere or climate which will guide the inquirer to make possible for him the achieving of new and more profound insights, to help him avoid the inevitable dead ends and to preserve him from the pitfalls of inescapable errors. Philosophy itself remains autonomous since it is not limited to the study of the data of revealed truths, since it does not involve within its process and method the intrinsic role of the data of revealed truth and the certitude of assent of faith, and since it does achieve great heights with the use of its purely natural means. That the philosopher in his philosophical inquiry is in a better position to develop a full blown autonomous philosophy if he carries his inquiry within the intellectual framework of the data of revealed truth and the state of the certitude of faith, is clearly expressed in the thought of Saint Bonaventure. That the philosopher who seeks to achieve the fulness of wisdom without the enlightenment of faith is doomed to inevitable shortcomings and to unsurmountable difficulties is also clearly expressed by Saint Bonaventure. But does this imply that the philosophy that the philosopher develops within the atmosphere of faith is not an autonomous philosophy at all and that the philosophy the philosopher develops outside the atmosphere of faith is not an adequate philosophy with its own real value? Saint Bonaventure would hold that in both cases philosophy as such is properly developed. The first need not necessarily be an heteronomous philosophy and the latter need not be a worthless and useless enterprise doomed to failure, but could constitute a proper

philosophy in its own right, be it not the end of all wisdom and free from all error.

Whether or not he has developed a fully autonomous philosophy and whether or not the philosophy he has developed presents a full synthesis does not warrant the conclusion that his intellectual attitude did not allow such a development or call for it. By profession, Saint Bonaventure was not a philosopher. His job was that of a theologian. Hence the way the philosophical thought which lived in his mind and which he used in his theological inquiries was actually developed as it was to be expected within the compass of theological thinking. In itself, when disengaged and thought out as it existed in his mind and was expressed in his writings, such a philosophy was of a purely rational order. That it was the function of philosophy to give the whole truth, is not to be expected in the thought of a Christian thinker. In fact, in this whole discussion, we must clearly distinguish the problem of the end of our intellectual activity from that of the proper object of philosophy as well as the problem of the autonomy of philosophy in the domain which properly belongs to it from that of the self-sufficiency of philosophy in relation to the human destiny. Father Robert³⁹² has reproached Prof Gilson with confusing these basic issues and thus with having misinterpreted Bonaventure. The adequate solution to the question of the exact nature of the characteristic intellectual attitude of Saint Bonaventure in the quest for certainty depends upon the answer given to these diverse though complementary aspects of the problem. It may not be of the nature of philosophy itself to fulfil adequately the totality of perfection in knowledge man is called for. Philosophy may be in its own domain a self-sufficient and autonomous science which in the total process of perfecting of man would be but a step and a moment. It may also be that man is called to a destiny that is beyond the reach of his own reason and surpasses the realm of philosophical inquiry. Yet philosophy, of its nature, could very well not be expected to yield these higher truths and conclusions while still remaining a worthwhile and adequate science with regard to its proper object. The range of reason may not extend to the whole of the reality man is called upon to understand and grasp with certitude. In fact, beyond the natural order of nature and reason is to be found the supernatural order of grace and faith. The existential reality involves both the natural order and the supernatural order. Consequently what is achieved by nature and reason is still worthwhile, even if what

³⁹² P. Robert, "Le problème de la philosophie bonaventurienne", (II), *Laval theol. phil.*, VII (1951), 23—24.

is achieved by grace and faith or the gift of science leads to higher results. That the one realm contributes to the success of the other without destroying it is not contradictory and even remains most plausible and possible. God has endowed man with nature and has superadded grace. He has given man the innate natural light of reason and has superadded the infused supernatural light of faith. The enlightenment in truth and certitude given by reason and by faith is increased through the gift itself of infused science.³⁹³ Man's developing of the potentialities of his nature and his reason within the atmosphere created by the influence of grace and faith no more involves the destruction of the proper efficacy of nature and reason than the exercise of grace and faith, operating within the nature of man and his reason which they do not destroy but rather elevate, involves the belittling and naturalizing of grace and faith. The order of grace presupposes and completes the order of reason. The order of infused faith and science presupposes and completes the order of natural reason and science. Thus it is not surprising that the proper order in the process of the acquisition of perfect knowledge in contemplation should require that contemplation presuppose the infused gift of science, that the gift of infused science presuppose the infused light of faith, that the infused light of faith presuppose the order of natural reason. As a result, the proper process may involve a going beyond the realm of philosophical science, through the realm of the knowledge had in faith and through the infused gift of science and wisdom, to the perfection of contemplation. Yet since grace does not destroy nature, it should not be surprising, if we find that each realm is autonomous and self-sufficient in its own domain with regard to its proper object and end. But it may well be that beyond the nine branches of philosophical inquiry which the pagan philosophers themselves have illustrated and elaborated with success, there is a tenth level of inquiry which would give the perfection of contemplation and which would require something more than the mere use of natural reason. This does not necessarily belittle the value of the whole realm of thought developed on the nine first levels. It is a higher form of contemplative wisdom alone which man fails to reach if left to his own limitations and shortcomings. What philosophy gives therefore is not perfect wisdom. Its function is limited to the acquisition of science in its nine branches. To attain to the fulness of perfection of rational inquiry, it must be somewhat elevated by being placed in a more enlightened atmosphere. The quest for certainty pursued

³⁹³ *Donis*, IV, 2, (V. 474).

within the atmosphere created by the framework of revealed truth and the state of the certitude of faith makes possible the attainment on the purely natural level of the perfect wisdom natural reason can be expected to achieve. But the fulness of perfection man is destined to by his supernatural calling is had but through the help given directly and intrinsically by grace and faith.³⁹⁴ There is a realm where the contribution of both faith and reason are united and transformed to create a new realm which warrants neither the clearness of the certainty of pure reason nor the firmness of the certitude of pure faith, but simply the firm persuasion of theology, which in its order has a great value. The use of philosophy is put to as the instrument or the servant of theology does not in fact destroy its autonomous and self-sufficient essence. Philosophy in the thought of Saint Bonaventure gives what it is called to give and serves its purpose. Philosophy is at once autonomous and limited. As autonomous, it serves faith, as limited, it is served by faith. In serving faith, philosophy either leaves faith intact or unites with it to constitute theology. In being served by faith, philosophy either remains intact or is transformed to constitute theology. It is man who uses both reason and faith to enrich himself and assure his perfection. Man as a theologian using both the data offered by faith and reason may very well achieve deeper and wider insights than man simply as a philosopher making use of natural reason alone. Yet each way of proceeding perfects man in its own and proper way. Man, as the underlying uniting principle of all the habitus, possesses and develops the data of both faith and reason in their autonomous realms as well as in their heteronomous combinations and thus achieves progressively the perfection obtained through the certitude of faith as well as through the evidence and certainty of philosophical science, of theological science and of gratuitous infused science in this world and through the beatifying vision of glorified science in the other.³⁹⁵

The typical intellectual attitude which characterized mediaeval thinkers of the full awareness of the necessity of pursuing, within the framework of the data of revealed truth and the state of certitude given through faith, an enlightened quest for the certainty of truths grasped on their evidence through rational insight and clear understanding was realized in Saint Bonaventure in a way which was totally and simply

³⁹⁴ *Hex.*, VII, 4—16, (V. 366—367). Ed. Delorme, *B.F.S.M.A.* VIII (1934) 99—108).

³⁹⁵ *Donis*, IV, 3—4, (V. 474). III *Sent.*, 35, 2, c. & ad 4, (III. 776). *Hex.*, III, 24—28. (V. 347).

unique in itself and different from the way of realization in the other thinkers from the point of view of the theory of knowledge which underlies this attitude, the methodology used in the development of the inquiry and the conclusions arrived at.

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THE POSITION AND FUNCTION OF MAN IN THE CREATED WORLD ACCORDING TO SAINT BONAVENTURE

CHAPTER II

SOURCES OF THE DOCTRINE

In order to prove the necessity of man's intermediate position in creation, St. Bonaventure has developed *three* main arguments.¹ We saw in our first chapter how each one of them centers around the idea that a *perfect manifestation* of the Creator's basic attributes requires a created world that consists of *three* levels. God displays His *power* best by creating the two *extremely distant realities* of spirit and matter, and by joining them together in one intermediate creature. His *wisdom* is most clearly manifested in a *perfect order*, which likewise demands a highest, a lowest, and an intermediate member. Finally, His self-diffusing *goodness* is shown most perfectly in a creation that displays an act of *self-communication*; and such an act again requires three elements: a giver that communicates to another, a receiver to which something is communicated, and the actual communication which is achieved through a union of the two. The necessary third, intermediate creature is in each case man who stands between the spiritual and the material realm of creation.

The *second* of these three arguments is the more basic and important one. Seen in the light of this second argument, the first one with its emphasis on the maximum distance appears more like a preparation, and the third one with its idea of communication more like a further elaboration of what takes place in the combination of the two extremes. The preeminence of this second argument is in agreement with the general plan of St. Bonaventure's doctrine which was outlined in the Introduction;² for this argument deals with the manifestation of the *wisdom* of the Creator, which is realized in a specific way in the *second phase* of creation. But the essential feature of this second phase is the

¹ II *Sent.* I. 2. I. 2. fund. 1—3 (II. 41b—42a). The exposition of these arguments has been given in Chapter I, Sect. B, § 2, a—c. See *Franciscan Studies* 20 (1960) 295—310.

² See § 1 and 2 (*Franc. Stud.* 20 [1960] 262—74).

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order among creatures; and this is indeed the predominant idea in the second argument, which thus proves to be of particular importance for the *position* of man *within* this order.

The decisive part, upon which the validity and cogency of the whole second argument depends, is the principle that "every order *necessarily* has a *lowest* level, a *highest* level, and an *intermediate* level."³ In our previous explanation of this second argument we have already seen the importance of this principle and the difficulties which it involves, and have tried to explain it by some parallel texts from the works of St. Bonaventure. But it is clear that a more complete answer to the problem of its evidence and justification can be given by showing its historical background; and this task will be undertaken in the present chapter. Since this principle about a necessary *medium* is basic for our whole study, which centers around the main idea of man's *intermediate* place and *mediating* function in creation, the analysis of its sources will prove helpful also for the understanding of the entire dissertation.

In our attempt to find the various sources we shall follow the explicit references or other definite indications which the texts themselves contain. We therefore begin with the works of St. Bonaventure. But since the indications we find in them do not lead us far enough, we shall then turn to Alexander of Hales, whose works represent the Franciscan School immediately prior to St. Bonaventure and are the Seraphic Doctor's proximate sources and authorities. Here we shall find several lines of development.

Section A

Sources Explicitly Mentioned or Implicitly Present in the Works of St. Bonaventure

§ 1

The Meaning of Some Explicit Quotations from Aristotle and their Limits with regard to the Principle

a) The Idea of a First, Middle, and Last Element

St. Bonaventure himself never mentions a definite source where we could find his principle in that complete form in which we have seen it

³ "Omnis autem ordo habet de necessitate infimum et summum et medium." II *Sent.* 1. 2. 1. 2. fund. 2 (II. 41b). For the complete text and translation of the second argument see Chapter I (*Franc. Stud.* 20 [1960]), page 298 and note 113.

stated on several occasions in his works. But in one place, after enumerating the three elements of the principle, he does give a quotation from Aristotle's work *On the Heavens*. One of his proofs for the existence of three and only three Persons in God points to the fact that the number *three* possesses the first and highest perfection, be it considered in itself, in a continuous quantity, or in creatures. With regard to the second point St. Bonaventure writes:

If this number [three] is considered in a *continuous quantity*, it has in itself the first and highest *perfection*: the *first* because *every quantity* has a *first*, *middle*, and *last* element; the *highest* because the supreme perfection of a continuous quantity consists in a threefold dimension, namely in length, breadth, and height. And this is what the Philosopher says in the beginning of his work *On the Heavens and the Earth* [1. 1]: "We express everything that is *perfect* in *three* terms, and we ourselves make use of this number when praising the one God, the Creator of all, who stands above the qualities of things created."⁴

The wording of this quotation from Aristotle does not fully correspond to any of the principal Latin versions; the translation appears to be rather free, and contains elements which may be traced back to different passages in the same first chapter of this Aristotelian work.⁵ One of the signs of a very free rendering of the text is the important expression "*omne enim perfectum*," which is, in this form, not found in the original text,⁶ but is in the present context all the more interesting

⁴ "Similiter, si consideretur numerus iste in quantitate continua, habet in se primam perfectionem et summam: *primam*, quia omnis quantitas habet *principium*, *medium* et *ultimum*; *summam*, quia perfectio quantitatis continuae suprema consistit in trina dimensione, scilicet longitudine, latitudine et altitudine. Et hoc est quod dicit Philosophus, in principio *De caelo et mundo*: 'Omne enim *perfectum* in tribus dicimus, et hoc numero adhibuimus nosmetipsos magnificare Deum unum, creatorem omnium, eminentem proprietatibus eorum quae sunt creata.'" I *Sent.* 2. u. 4. c. (I. 58a).

⁵ An example of the Greek-Latin and Arabic-Latin translations is given in the Quaracchi-edition, vol. I, p. 58, note 3. — For the complete text to which St. Bonaventure's quotation shows a relationship see below, note 7, where the various parallels are emphasized by italics. — St. Bonaventure's quotation, as set off by quotation marks in the Quaracchi-edition, not only shows considerable differences in expression and composition, but also goes *essentially* beyond the original text of Aristotle when speaking of "*one God, the Creator of all*." Perhaps, this last part was not intended to be a strict quotation.

⁶ In connection with the reference to divine worship, and especially in the part that precedes this reference, Aristotle merely speaks of "totum et omnia — τὸ πᾶν καὶ τὰ πάντα" (268a 11); an equation of these terms with "perfectum" (τὰ πάντα καὶ τὸ πᾶν καὶ τὸ τέλειον) follows only later (268a 20—1). The words "in tribus dicimus" remind of line 268a 18: "De tribus hanc appellationem ['omnes'] dicimus primum." For the same quotation from Aristotle in the *Summa Halesiana* see below, page 30, note 93; an explanation follows in note 94. — GENERAL REMARK: The numbers in parentheses refer, wherever they appear in connection with

and significant because it is precisely this expression which makes the use of this quotation so much easier for St. Bonaventure, who now concentrates on this notion of perfection.

At first sight it may look as if the quotation were given only as an illustration of the second point, namely of the fact that the number *three* possesses the *highest* perfection. This would leave open the question concerning the source of the first point, which is for us of greater importance. However, in the same passage from which St. Bonaventure quotes, we also find those three elements of our principle. The complete text of Aristotle, on which the condensed version in St. Bonaventure seems to be based, contains the additional statement: "As the Pythagoreans say, the world and all that is in it is determined by the number three, since beginning and middle and end give the number of an 'all,' and the number they give is the triad."⁷ This appears as a definite parallel to what St. Bonaventure says about the *first* perfection of the number *three*; and the three elements he mentions in that connection are therefore, at least indirectly, linked to this text of Aristotle.⁸

ARISTOTLE, to the Greek text of the Bekker-edition (Berlin 1831). Unless indicated otherwise, the Greek and Latin quotations from the works of Aristotle are also taken from this edition (for the Greek text see vols. 1—2; for the Latin translation see vol. 3).

⁷ The entire passage of the original text reads as follows: "Magnitudinis autem quae quidem ad unum, linea; quae autem ad duo, planum; quae autem ad tria, corpus. Et praeter has non est alia magnitudo, propter *tria omnia esse*, et ipsum ter omniaque. Quemadmodum enim aiunt et Pythagorici, *totum et omnia tribus determinata sunt*. CONSUMMATIO enim et MEDIUM et PRINCIPIUM numerum habent eum qui omnis (τελευτή γάρ καὶ μέσον καὶ ἀρχή τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἔχει τὸν τοῦ παντός): haec autem eum qui trinitatis est. Propter quod, a natura accipientes tanquam leges illius, et ad sanctificationes deorum hoc utimur numero. Assignamus autem et appellationes secundum modum hunc. Quae enim duo, ambo dicimus, et duos ambo: *omnes* autem non dicimus, sed *de tribus* hanc appellationem dicimus primum. Hoc autem, quemadmodum dictum est, propter naturam ipsam sic inducentem sequimur. Itaque, quoniam *omne* et *totum* et *perfectum* non secundum speciem differunt ab invicem, sed si quidem utique in materia et in quibus dicuntur, corpus utique erit solum e magnitudinibus *perfecta*. Solum enim *determinatum est tribus*; hoc autem est *omne*." *De caelo* I. 1 (268a 7—24). The present Latin text is taken from the version which is found in connection with St. Thomas' Commentary on this work (*Op. omnia* [ed. Leon.] 3. 5b); the English translation is according to R. McKeon, *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (New York 1941) 398.

⁸ The idea that every total comprises a first, middle, and last element appears also in other writings of Aristotle, so e. g. *Metaph.* 4 (5). 26: "Cum quantum habeat *principium*, *medium*, et *ultimum* (ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσον καὶ ἔσχατον), quorumcumque positio non facit differentiam, *omne* (πᾶν) dicitur; quorumcumque vero facit, *totum* (ὅλον)" (1024a 1—3). In *Poet.* 7 we read: "Positum autem est a nobis perfectae atque totius actionis esse imitationem, habentis aliquam *magnitudinem*. *Totum* autem est habens *principium* et *medium* et *finem* (ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευτήν)" (1450b 23—7). — Note that the connection with quantity and magnitude is always present.

To what extent, however, this source actually provides a basis for our principle, is another question. The three elements are in this case derived from the very definite situation that exists in an *extended, continuous body*. Such a body or other reality,⁹ no matter how small, can always be divided into a number of homogeneous parts. It is now evident that such a line or series of homogeneous parts must have not only a first and last part, which constitute the limits, but also certain other parts between these extremes, if the whole is to possess continuity. With regard to such members our principle certainly holds, and can find a basis in the text we are considering. But in those cases in which we saw St. Bonaventure apply his principle of a necessary middle term, the members involved were of a quite different nature. There we had distinct and dissimilar beings and various levels of perfection, which are not linked together by the same kind of order; and this passage of Aristotle alone, therefore, does not really justify an application of our principle of the three terms to *every* order.

Of interest at this point is the attitude which St. Thomas Aquinas takes with regard to this text; for it not only confirms the present analysis, but also shows where the two great masters take different directions. In his *Summa Theologica* St. Thomas seems to make use of this text of Aristotle when proving the existence of three orders within each angelic hierarchy. He compares the angelic ranks with those of a human society, in which we find a multitude of members. Because of their various functions these members form a gradually descending scale; but the number of steps in this scale "can be reduced to three, in as far as every *perfect multitude* has a beginning, a middle, and an end."¹⁰ In this connection St. Thomas himself mentions only Denis the Areopagite, whereas Cajetan, his later commentator, refers also to the beginning of Aristotle's work *On the Heavens*.¹¹ Since the members of this multitude are basically of the same nature and take their place within the vertical scale merely according to their function, this case is somewhat similar

⁹ Not only space, but also time possesses such a continuity. See e. g. *Categ.* 6 about the notion of quantity, where Aristotle states: "Quanti autem aliud est discretum (διωρισμένον), aliud continuum (συνεχές) . . . Discretum est, ut numerus et sermo; continuum est, ut linea, superficies, corpus, et praeterea locus et tempus" (4b 20—5).

¹⁰ "Sed quamvis multi sint unius civitatis ordines, omnes tamen ad tres possunt reduci, secundum quod quaelibet *multitudo perfecta* habet *principium, medium et finem*." *Summa theol.* 1. 108. 2. c. (*Op. omnia* [ed. Leon.] 5. 496a).

¹¹ *Ibid.* (5. 496b).

to Aristotle's example of a continuous body that consists of several parts, and the same principle can thus be applied.¹²

Later, in his *Commentary* on the same work of Aristotle¹³, St. Thomas is more critical about this principle of the three terms and its applicability. He first gives an explanation of the text. "In *divisible* things," he significantly emphasizes, "the first part is not sufficient for the integrity of the whole which is constituted by the last part, and we reach the latter from the beginning through an intermediate part."¹⁴ In the discussion which follows he draws our attention to the fact that, otherwise, Aristotle never uses Pythagorean arguments in order to prove his point, and that he nowhere else draws conclusions from certain qualities of numbers. His final opinion on this principle is that it is not cogent in every case, and that the necessity of three terms must be proved in some other way by the respective science.¹⁵ In the present passage of Aristotle's work, St. Thomas considers this principle not as part of the demonstration, but merely as an additional confirmation which in itself possesses only *probability*. It is thus understandable that he does not go further in the use of this principle. If it plays such an important role in St. Bonaventure's doctrine and is treated there like an axiom, it can hardly be derived from this text of Aristotle, but must have other, more powerful roots from which it draws its strength. In searching for these sources we shall find a background that differs from the world of St. Thomas and shows St. Bonaventure on his own ground, upon which he has also built his doctrine on the position of man in creation.

b) The Idea of Two Extremes and a Necessary Connecting Medium

The preceding conclusion will be confirmed and further strengthened, if we take a closer look at another text of St. Bonaventure, where the

¹² St. Bonaventure, too, occasionally enumerates the three elements merely in this general sense, so e. g. *In Hexaem.* 10. 12: "In isto ordine per posteriora ad priora et ad primum pervenitur. Omnia enim vel sunt *posteriora*, vel *media*, vel *prima*" (V. 378b).

¹³ The first part of the *Summa Theologica* was finished in 1268, whereas the *Commentary* on Aristotle's *De caelo* was written in 1271/72. See P. Glorieux, *Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIII^e siècle* (Paris 1933) I. 92 and 97.

¹⁴ "In rebus enim divisibilibus prima pars non sufficit ad integritatem totius, quod constituitur per ultimum, ad quod a principio pervenitur per medium." *Comment. in libr. De caelo et mundo* I. 1, lect. 2. 4 (*Op. omnia* [ed. Leon.] 3. 6b).

¹⁵ *Ibid.* lect. 2. 7: "Videtur tamen quod haec probatio non sit efficax . . . Sed sciendum est quod, sicut dicit Simplicius in Commento, Aristoteles non procedit hic demonstrative, sed secundum probabilitatem: et hic modus sufficiens est post demonstrationes praemissas, vel praesuppositas ab alia scientia" (3. 7a). The three dimensions in the present example are to be proved by mathematics.

three elements are not only enumerated, but presented in such a way that the existence of the important middle term follows from the two extremes. In this case the name of Aristotle is not mentioned, but the same work *On the Heavens* is obviously being quoted. This text is the *fourth argument* which the Seraphic Doctor adds to the three principal arguments we considered in the first chapter. We mention the fourth argument in this connection because of its reference to Aristotle, and we are justified in separating it from the other three on account of its *different character*. This difference is indeed considerable and sets it apart from the preceding arguments in various respects. St. Bonaventure himself calls it a philosophical argument, whereas he characterizes the other three as theological reasons.¹⁶ The subsequent conclusion to the question does not refer to the fourth argument in any way, a fact which makes it appear to be less important in the judgment of the author. Compared with the other three, it is very short and states the entire proof in the following few lines:

If one of two contraries is to be asserted, then also the other; if a corporeal substance, then also a spiritual one. And if combinable extremes are to be assumed, then also a medium.¹⁷

This argument evidently considers the two extreme levels in creation as two contrary realities. Since one of the contraries, namely the corporeal and visible world, actually exists, the corresponding contrary, that is the world of spirits, must also exist because of a general principle which says that the existence of one contrary implies the existence of the other. But these two contrary levels cannot form one harmonious creation unless the two extremes are somehow combinable, and their connection, in turn, demands a combining medium between them. Such appears to be the meaning of the present brief argument, and since at least the first part, namely the axiom about the existence of two contraries, shows an evident relationship to a passage in Aristotle's work *On the Heavens*, the Aristotelian basis for St. Bonaventure's principle of the three terms seems to be established.

However, a more careful examination of this source reveals a different picture. In the chapter from which the axiom about contraries is taken, Aristotle proves step by step the existence and location of the four elements in the universe. In the fixed center of the rotating heavenly

¹⁶ "Item, hoc non solum videtur ratione theologica, sed etiam philosophica." II *Sent.* I. 2. I. 2. fund. 4 (II. 42a).

¹⁷ "Si est ponere unam differentiam contrarietatis, et alteram [*De caelo* 2. 3]: si ergo corporale, et spirituale; et si ponere est extrema componibilia, ergo et medium." *Ibid.*

sphere is the earth, the heavy and, at the same time, motionless element. Aristotle's next conclusion is that, "if there is earth, there must also be fire; for *if one of two contraries exists in nature, it is necessary that also the other exists in nature.*"¹⁸ Here is the axiom which the argument of St. Bonaventure adopts.

Aristotles then continues with some explanatory remarks. In order to verify the *general axiom* which he has used as proof for the actual existence of the contrary element of fire, he now calls attention to the fact that contraries have a *common substance* or *substratum*, so that the substance of one contrary is always capable of assuming the other. The elements have their common substratum in prime matter, so that this general axiom about the existence of contraries applies to them.¹⁹

Here it should be noted that this reference to a common substratum proves, strictly speaking, only the *possible* existence of the other contrary, and not yet the *actual* or *necessary* existence of which the axiom speaks. St. Thomas Aquinas seems to have been aware of this difficulty when writing his Commentary on this text. In order to show the valid basis for the remaining step from the possible to the actual and necessary existence of the other contrary, he mentions an *additional axiom* which says that "in nature nothing is in vain."²⁰ And he is right in considering this axiom as implicitly contained in the present argument; for this additional axiom is not only stated a number of times in other works of Aristotle,²¹ but is also in accordance with a basic feature in Aristotle's

¹⁸ The text of Aristotle in *De caelo* 2. 3, as we find it in connection with the Commentary of St. Thomas on this work (*Op. omnia* [ed. Leon.] 3.134b), reads as follows: "Sed adhuc, si terram, necesse et ignem esse. Contrariorum enim si alterum natura, necesse et alterum esse natura (τῶν γὰρ ἐναντίων εἰ θάτερον φύσει, ἀνάγκη καὶ θάτερον εἶναι φύσει)" (286a 22—4). — The other Latin quotations from *De caelo*, which follow in this section b), are also taken from this edition.

¹⁹ "Si vero sit contrarium, et esse quandam ipsius naturam: eadem enim materia contrariorum (ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ ὕλη τῶν ἐναντίων)." *De caelo* 2. 3 (286a 24—5).

²⁰ St. Thomas explains: "Sic oportet quod materia unius contrarii habeat *potentiam* ad aliud contrarium; quae quidem potentia esset *frustra*, si illud contrarium non posset esse in natura. Unde, *cum nihil sit frustra in natura, necesse est quod si unum contrariorum est, quod et reliquum sit*" (*Comment. in libr. De caelo et mundo* 2. 3, lect. 4. 7 [*Op. omnia* (ed. Leon.) 3. 137b]).

²¹ The axiom that "nature does nothing in vain (ἡ φύσις οὐδὲν μάτην ποιεῖ)" appears in *De caelo* 1. 4 (271a 33) and 2. 11 (291b 13—14); *De anima* 3. 9 (432b 21) and 3. 12 (434a 31); *De respiratione* 10 (476a 12—13); *De partib. animal.* 2. 13 (658a 8—9), 3. 1 (661b 23—4), and 4. 13 (695b 19); *De animal. incessu* 2 (704b 15) and 8 (708a 9—10); *De animal. generat.* 2. 5 (741b 4—5) and 2. 6 (744a 36—7); *De re publ.* 1. 2 (1253a 9) and 1. 8 (1256b 20—1). All these texts use the same words, with a variation only in their order and construction according to the particular context. In addition to these texts there are many others in which the same axiom is expressed in

conception of nature, namely with the general tendency of all things to come from potentiality to operation, and to reach the state of actualization and perfection.²² In the *Politics* we find the statement that "nature is the end, and what each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature."²³ These thoughts, as expressed in that additional axiom and referred to by St. Thomas, are the basis for the conclusion of the original axiom that, if one contrary actually exists, the other contrary, for which the common substratum possesses the potentiality, must also be actualized somewhere in nature.

To confirm further that the existence of earth implies the existence of the contrary element of fire, Aristotle then adds a second proof which applies only to the *particular conclusion* drawn from earth to fire.²⁴ Referring to the fact that one of two contraries is always a privation with regard to the other,²⁵ he points out that the affirmation of something is by nature prior to its privation. The existence of the heavy and motionless element of earth, therefore, presupposes the existence also of the contrary element of fire, which possesses the positive qualities of lightness and movement.²⁶ and which has its place at the greatest distance from

similar terms. — J. Zürcher (*Aristoteles' Werk und Geist* [Paderborn 1952] 81) enumerates this axiom among other *Stoic* elements which were added at a later redaction; but he leaves open the possibility that it may also be *Platonic-Aristotelian*. In a later work (*Das Corpus Academicum* [Paderborn 1954] 138) he calls it *Aristotelian-Theophrastic*.

²² This general tendency to come from potentiality (δύναμις) to operation (ἐνέργεια), and to reach actualization and perfection (ἐντελέχεια), is insinuated e. g. in *Phys.* 8. 5 (257b 7—8), *De caelo* 4. 3 (311a 4), and also *Metaph.* 8 (9). 8 (1050a 21—3).

²³ "At natura finis est (ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος ἐστίν): quale enim quidque est ortu eius absoluto atque perfecto (τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθείσης), hanc cuiusque naturam esse dicimus, ut hominis, equi, domus." *De re publ.* 1. 2 (1252b 32—4). For the English translation and for the dynamic and teleological character of the Aristotelian universe see E. Barker, "Aristotle," *Encyclop. Brit.* 2 (1960) 353. That "nature is the end" is stated also in *Phys.* 2. 2 (194a 28).

²⁴ Because of the close connection between this part and the preceding explanation one might be tempted to consider this sentence as still being a part of the proof for the above-stated *general* axiom, and to see in it, perhaps, the missing justification of the important step from the possible to the actual existence of the other contrary. But since this second argument is based on the idea of a *priority* of one contrary over the other, it would seem to be applicable only in *one* direction and can, for this reason, not serve as proof for that general axiom which asserts, by its very general formulation, the validity of such a conclusion in either direction. The Commentary of St. Thomas (*loc. cit.*, lect. 4. 8) also considers this part of the text as a *second* proof.

²⁵ This fact is implicitly contained in the present text, but is explicitly stated on other occasions, e. g. *Metaph.* 9 (10). 4 (1055a 33—b29).

²⁶ Aristotle briefly states: "Et privatione prius affirmatio, dico autem puta calidum frigidus: quies autem et gravitas dicuntur per privationem levitatis et motus." *De caelo* 2. 3 (286a 25—8).

the earth as the most outward layer. Using in this way both the *general* axiom about the necessary existence of contraries and the *more specific* axiom about the priority of one contrary over the other, Aristotle establishes earth and fire as the two extremes among the four elements.

The text of Aristotle shows in this point a certain parallel to the two extreme levels in creation, and this may be the reason why the argument of St. Bonaventure seeks to prove the necessity of these two levels with the help of that same *general* axiom about the necessary existence of contraries which Aristotle has used. What makes this parallel even greater, and therefore seems further to justify the application of this axiom to the two levels of creation, is the fact that the Seraphic Doctor actually considers prime matter as the common substratum for both corporeal and spiritual beings.²⁷ However, after comparing the two sets of contraries in their real nature, we must still say that St. Bonaventure's use of this axiom represents a considerable step beyond Aristotle's idea and involves some difficulties.

One important difference lies in the transition from one contrary to the other. Such a change is always possible in the case of the elements, as Aristotle explicitly teaches and explains;²⁸ but it cannot take place between the corporeal and the spiritual nature, no matter how much they may be conceived as contraries. St. Bonaventure assumes for both of these contraries a common substratum which he characterizes as matter in its *essence*.²⁹ But he also emphasizes that once this matter is united with any form — and it cannot exist without some form — it is according to the nature of that particular form determined either as corporeal or as spiritual matter. Since this *actually existing* matter, as St. Bonaventure calls it in contradistinction to matter in its essence, is not of the same nature in the two contraries in question, no change from one contrary into the other is possible.³⁰

²⁷ With regard to the angels see II *Sent.* 3. 1. 1. 1—2 (II. 89—98); with regard to the human soul see II *Sent.* 17. 1. 2 (II. 413—6).

²⁸ E. g. *De generat. et corrupt.* 2. 4 (331a 7—332a 2). *Metaph.* 9 (10). 4 defines contrariety as "the greatest difference" or distance within which a change from one contrary into the other is still possible (1055a 3—10). See below, note 69 on page 24.

²⁹ About the important distinction which St. Bonaventure makes between *materia secundum essentiam* and *secundum esse* see II *Sent.* 3. 1. 1. 2. c. (II. 97b) and ad 1 (98a); also 12. 1. 1. c. (294a) and 30. 3. 1. c. (729b).

³⁰ In an *objection* is stated: "Cum ergo materia subiecta corporalibus formis nullo modo possit capere formas spirituales per individuum perfectionem, nec e converso, quia nunquam de angelo potest fieri corpus, nec e converso: ergo differunt per essentiam." — In the *answer* of St. Bonaventure we read: "Capacitas consequens essentiam materiae indifferenter se habet ad formam sive spiritualem sive corporalem; sed quia materia nunquam exspoliatur ab omni esse, et quae semel est sub esse corporali nun-

St. Bonaventure himself mentions as a possible objection against his doctrine of a common matter for bodies and spirits, that whatever has a common matter could be changed from one into the other. He answers this point by saying that the present objection refers to *actually existing corporeal* matter, "on account of which things are said to be changeable into one another."³¹ This is what Aristotle means when he speaks about contrary elements, but it takes place only within the material realm, that is, within *one* of the two contraries mentioned and confronted in the argument of St. Bonaventure.

We thus see that even if St. Bonaventure's particular notion of prime matter as substratum for every creature is taken into account, the parallel between Aristotle's extreme elements and St. Bonaventure's extreme levels in creation is not complete. In the present two cases the notion of contraries does not appear to be precisely the same, and the use of Aristotle's axiom in the argument of St. Bonaventure therefore leads to some difficulties. All this contributes to the general impression that Aristotle is not really the original or principal source for St. Bonaventure's idea concerning the order in creation. The Seraphic Doctor appears to have received his basic thoughts from somewhere else, and now seems to have the intention to confirm his position by introducing some other principle which he found in common Scholastic tradition.

The difference between St. Bonaventure's argument and the quoted work of Aristotle becomes even greater and more manifest in the *second* part of the argument, which seeks to prove a necessary *medium* between these extremes. Having established the existence of earth and fire, Aristotle now shows that there must be two other elements between them, namely water and air.³² But instead of invoking some other principle about a connecting middle term that would have the necessary function of combining the two extremes, as we find it now in St. Bonaventure's argument, Aristotle proves these intermediate elements by the aid of the same *general axiom* about the necessary existence of

quam exiit, et similiter illa quae est sub esse spirituali: hinc est quod materia consequens esse in spiritualibus et corporalibus est alia et alia." II Sent. 3. 1. 1. 2. arg. 3 (II. 95 b) and ad 3 (98 a).

³¹ The *objection* says: "Quaecumque communicant in materia, sunt ad invicem transmutabilia, sicut dicit Boethius, De duabus naturis et una persona Christi; sed spiritualia et corporalia non sunt huiusmodi." — St. Bonaventure *answers*: "Loquitur de materia secundum esse, hoc est de materia transmutabili, ratione cuius dicuntur res ad invicem transmutabiles; et ideo sermo ille secundum physicum et in genere physici est intelligendus." *Ibid.* arg. 2 (95 b) and ad 2 (98 a).


³² "Sed adhuc, si quidem est ignis et terra, necesse et intermedia ipsorum esse corpora." *De caelo* 2. 3 (286 a 28—9).

contraries. His explanation consists in the brief statement that "each one of the elements possesses a contrariety to every other one."³³ According to Aristotle's detailed descriptions on other occasions, the four elements are constituted by two fundamental contraries which are coupled in four possible ways.³⁴ Earth and fire are, therefore, not only contrary to one another, but contain at the same time some quality which has its contrary in the remaining two elements.³⁵ The existence of earth and fire thus implies and indicates the existence of the two intermediate elements in virtue of the same general axiom about contraries.³⁶

Compared with this solution of Aristotle, the second part of St. Bonaventure's argument shows a completely different approach which reveals its true background. Instead of continuing the idea of contraries, it now centers around the fact that the extremes must be *combined* and must, for this reason, have some medium between them which functions as a kind of *bond*. Aristotle does not mention this idea. But St. Thomas Aquinas, in his Commentary on this work, compares Aristotle's answer with that of Plato, who first states the existence of the same two extreme elements, and then demands two intermediate elements as a necessary bond in order to assure the continuity and unity of the whole. These

³³ "Contrarietatem enim habet unumquodque ad unumquodque elementorum." *Ibid.* (286a 29—30).


³⁴ See e. g. *De generat. et corrupt.* 2. 1—3 (328b 26—331a 6). The two fundamental contraries (---) are: hot-cold and moist-dry. They allow four different combinations (—) which constitute the four elements in the following way:



³⁵ How the two extreme elements have a contrary quality also in the two intermediate elements, and thus imply and indicate their existence, can be shown in the following scheme:

←---→ The contrary qualities in the two extreme elements.

—→ The necessary existence of that contrary quality which corresponds to the *second* quality (dry) in the extreme elements, and which is found in the *intermediate* elements in two combinations.



³⁶ The Commentary of St. Thomas explicitly points out that Aristotle's proof for the necessary existence of intermediate elements rests on the same *general axiom* about contraries. He explains: "Unde relinquitur, si sunt duo elementa, quod necesse est esse alia duo, ex hoc quod probatum est quod si necesse est esse unum contrariorum, necesse est esse alterum." *Comment. in libr. De caelo et mundo* 2. 3, lect. 4. 9 (*Op. omnia* [ed. Leon.] 3. 138a).

intermediate element are now proved in terms of numerical proportions.³⁷ Not the Aristotelian, but this Platonic background is, as we shall see more and more, the real source of St. Bonaventure's doctrine on man's intermediate position, and particularly the source of that principle upon which this doctrine is based.

c) The Idea of Two Extremes and a Necessary Intermediate Member

Before turning our full attention to other sources, we must examine one further text of St. Bonaventure's Commentary on the *Sentences* in which the principle of two extremes and a necessary third, intermediate member is clearly stated. In considering the principle as formulated in this passage, a close parallel in the works of Aristotle comes to our mind, with the result that this text once more raises the question as to a possible Aristotelian origin of the principle.³⁸ The question of this relationship to Aristotle is the reason for discussing the passage at this point of our study. The indispensable analysis of the text itself, however, will throw new light also on the background of St. Bonaventure's principle, particularly on the real meaning of that more general axiom about the perfection in the universe which we have met so frequently in the first chapter of our study, and on which, to a great extent, the convincing power of our principle depends.

α) The Context Surrounding the Principle in St. Bonaventure

The text to be examined occurs in connection with the question "as to whether the soul of the Blessed Virgin was sanctified before being affected by original sin."³⁹ Among the arguments in favor of the doctrine that, in this case, sanctification preceded every stain of original sin, we find one argument which is built upon the idea of a necessary intermediate being. The argument begins with an axiomatic statement in which we at once recognize our principle about the three terms. The first brief sentence declares: „Given that there are extremes, then there is also a medium."⁴⁰ The argument then presents two such extremes

³⁷ "Plato autem probavit ex extremis elementis quod necesse est esse media, per proportionem numeralem: quia inter duos cubicos numeros necesse est esse duos alios numeros secundum continuam proportionalitatem." *Ibid.* St. Thomas is referring to a passage in Plato's *Timaeus* which will be examined in § 2 (p. 24 ff.) of the present Section.

³⁸ The Quaracchi-edition (III. 65b) refers to Aristotle by quoting, in a footnote (no. 4) to this passage, a text from the *Eudemian Ethics* (3. 4).

³⁹ III *Sent.* 3. 1. 1. 2: "Utrum anima beatae Virginis sanctificata fuerit ante originalis peccati contractionem" (III. 65—9).

⁴⁰ "Item, si est ponere extrema, contingit ponere medium." *Ibid.* arg. 4 (III. 65b).

which actually exist: The descendants of Adam have in common original sin *both in soul and in body*; Christ, on the other hand, had original sin *neither in soul nor in body*. From these two extremes the argument concludes, on the basis of the above-stated principle, that an intermediate reality is to be found also, namely a creature with original sin *in soul or body alone*.⁴¹ Since it is impossible to have original sin in the soul and not in the body, because the soul is affected by this sin through the body which alone is transmitted by generation, there remains the only other alternative, namely of having original sin in the body and not in the soul.⁴² This intermediate case is realized in the Virgin Mary who, in her purity, comes nearest to Christ.⁴³

The main part of the question resumes the idea of this argument and again states these three cases: "Just as there was a person exempt from original sin both in body and in soul, or in cause and effect, and also a person that has original sin in both ways, so there should also be an intermediate person who in some way has it, and in another way has it not." This intermediate person again is the Blessed Virgin "who is the mediator between us and Christ, as Christ is between us and God." As reason for the need of such an intermediate person we now do not find any allusion to the principle of two extremes and an intermediate term; the text merely refers to the "decorum of order" which is said to call for three such members.⁴⁴ This change to the more general axiom of order and perfection in the universe is not, however, surprising if one remembers that the perfect order is seen in the realization of these three terms.

St. Bonaventure himself, it is true — and a faithful analysis of the text must take this fact into account —, does not adopt the position

⁴¹ "Sed contingit ponere *habentes* originale peccatum in anima et in carne, sicut filii Adam habent communiter; contingit invenire *carentem* in anima et in carne, sicut in Christo: ergo contingit reperire *medium*, scilicet habentem in carne et non in anima, vel in anima et non in carne." *Ibid.* — Note that both of these intermediate cases are again a composition of some elements in either extreme.

⁴² "Sed habere in anima et non in carne est impossibile, quia originale ortum habet a carne; anima enim non traducitur, sed caro: restat igitur, quod aliqua persona fuit, quae haberet originale solum in carne et non in anima." *Ibid.*

⁴³ "Haec autem fuit illa, quae maxime accedit ad Christum puritate, et haec est Virgo Maria." *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ The entire passage reads in this way: "Haec autem positio videtur posse fulciri multiplici congruentia, tum . . . tum etiam propter *ordinis decorum*, ut, sicut fuit persona *immunis* ab originali et in carne et in anima, sive in causa et in effectu, et persona *utroque modo habens* originale, sic esset persona *media*, quae quodam modo haberet et quodam modo non haberet; et ista est beata Virgo, quae *mediatrix* est inter nos et Christum, sicut Christus inter nos et Deum." *Ibid.* c. (67a).

which the above-quoted argument seeks to prove. Although discussing the reasons in favor of this position very carefully and with apparent benevolence, trying to show it in all its strength and thus giving the impression that he sees in it more than a mere possibility, he still hesitates to exclude Mary from that universal law of original sin, of which St. Paul so forcefully speaks in his letter to the Romans, and which is so greatly stressed by the Saints and tradition.⁴⁵ But the fact that he finally decides in favor of the opposite opinion does not mean a rejection of the present argument, in as far as the involved principle of two extremes and a middle term is concerned. In his answer to this argument St. Bonaventure repeats the principle in abbreviated form and explicitly says that "it is true." In order to defend the position he is taking in this question, he then merely draws a more precise limit to the validity of the principle by adding that it holds "if such a medium can be made up of the extremes in accordance with due order and fitness."⁴⁶ This restriction reminds us of St. Bonaventure's fourth argument in favor of man's intermediate position, where he states that, "if *combinable* extremes are to be assumed, then also a medium."⁴⁷ This particular condition is not, according to the Seraphic Doctor, fulfilled in the case of that medium which the present argument about original sin seeks to construct; for it would mean "to assume a cause without an effect, or an effect without a cause."⁴⁸

β) The General Background for the Principle in St. Augustine

The fact that St. Bonaventure's principle of two extremes and a necessary intermediate term now appears in an argument favoring the

⁴⁵ St. Bonaventure states his own position in the second part of the conclusion (III. 67b—68a). His central argument is the universality of original sin and the universal need of redemption. It culminates in three quotations from Holy Scripture (Rom. 3 : 23; 5 : 12; 2 Cor. 5 : 14) which all contain the weighty word *omnes*. St. Bonaventure had not yet arrived at the notion of redemption by preservation, which Duns Scotus later developed to overcome this difficulty, and which actually represents not only a true but also the most excellent way of redemption. See on this question esp. E. Chietini, *Mariologia S. Bonaventurae*, Bibliotheca Mariana Medii Aevi 3 (Rome 1941) 134—48.

⁴⁶ "Ad illud quod obicitur, quod si est ponere extrema, et medium; dicendum, quod verum est, si medium illud natum sit confici ex extremis secundum debitum ordinem et congruentiam." III *Sent.* 3. 1. 1. 2. ad 4 (III. 68b).

⁴⁷ "Si ponere est extrema componibilia, ergo et medium." II *Sent.* 1. 2. 1. 2. fund. 4 (II. 42a). See above, page 7 and note 17.

⁴⁸ The concluding sentence of St. Bonaventure's answer says: "Non sic autem est in proposito; nam ponere causam sine effectum, vel effectum sine causa non convenit neque decet." III *Sent.* 3. 1. 1. 2. ad 4 (III. 68b).

opposite opinion, leads to the assumption that this argument was also used by other authors who defended the same doctrine. A review of various medieval writings of this period shows that the argument deduced from the perfection in the universe was, indeed, widely mentioned as a reason for the Immaculate Conception. One example, which is particularly revealing, will be sufficient in the present connection. Robert of Cowton, a Franciscan theologian of whom we know that he was living in the monastery at Oxford together with Duns Scotus in the year 1300, has, in his Commentary on the *Sentences*, also written a question on the Immaculate Conception, which has now been published.⁴⁹ The final argument he advances there in favor of Mary's preservation from original sin is built upon the idea of the perfection in the universe.

The first part of the argument seeks to justify this idea of perfection by quoting a passage from St. Augustine's work *On the Free Will*. Robert of Cowton gives a very brief but precise summary of the actual text when he states: "What thou canst imagine in the light of the *true reason* as an existing reality, this, I believe, has been made."⁵⁰ In the chapter from which these words are taken, St. Augustine first explains how creation comprises not only the perfect heaven but also the less perfect earth with its great variety, so that it represents all degrees of perfection and exceeds our imagination. But man not only perceives this wide range between heaven and earth and marvels at the multiformity and gradation of created things upon this earth; his soul also is, as St. Augustine now goes on to explain, "in a natural way *connected with the Divine Ideas* on which it depends. When the soul judges it to be better that this come into being rather than that, and if it states the truth and sees what it states, it sees it in those Ideas with which it is connected. It may,

⁴⁹ See B. Hechich, *De Immaculata Conceptione Beatae Mariae Virginis secundum Thomam de Sutton O. P. et Robertum de Cowton O.F.M.: Textus et doctrina*, Bibliotheca Immaculatae Conceptionis 7 (Rome 1958). The published text of Robert of Cowton comprises III *Sent.* d. 3, q. un. The document which proves his stay at Oxford in the year 1300 is discussed on p. 21—2; the argument from the perfection of the universe appears on p. 84—5.

⁵⁰ Robert of Cowton formulates the first part of his argument in this way: "Item, arguitur hoc idem ex universi perfectione, — nam secundum Augustinum III *De libero arbitrio* cap. 4, dicit: 'Quod vera ratione cogitare potes in rebus, hoc existimo factum est.'" III *Sent.* 3. 1. arg. ultimum (B. Hechich, *op. cit.*, 84). — The principal passage upon which this summary is based reads in the work of St. Augustine as follows: "Potest ergo esse aliquid in rerum natura, quod tua ratione non cogitas. Non esse autem quod vera ratione cogitas, non potest. Neque enim tu potes aliquid melius in creatura cogitare, quod creaturae artificem fugerit." *De lib. arbit.* 3. 5 (no. 13) (ML 32. 1277). — The same idea is expressed also in the beginning of the chapter: "Quidquid enim tibi vera ratione melius occurrerit, scias fecisse Deum tanquam bonorum omnium conditorem." *Ibid.*

therefore, be convinced that God has made what it recognizes in the light of the *true reason* as something that had to be made by Him, even if it does not see it among things created."⁵¹

With this reference to a connection between the human mind and the Divine Ideas, St. Augustine indicates the real reason why, according to him, man is justified in concluding from the *mental recognition* of something more perfect that this more perfect being or arrangement also *actually exists* in creation. On the background of this truly Augustinian thought, which is derived from Plato's doctrine of ideas and known as St. Augustine's theory of illumination, we begin to understand what Robert of Cowton really means when he speaks about "imagining something in the light of the *true reason*," or at least what this expression originally implies. The use of the principle about the perfection in the universe as a norm for what actually exists and has to exist in creation becomes, in this light, meaningful and convincing. In our search for possible sources of St. Bonaventure's principle of three terms, we once again meet a Platonic tradition.

Having thus established the validity of this general axiom about the perfection in the universe, Robert of Cowton now makes the application by showing in what particular characteristic he sees this perfection, and this constitutes the second and far more elaborate part of his argument. While the first part was taken from an anonymous author who wrote on the same subject towards the end of the thirteenth century,⁵² Robert now completely follows St. Bonaventure, whose perfect order of two extremes and a necessary intermediate term he probably considered to be more effective. Using both the argument and the main part of St. Bonaventure's question, he first affirms the two extremes as definite realities and then states the necessity of an intermediate creature.⁵³

⁵¹ "Humana quippe anima naturaliter *divinis* ex quibus pendet *connexa rationibus*, cum dicit, Melius hoc fieret quam illud; si verum dicit, et videt quod dicit, *in illis quibus connexa est rationibus* videt. Credat ergo Deum fecisse quod *vera ratione* ab eo faciendum fuisse cognovit, etiamsi hoc in rebus factis non videt." *Ibid.*

⁵² About the two preserved and published redactions of the work of this anonymous author see B. Hechich, *op. cit.*, 72, note 1. More about this author and his relationship to the argument of Robert of Cowton is said on p. 149—50 and 154—6. The anonymous author, too, was not yet ready to accept the Immaculate Conception as sufficiently proved; his answer to the present argument is found on p. 90 and explained on p. 159—60.

⁵³ Having stated the principle about the perfection in the universe, Robert of Cowton continues: "Tunc sic: est dare aliquem qui *quoad causam et effectum* originale peccatum contraxit, et est dare aliquem qui *nec quoad causam nec effectum* ipsum contraxit, ut Christum; ergo *oportet* dare *medium*. Sed medium non potest esse nisi dupliciter: uno modo sic quod aliquis quoad effectum contraxit et non habuerit causam, et haec mediatio est impossi-

Not every author who uses the idea of perfection in the universe proceeds in this way, and it becomes manifest, at this point, that the general axiom of perfection in the universe admits of various applications according to the quality or arrangement in which the author sees this perfection. The editor of Robert of Cowton's question quotes, in an extensive footnote, four interesting parallel texts from different authors who all base their argument, at least implicitly, on this notion of perfection.⁵⁴ But of these St. Bonaventure and, with him, Robert of Cowton are the only ones who infer the necessary realization of the third, intermediate member from the existence of the two extremes, and it is St. Bonaventure alone who actually quotes that *principle* about the two extremes and the necessary intermediate term which is so characteristic of his thought and doctrine. To the quotation of this principle in his argument we must now return, in order to examine the question of its Aristotelian origin.

γ) *The Seeming Relationship of the Principle to Aristotle*

This time St. Bonaventure does not indicate any specific source from which the principle is taken or derived. A footnote in the Quaracchi-edition, however, refers to the *Eudemian Ethics* of Aristotle and quotes a short phrase from the fourth chapter of the Third Book.⁵⁵ In this section of his work Aristotle discusses the various virtues and seeks to show how each virtue represents the *right medium* between two wrong extremes. The fourth chapter deals with the virtue of generosity which "has to do with the gain and loss of material goods." Aristotle first states three possible cases: "He who rejoices about every gain *more* than is right, and grieves over every loss more than is right, is avaricious; he who, in both respects, does *less* than is right, is prodigal; and he who, in both respects, does *as* is right, is generous."⁵⁶ After remarking that

bilis; ergo oportet dare aliam partem, scilicet quod aliquis originale contraxit quoad causam et non quoad effectum: talis autem est beata Virgo, quia *magis congruum* est de ea quam de quacumque alia; ergo beata Virgo originale per peccatum non contraxit." See B. Hechich, *op. cit.*, 84—5.

⁵⁴ The texts quoted by B. Hechich (*op. cit.*, 84, note 35) are: St. Albert the Great, III *Sent.* 3. 4. arg. 3 (*Op. omnia* [ed. Borgnet] 28. 46b); Giles of Rome, *Quodl.* 6. 20 (ed. Bologna 1481, f. 130vb); St. Bonaventure, III *Sent.* 3. 1. 1. 2. arg. 4 (III. 65b) and c. (67a); the anonymous author, *Quaestiones*, ed. by A. Deneffe, "Deux questions médiévales concernant l'Immaculée Conception," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 4 (1932) 410.

⁵⁵ To the principle, "si est ponere extrema, contingit ponere medium," the Quaracchi-edition (III. 65b) remarks in note 4: "Aristot., III *Moral. Eudem.* c. 6 (c. 4): Ubi extrema sunt, istic et medium."

⁵⁶ "Qui omni acquisitione gaudet omni amissione dolet, utrumque *magis* quam oportet (μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ), illiberalis est; qui utrumque *minus*

by "right" he understands that which corresponds to right reason, Aristotle now deduces the intermediate place of the virtue from the two wrong extremes by saying:

Since those [first two cases] consist in *excess* and *deficiency* — but where extremes are, there is also a *medium*, and this is the best, and there is only one best in every species — it follows that generosity must be the *medium* between prodigality and avarice with regard to the gain and loss of material goods.⁵⁷

The principle of two extremes and a necessary medium, which Aristotle mentions in this place, comes indeed very close to that of St. Bonaventure, both in its general formulation and in its application to an intermediate reality. The manner in which Aristotle introduces the principle suggests that the reader of this passage already knows of it; as a parenthetical clause, this phrase seems to recall something that has been explained before. Some brief allusions to the principle occur in the preceding chapters,⁵⁸ but they have not the same general axiomatic character and seem to refer more exclusively to the particular situation that exists in the case of the virtues. The lack of such an explanation at this point, however, is not surprising, since this Third Book merely applies that notion of virtue which has been developed in the Second Book. Here we find the real answer to our question, namely whether this principle can, in its original Aristotelian meaning and context, be considered as a sufficient basis for the principle which St. Bonaventure quotes and uses.

In the Second Book of the *Eudemian Ethics*, Aristotle begins with the general assertion that virtue is a certain condition or quality of the soul; and he defines this virtue as "the best disposition or habit or ability in every field that provides some usage or activity."⁵⁹ After adding some further explanation and discussing other related questions,

quam oporteat (ἡττον ἢ δεῖ), prodigus: qui vero ut oportet (ὥς δεῖ) utrumque, liberalis." *Eth. Eud.* 3. 4 (1231b 29—32). — The Latin version of the Aristotelian texts is taken again from vol. 3 of the Bekker-edition (Berlin 1831).

⁵⁷ "Quia illi quidem in excessu defectuque (ἐν ὑπερβολῇ καὶ ἐλλείψει) sunt — nam ubi extrema sunt, isthic et medium, quod praestantissimum est in quaque specie et unum (ὅπου δὲ ἑσχατά εἰσι, καὶ μέσον, καὶ τοῦτο βέλτιστον, ἐν δὲ περὶ ἕκαστον τῷ εἶδει τὸ βέλτιστον) —, necessum et liberalitatem inter prodigalitatem illiberalitatemque circa facultatum acquisitionem et amissionem mediam (μεσότητα) consistere." *Ibid.* (1231b 35—8).

⁵⁸ Chapter 2 (1231a 34—6) and 3 (1231b 15—21). See also the parallel work of the *Nicomachean Ethics* 5. 6 (1131a 9—11).

⁵⁹ *Eth. Eud.* 2. 1 (1218b 38—1219a 1).

he then proceeds, in the third chapter, to the more detailed definition of virtue as an *intermediate* habit and develops this notion in the following way:

After this has been determined, one must hold that in everything which is *continuous and divisible* there is an *excess*, a *deficiency*, and a *medium*, and this either with regard to *one another* or with regard to *us*; so for instance in the art of gymnastics, in medicine, in architecture, in navigation, and in every other *action*, be it scientific or unscientific, skilful or unskilled; for *movement is something continuous*, and *action is movement*. The *best* in everything, however, is the *medium with regard to us*, since this is according to the demand of knowledge and reason.⁶⁰

The important passage just quoted contains the essential elements in the notion of virtue which runs through the entire ethics of Aristotle. The two extremes and the necessary intermediate term are clearly enumerated and developed. An obvious parallel to this text is found in the Second Book of the *Nicomachean Ethics* where Aristotle employs the same three terms; it is merely a change of expression when he now says that "in everything which is continuous and divisible, a *more*, a *less*, and an *equality* must be assumed."⁶¹ This parallel passage of the *Nicomachean Ethics* also explains those two viewpoints which the text of the *Eudemian Ethics* merely mentions. With regard to the relationship of *one term to another*, the right medium is that which "has equal distance from either extreme." With regard to *us*, however, the right medium is what "causes neither excess nor deficiency."⁶² This latter medium can vary according to individual persons and actual circumstances, and is in each case determined by knowledge and reason.

With regard to our question, the most important and significant feature in the above-quoted passage is the reference to *continuity* and *divisibility* at the beginning; for these two notions are the real basis from

⁶⁰ "Quibus ita determinatis, constituendum in omni continuo divisibili-que excessum defectum mediumque (ὑπεροχή και ἔλλειψις και μέσον) περιτρί, atque haec vel mutuo ad se in vicem vel nostri respectu, ut gymnastica, medicina, aedificatoria, gubernatoria, et quaecumque actiones aliae, sive iuxta scientiam institutae sive scientiae expertes, aut artificiosae sive inartificiosae: motus enim continuum quippiam est, actio vero motus. In omnibus vero scientia et ratio medium nostri respectu et quid optimum sit praecipit." *Ibid.* 2. 3 (1220b 21—8).

⁶¹ "Licet igitur in omni re continente ac dividua et plus et minus et aequale (τὸ μὲν πλεῖον τὸ δ' ἑλάττω τὸ δ' ἴσον) sumere; eaque vel ex ipsa re iudicantur vel ad nos referuntur. Aequale autem quiddam medium est inter nimium et parum (μέσον τι ὑπερβολῆς και ἔλλειψεως)." *Eth. Nic.* 2. 5 (1106a 26—9). In his explanation Aristotle thus uses again the same set of terms which we find in the *Eudemian Ethics*, replacing now the word ὑπεροχή by the parallel expression ὑπερβολή.

⁶² *Eth. Nic.* 2. 5 (1106a 29—32).

which Aristotle deduces those three terms, particularly the necessity of that *intermediate* term in which he finds virtue. This reference, which is almost literally the same in both *Ethics*,⁶³ is an allusion to the realm of physics, because continuity and divisibility are qualities of an extended and coherent physical thing or process.⁶⁴ Such a deduction of an ethical principle from notions of physics may, in the first moment, come as a surprise; and Aristotle apparently seeks to justify this step by adding that "movement is something continuous, and action is movement."⁶⁵ The science of ethics is concerned with good and bad actions, and they, in turn, belong to the more general category of *movement* or change to which the laws of physics apply. The law which pertains to the present case is the principle that any movement or change from one contrary extreme to another is something *extended* and *continuous*, and that the other extreme, therefore, is not reached immediately, but only after passing through some *intermediate* stages.⁶⁶ For

⁶³ The *Eudemian Ethics* (2. 3) states: "Ἀηπτέον ἔτι ἐν ἅπαντι συνεχεῖ καὶ διακετῶ ἔστιν . . ." (1220b 21—2). Using the same words, the *Nicomachean Ethics* (2. 5) declares: "Ἐν παντὶ δὴ συνεχεῖ καὶ διακετῶ ἔστι λαβεῖν . . ." (1106a 26—7).

⁶⁴ Divisibility implies the physical *extension* of a thing or process, whereas continuity means the *unity* of all parts of this extended, divisible object. See the two definitions of the continuum which St. Thomas Aquinas mentions in his Commentary to Aristotle's *Physics*: "[1] Continuum est quod est *divisibile* in infinitum . . . [2] Continuum est cuius partes ad *unum terminum communem* copulantur." *Comment. in 8 libr. Phys.* 3. 1, lect. 1. 3 (*Op. omnia* [ed. Leon.] 2. 102a). St. Thomas distinguishes the same two definitions in his *Comment. in libr. De caelo et mundo* 1. 1, lect. 2. 2 (*Op. omnia* [ed. Leon.] 3. 6a), where he characterizes them as material and formal definition.


⁶⁵ "Ἡ μὲν γὰρ κίνησις συνεχὲς, ἡ δὲ πρᾶξις κίνησις." *Eth. Eud.* 2. 3 (1220b 26—7). — In connection with this deduction of an ethical principle from notions of physics, a study of H. Kalchreuter deserves mention; it brings out, as a major point, that the idea of a right and well-balanced medium was present *primarily* in the realm of *natural science* (Heraclitus, Empedocles, and Democritus who use the terms ὑπερβολή — ἄλλειψις — ἴσον) and in *Hippocratic medicine* (μετρία χρῆσις), and that Aristotle has *applied* this idea then also to ethics (Die MEΣOTHΣ bei und vor Aristoteles [Diss. Tübingen 1911] 9—10, 46—9, 51, 60, 62). See also H. Schilling, *Das Ethos der Mesotes: Eine Studie zur Nikomachischen Ethik des Aristoteles*, Heidelberg Abhandlungen zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte 22 (Diss. Cologne: Tübingen 1930) 11—12, 14—15, 26.

⁶⁶ For a brief presentation of this important Aristotelian notion of change see B. Hechich, *op. cit.*, 166—9. After enumerating the three kinds of change between contraries (change of place, of quality, and of quantity) the author continues: "Ista triplex mutatio non fit tota simul in instanti, seu non est instantanea, sed per medium continuum, in infinitum divisibile, in tempore transit" (167). — In *Phys.* 5. 3, Aristotle himself defines the medium in the following way: "Id est autem *inter* (μεταξύ), ad quod *prius accedere* aptum est id quod mutatur, quam ad id in quod *ultimum* mutatur, secundum naturam *continue* subiens mutationem" (226b 23—5).

this reason, between two extremes of such a continuous and divisible reality, there is necessarily a medium.

When Aristotle speaks about moral actions in terms of movement and applies to them the laws of a physical process, we may, for a moment, have the impression that he means the *individual* human act, and be inclined too quickly to see the continuity between the beginning and the end of such a single act. But this is not what Aristotle has in mind; for the virtue which he intends to define as the right medium in a divisible continuum is certainly not the intermediate part of this act, but comprises the entire human act. The continuity to which Aristotle refers in the present connection is of a different nature and lies in an entirely different direction. By setting up two contrary extremes of human behavior with regard to a definite situation — such as prodigality and avarice with regard to the handling of material goods, as we have seen in the example earlier in this section — Aristotle establishes a certain *range* within which a man may act. These *possible modes* of action all lie somewhere between the two extremes, but at various distances from them; they are unlimited in number and together constitute a *line of gradual, continuous transition* from one extreme to the other.⁶⁷ This scale of possible ways of conduct with regard to a definite

⁶⁷ The two different kinds of continuity and movement may be illustrated in the following way: If the extended and continuous movement of the *individual* human act is indicated by a *horizontal* arrow, then the *range of possible modes* of acting is signified by a number of parallel horizontal arrows, which all together form a *vertical* scale, like that of a thermometer. This vertical scale is the continuum which Aristotle now has in mind, and in which that movement takes place of which he is speaking. — In order to express also the unity of the acting subject which can realize all these possible modes of conduct, and in order to indicate, at the same time, that the virtue is not only something intermediate (μεσότης) but also the best and therefore a summit (ἀκρότης, see *Eth. Nic.* 2. 6 [1107a 6]), we may follow the idea of a scheme presented by H. Schilling, *op. cit.*, 23, and arrange these arrows in such a way that they all proceed from one point which symbolizes the acting subject. Those



situation is the continuum of which Aristotle is now speaking. Such a divisible continuum necessarily has something intermediate, and the virtuous act is the right medium in the scale of countless other possible manners of acting.

The "movement" within this gradual scale of possible modes of action is not a movement or change in the usual sense of a single physical process; but these countless possibilities between the two extremes nevertheless form a true continuum. The necessary *unity*, which is so characteristic of any continuum,⁶⁸ rests in this case not only on the gradual, unbroken *transition*, but also on the other facts that all these possible ways of conduct are concerned with the *same situation* and can all be realized in *one subject*. Aristotle is, therefore, justified in applying the physical laws of a continuum, in this case the law of a necessary intermediate reality between two extremes, to such a gradual scale of possible modes of action.

On the background of this idea of a *physical continuum* and of the other idea of *unity* with regard to the situation and the acting subject, the present development and application of the axiom of a necessary middle term in the field of ethics is thus, in the final analysis, similar to the two previous quotations from Aristotle which we examined before. In as far as the scale of possible manners of acting has *two ends* and something *in between*, we find a condition that corresponds to the law of extension and *quantity* mentioned in the first quotation; in as far as the two wrong extremes are two *contrary realities* which belong to the *same situation* and can be realized in *one subject*, we have the basic elements of the second quotation which implies the idea of a *common substratum*. Wherever the axiom that two extremes demand a third, intermediate member appears in the works of Aristotle, it is deduced

arrows which represent the extremes lead from this point into opposite directions to left and right. The arrow in the middle, signifying the virtue, stands vertically and reaches highest in the order of values. The other modes of conduct are somewhere in between. The points of all these arrows form a *semicircle* which now represents the continuum in question. — The explanation of H. Schilling on this point culminates in the statement: "Jedem Situationskreis steht 'eine ganze Skala von Verhaltensweisen', ein ganzes 'Kontinuum möglicher ἔξεις' gegenüber (Nicolai Hartmann 'Ethik', S. 400f.)" (*op. cit.*, 22—3).

⁶⁸ In *Phys.* 5. 3, Aristotle concludes his definition of *continuum* by saying: "Patet in his esse continuum, ex quibus aptum est *unum* quid fieri tactu; et ut fit ipsum continuum *unum*, sic et ipsum totum fore *unum*" (227a 10—16). — St. Thomas remarks in his *Comment. in libr. De caelo et mundo* I. 1, lect. 2. 2: "Unitas enim continui est quasi forma ipsius" (*Op. omnia* [ed. Leon.] 3. 6a).

from a physical thing or process, and is applied to situations that are similar to them.⁶⁹

This constant and inseparable connection of Aristotle's axiom with continuous realities in the realm of physics places a definite limit to its applicability. The use of this axiom is not really justified where such a continuous reality and unity of subject is lacking. Now, both in the afore-mentioned argument in favor of the Immaculate Conception and in St. Bonaventure's principle as applied to the three levels in creation, we find completely different and independent realities which do not constitute a continuum or unity of subject in any real sense; therefore the axiom, as Aristotle developed it, cannot form a sufficient basis and proof for the necessity of an intermediate member between extremes of this kind. If the axiom is nevertheless applied in such cases, it plays a role which essentially exceeds its original limits and can, for this reason, not be considered any more as truly Aristotelian. It may be that Aristotle's axiom of a necessary intermediate reality has provided the exterior form of expression for that principle which the Scholastics later applied to every order of beings; but the real sources of the ideas behind this Scholastic principle lie elsewhere. To determine these sources and to see their relationship to one another, will now be our difficult, but also very interesting task.

§ 2

The Real and Ultimate Sources of the Principle: The Pythagoreans and Plato

The detailed analysis of the preceding Aristotelian texts, to which St. Bonaventure himself or at least the Quaracchi-edition refers, has

⁶⁹ This is also true with regard to a passage in *Metaph.* 9 (10). 5, where Aristotle states that "an opposition of contraries always has some medium between its extremes (ἐναντιώσεις . . . ἔχει ἀεὶ ἐαυτῆς τι μετὰξὺ)" (1056a 12—15). The context, in this case the preceding chapter 4 about contraries, makes it very clear that Aristotle means only extremes which can *change into one another*, and the "greatest difference" (1055a 4) of which he speaks is that distance within which such a transition from one extreme to the other is still possible (1055b 16—17). Accordingly, things of a different *genus* cannot stand in such an opposition; for "they have no way to one another, but are too far apart and cannot be brought together (ἀσύμβλητα). In the case of a difference in *species*, however, something comes into being out of the contraries as out of extremes." (1055a 6—9). The same idea is further emphasized by the repeated reference to a *common substratum* in which this change takes place (1055a 29—31; also 1056b 2). We thus see that what Aristotle here states about a necessary medium between extremes applies only to the particular situation in such an opposition, and Aristotle himself explicitly

not only disproved these texts as genuine sources of St. Bonaventure's principle by showing their limits and insufficiency in this respect, but has, at the same time, brought us into contact with some definite other sources. Twice we met ideas that proved to be distinctly Platonic,⁷⁰ and the first text we examined even mentioned the Pythagoreans by name.⁷¹ Here we have reached the real sources, which contain the main elements of St. Bonaventure's principle and have been the basis for its development.

The first definite traces of our principle, however, are still older than these sources and appear very early in Greek literature. The three terms of the principle are clearly enumerated in an ancient fragment which bears the name of Orpheus and declares: "God holds — as the old saying has it — the *beginning* and the *end* and the *middle* of all things."⁷² The parenthetic remark in this fragment indicates that this statement existed as a traditional saying already at the time when the Orpheus text was written, which means that the first roots of our principle reach back into an even earlier period. The three terms which the fragment enumerates are most likely an expression of totality, just as we have seen before in several quotations from Aristotle.⁷³ But it is interesting to note that, in this case, the two extremes are mentioned first and only afterwards the intermediate part, which thus seems to function also as a kind of connection between the extremes.

The parallel between this old Orpheus fragment and the above-mentioned Pythagorean passage, quoted by Aristotle in the treatise *On the Heavens*, is surprisingly close. The two texts not only use the same expressions for the three terms, but they also have a religious theme in common in as far as they both refer to God or divine worship. In view

turns against any attempt to demand, on the basis of this statement, a necessary medium between things that lie beyond these definite limits (1056a 30—b2). — More about the *nature* of the medium between such contrary extremes will follow later in Section D, § 1.

⁷⁰ See above, p. 12 and 17.

⁷¹ See above, p. 4. J. Zürcher characterizes the first chapter of *De caelo* as "quite Pythagorean, according to the tradition: Archytas — Plato — Aristotle" (*Aristoteles' Werk und Geist*, 131).

⁷² "Ὁ μὲν δὴ θεός, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος, ἀρχὴν τε καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσα τῶν ὄντων πάντων ἔχων." See H. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (8. ed. by W. Kranz, Berlin 1956) 1. B. 6 (1. 8). — Similar enumerations of these three terms are also found in fragments from Pythagoreans, as that of Ocellus (H. Diels, *op. cit.*, 48. 8 [1. 441]) and of other anonymous authors (*ibid.* 58. B. 2 [1. 451]). — About the notion of medium and its development in the antiquity see also G. Garuti, "Giusto mezzo," *Enc. F.* 2 (1957) 807—8.

⁷³ See above, p. 4 with notes 7 and 8.

of the fact that the Orphic cult and literature, although being primarily of religious character, have exercised a great influence on the Pythagoreans,⁷⁴ a real connection between these two quotations may very well exist.

But whatever the exact relationship may be, in one respect the Pythagoreans have made an important step *beyond* this simple enumeration of three terms and *forward* towards the principle as stated later by St. Bonaventure: they gave special attention to the idea of a medium as a connecting and harmonizing link between certain extremes. In accordance with their basic doctrine that all things are finally constituted and determined by numbers,⁷⁵ they inclined to find this connecting link in the realm of mathematics, the laws of which they also applied to nature. They must have been strongly confirmed in this approach by the discovery that the musical intervals depended on certain arithmetical ratios of lengths of strings at the same tension.⁷⁶ Besides discovering the theory of proportion, the Pythagoreans also worked out the arithmetic, the geometric, and the harmonic means.⁷⁷ Now, a proportion always consists of extreme and intermediate members; and the Pythagoreans considered the intermediate part of such a proportion as a perfect connection between the extremes because it establishes the balance and harmonious relationship among all the members involved.

The same idea of a connecting medium was used and further developed by Plato. A famous passage in the *Symposium* presents the *Eros* as one of those great demons that stand in the middle between God and mortals, in order to bring prayer and sacrifices from men to God and to deliver missions and answers from God to men.⁷⁸ About this demon the text then states that, "being in the middle between the two, it fills

⁷⁴ See e. g. the article "Orpheus" in *Encyclop. Brit.* 16 (1960) 935b.

⁷⁵ See the description of the Pythagorean doctrine given by Aristotle in *Metaph.* I. 5 (985b 23—986a 21).

⁷⁶ The principal intervals are: 1 : 2 = octave, 2 : 3 = perfect fifth, and 3 : 4 = perfect fourth. See e. g. the article "Pythagoras and Pythagoreanism" in *Encyclop. Brit.* 18 (1960) 803a—b.

⁷⁷ The Neoplatonist Iamblichus mentions these three means as having been held by Pythagoras and the mathematicians of his school (H. Diels, *op. cit.*, 18. 15 (1. 110). — H. Schilling remarks that the word *μεσότης* seems to have originated in Pythagorean philosophy, where it signified the intermediate member of a mathematical proportion (*op. cit.*, 14, note 4).

⁷⁸ J. Zürcher sees in the mention of demons a sign of a later redaction, made particularly by Polemon, the head of the Platonic Academy from 315—270 B. C. He bases this assumption on the fact that a developed belief in demons existed in the Academy only since Xenocrates (*Das Corpus Academicum*, 66).

out everything so that the universe itself is *bound together* in itself.”⁷⁹ While this text mentions the connecting function of an intermediate being more as a *fact*, there is another text which clearly states also the *necessity* of such a bond. This important passage occurs in the *Timaeus*, where Plato discusses the existence of the four elements. From the fact that the world had to be both visible and tangible, Plato draws the conclusion that it was composed, in the first place, of fire and earth. Having established these two elements as extremes, the author then declares with regard to the remaining, intermediate elements: “It is not possible that two things alone should be conjoined without a third; for there must needs be some intermediary *bond* to connect the two.”⁸⁰ In his further explanation and justification of this necessary bond, Plato follows the Pythagorean pattern by referring to the law of proportion which says that, in order to combine two cubic numbers in a proportion, two mean proportionals are required.⁸¹ Therefore, in a world of three dimensions — to which the cubic numbers refer — the two extreme elements demand for their conjunction two intermediate elements.⁸² Plato considers this proportion as the best and most beautiful bond because it “most perfectly unites into one both itself and the things which it binds together.”⁸³

In this passage of the *Timaeus* we thus find the doctrines of the Pythagoreans and of Plato combined; they are the two fundamental sources of St. Bonaventure’s principle, and to them all other given sources can be traced back. But these two sources are very remote; for the way from here to the period of St. Bonaventure is a long one. The next task in explaining our principle is to discover, as far as possible, through what channels these ideas have been transmitted, what further development has taken place, and in what form they may have finally reached the Seraphic Doctor.

⁷⁹ “Ἐν μέσῳ δὲ ὃν ἀμφοτέρων συμπληροῖ, ὥστε τὸ πᾶν αὐτὸ αὐτῷ συνδεῖσθαι.” *Symposium* 202. E (Zurich-edition).

⁸⁰ “Δύο δὲ μόνῳ καλῶς συνίστασθαι τρίτου χωρὶς οὐ δυνατόν· δεσμὸν γὰρ ἔν μέσῳ δεῖ τινα ἀμφοῖν συναγωγὸν γίγνεσθαι. *Timaeus* 31. B—C; transl. by R. G. Bury, *Plato* 7. 59, LCL (Cambridge, Mass., 1942).

⁸¹ How two cubic numbers are joined together by two intermediate numbers, is shown in the following scheme:

$$a^3 : a^2b :: a^2b : ab^2 :: ab^2 : b^3$$

$$\text{or: } 8 : 12 :: 12 : 18 :: 18 : 27$$

Other proportions with connecting intermediate members occur in *Timaeus* 36. A and 43. D.

⁸² “Τὰ δὲ στερεὰ μία μὲν οὐδέποτε, δύο δὲ ἀεὶ μεσότητες συναρμόττουσι.” *Timaeus* 32. B.

⁸³ “Δεσμῶν δὲ κάλλιστος ὅς ἂν αὐτὸν καὶ τὰ συνδούμενα ὅτι μάλιστα ἔν ποιῇ.” *Ibid.* 31. C (transl. by R. G. Bury, *loc. cit.*).

Section B

*Proximate Sources of St. Bonaventure as Contained or Reflected
in the SUMMA and the GLOSSA of Alexander of Hales*

§ 1

The Doctrine of Alexander of Hales on Creation in Particular

Although there remain some doubts as to the exact time at which St. Bonaventure joined the Franciscan Order, it is now generally assumed, after careful studies of various existing testimonies, that this took place in 1243.⁸⁴ In the following year he must definitely have begun his theological studies at the University of Paris, where Alexander of Hales was still *Magister Regens* and remained in this office until his death on August 15, 1245.⁸⁵ St. Bonaventure himself repeatedly refers with great veneration to Alexander of Hales as "our Father and Master," and explicitly professes to follow his teaching with particular fidelity.⁸⁶

Because of this close relationship between the respected master and his faithful student, the works of Alexander of Hales have a special place among the immediate sources of St. Bonaventure; they must be regarded as a necessary and also promising object of investigation in our search for traces of the principle about three members in every perfect order. When thinking of Alexander of Hales, the first work

⁸⁴ See esp. the *Prolegomena in librum III necnon in libros I et II "Summae Fratris Alexandri,"* vol. 4 in the Quaracchi-edition of the *Summa Theologica* of Alexander of Hales (Quaracchi 1948) p. CLIIIa with note 1, written by V. Doucet. The year 1243 is the later one among several given dates, see E. Gilson, *La philosophie de Saint Bonaventure*, EPM 4 (2. ed. Paris 1943) 10.

⁸⁵ See the above-mentioned *Prolegomena*, p. CLIIb—CLIIIa, where V. Doucet lists the principal arguments indicating that Alexander of Hales continued in his office at the University until the end of his life.

⁸⁶ "Quemadmodum in primo libro sententiis adhaesi Magistri Sententiarum et communibus opinionibus magistrorum, et potissime patris et magistri nostri bonae memoriae fratris Alexandri, sic in consequentibus libris ab eorum vestigiis non recedam." With regard to eight opinions held by Peter Lombard, but commonly abandoned by the Scholastics, St. Bonaventure states again, and now with an exclusive reference to Alexander of Hales: "Verumtamen pater et magister noster bonae memoriae frater Alexander in nulla harum ipsum sustinuit, sed potius contrarium sensit, cuius vestigiis praecipue inhaerere propono." See the *Praelocutio ad procem. in II Sent.*, ed. by F. Delorme, *S. Bonaventurae Collationes in Hexaemeron et Bonaventuriana quaedam selecta*, BFSMA 8 (Quaracchi 1934) 357 and 360. About the authenticity of this *Praelocutio* (Quaracchi-edition II. 1—3) see esp. F. Henquinet, "Trois petits écrits théologiques de Saint Bonaventure à la lumière d'un quatrième, inédit," *Mélanges Auguste Pelzer*, Univ. de Louvain — Recueil de travaux d'hist. et de philol. 3, 26 (Louvain 1947) 195—216. — The addition "patris et magistri nostri" appears also in II *Sent.* 23. 2. 3. ad 7 (II. 547b).

which usually comes to our mind is the voluminous *Summa Theologica*, which bears his name and was previously ascribed to him, but which is now recognized as a compilation made by several Masters of the early Franciscan School in Paris and based on his works, teaching, and perhaps directions.⁸⁷ In this work, now also referred to as the *Summa Fratris Alexandri* or the *Summa Halesiana*, we find two sections of considerable length which come so close to some basic notions in St. Bonaventure's principle that we should certainly expect some parallels or allusions to this principle, and the lack of them might at first surprise us.

One of these sections deals with the *order* of the universe;⁸⁸ but all we find here is a discussion about the necessary gradation of all things in creation. Basing his exposition on St. Augustine's definition of order as "an arrangement of equal and unequal things, by which to each one is assigned its place,"⁸⁹ the author of the *Summa* sees the required order of the universe in the fact that certain creatures always stand above others and thus possess priority over them,⁹⁰ and that the creatures have their place in this order particularly according to their greater or less distance from the First Principle.⁹¹ As efficient cause of this order in creation the last chapter mentions the three familiar attributes of divine power, wisdom, and goodness, but appropriates it in a special way to divine wisdom; "for it belongs to wisdom to order things duly among themselves."⁹² But much as these *general* ideas about order show a similarity with the doctrine of St. Bonaventure, this entire section

⁸⁷ See the above-mentioned *Prolegomena* and also the introduction to vol. 1 of the *Glossa in quatuor libros Sent. Petri Lomb.*, BFSMA 12 (Quaracchi 1951) 5*—130*, likewise written by V. Doucet. For a brief summary of the pertinent points in the *Prolegomena* see A. Fuerst, *An Historical Study of the Doctrine of the Omnipresence of God in Selected Writings between 1220—1270*, CUA-Theol. Stud. (2. series) 62 (Diss. Washington 1951) 23—9.

⁸⁸ *Summa theol.* II—I. 1. 2, quaest. 4: De creatura secundum relationem seu de ordine universi (ed. Quaracchi 2. 109—14).

⁸⁹ "Ordo autem sic definitur ab Augustino XIX *De civitate Dei* [13. 1]: 'Ordo est parium dispariumque rerum sua cuique loca tribuens dispositio' [ML 41. 640]." *Ibid.* c. 1 (no. 86) (109a).

⁹⁰ "Ordo in partibus universi attenditur secundum prius et posterius et simul...; magis tamen respicit prius et posterius. In illis etiam quae dicuntur esse simul, invenitur aliquo modo prius et posterius." *Ibid.* c. 4, p. 1 (no. 89) sol. (113a). The first answer to the objections mentions the same universal gradation (*ibid.* ad 1a).

⁹¹ *Ibid.* p. 3 (114b).

⁹² "Dicitur tamen propter appropriationem quod congruit sapientiae divinae ordo, quia ordinare res decenter in se congruit sapientiae." *Ibid.* c. 5 (no. 90), p. 1 (114a); see also c. 2 (no. 87) fund. 2 (109a). — Chapter 5 discusses in part 2 also the *final* cause of this order (114a—b), and chapter 3 (no. 88) deals with the ordination of all things towards man (111a—112b); but this aspect is characterized by St. Bonaventure as *ordo in finem* and is not the same order of which the principle of the three terms speaks.

does not contain any reference to a *threefold* division, to say nothing of the necessity of an intermediate creature.

In one place we do find a quotation from the previously mentioned passage in Aristotle's treatise *On the Heavens*, in which the number *three* is considered as an expression of totality and completeness.⁹³ This quotation, although rendering the Aristotelian text rather freely, nevertheless shows, at least in its general structure, some parallels to the same quotation in St. Bonaventure.⁹⁴ But if we compare the way in which the two authors make use of this quotation, we notice an important difference: while the Seraphic Doctor aims particularly at the *number three* and uses this text to confirm the existence of three Persons in God, the author of the *Summa* merely concentrates on the idea of *gradation* and *totality*.

The number *three* is mentioned in this quotation; it now has, however, an addition which corresponds to the Aristotelian text but does not appear in St. Bonaventure. The quotation in the *Summa* says that "we employ the words 'all' and 'entire' *first to three*." The addition of the expression "first" opens the way to a different understanding and application of this text. The number *three* is now used only to confirm the idea that a complete universe requires a *plurality* of grades which includes *at least* three levels. There is no sign of any attempt to establish a *ternary* by *limiting* the number of grades in creation to three; on the contrary, the immediately following reference to an "increasing recession" from a higher to a lower level conveys the idea of a much greater number of degrees.

⁹³ "Ad hoc vero quod dicit AUGUSTINUS: 'Si essent aequalia, non essent *omnia*,' intelligendum est quod per aequalitatem non tollitur multitudo rerum conditarum, sed *sufficientia*; sed si esset sola aequalitas, tolleretur *sufficientia*, quae per '*omne*' designatur. '*Omne*' enim dicitur cui non potest addi; addi autem potest aequalitati: plus enim est esse aequalia et inaequalia quam aequalia. Praeterea, PHILOSOPHUS dicit [*De caelo* 1. 1]: '*Omne et totum super tres ponimus in primis*'; *magis autem et magis recedendo* est plus de inaequalitate: aequalitas enim manet indivisa, inaequalitas vero divisibilis est, et ideo ad *completionem* universi necessaria fuit inaequalitas." *Ibid.* c. 4 (no. 89), p. 1, ad 1b (113a). For the entire passage in Aristotle see above, note 7.

⁹⁴ If the two quotations are placed side by side, they present the following picture:

Alexander of H.:	"Omne et totum	super tres ponimus	in primis."
St. Bonaventure:	"Omne enim perfectum	in tribus dicimus."	

For the complete text of St. Bonaventure see above, p. 3 and note 4. In tracing the quotation of Alexander of Hales back to the Aristotelian text (which is quoted above, note 7), we find difficulties similar to those in St. Bonaventure's quotation. The expression *omne et totum* and its close connection with the number *three* seem to correspond to line 268a 11, whereas the final words *in primis* clearly point to line 268a 18/19, which is the only place in this chapter where the word *πρῶτον* is used.

In order to understand the principal meaning of this quotation in the present context, we must bear in mind that this passage of the *Summa* seeks to explain a statement of St. Augustine which says about creatures that "they would not be *all* if they were equal."⁹⁵ The word "all" has obviously been the decisive cue for introducing the quotation from Aristotle, and the only purpose of this quotation is now to prove, by means of an additional argument, the need of inequality and gradation among created things, by which alone the universe is made truly complete.

The following section of the *Summa* speaks about the *perfection* of the universe⁹⁶ and explicitly raises the question as to whether creation would be perfect if certain parts, like the angels, the inferior creatures, or those harmful to man, were missing.⁹⁷ The term "perfect" is now explained as meaning "something that does not lack any of the parts belonging to it,"⁹⁸ and we are told that these parts are necessary for the integrity of the universe in as far as they all contribute to its perfection in some respect; but nothing in this section reminds us of St. Bonaventure's doctrine and argumentation about the position of man. The last chapter does mention the fact that the parts of creation have a perfection which consists in a certain connection between them,⁹⁹ and that the fall of the highest created spirits would disturb the stability and harmony of things; but again, the presence of man in particular is not demanded or even mentioned.

Besides this *Summa Theologica* we now also possess Alexander's *Glossa on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*, which was discovered only in 1945/46 and recognized as an authentic work of his. But as far as the doctrine on creation is concerned, we find a similar situation. Although

⁹⁵ *De div. quaest.* 83, q. 41: Cum omnia Deus fecerit, quare non aequalia fecerit? — "Quia non essent omnia, si essent aequalia: non enim essent multa rerum genera, quibus conficitur universitas, primas et secundas, et deinceps usque ad ultimas ordinatas habens creaturas: et hoc est quod dicitur, omnia" (ML 40. 27). — St. Bonaventure quotes from the same passage when speaking about the necessary gradation in the created world; see Chapter I (*Franc. Stud.* 20 [1960]), p. 293, note 89.

⁹⁶ *Summa theol.* II—I. 1. 2, q. 5: De perfectione universi (2. 115—20).

⁹⁷ *Ibid.* c. 3: Utrum aliquibus bonis deficientibus sit perfectio. Art. 1—3 (no. 93—5) (116a—118b).

⁹⁸ "Dicitur perfectum cui nihil deest de partibus sibi convenientibus." *Ibid.* c. 1 (no. 91) (115b).

⁹⁹ "Si vero loquamur de ipsis partibus in esse suo, habent quamdam perfectionem intra, quae secundum Augustinum vocatur connexio, quae tamen connexio non est sine virtute divina res mundi in ordine connectente." *Ibid.* c. 6 (no. 98) concl. (120b).

the intermediate position of man¹⁰⁰ and also the reasons for a union between soul and body¹⁰¹ are mentioned, the explanations of these points are very brief and do not go beyond that which Peter Lombard had written before in his *Sentences*. The only additional element of interest to us is a quotation from St. John Damascene which, at the end, mentions the visible and invisible world of creation, and brings in man as the combination of these two.¹⁰² But since the text is quoted mainly to show the goodness of God as the source of creation, the remark on man appears to have entered only accidentally. A closer look at the sources of this quotation is needed in order to realize its importance with regard to St. Bonaventure's doctrine on the position of man. We shall return to this quotation in the next section about further sources.

§ 2

The Teaching of Alexander of Hales on Other Subjects in General

Although the works of Alexander of Hales do not show real elements of St. Bonaventure's principle in sections where we should expect them, we find very definite and valuable parallels in both the *Glossa* and the *Summa* as soon as we broaden the basis of our investigation and include other subjects. This reminds us of St. Bonaventure, who likewise uses and explains his principle not so much when dealing with creation as when discussing the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity.

Alexander of Hales definitely knows of an argument that is called *ex ratione medii*.¹⁰³ It means that, if two extremes exist, an intermediate reality exists also, provided that such a middle term does not involve an impossibility or contradiction, "since nothing is *incomplete* in the order of the universe."¹⁰⁴ In the case to which we are now referring, the

¹⁰⁰ "*In medio* . . . Respondeo: secundum existentiam ultimus est; secundum dignitatem tam(n) dicitur *in medio positus*, quoniam superior est aliis creaturis et inferior angelis." *Glossa in II Sent. Petri Lomb.* 1. 26, BFSMA 13 (Quaracchi 1952) 11.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.* 1. 28 (*op. cit.*, 12—13).

¹⁰² "*Bonitatem*. Ioannes Damascenus, cap. 18 [*De fide orthod.* 2. 2]: 'Quia igitur bonus et superbonus Deus, non contentus est sui ipsius contemplatione, sed superabundantia bonitatis accepit generari quaedam quibus beneficeret et participatura sua bonitate ex non-ente ad esse perduxit et condidit universa *visibilia* et *invisibilia*, et cum qui *componitur ex visibili et invisibili hominem*.'" *Ibid.* 1. 19 (*op. cit.*, 8—9).

¹⁰³ "Quaeritur autem utrum aliqua creatura possit esse coeva Creatori, *propter rationem medii*." *Ibid.* 1. 8 (*op. cit.*, 5).

¹⁰⁴ The *Summa* explains with regard to the same point: "Cum ergo haec duo extrema sint in universo et in ordine universi nihil est *incompletum*,

principle is used in an argument favoring the opposite opinion,¹⁰⁵ but it likewise appears in connection with the author's own reasoning. Three persons in one nature, as realized in the Blessed Trinity, and two natures in one person, as realized in Christ, are shown in the *Glossa* as two possible cases between the two extremes of one person in one nature, as in one man, and that of several persons in several different natures, as in the case of a man and an angel. These intermediate realities are presented here on the basis of the principle that "extremes do not actually exist unless there are also *intermediate members* in which there is *no opposition*."¹⁰⁶ The *Summa* takes up the same point. But while mentioning only one intermediate case, namely that of three persons in one nature in God, this passage takes two further significant steps in the direction towards our principle of St. Bonaventure: it declares this intermediate reality as *necessary*,¹⁰⁷ and it mentions, as an additional reason for the existence of such an intermediate reality, the *connection and perfection of the universe*.¹⁰⁸

The statement of another argument, namely that "the medium must communicate with the extremes,"¹⁰⁹ is only a special aspect of the same principle. The emphasis now lies on the *nature* of that required medium. It functions as an intermediate member because of the fact that it possesses qualities of both extremes, as we have seen before in St. Bonaventure. Alexander of Hales uses this principle, for instance, when presenting the Blessed Trinity, in whom *simplicity and plurality* are found together, as a necessary intermediate between the absolute unity

... erunt ergo illa duo media, *si non obviet eis impossibilitas rationis*" (II—I. 1. 2. 2. 4. 1. 1 [no. 67] arg. 11 [2. 85a]). — See also note no. 1 to the text of the *Glossa in II Sent.* 1. 8 (*op. cit.*, 5).

¹⁰⁵ This argument defends the possibility of a *created* being *without beginning* on the basis that it would be the required medium between God, the Uncaused Being without beginning, and the caused creatures with a beginning. — In his answer (*Glossa, loc. cit.*; *Summa theol., loc. cit.*, ad 11 [2. 87b]) Alexander does not reject the principle, but shows that such a medium is impossible because it contradicts the very notion of creature, which means the coming from non-existence into existence, and thus having a beginning.

¹⁰⁶ "Cum ergo extrema non sint in actu rerum, nisi et media sint in quibus non est oppositio." *Glossa in I Sent. Petri Lomb.* 31. 32b, BFSMA 12 (Quaracchi 1951) 315.

¹⁰⁷ "Si ergo duo sunt extrema in rerum natura, et etiam unum medium est accipere quod similiter *necessario* intelligitur inter extrema." *Summa theol.* I. 1. 3. 1. 2. 5 (no. 81) fund. 2 (1. 132a).

¹⁰⁸ The argument is introduced with the words: "Hoc patet per *connexionem perfectionis universi*." *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁹ "*Mediator in quantum est homo*. Contra: medium communicare debet extrema: ergo in quantum Deus et homo. — Respondeo: triplex est mediatio. Prima *quoad naturam*, inter humanam et divinam media, quae sit compacta ex utrisque; hoc est impossibile." *Glossa in III Sent. Petri Lomb.* 19. 38, BFSMA 14 (Quaracchi 1954) 219.

and *simplicity* of the Divine Essence on the one hand, and the extreme *plurality* and composition of creatures on the other.¹¹⁰ He speaks about this kind of conjunction also among created things. Between the celestial bodies that *emit* rays of light and the *receiving* earthly elements is the moon, which both *receives and gives* this light.¹¹¹ Similar intermediate creatures are mentioned also between the various levels of living beings. The purpose of all these intermediate members is the connection, unity, and beauty of creation.

These texts of Alexander of Hales contain practically all the essential elements that appear later in St. Bonaventure's principle of the three terms. We find in every example a middle term which has something in common with each of the two extremes. The reason for the presence and necessity of such a middle term is seen in the completeness and perfection that are believed to exist in the order of the universe. The specific function of this middle term is to prevent opposition among the different members and to join them together in a harmonious unity. There now remain for our discussion a few more passages, which not only show further parallels, but also explicitly mention certain intermediate sources from which they are taken or derived. The examination of these will allow us to come to some definite conclusions concerning the complete background of St. Bonaventure's principle and concerning certain stages of its development.

Section C

Further Sources Mentioned in the Works of Alexander of Hales and their Respective Lines of Development

§ 1

St. John Damascene and his Sources in St. Gregory of Nazianz, Nemesius of Emesa, Origen, Poseidonius, and Plato

We already mentioned one of the texts that refer to another source, namely Alexander's quotation from St. John Damascene in the *Glossa*,

¹¹⁰ "Ascendens ad simplicissimam unitatem a maxima diversitate necesse est per media transire existentia inter illa . . . Dico autem medium secundum intelligentiam, non secundum rem . . . Est ergo pluralitas personarum divinarum medium inter unitatem et simplicitatem divinae essentiae et multitudinem et compositionem creaturae." *Glossa in I Sent.* 31. 32c (*op. cit.*, 315).

¹¹¹ "In universo sic est ad pulchritudinem eius quod semper est aliqua convenientia inter diversa quae sibi coniunguntur . . . Luna recipit lumen, et in hoc convenit cum ipsis elementis, et dat lumen, et in hoc convenit cum ipsis corporibus supercaelestibus." *Summa theol.* II—I. 1. 2. 3. 6. 4 (no. 85) fund. I (2. 107a).

where the spiritual world, the material world, and man as the combination of the two are briefly mentioned.¹¹² This passage is taken from the Second Book of the important work *De fide orthodoxa*, which was known to the Scholastics through the Latin translation made by Burgundio about the middle of the twelfth century.¹¹³ A closer look at this source shows that those three levels of creation, which the second chapter indicates, are further elaborated in the twelfth chapter of the same Book, where the author speaks about man in particular.¹¹⁴ Since the decisive phrase in this twelfth chapter about the purpose of man in creation uses a quotation from Gregory of Nazianz, we are immediately directed to this further source. In Oration 38 of this Greek Father we find, in fact, most of what St. John Damascene writes in the above-mentioned second and twelfth chapter.¹¹⁵ St. Gregory first describes how God, because of His goodness which calls for diffusion and extension, created the world of spirits and also the material universe, which in themselves were "silent praisers of the great work." Referring to these two distinct levels, he then explains the role of man within this creation in the following words:

However, there was not yet a harmonious combination of the two, nor any mixture of these opposite realities, which would manifest a still greater wisdom and an overflowing prodigality towards creatures; nor were all the riches of goodness discernible. Since the Word and Artist wanted to display all this, He made one living being out of the two [extremes], that is, out of the invisible and the visible nature: He made man.¹¹⁶

This passage is a surprising parallel to St. Bonaventure's second and also third argument for the necessity of man in creation, particularly with regard to the idea that the manifestation of the Creator reaches its highest degree in the creation of man, a thought which does not appear in any other part of our analysis. In as much as the two extreme levels of creation are considered as praisers of God's greatness and

¹¹² *De fide orthod.* 2. 2: De rerum creatione (MG 94. 864—5). See above, footnote 102.

¹¹³ For the critical edition of this Latin translation see E. M. Buytaert, *Saint John Damascene: De fide orthodoxa. Versions of Burgundio and Cernbanus*, FIP—TS 8, St. Bonaventure, N. Y., 1955.

¹¹⁴ *De fide orthod.* 2. 12: De homine (MG 94. 917—29).

¹¹⁵ Gregory of Nazianz, *Oratio* 38, 9—11 (MG 36. 320—24). A duplicate of this part of Oration 38 is found in Oration 45, 5—7 (MG 36. 629—32).

¹¹⁶ "Οὕτω δὲ ἦν κρᾶμα ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων, οὐδὲ τις μίξις τῶν ἐναντίων, σοφίας μείκονος γνῶρισμα, καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰς φύσεις πολυτελείας· οὐδὲ ὁ πᾶς πλοῦτος τῆς ἀγαθότητος γνῶρισμα. Τοῦτο δὲ βουλευθεὶς ὁ τεχνίτης ἐπιδείξασθαι Λόγος, καὶ ζῶον ἐν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων, ἀοράτου τε λέγω καὶ ὁρατῆς φύσεως, δημιουργεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον." *Oratio* 38, 11 (MG 36. 321 C).

power, we see represented all those three divine attributes upon which St. Bonaventure later bases his arguments.

Although no particular sources of this text are mentioned, we are able to arrive at some conclusion concerning its origin. There is not only the general tendency of the Greek Fathers to favor Platonic ideas, but also another more specific sign which points in the same direction. St. Gregory of Nazianz sees the real source of creation in the goodness of God, which tends to diffuse itself and to communicate itself to others.¹¹⁷ This principle concerning the nature of the good is usually traced back to Denis the Areopagite,¹¹⁸ but has its deeper roots in the Neoplatonic system and in Platonism.¹¹⁹

Of special interest and importance for our question is the way in which St. John Damascene uses this text of St. Gregory more than three hundred years later. Quoting some of it, he presents the same doctrine on the position of man in these words:

However, there also had to come into being a mixture of the two [extremes] "as a manifestation of a still greater wisdom and of an overflowing prodigality towards creatures," as Gregory the Theologian says, and as a kind of bond between "the visible and the invisible nature."¹²⁰

¹¹⁷ "Ἔδει χεθῆναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὁδεῦσαι, ὥς πλεῖον εἶναι τὰ εὐεργετούμενα (τοῦτο γὰρ τῆς ἀκρας ἦν ἀγαθότητος)." *Ibid.* 9 (MG 36. 320 C). — St. John Damascene takes this passage over and expresses the Divine Goodness in still stronger terms: "Quia igitur bonus et superbonus Deus, . . . superabundantia bonitatis acceptavit generari quaedam, quibus bene faceret (ὁ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ὑπεράγαθος θεός, . . . ὑπερβολῇ ἀγαθότητος)." *De fide orthod.* 2. 2 (MG 94. 864 C). The Latin version is that of Burgundio; see E. M. Buytaert, *op. cit.*, 68. The additional emphasis expressed in the repeated use of the preposition ὑπερ- appears to be an influence of Denis the Areopagite, whom St. John Damascene followed particularly in his doctrine on God. B. Altaner, who lists the principal sources of St. John Damascene, remarks on this point: "In der Lehre von Gott schließt sich Johannes vor allem an Pseudo-Dionysius an" (*Patrologie: Leben, Schriften und Lehre der Kirchenväter* [5. ed., Freiburg 1958] 489). About this preposition as one of the characteristic features in Denis' writings see J. Stiglmayr, *Des heiligen Dionysius Areopagita angebliche Schriften über die beiden Hierarchien*, BKV (Kempten 1911), Introd. 19.

¹¹⁸ The principle *Bonum est diffusivum sui* has been explained before in connection with St. Bonaventure's third argument for the middle position of man in creation. See Chapter I (*Franc. Stud.* 20 [1960]), page 307—8.

¹¹⁹ Concerning Platonic ideas in Gregory of Nazianz see R. Gottwald, *De Gregorio Nazianzeno, platonico*, Breslau 1906, and H. Pinault, *Le Platonisme de S. Grégoire de Nazianze*, Paris 1925.

¹²⁰ "Ἔδει δὲ καὶ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων μίξιν γενέσθαι, σοφίας γνῶρισμα μείζονος, καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰς φύσεις πολυτελείας, ὥς φησιν ὁ Θεολόγος Γρηγόριος, οἷόν τινα σύνδεσμον τῆς ὁρατῆς τε καὶ ἀοράτου φύσεως." *De fide orth.* 2. 12 (MG 94. 920 A). The Latin translation of Burgundio reads: "Oportebat autem 'ex utrisque mixtionem fieri, maioris sapientiae cognitionem et circa naturas glorificationis,' ut ait divus Gregorius, velut quamdam copulam 'visibilis et invisibilis naturae.'" See E. M. Buytaert, *op. cit.*, 112.

If we compare this text with that of St. Gregory of Nazianz, we notice on the one hand that the passage, as a whole, has been shortened and condensed.¹²¹ The part that speaks about the manifestation of wisdom and prodigality is quoted literally, whereas the goodness is not mentioned, perhaps because prodigality was considered as expressing it sufficiently. The text of St. John Damascene shows on the other hand two significant additions, which lead us nearer to St. Bonaventure's principle and argumentation. The passage opens with the remark that such a mixture *had* to take place (ἔδει γενέσθαι), an expression which the author later explains as in no way directed against the free will and sovereign right of the Creator. We remember the opening word *decurit* in the three arguments of St. Bonaventure. In the concluding part St. John Damascene considers man as a kind of *bond* (τινὰ σύνδεσμον) between the visible and the invisible nature. By adding this comparison he emphasizes the role of man in creation as a connecting link. This idea of a bond calls to our minds St. Bonaventure's notion of the necessary coherence among members of a true order.

These two additions deserve our special attention. They are taken from another important source which St. John Damascene does not mention by name, but which he uses to a great extent in his chapters on man.¹²² This source is Nemesius of Emesa, who wrote the detailed and comprehensive work *On the Nature of Man*.¹²³ The time of its composition is assumed to be about 400 A. D. The true author was often unrecognized, and the work appeared for a long time under the name of other authors, particularly under that of Gregory of Nyssa,¹²⁴ a fact which increased its influence. It reached the Middle Ages not only

¹²¹ E. g. the expression "mixture of the two" combines elements of two parallel phrases in the text of St. Gregory.

¹²² B. Altaner writes about the sources of St. John Damascene: "Für die Schöpfungslehre [bevorzugt Johannes] Nemesius von Emesa" (*op. cit.*, 489). See also W. Telfer, *Cyril of Jerusalem and Nemesius of Emesa*, LCC 4 (Philadelphia 1955) 216, and B. Domanski, *Die Psychologie des Nemesius*, BGPM 3, 1 (Münster 1900), who remarks on this point: "Das Werk des Nemesius wurde in der späteren Zeit vielfach citiert, u. a. auch von Johannes Damascenus in dessen 'de fide orthodoxa' (ohne Angabe der Quelle)" (p. XII).

¹²³ Περὶ φύσεως ἀνθρώπου — *De natura hominis* (MG 40, 504—817). B. Domanski calls attention to the fact that this work of Nemesius "is noteworthy as the first anthropology" (*op. cit.*, XVI); he also examines the different opinions as to the time of composition (p. VII—XI).

¹²⁴ Not only the work as a whole has been attributed to Gregory of Nyssa, but its 2nd and 3rd chapters appear as a separate treatise under the new title *De anima* among the other works of Gregory. — St. Bonaventure (II *Sent.* 1. 2. 2. arg. 2 [II. 46a]) and other Scholastics quote the work of Nemesius also under the name of Remigius; see I. Brady, "Remigius — Nemesius," *FS* 8 (1948) 275—84.

through quotations in other writings, but also directly through several Latin translations.¹²⁵ A brief look at the content will immediately show its prominent place in our historical analysis of St. Bonaventure's principle.

Of particular importance for our question is the first chapter, in which Nemesius deals with the position of man within the general structure of creation. The opening sentence defines man as "most perfectly composed of a soul endowed with intellect, and a body."¹²⁶ After stating in this way the two essential parts of man and comparing this truly Christian notion with the opinions of some of the great pagan philosophers, the author continues with a consideration of the fact that man is joined to the corporeal as well as to the spiritual world, and shares in both. He then first discusses the more general law of gradual transition and continuity in creation, and explains how the various levels of created beings are linked together by certain intermediate creatures which possess qualities of two different levels, for instance of both animals and plants, and are thus similar to either level.¹²⁷ After this look into the structure of creation as a whole he returns to his principal topic and now explains the position of man within this creation in the following way:

After both an intelligible and a visible world were created, there also had to come into being some bond between the two, in order that the entire universe be one, and its parts be in "sympathy" with each other and not unrelated to one another. For this reason man, the living being that binds both natures together, was created. Such, to put it briefly, is the wisdom of the Creator.¹²⁸

¹²⁵ Alfano, Archbishop of Salerno, who died in 1085, made a translation which was known to Albert the Great; another translation, made by Burgundio of Pisa in 1159, was at the disposal of Peter Lombard and St. Thomas Aquinas. See W. Telfer, *op. cit.*, 217—8, and B. Domanski, *op. cit.*, XII.

¹²⁶ "Τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ ψυχῆς νοερᾶς καὶ σώματος ἀρίστα κατεσκευάσθαι." *De natura hominis* 1 (MG 40. 504 A). — For a more detailed presentation of this chapter see P. Boehner — E. Gilson, *Christliche Philosophie von ihren Anfängen bis Nikolaus von Cues* (3. ed., Paderborn 1954) 121—3.

¹²⁷ This similarity of qualities, and the connection of the different levels which is accomplished through such a similarity, are expressed by the terms κοινωνεῖν, συνάπτειν, συναρμύζειν, μετέχειν, μεταλαμβάνειν, συνδεῖν, συγγενῆς, οἰκεῖος, ἐγγύς, ἐν μεθορίοις, δεσμός, συμφυὲς καὶ φυσικός (*Ibid.* [505B—512 B]). All these expressions occur in the section which leads to our main text on the position of man in creation. This terminology has its roots in Plato and is characteristic for Neoplatonic thought, which has been the predominant source for Nemesius. We shall return to it in the following Section D of the present Chapter.

¹²⁸ "Νοητῆς γενομένης οὐσίας καὶ πάλιν ὁρατῆς, ἔδει γενέσθαι τινὰ καὶ σύνδεσμον ἀμφοτέρων, ἵνα ἐν ᾗ τὸ πᾶν καὶ συμπαθὲς ἑαυτῷ, καὶ μὴ ἀλλότριον αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ. Ἐγένετο οὖν τὸ συνδῆον ἀμφοτέρας τὰς φύσεις ζῶον, ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς σοφίας τοῦ Δημιουργοῦ, συντόμως εἰπεῖν τοιαῦτα." *Ibid.* (MG 40. 512 B).

The reader of this passage easily recognizes those two elements which we saw added in the text of St. John Damascene. The expressions are nearly identical. The only real difference is that, while Damascene uses the two elements in separate places, they are here, in the source, still joined together in the same part of the sentence (ἔδει γενέσθαι τινὰ καὶ σύνδεσμον). The general impression made by this passage is similar to that which we received from the two preceding quotations. Even the wisdom of the Creator is mentioned, although the idea of its manifestation as reason for man's creation is missing.

As far as this reason for the necessity of man in creation is concerned, Nemesius entirely concentrates on the ideas of unity and harmony in the universe. The emphasis he places on them and some of the expressions he uses in the present text point to a particular source from which he must, in some way, have received these ideas. This source is Poseidonius of Apamea, one of the great minds of the Middle Stoa about 100 B. C. His system is fundamentally that of Stoic monism. In accordance with this principle he seeks to bring out the complete *unity* of nature. He presents a universe in which all parts, both visible and invisible, are linked together by a contact which he describes as *sympathy*,¹²⁹ so that all these parts form a continuous ascending scale and constitute one totality of being. The same harmonious transition and connection, upon which the unity of the whole depends, exists also between the higher, imperishable, heavenly world and the lower, perishable, earthly world. These two are bound together in man who is the *bond* between them.¹³⁰

The brief passage of Nemesius quoted above clearly reflects this doctrine of Poseidonius with its central notions of unity, sympathy, and bond, which all occur in the same first sentence. With regard to the idea of unity by gradual transition, which is expressed in the first two

¹²⁹ This term is particularly characteristic of the influence of Poseidonius. Gregory of Nyssa, to whom the work of Nemesius had been attributed, and whose writings were used to a great extent by Nemesius, has written a special work under the title *De hominis opificio* (MG 44. 124—256). In chapter 1, Gregory deals with the connection among the different levels in creation; he first speaks of heaven and earth as representing the original principles of motion and rest, and then explains how "the other creatures between these opposites share, to some extent, in the adjacent opposites, and thus function, by themselves, as a medium between the extremes" (*Ibid.* 129A). Even the term σύνδεσμος is used (128C), but never the other term συμπαθής. Chapter 2 (*ibid.* 132D—133B) deals with the reason why man was created last, but not one word is said about Nemesius' second reason, the unity of creation.

¹³⁰ See F. Copleston, *A History of Philosophy* 1 (Westminster, Md., 1946) 422—3, and W. Telfer, *op. cit.*, 212. — The influence of Poseidonius on the use and development of the Platonic idea of a bond will be mentioned again in Section D, at the end of § 1 (p. 59).

terms, the connection between the two authors is evident. Some difficulty, however, arises concerning the other idea of man as a bond between two such radically different worlds, because this introduces an element of dualism into the fundamentally monistic system of Poseidonius. Some authors hold that Nemesius found also this idea in the doctrine of Poseidonius himself.¹³¹ They explain the presence of the dualistic element as a concession to Platonism, which the less rigid and more eclectic Middle Stoa was able and ready to make.¹³² W. Telfer, on the other hand, shows that, although both authors consider man as a bond, they do not do so in the same sense. He stresses the difference between the Stoic monism of Poseidonius, which "included heaven and the gods in the categories of space and matter," and the two worlds of Nemesius.¹³³ Telfer's conclusion is that Nemesius probably did not take this idea directly from Poseidonius, and that Origen's lost *Commentary on Genesis* is more likely to be the source from which Nemesius received the Poseidonian theme in a Platonized and Christianized form.¹³⁴

The exact nature of this relationship, and the development which may have taken place, are difficult to determine because the works of Poseidonius have perished. But there remains the fundamental fact that Poseidonius "has provided Nemesius with the means of setting the nature of man against the widest and most stimulating background."¹³⁵ Poseidonius, in turn, is related to Plato, whose *Timaeus* was an important source for the idea of a universe in which all orders or levels are linked together and thus form a unity.¹³⁶ In this work Plato declares, through the mouth of Timaeus, that "it is not possible that two things alone should be conjoined without a third; for there must needs be some intermediary bond to connect the two (δεσμὸν γὰρ ἐν μέσῳ δεῖ τινὰ ἀμφοῖν ζυσαγωγὸν γίγνεσθαι)."¹³⁷ We have met this

¹³¹ E. g. F. Copleston (*op. cit.*) and K. Reinhardt as mentioned by W. Telfer, *op. cit.*, 231.

¹³² F. Copleston, *op. cit.*, 421, 423.

¹³³ W. Telfer, *op. cit.*, 231.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.* — In connection with the question of why man was the last to be created, Telfer also mentions Philo and his work *On the Creation of the World* as a particular source for Origen (*op. cit.*, 235, note 1). For further details about this connection between Poseidonius and Nemesius see the fundamental studies of W. Jaeger, *Nemesios von Emesa: Quellenforschungen zum Neuplatonismus und seinen Anfängen bei Poseidonios* (Berlin 1914) esp. 138—43, and H. Koch, *Quellenuntersuchungen zu Nemesios von Emesa* (Berlin 1921) 9—21.

¹³⁵ W. Telfer, *op. cit.*, 232.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.* 231. — The question of the connection between Poseidonius and Plato will be touched upon again in the concluding survey of § 1 of the following Section D (p. 50).

¹³⁷ *Timaeus* 31. B—C (Zurich ed.), transl. by R. G. Bury, *Plato* 7. 59, LCL (Cambridge, Mass., 1942). See above, page 27 with note 80. — In this text, the idea of bond (δεσμός) merely expresses the general need of a gradual, harmonious transition, and is not yet applied to man in particular.

little phrase earlier in our analysis, but only now, after tracing back the various stages of its influence, do we fully realize how many of the later characteristic elements are contained in this single sentence and expressed in almost the same words. The line of development, which thus leads from Plato through the various connections of Poseidonius, Nemesius, St. Gregory of Nazianz, and St. John Damascene to the time of Alexander of Hales and his contemporaries, and in which we have found numerous characteristics of St. Bonaventure's argument, is definitely one of the chief factors in the historical background of St. Bonaventure's doctrine on the position of man in creation.

§ 2

St. Augustine and the Heritage of the Pythagoreans

We must now return to the starting point of our foregoing investigation, to Alexander of Hales, the proximate source of St. Bonaventure; for Alexander's *Glossa* on the *Sentences*, which has led us into this line of development through that brief quotation from St. John Damascene, contains still another important passage with even closer parallels to St. Bonaventure's principle of the three terms. The authority now mentioned and quoted is St. Augustine, and the tracing of this source will reveal a different line of development. As in most of the previous examples, the context is again a discussion about the number of Persons in God. The proof for three and only three Divine Persons starts out from the fact that these Divine Persons are distinct only with regard to their origin from one another.¹³⁸ Alexander of Hales then reminds us that Peter Lombard has called this mutual relationship between the Divine Persons an "order of nature,"¹³⁹ and concentrating on this notion of order, he presents his proof in the following way:

There is, as we have seen above in the last chapter of the twentieth distinction, an *order of nature* among the Divine Persons. But the *first perfection* of an order consists in three members, as St. Augustine says in

¹³⁸ "Restat ergo quod secundum originem distinctio personalis attenditur, scilicet secundum esse *ab alio* et non esse *ab alio* sive *a semetipso*; et si utraque habeat originem, differenter secundum modum existendi *ab alio*, scilicet secundum esse *sine medio* et esse *mediate*." *Glossa in I Sent.* 28. 5. d (*op. cit.*, 275). Alexander of Hales mentions as source of this passage Richard of St. Victor, *De Trinitate* 4. 15 (ML 196. 939), where we do not find, however, the final notion of medium.

¹³⁹ "Nec cum dicitur Filius a Patre genitus, ostenditur inaequalitas substantiae, sed *ordo naturae*, non quo alter prior esset altero, sed quo *alter est ex altero*." *Lib. I Sent.* 20. 3 (ed. Quaracchi 1916: I. 140).

the "Music of Hymns," and the first "whole" number, therefore, is the ternary. On the other hand, the *highest perfection* of an order consists in the highest and first plurality. Hence it follows that there are only three Persons.¹⁴⁰

In this passage, which comes in many respects close to what St. Bonaventure says about the perfection of the number *three*,¹⁴¹ Alexander of Hales points out the first and the highest perfection of an order. His intention is to establish the minimum and maximum number of members that are required to form a complete and perfect order, as it must surely exist in the all-perfect God. He arrives in both cases at the number *three*. Our special attention is now concentrated on the first point, in which he states that a perfect order cannot have less than three members; for the existence of at least three members is precisely what the principle of St. Bonaventure claims to be necessary for a perfect order. Alexander of Hales justifies his statement by referring to St. Augustine's treatise *On Music*, and in this source we indeed discover not only those three members, but also a number of other important elements involved in St. Bonaventure's principle.

St. Augustine begins the twelfth chapter of the First Book with a consideration of the first three numbers. The way in which he proceeds here reminds us strongly of the Pythagorean explanation to which, as we have seen, Aristotle refers in his work *On the Heavens*.¹⁴² For although the chapter as a whole seems to speculate on numbers and their qualities in themselves, this first stage of the development has a definite and decisive connection with an extended reality. "What we call the *beginning* or principle," St. Augustine says, cannot be "a beginning at all unless it is the beginning of *something*." In a similar way, what we call the *end*, cannot be "an end, unless it is the end of *something*." Having established the two extremes, St. Augustine adds that we cannot "go from the beginning to the end without going through the *middle*," and he finally arrives at the conclusion that, "for something to be a whole, it must consist of a beginning, middle, and end."¹⁴³ Proceeding to the

¹⁴⁰ "Quia vero est *ordo naturae* in divinis personis, sicut supra habitum est, XX distinctione, cap. ultimo; *prima* autem perfectio ordinis, ut dicit Augustinus in Musica hymnorum, est in tribus: unde primus numerus totus est ternarius; *summa* autem perfectio ordinis est in summa et prima pluralitate, restat quod tres sunt personae tantum." *Glossa in I Sent.* 28. 5. d (*op. cit.*, 275).

¹⁴¹ *I Sent.* 2. u. 4. c. (I. 57b—58a). For the text and translation of this passage see above, p. 3 with note 4.

¹⁴² *De caelo* I. 1; see above, p. 4 with note 7.

¹⁴³ The entire section reads as follows: "*Magister*: Unde abs te quaero, utrum quod vocamus *principium*, possit omnino nisi *alicuius* esse principium. *Discipulus*: Nullo modo potest. *M.* Item quod dicimus *finem*, potestne nisi

consideration of *numbers*, he observes that beginning, middle, and end are contained in the number *three*. "And so you see," he concludes, "there is a certain *perfection* in three because it is a *whole*: it has a beginning, middle, and end."¹⁴⁴

In this way St. Augustine develops his central notion of a *whole and perfect number*, which repeatedly occurs in the present chapter¹⁴⁵ and guides his further speculations. Having shown the ideal fulfillment of this notion in the number *three*, he now asks for the first whole and perfect *even* number, reminding us at the same time that the middle term can, in this case, not be a single, indivisible unit, but must consist of two parts. The answer to this question leads to a surprising result: the first whole and perfect even number turns out to be the number *four*.¹⁴⁶

Anticipating the question of the astonished reader about the number *two*, St. Augustine adds some explanations which sound like an answer to the similar question we raised at our first meeting with St. Bonaventure's principle, namely why two terms or levels, such as the spiritual and the material world, should not be sufficient to constitute a true and complete order.¹⁴⁷ He gives his first and general answer by asking: "How can the three things through which a number is a whole, that is, beginning, middle, and end, be found in the number *two*?"¹⁴⁸ In the following explanations he assures us again, and now with more explicit reference to our question, that we cannot understand the number *two* as the beginning and end of something and thus consider it as complete, because "nothing can attain its end except through a middle."¹⁴⁹ We

alicuius rei finis esse? D. Etiam id non potest. M. Quid? a principio ad finem num putas perveniri posse, nisi per aliquod medium? D. Non puto. M. Ergo ut totum aliquid sit, principio et medio et fine constat. D. Ita videtur." De musica I. 12 (no. 20) (ML 32. 1095); the English translation of this and the following quotations is taken from R. C. Taliaferro, *On Music* (FCh, St. Augustine 2) 195—202.

¹⁴⁴ "M. Dic itaque nunc, principium, medium et finis, quo numero tibi contineri videntur. D. Arbitror ternarium numerum te velle ut respondeam: tria enim quaedam sunt, de quibus quaeris. M. Recte arbitraris. Quare in ternario numero quamdam esse *perfectionem* vides, quia *totus* est: habet enim principium, medium et finem." *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁵ The expression *totum atque perfectum* is used in no. 21 (1095) and again in no. 22 (1096).

¹⁴⁶ "Dum quaero totum numerum parem, quaternarius primus occurrit." *Ibid.* (no. 21) (ML 32. 1095).

¹⁴⁷ See Chapter I (*Franc. Stud.* 20 [1960]), page 301.

¹⁴⁸ "Nam in duobus quomodo possunt tria illa inveniri, per quae totus est numerus, id est principium, medium et finis?" *De musica* I. 12 (no. 21) (ML 32. 1095).

¹⁴⁹ "Non possumus in eis intelligere *principium et medium*, cum medium esse non possit nisi ubi finis est; aut *principium et finem*, cum ad finem nisi per medium non queat perveniri?" *Ibid.* (ML 32. 1096).

see how those three basic elements, which were first developed in an obvious reference to an extended reality, become now the essential condition for anything complete and perfect. Since the number *two* "lacks a middle and end," it does not fulfill this essential requirement. St. Augustine considers it merely as a second beginning, which is constituted by the number *one* (the first beginning of all numbers), but which is itself the beginning of combination and addition.¹⁵⁰

St. Augustine then considers these first three fundamental numbers in their relation to one another. He points out with emphasis and illustrates by examples that the harmony and unity in this ternary is greater than in any other number.¹⁵¹ The deeper reason for this unity lies in a special relation between the terms. Things are, as St. Augustine says, most perfectly conjoined to a unified whole "when the means agree with the extremes, and the extremes with the means."¹⁵² The ternary fulfills this condition perfectly. One and three are the extremes, and two the mean. The bond that unites them is a certain proportion: "*One* is exceeded by *two* as *two* is exceeded by *three*."¹⁵³ The sum of the extremes is, in this sentence, equal to the twice-mentioned middle term; the result of the addition is four in both cases, a fact which manifests the complete balance and agreement. St. Augustine considers this proportion as the basis of that most perfect harmony and unity which exists in this ternary.¹⁵⁴

When Alexander of Hales, in the above-quoted proof for three and only three Persons in God, mentions as second point the *highest* perfection of an order and finds it in the same number *three*, he does not refer to a particular source; but we have good reason to assume that he follows these same ideas of St. Augustine who, as the text under consideration

¹⁵⁰ "Si medio caret et fine, quod, ut dixisti, cogit ratio confiteri; quid restat, nisi ut sit *hoc quoque principium*? . . . hoc alterum principium de illo primo est, ut illud *a nullo* sit, hoc vero *ab illo* . . . principia ita sunt ambo, ut omnes numeri quidem ab uno sint; sed quia per complicationem atque adiunctionem quandam fiunt, *origo autem complicationis et adiunctionis* duali numero recte tribuitur." *Ibid.*

¹⁵¹ "Magna haec ergo concordia est in prioribus tribus numeris: unum enim et duo et tria dicimus, quibus nihil interponi potest [1, 2, 3]: unum autem et duo, ipsa sunt tria [1 + 2 = 3]." *Ibid.* no. 22 (ML 32. 1096).

¹⁵² "Certe quaelibet rerum copulatio atque connexio tunc maxime unum quiddam efficit, cum et media extremis, et mediis extrema consentiunt." *Ibid.*, and also no. 24 (ML 32. 1097).

¹⁵³ "M. Nam cum unum, duo, tria dicimus, nonne quanto unum a duobus, tanto duo a tribus superantur? D. Verissimum est." *Ibid.* no. 23 (ML 32. 1097).

¹⁵⁴ "Illa unitas quam te amare dixisti, in rebus ordinatis hac una effici potest, cuius graecum nomen *ἀναλογία* est, nostri quidam *proportionem* vocaverunt." *Ibid.*

has shown us, sees the reason for the highest perfection of the number *three* in its perfect inner balance and harmony. This assumption is confirmed by a text in the *Summa Halesiana*, which discusses the same question concerning the number of Divine Persons. Taking the fundamental notion of order now in the sense of harmony, the author concludes with an obvious reference to those same ideas in the twelfth chapter of St. Augustine's work *On Music*: "The number of [Divine] Persons is three because the highest order and harmony exists in three. Hence Augustine says that the greater number is that in which there is the greater harmony."¹⁵⁵

Concerning the sources that have influenced and guided St. Augustine in these speculations about the number *three*, there is no doubt that they are to be sought in the Pythagorean doctrine, with the exception of the idea of two beginnings, which is a later development and seems to have Trinitarian implications.¹⁵⁶ The Pythagorean origin becomes manifest again in the remaining part of the twelfth chapter, where St. Augustine adds the number *four* to the original ternary. He does so because four is contained in that proportion by which the first three numbers are joined together. It is, as we have seen, the number upon which the balance of this proportion rests, and through which this balance becomes known. As unifying bond of the first three numbers, four follows them immediately and constitutes together with them the most fundamental, complete, and harmonious progression of numbers.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁵ The complete sentence reads: "Quia ergo summa ordinatio debet ibi esse, ut ostendatur ibi esse summus ordo et concordia, stat numerus personarum in tribus, quia summus ordo et concordia stat in tribus. Unde Augustinus dicit quod ille numerus maior est in quo est maior harmonia; et ideo vult dicere quod numerus divinarum personarum est numerus trium." *Summa theol.* I. 1. 2. u. 3. 6 (no. 318) ad 1 (ed. Quaracchi I. 467b). — This reference to St. Augustine, which speaks of "the greater number," leads to a better understanding of what Alexander of Hales in the above-quoted text of the *Glossa* (see above, p. 42, note 140) means by "the highest and first plurality."

¹⁵⁶ See the commentary on this passage by C. J. Perl, *Aurelius Augustinus: Musik* (2. ed., Paderborn 1940) 288 (19—21).

¹⁵⁷ "In praesentia satis est, tres illos numeros, quorum mirabare concordiam, sibimet in eadem connexionione nisi per quaternarium numerum non potuisse conferri. Quamobrem post illos se ordinari, sic ut illa concordia cum his arctiore copuletur, quantum intelligis iure impetravit; ut iam non unum, duo, tria tantum; sed unum, duo, tria, quatuor, sit amicissime copulata progressio numerorum." *De musica* I. 12 (no. 23) (ML 32. 1097). — Towards the end of the chapter St. Augustine gives this brief summary of his explanations: "Unum et duo principia sunt, et quasi semina numerorum, e quibus ternarius conficitur, ut sint iam tres numeri; qui sibi dum proportionem conferuntur, quaternarius elucescit et gignitur, et propterea eius iure coniungitur, ut usque ad illum fiat ea, quam quaerimus moderata progressio." *Ibid.* n. 25 (ML 23. 1098).

The sum total of these four numbers is ten, the highest number, after which we return again to one.¹⁵⁸ All this is contained and expressed in the "Holy Four" or the so-called tetractys of the Pythagoreans. The fact that these four numbers represent also the principal intervals of the musical scale makes the combination of them an even more expressive symbol of perfect harmony.¹⁵⁹ With this Pythagorean origin in mind, we now understand that intimate connection between real things and numbers which we observed in St. Augustine's development of the first and basic ternary; for the Pythagoreans were strongly inclined to consider everything under the aspect of numbers and to find the essence of all things in numbers. In the light of St. Augustine's explanations and on the background of the Pythagorean doctrine, the number *three* contains and fulfills the idea of completion, harmony, and perfection.

We now also arrive at a better understanding of what Alexander of Hales means when he says with reference to St. Augustine's work *On Music* that "the *first* perfection of an order consists in three members," and that "the first whole number, therefore, is the ternary."¹⁶⁰ In one respect, however, we see Alexander going beyond the source he is quoting; and, considered from the viewpoint of St. Bonaventure's principle which we are trying to explain, it is an important point. The reader of Alexander's text is likely to get the impression that St. Augustine himself mentions the "first perfection of an *order*." But this is not the case. The source speaks, as we have seen, merely about the first *whole* and *perfect number*. The term *ordo* is used only once in the entire chapter, and there it refers to nothing more than the regular or orderly *sequence* of numbers.¹⁶¹ The connection of the number *three* with the notion of order, and especially with every perfect order in general, must have come from some other source. But we can say that this connection and generalization is in accordance with St. Augustine's ideas; for we

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.* no. 26 (ML 23. 1098).

¹⁵⁹ In the tetractys of the Pythagoreans, the four numbers are expressed by dots which are usually arranged in such a way as to form a triangle. — We find this design again on a tablet in the left foreground of Raphael's "School of Athens." — These four numbers represent also the numerical ratios that determine the principal intervals of the musical scale. See above, Section A, § 2 (p. 000 and note 76).

¹⁶⁰ See above, p. 26 with note 140.

¹⁶¹ "Idem igitur numerus [scil. ternarius], qui fit ex uno et duobus [$1 + 2 = 3$], post utrumque *in ordine collocatur* [1, 2, 3], ita ut nullus alius interponi queat." *De musica* I. 12 (no. 22) (ML 32. 1096). — The expression *in rebus ordinatis* (the text is quoted above, note 154) could be considered as having some relationship, but it is still too general to be a direct source for Alexander of Hales' *perfectio ordinis*.



have seen how he himself first developed the theme of the three basic numbers as a necessity for a complete *thing*, but then considered the ternary as a kind of *general principle* of completion and perfection. When authors of a later period called such a ternary or set of distinct beings, which together form a complete harmony and unity, a perfect *order*, they merely attached an appropriate name to an idea which had been developed before.

If we thus consider Alexander's text in the *Glossa* on the background of its Augustinian and Pythagorean sources, it explains much of St. Bonaventure's principle. It shows what is meant by a perfect order, and in what sense such a perfect order requires three members. Here, too, the middle term functions as a means of transition from one extreme to the other. With regard to this last point, however, we still notice a difference. St. Augustine finds the basis for the harmonious connection of the three terms in a certain *proportion*. It is an explanation which manifests the heritage from the Pythagoreans who inclined towards the mathematical approach. Alexander of Hales¹⁶² and St. Bonaventure,¹⁶³ on the other hand, show by their explanations and examples that they see the connection of two extremes accomplished through a middle term which possesses qualities of both extremes; and this *similarity of qualities in adjacent members* is for them the basis that makes a connection possible. This second approach reminds us of Nemesius who, under the influence of Poseidonius, presented a picture of the created world in which each level was joined to the next by means of some common attribute.¹⁶⁴ The important source that developed and crystallized this idea of conjunction by common attributes is the Neoplatonic doctrine and system, to which we must now direct our full attention.

§ 3

Richard of St. Victor in the Line of the Neoplatonic Tradition

Before turning to the wide field and complex structure of Neoplatonism itself, we have to consider one more source which both Alexander of Hales and St. Bonaventure mention by name, and in which precisely this thought of a connecting middle term with qualities of both extremes is particularly clear. This source is Richard of St. Victor, and

¹⁶² See above, Sect. B, § 2 (p. 32).

¹⁶³ See Chapter I (*Franc. Stud.* 20 [1960]), Sect. B, § 2, b (p. 304—5).

¹⁶⁴ See above, p. 40.

the work that is usually quoted is his treatise *On the Trinity*, which has influenced many writers. One passage, which is used by St. Bonaventure¹⁶⁵ and to an even greater extent by Alexander of Hales,¹⁶⁶ will be sufficient to demonstrate the importance of this source with regard to our question. In the Fifth Book of his work Richard of St. Victor has written a special chapter in which he shows that there is one and only one intermediate Divine Person. He first reminds us of the highest beauty and *perfection* in God, which demand that the Divine Persons must be both "joined together by a most congruent beauty and *distinct* from one another by a most ordered diversity." The necessity of one intermediate Person with regard to this harmonious connection he then proves in the following way:

It therefore seems to be necessary that, between the Person to whom it belongs to give the fullness without accepting and the Person to whom it belongs to accept without giving, there is only one intermediate Person whose peculiar characteristic it is to give as well as to receive, so that, placed in the middle, He adheres to one of the two extrinsic Persons on account of one attribute, and is connected to the other of them by virtue of the other attribute. It thus comes about that by giving He will agree with the giver, and by receiving with the receiver.¹⁶⁷

The reader of this passage easily recognizes that this proof for the necessity of such an intermediate member is nothing but a practical application of the principle of the three terms. The part that speaks about the adherence of the Divine Persons to one another comes so close to the way in which St. Bonaventure explains the principle in his *Collationes in Hexaemeron*,¹⁶⁸ that it could have been the immediate source for the Seraphic Doctor. We have now met this same idea of a middle term with qualities of both extremes in so many different places that we can rightly ask for a possible common source from which this idea originated or at least received its dynamic power.

¹⁶⁵ I *Sent.* 2. u. 4. c. (I. 57b). For the text see Chapter I (*Franc. Stud.* 20 [1960]), p. 305, note 133, 2nd quotation.

¹⁶⁶ *Summa theol.* 1. 2. u. 3. 7 (no. 319) fund. 1 (I. 468a). Fund. 2 (468 a—b) shows a similar arrangement of two extremes and one intermediate member; Richard's name is again mentioned and the same work *De Trinitate* (5. 11) quoted.

¹⁶⁷ "Videtur itaque necesse esse, ut inter illam cuius est plenitudinem dare, nec accipere, et eam cuius est accipere, nec dare, sit sola una media cuius sit proprie proprium tam dare quam accipere, ut constituta in medio, uni altrinsecarum cohaereat ex uno, et alteri earum connectatur ex altero. Sicque fiet ut ex datione concordet cum dante, et ex acceptione concordet cum accipiente." *De Trinitate* 5. 14 (ML 196. 960A).

¹⁶⁸ In *Hexaem.* 8. 12 (V. 371a). For text and explanation see Chapter I (*Franc. Stud.* 20 [1960]), p. 304, notes 130—I.

There is indeed such a source which, although scarcely mentioned in connection with our principle,¹⁶⁹ has influenced indirectly and, to a great extent, also directly most of the texts we have considered on this matter of a middle term, including the last-mentioned passage from Richard of St. Victor. This *central* source, as we can readily call it, is the Neoplatonic system which was passed on to the Scholastics of the Middle Ages largely by Denis the Areopagite whom they accepted on account of his great authority as the alleged disciple of St. Paul.

The Dionysian writings had a special influence on Richard of St. Victor,¹⁷⁰ who not only accepted the ideas of this highly respected source but also developed them further. He, for instance, elaborated the Dionysian and Neoplatonic idea of the overflowing and self-diffusing goodness of God into a complete Trinitarian doctrine with its central notion of "fountain-fullness."¹⁷¹ Richard of St. Victor, in turn, became an important source for St. Bonaventure who continued the development of the same notion by shifting the emphasis to the related idea of primacy.¹⁷² We thus see a definite line of connection¹⁷³ through which Neoplatonic ideas reached the Seraphic Doctor, and the particular point in the doctrine on the Blessed Trinity, which we have just considered, is only one example for this connection. We can expect — and the very clear passage from Richard's work *On the Trinity*, quoted above, already shows it — that this line from Denis the Areopagite through Richard of

¹⁶⁹ The *Glossa* of Alexander of Hales (I *Sent.* 31. 24. c [op. cit., 311]) refers to Denis the Areopagite (*De divinis nom.* 2. 5 [MG 3. 643; ML 122. 1122C]). However, the terms *principium* — *medium* — *ultimum* are not mentioned in the source itself, but are Alexander's own elaboration of the text. This example shows that he not only quotes his source, but combines it with other facts and draws conclusions, contributing in this way to a further development. The principle of St. Bonaventure may have originated in a similar manner.

¹⁷⁰ About the influence of Denis the Areopagite on Richard of St. Victor and his work *De Trinitate* see G. Fritz, "Richard de Saint-Victor," *DTC* 13. 2 (1937) 2694. — St. Bonaventure emphasizes the close relationship of Richard to Denis when he writes: "Tertium vero [scil. Dei et animae unionem] docet Dionysius . . . Richardus sequitur Dionysium, quia . . . Richardus in contemplatione" (*De reduct. art.* 5 [V. 321b]).

¹⁷¹ See A. Stohr, *Die Trinitätslehre des heiligen Bonaventura; I. Teil: Die wissenschaftliche Trinitätslehre*, Münsterische Beiträge zur Theologie 3 (Münster 1923) 28, 31.

¹⁷² For the meaning of these two terms and their fundamental importance in the system of St. Bonaventure see the Introduction, § 1 (*Franc. Stud.* 20 [1960]), p. 266—7. The eminent position of Richard of St. Victor as source of St. Bonaventure is emphasized by A. Stohr, *op. cit.*, 5.

¹⁷³ It is to be noted that the present survey mentions only the principal figures in this line. A more detailed study will reveal a number of intermediate authors. A. Stohr mentions the line of Denis — Richard — William of Auvergne — William of Auxerre — Alexander of Hales — Bonaventure (*op. cit.*, 33).

St. Victor to St. Bonaventure will prove to be of special importance also with regard to our question of a necessary composite middle term which possesses qualities of either extreme, and that the further retracing of this line towards its origin will yield valuable information.

Section D

The Central Source of General Influence: The Neoplatonic System

§ 1

The Middle Term as a Composition of Two Extremes in the Writings of Aristotle

One of the essential and significant elements in the principle of St. Bonaventure is the idea of a medium that is composed of two extremes. Since this idea appears to be well developed already in Aristotle, it is advisable to turn first to the pertinent texts of his works in order to determine the extent and limit of his share in the development of this important notion. The result of this examination will allow us to give a definite and final answer to the question as to whether and how far St. Bonaventure's principle can be considered as Aristotelian.

Our previous analysis has shown, by a considerable number of examples, that the various texts in which Aristotle speaks of a necessary medium between two extremes refer to very definite and *specific* conditions as they exist in the realm of physical realities, and therefore cannot be considered as a real source of St. Bonaventure's principle of three such terms in *every* perfect order of beings. Aristotle, however, although not speaking about any general necessity of a medium with regard to its *actual existence*, nevertheless did make further inquiries into the necessary nature and *structure* of that medium; and the influence which this point of his doctrine may have had on the development of St. Bonaventure's principle now remains to be determined.

Of special interest and importance with regard to our question is the seventh chapter in the Ninth (resp. Tenth) Book of the *Metaphysics*, where Aristotle explains the basic characteristics which every medium must possess. He begins the chapter with the general, but in view of our problem very significant statement that between contraries — of which he has spoken in the preceding chapters¹⁷⁴ — “there *can* be, and

¹⁷⁴ Esp. chapter 4. For a brief summary of the main ideas in this chapter see above, note 69.

sometimes actually *is*, something intermediate"; such media, he then concludes, "are necessarily composed of the contraries."¹⁷⁵ These last words express the main theme of the entire chapter. Since this topic concerns the problem of the relationship between extremes and medium, Aristotle now seeks to determine this relationship and thereby characterizes the nature of the medium in three ways.¹⁷⁶

The first point he brings out is that "everything intermediate belongs to the *same genus* as those realities of which it is the medium; for we call medium that (stage) into which a thing that is changing, must change first."¹⁷⁷ As in the other texts already examined, Aristotle again refers to a physical change from one contrary to another. This change is an extended process which passes through certain intermediate stages. His two examples of gradual transition from the highest to the lowest tone of a musical instrument and, in the field of color, from white to black¹⁷⁸ further emphasize this idea. All steps in such a gradual transition must certainly belong to the same genus.

As a second characteristic of every medium Aristotle then mentions the fact that it is, and can be, only "between some opposites; for out of these alone is a change in the proper sense possible."¹⁷⁹ Here again is the same reference to a process of alteration from one contrary to another. On the basis of these two facts, that media are of the *same genus* as the contraries and that they lie *between* them, the Philosopher then states the third and most important characteristic, namely that "they are necessarily composed of these contraries."¹⁸⁰ The two contraries

¹⁷⁵ "Cum vero contrariorum contingat aliquid medium esse et quorundam sit, necesse ex contrariis media esse." *Metaph.* 9 (10). 7 (1057a 18—19). — As in the previous sections on Aristotle, the Latin version of the Aristotelian texts is again according to vol. 3 of the Bekker-edition. See the general remark above in note 6.

¹⁷⁶ For the distinction and explanation of these three characteristics see St. Thomas Aquinas, *Comment. in 12 libr. Metaph.* 10. 3 (*Op. omnia* [ed. Vivès] 25. 124a—126a) and E. J. Scheller, *Das Priestertum Christi im Anschluß an den hl. Thomas von Aquin: Vom Mysterium des Mittlers in seinem Opfer und unserer Anteilnahme* (Paderborn 1934) 44—5.

¹⁷⁷ "Omnia enim media, et illa quorum media sunt, in eodem genere sunt. Media namque illa dicimus, in quae necesse est primo transmutari quod transmutatur." *Metaph.* 9 (10). 7 (1057a 19—22). — The same basic principle also appears in *Analyt. Poster.* 1. 7: "Ex eodem genere necesse est et extrema et media esse" (75b 10—11).

¹⁷⁸ "Utpote si ab hypate in neten paullatim pertranseat, prius ad medios sonos veniet. Et in coloribus, si ex albo ad nigrum veniat, prius ad puniceum et fuscum quam ad nigrum veniet." *Metaph.* 9 (10). 7 (1057a 22—6).

¹⁷⁹ "Omnia [media] aliquorum oppositorum sunt: ex his namque solis per se transmutari est." *Ibid.* (1057a 30—31).

¹⁸⁰ "Quodsi media in eodem genere sunt, ut ostensum est, et contrariorum media, necesse est ea ex his contrariis componi." *Ibid.* (1057b 2—4). — The same idea is developed in *Phys.* 1. 5 (188b 21—6).

or extremes are considered as principles, which exist prior to any medium and are not composed of each other; every medium, on the other hand, does not exist except as a composition of these extremes.¹⁸¹

To demonstrate this, Aristotle once more refers to a process of alteration. He explains how something comes into being out of contraries in such a way that, before the change from one contrary to the other is reached, there is first a change into something else; "for this ['something else'] is *both more and less* than either of the contraries. This is, therefore, also the *medium* of the contraries."¹⁸² The fact that the medium is "both more and less than either of the contraries" manifests its composite nature; "for that which is more than the one and less than the other is somehow *composed of those things* of which it is said to be more than the one and less than the other."¹⁸³

In this way Aristotle shows that every medium is, of necessity, a composition of two contrary extremes.¹⁸⁴ By establishing and clarifying this aspect in the notion of medium, he has developed something which constitutes an essential element in St. Bonaventure's principle of three members in every perfect order; for it is precisely this kind of medium which the Seraphic Doctor always mentions and demands. As far as this composite nature of the middle term is concerned, St. Bonaventure's principle can, therefore, be considered as Aristotelian. We must add, however, that we here reach also the definite limit of Aristotle's contribution to the development of this principle.

We do not emphasize this limit without reason; for there is something in this Aristotelian doctrine which could lead to the conclusion that Aristotle's influence on St. Bonaventure's principle has gone

¹⁸¹ "Contraria in vicem incompressa, propterea quod principia sunt. Media vero aut omnia aut nullum." *Metaph.* 9 (10). 7 (1057b 22—3). About contraries as principles see also *Phys.* 1. 5 (188a 27—30).

¹⁸² The complete passage reads as follows: "Ex contrariis vero aliquid fit. Quare erit in hoc transmutatio antequam in illa: utroque enim et magis et minus erit (ἐκατέρου γὰρ καὶ ἥττον ἔσται καὶ μᾶλλον); medium igitur contrariorum hoc etiam erit." *Metaph.* 9 (10). 7 (1057b 23—6). — Here and in the text of the following note the Latin version reverses the position of the two Greek words ἥττον and μᾶλλον.

¹⁸³ "Ergo cetera quoque media composita sunt. Id enim quod uno minus, altero magis est, compositum ex illis quodam modo est, quorum uno minus altero magis dicitur esse." *Ibid.* (1057b 26—9).

¹⁸⁴ With regard to the Aristotelian notion of *virtue*, it is particularly H. Schilling (*Das Ethos der Mesotes* Diss. Tübingen 1930] 24—9) who points out that virtue as a right medium between two wrong extremes is, like all other media, a *composition* of some positive elements in both extremes, and thus represents a "synthesis of values." He writes on p. 27: "Der Kern der Mesotes-Lehre liegt darin, daß die Mesotes das in den Extremen liegende Wertvolle synthetisch vereinigt. Die Aristotelischen Aretai sind 'Wert-synthesen' (Nicolai Hartmann, *Ethik*, S. 518)."

beyond that limit. Because the medium is composed of two extremes and therefore possesses their qualities to a certain degree, it has something *in common* with either extreme and *participates* in the nature of both. In virtue of these facts, the medium receives a connecting function and could eventually be considered as a necessary bond between the extremes. This would actually be the basic thought and the decisive element of St. Bonaventure's principle which would, thus, prove to be truly and completely Aristotelian. But the question is whether this line of thought is really found in the works of Aristotle, or whether it is at least according to his mind and intention.

The ideas of common qualities and of participation, as they are implicitly contained in the notion of a composite medium, occasionally appear in the writings of Aristotle. In the *Politics* the Philosopher speaks about a synthesis of democracy and oligarchy, and declares that the perfect mixture of the two is reached where the same form of government can be called democracy and oligarchy. "But this is exactly what happens in the case of a medium; for *in it both extremes appear and shine forth*."¹⁸⁵ Another interesting example for the same idea is found in Aristotle's description of animals and their various parts, where we read also about unicorns. The horn of this creature is placed in the middle of its forehead because "in this way both sides of the head possess the horn to the fullest extent, since *the medium is equally common to either extreme*."¹⁸⁶ A third example occurs in the preceding chapter which speaks about the different kinds of teeth with which man is endowed. There are the sharp incisors as well as the broad molars, and these two groups are separated by the so-called canines which "are in the middle between and have the nature of both; for *the medium participates in both extremes*, and the canines themselves are at the same time both sharp and broad."¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁵ "Certus autem bene permistae democratiae et oligarchiae finis ac terminus erit, ubi licebit eandem rei publicae administrandae formam democratiam et oligarchiam appellare. Perspicuum enim est, iis qui ita loquuntur, id ex eo accidere quod bene sint permistae. Idem porro et medio accidit: in eo enim utrumque extremorum apparet atque elucet (ἐμφανίζεται)." *De re publ.* 4. 9 (1294b 14—18). Two other references to a union of qualities of both extremes occur in the preceding part of the same chapter: "Commune (κοινόν) autem et medium horum est hoc utrumque iunctum (ἀμφοτέρω)" (1294a 41). — "Commune est autem neque hoc neque illud, sed quod medium est inter utrumque horum censum" (1294b 4—6).

¹⁸⁶ "Gerunt sane medio sui capitis cornu fixum ea quae unum habent: sic enim maxime pars utraque cornu obtinebit, cum medium commune pariter utrique extremo sit." *De partib. animal.* 3. 2 (663a 24—7).

¹⁸⁷ "Homo vero ad usum communem probe factos obtinet dentes, primores acutos ut secant, maxillares latos ut molant. Discriminant eos utrosque hi qui canini appellantur, media inter eos natura conditi: nam et medium

The brief review of these texts shows the very diverse fields of knowledge to which Aristotle applies his principle about the composition of a medium. He quotes this principle in each case as a proof or confirmation of some particular fact. The first two texts mention the idea that a medium has something *in common* with either extreme; the third text actually speaks of a *participation* in both. However, not one of these passages states or insinuates in any way that the medium could, on account of these qualities, serve as a *bond* which unites the extremes to a harmonious order, and still less do we find the idea that such a medium is *necessary* in order to establish this unity. And yet, it is precisely this idea of a *necessary coherence* between the extremes which prompts St. Bonaventure to *demand* a medium,¹⁸⁸ and which is the most decisive element in his principle, especially in as far as he applies it to the necessary position of man in creation.

We try in vain to find this notion of medium as a necessary bond between opposite extremes in the world of Aristotelian thought.¹⁸⁹ There is one place in Aristotle's *Problems* in which, indeed, we read that the intermediate note of a musical scale is like a bond which establishes the right harmony of the whole;¹⁹⁰ but all the details mentioned in this passage are a clear indication that this "Aristotelian" problem is actually of Pythagorean character and origin.¹⁹¹ Aristotle himself does not take up this idea of medium as a *necessary bond*, but merely concentrates on the *necessary nature and structure* of a medium.¹⁹² This distinction has to be made particularly in view of the frequent, and sometimes exclusive,

particeps (μετέχει) utriusque extremi est, et canini ipsi partim acuti sunt partim lati." *Ibid.* 3. 1 (661b 6—12).

¹⁸⁸ Esp. *In Hexaem.* 8. 12 (V. 371a). For text and explanation see Chapter I (*Franc. Stud.* 20 [1960]), p. 304 and note 131.

¹⁸⁹ Werner W. Jaeger, the renowned expert on Aristotle, remarks on one occasion: "Auch die Grundtendenz unserer Lehre [i. e. the doctrine of Nemesis about the opposite elements], die Verbindung durch media und den δεσμός, von dem unten mehr die Rede sein soll, vermißt man bei Aristoteles" (*Nemesios von Emesa* [Berlin 1914] note on p. 73).

¹⁹⁰ *Problem.* 19. 20: "Medius veluti coniunctio est sonorum — τῶν φθόγγων ἡ μέση ὥσπερ σύνδεσμός ἐστι" (919a 26).

¹⁹¹ See W. Jaeger, *op. cit.*, 109. — The term σύνδεσμος is mentioned by J. Zürcher among possible Stoic elements in the *Corpus Aristotelicum* (*Aristoteles' Werk und Geist* [Paderborn 1952] 80). According to Zürcher, the *Problemata* have been revised or composed by Theophrastus about 310 B. C. (*ibid.* 310, 318).

¹⁹² E. J. Scheller, who in the first main part of his work on Christ the Mediator presents a detailed study about the development of the underlying philosophical notions of *medium* and *participation* (p. 42—67), comes to the conclusion: "Um auf Aristoteles zurückzukommen, muß erwähnt werden, daß Aristoteles im Begriff des Mittleren nur das metaphysische Sein betrachtet, nicht aber den Akt des Verbindens beider Gegensätze erörtert" (*op. cit.*, 46).

references to Aristotle in places where the subject of medium is treated; for such references could, otherwise, lead to the false impression and conclusion that the idea of *connection by a medium* be also a part of Aristotle's own doctrine.¹⁹³ The facts we have found in our analysis clearly show that Aristotle merely concentrates on the necessary *structure of a medium*; only with regard to this particular aspect can he, therefore, be taken into consideration as a source for St. Bonaventure's principle about a necessary intermediate term composed of two extremes.

In this connection with Aristotle's notion of a composite medium, one more text is worth mentioning, because a reader could, perhaps, be tempted to consider it as an Aristotelian source having a still greater and more decisive influence on St. Bonaventure's principle. This text occurs in the Eighth Book of the *Physics* where we find, in addition to the two extremes and the composite middle term, also the inference that, given two terms, there must be also a third, an idea which seems to come closer to the main element of St. Bonaventure's principle. The fifth chapter declares, in one of the proofs for a first member in any causal series of movements, that if there is something which *only is moved* without moving another, and something which *both moves and is moved*, then there is to be assumed also something which *only moves* without being moved by another.¹⁹⁴ The idea of this argument appears again later in the writings of the Commentator Averroes († 1198) and the Jewish philosopher Maimonides († 1204) who became sources of Aristotelism for High Scholasticism, living, as they did, on the threshold of that period. They present the same proof in the more general form that, if something exists which is composed of two elements, and if one of these elements exists also separately by itself, then the other element must likewise exist separately by itself.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹³ We read e. g. in the work of R. Šilić: "Ebenso war die aristotelische Lehre vom medium in der Zeit vor Bonaventura bekannt. Sie besagt, daß ein medium, das zwei Extreme verbinden soll (italics mine), von beiden verschieden sein, aber auch an der Natur beider teilnehmen muß" (*Christus und die Kirche: Ihr Verhältnis nach der Lehre des heiligen Bonaventura*, Breslauer Studien zur historischen Theologie [new series] 3 [Breslau 1938] 77).

¹⁹⁴ After enumerating the three necessary elements in every act of movement (see below, note 199), Aristotle draws the following conclusion: "Cum igitur sit et ultimum ipsum, ut cernimus, quod motu quidem cieri potest, principium autem motus non habet, et id item quod movetur quidem, sed ab alio, non a se ipso cietur, rationi consentaneum est, ne necessarium dicam, et ipsum tertium esse, quod movet quidem, immobile autem est." *Phys.* 8. 5 (256b 20—4). Similar conclusions, based upon the same principle, are found also in *Metaph.* I (2). 2 and II (12). 7.

¹⁹⁵ Maimonides states this general principle in Book II, chapter 1, of his famous *Guide of the Perplexed* (known by the Scholastics as *Dux neutrorum sive dubiorum*) with an explicit reference to Aristotle. After some ex-

St. Bonaventure clearly knew of this argument; for we find it in one of his proofs for the existence of pure spirits in creation.¹⁹⁶ The fact that it appears there in the same general form in which Averroes and Maimonides presented it, leads to the assumption that these great philosophers may have been among those who transmitted this argument to the period of St. Bonaventure. But even though the argument might seem to have a relationship to our principle of the three terms, it cannot be considered as a real source of it; for the decisive composite intermediate member, which St. Bonaventure only seeks to prove on the basis of the two existing extremes, is in this case already present and serves as starting point. The process of this argument consists principally in an analysis of this intermediate term, in an investigation into its constituent parts, and in an unfolding of what the existence of such a composite medium implies. There is no mention of a required connection between the three terms, and as far as the necessity of such a composite intermediate term is concerned, Aristotle explicitly denies it in the same chapter of his *Physics*. The medium which both moves and is moved he conceives as an instrument¹⁹⁷ which an agent may use, and he declares: "A movement by an instrument is impossible without a [final]

planatory remarks about this principle he mentions first the example of honey water [mead] and then the particular case of the mover and the moved. It should be noted that Aristotle himself only speaks of this *last* case, which belongs to the particular realm of causality. — Apart from some additional remarks, *Maimonides* has literally the same text as the Commentary of *Averroes* who, in turn, quotes the "Expositor" *Alexander of Aphrodisias* (about 200 A. D.). We read in the Commentary of Averroes: "Dicit Alexander: Ista est ratio, quod aliquid movens non movetur, et est dicta breviter et rememoratio eius, quod dictum est in ultimo Physicorum. Et est fundata super duas propositiones, quarum una est (the following is literally the same as in Maimonides) quod *omne compositum* ex duobus, quorum alterum potest esse per se, possibile erit etiam alterum esse per se . . . ; verbi gratia quod *hydromel*, quia compositum est ex aqua et melle, et mel invenitur per se, necesse est ergo, ut aqua inverniatur per se. Et, quia invenimus aliquid *motum* et *movens*, quasi compositum ex movente et moto, et invenimus aliquid motum per se et non movens, manifestum est, quod est necesse aliquid movens esse et non motum." This text is quoted by A. Weiss, *Mose Ben Maimon: Führer der Unschlüssigen*, Philosophische Bibliothek 184 b (Leipzig 1924) 2. 27—8, note 33.

¹⁹⁶ "Item, si aliquid componitur ex diversis naturis, et alteram illarum est reperire per se, contingit similiter per se reperire et reliquam; sed homo componitur ex substantia spirituali et corporali: cum ergo sit reperire substantiam pure corporalem, per se est reperire substantiam pure spiritua-lem; hanc autem dicimus Angelum: ergo Angelus non habet corpus." II *Sent.* 8. 1. 1. 1. fund. 4 (II. 210b—211a). The Quaracchi-edition refers, in note 11, only to the *Physics* (8. 5) of Aristotle.

¹⁹⁷ Aristotle speaks of this intermediate member in a causal series of movements as "τὸ ὃ κινεῖ — id quo movens movet" (e. g. 256a 26, b 15), and he shows its composite nature by saying: "Id autem quo motus affertur, et *movere* necesse est et *moveri*." *Phys.* 8. 5 (256b 16—17).

mover which moves by itself, whereas a mover which moves by itself does not need an instrument."¹⁹⁸

This statement, which clearly *denies* the necessity of an instrument as third member between the mover and the moved, seems to be contradicted by another sentence which appears later in the same chapter, and which runs as follows: "There *must* be *three*: that which is moved, the mover [who moves it], and that by which the mover moves [that which is moved]."¹⁹⁹ On a first reading, this sentence seems to state the opposite from what Aristotle has said just before about the need of an instrument; it seems to *affirm* the necessity of a third, intermediate member between the two extremes of the mover and the moved, and may thus give the impression of being a parallel to St. Bonaventure's principle of the three terms.

However, the seeming contradiction of Aristotle's previous statement, and with it also the seeming parallel to St. Bonaventure, disappear if we understand that third element "*by which the mover moves*" in a general sense, namely as the means by which the mover *attains* and *is united* to the object to be moved. This *contact* between the two is always necessary, and it is, in this general sense, true that one thing moves the other always *by* something.

We can and have to interpret the third element "*by which the mover moves*" in this *general* sense of a necessary contact between the mover and the moved because Aristotle himself also *specifies* this third element and thereby shows how it is to be understood. On a similar occasion earlier in the same chapter, he enumerates those same three elements that belong to every process in which one thing moves another. In this place he then adds a remark which can only be taken as a specification of the third element. There Aristotle states: "Everything which *moves* is moving *something* and [moving it] *by* something; for it moves either *by itself* or *by another*."²⁰⁰ The *contact* between the mover and the moved, which is a *general* necessity for every movement of one thing

¹⁹⁸ "Fieri vero non potest ut id quo motus affertur, moveat absque eo quod movet se ipso. Sed si id quidem sit quod motum affert se ipso, non necesse est aliud esse quo motus affertur (ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν αὐτὸ αὐτῷ κινεῖ, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἄλλο εἶναι ὃ κινεῖ)." *Phys.* 8. 5 (256a 25—7).

¹⁹⁹ "Tria namque necesse est esse, id quod *movetur*, id quod *movet*, et id insuper quo movens movet (τρία γὰρ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, τὸ τε κινούμενον καὶ τὸ κινεῖν καὶ τὸ ὃ κινεῖ)." *Ibid.* (256b 14—15). After a brief explanation of each of these three elements, the text quoted above in note 194 follows.

²⁰⁰ "Omne namque quod *movet*, et *aliquid* et *aliquo* movet: aut enim *se ipso* aut *alio* movet (πᾶν γὰρ τὸ κινεῖν τί τε κινεῖ καὶ τινί· ἢ γὰρ αὐτῷ κινεῖ τὸ κινεῖν ἢ ἄλλῳ)." *Ibid.* 8. 5 (256a 22—3). The same two possibilities are mentioned side by side also in the beginning of the chapter (256a 4—5).

by another and constitutes that third element mentioned by Aristotle, can thus be realized in *two particular* ways: either directly by the *mover itself*, or indirectly by means of an *instrument*. The *necessary contact* of the mover with the moved, therefore, does not mean also the *necessary existence* of a third, intermediate *thing*. In the present case, Aristotle speaks of the medium as a *distinct reality*, because it happens to be given as part of the *observed fact* from which he starts to prove the existence of the invisible first mover; but such a third distinct factor is not essential to the main thrust of his argument. In this whole chapter of the *Physics*, Aristotle neither *demand*s a *third*, intermediate member as necessary, nor does he, for any reason, *restrict* the total number of things in a series of causal movements to *three*,²⁰¹ so that in neither respect do we see a real relationship to the basic ideas of St. Bonaventure's principle.

We thus arrive at the same conclusion as before, namely that the influence of Aristotle on the development of St. Bonaventure's principle of the three terms does not go beyond the doctrine on the *composite nature* of a medium. The other ideas of *connection* and *coherence*, however, and with them the *necessity* of such a medium, which constitute the main and decisive elements of this principle, have developed along a different line.

This development really begins, as we have seen, with the Pythagoreans, and continues with Plato who applies the Pythagorean idea of a connecting and harmonizing medium to the structure of the visible world; between the two extreme elements he demands two intermediate elements as a necessary *bond*.²⁰² Later, Poseidonius took up this idea; he developed into a definite system and terminology what the twice-quoted phrase of Plato's *Timaeus*²⁰³ somewhat casually mentions and seems to employ rather as a poetical expression.²⁰⁴ The important work

²⁰¹ Aristotle repeatedly insinuates and also explicitly states that there may be only *one* intermediate member, but that there can just as well be *several* in such a causal series of movements. We read, e. g. in the beginning of the chapter which we have now examined: "Et hoc [quod movet] aut primum post ultimum aut per plura media movet" (*Phys.* 8. 5 [256a 5—6]). Aristotle's only concern in this section is that there is a first mover at the beginning of any such series; the number of intermediate members remains completely indifferent.

²⁰² According to W. Jaeger (*op. cit.*, 101), it was Plato who first formed the notion of bond in this particular meaning and connection.

²⁰³ See above, p. 27 with note 80 and p. 40.

²⁰⁴ W. Jaeger formulates it in this way: "Dieser anfänglich dichterische Ausdruck Platons [namely δεσμός, συνδεῖν] ist für den Interpreten feste Begriffssprache für ein methodisches Leitmotiv seines Denkens geworden" (*op. cit.*, 100).

in which Poseidonius has accomplished this task is his lost *Commentary on the Timaeus*.²⁰⁵ Because of the tremendous influence of this Commentary on subsequent centuries, "the Plato of the *Timaeus* has become the Plato of Neoplatonism,"²⁰⁶ and the ideas of bond and coherence as well as those of harmony and unity appear from now on as basic elements of Neoplatonic cosmology.²⁰⁷

This comprehensive system of Neoplatonism is such that it can embrace the Aristotelian notion of a composite medium also, particularly on account of the fact that the idea of participation, implicitly contained in it, is really Platonic.²⁰⁸ In Neoplatonism we thus reach the central source from which St. Bonaventure's principle has mainly developed and has received its greatest influence. This source now remains to be examined. In our attempt to discover the lines of this development, we shall follow the same method as in the previous sections and start with sources that are used by St. Bonaventure.

§ 2

The Tripartite Structure of the Hierarchical Order in the Writings of Denis the Areopagite

Although St. Bonaventure, in his discussions about the necessity for three members in every perfect order, never mentions the name of

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.* 93—4. Jaeger sees in Poseidonius the thinker who laid the foundation for the synthesis of Plato and Aristotle (70, 91—2) and calls his doctrine "die Grundtriebkraft des Neuplatonismus — the fundamental motive power of Neoplatonism" (97).

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.* 70. — Jaeger points out that it is particularly the principle of a necessary bond which, since the time of Poseidonius, causes the *Timaeus* to be "the authentic witness of the Platonic way of thinking and makes it the cornerstone of all philosophy; for it was Poseidonius who thought this principle over with consistency, connected it with Heraclitus' doctrine on the harmony of opposites, and used it as basis of a strictly uniform, monistic conception of nature" (*Ibid.* 101).

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.* 75, 100, and 106. As particular examples Jaeger mentions the expressions δεσμός, συνδεῖν, συνάπτεσθαι, and μεθόριος. See the similar list of expressions given above in connection with Nemesius on p. 38, note 127.

²⁰⁸ E. Scheller calls attention to the fact that in the "more or less" of the Aristotelian medium (see above, note 182!) "the Platonic notion of participation glimmers through" (*op. cit.*, 45). Note that the expressions κοινόν and μετέχειν, which occur in the above-quoted texts of Aristotle (See notes 185—7), are also among the first in the list of words used by Nemesius in his treatise *On the Nature of Man* (see above, note 127). They are of Platonic origin and become fundamental later in Neoplatonism. Aristotle, however, did not think too much of the Platonic notion of participation; for instance, he remarks with reference to this notion in the Platonic theory of ideas: "Participare (μετέχειν) namque, ut prius diximus, nihil est" (*Metaph.* 1. 9 [992a 28—9]). In connection with the notion of medium, Aristotle left these Platonic thoughts undeveloped.

Dionysius, his connection with this important source remains a fact and can be sufficiently shown. On several occasions the Seraphic Doctor uses another axiom which contains the same three elements of our principle and which he himself attributes to Denis the Areopagite. He once states with an explicit reference to the work *On the Angelic Hierarchy*, that "it is divine law not to neglect the order in anything, but to bring back the *intermediate* members through the *first* ones, and the *last* members through the *intermediate* ones."²⁰⁹

It is true that this sentence speaks about the third phase of creation, the final return of the creatures to God, and not about their relationship towards one another. The order mentioned here is in the first place the *ordo in finem*, and it may for a moment seem to be an unjustified step to conclude, from this text, that Denis is a source also of that other principle of three necessary terms, which is essentially a principle about the *ordo rerum ad invicem*. But we have seen in the Introduction how intimately these two kinds of order are connected and correspond to one another.²¹⁰ And what is even more important, the above-mentioned passage in the work *On the Angelic Hierarchy*, to which St. Bonaventure refers, actually contains both principles.

In the third paragraph, which discusses certain apparitions of God, Denis teaches, among other things, that Moses received the Divine Law not immediately from the invisible and inaccessible God but through the mediation of an angel. This manner of communication, he then remarks, was like a confirmation of the order of the "divine law," according to which "the *lower* beings are to be brought to the Godhead through the *higher* beings."²¹¹ The mention of lower and higher beings

²⁰⁹ Hoc confirmatur per illud quod dicit Dionysius in libro de Angelica Hierarchia [4. 3]: 'Lex divinitatis est in nullo negligere ordinem, sed per *prima media*, et per *media postrema* reducere.'" II *Sent.* 11. 1. 1. fund. 3 (II. 277a). We find this Dionysian principle in the same complete form in IV *Sent.* 19. 3. 1. c. (IV. 508b) and, with an inversion of the two parts, also in II *Sent.* 29. 1. 1. fund. 3 (II. 695a). The simpler version of "*infima per media ad suprema reducere*" appears in II *Sent.* 11. 1. 1. c. (II. 277b), *Brevil.* 2. 9 (V. 226b), and *In Hexaem.* 3. 32 (V. 348b).

²¹⁰ Introduction, § 2 (*Franc. Stud.* 20 [1960]), p. 274.

²¹¹ *De caelest. hier.* 4. 3 (MG 3. 180D—181A): "Docet autem et hoc sapienter theologia, per angelos eam [scil. legislationem] in nos provenire, tanquam divino legali ordine illud legaliter ponente, hoc est, *per prima secunda* in divinum reduci" (ML 122. 1047C). — Here and in the following quotations from Denis the Areopagite, the Latin version is taken from the translation of John Scotus Eriugena, which was used by St. Bonaventure. See on this point e. g. D. Dobbins, *Franciscan Mysticism: A Critical Examination of the Mystical Theology of the Seraphic Doctor with Special Reference to the Sources of his Doctrines*, FS No. 6 (New York 1927) 29, note 64, and R. Šilić, *op. cit.*, 35, notes 4 and 5.

seems to remind the author of another and more fundamental fact, namely of the actual order *among* these creatures. In order to give a more complete explanation on this point, he now states the other "divine law" concerning the basic structure of creation, with particular reference to the world of rational beings. By adding, and now in greater detail, the other law about the return, he combines the two principles in this one sentence:

Not only for superior and inferior spirits, but also for those of an equal order has the following law been laid down by the Principle of all order which exists above all things, namely [1] that there be *first, middle, and last* ranks and powers in each hierarchy, and [2] that the *more excellent* ones be teachers and leaders of the *inferior* in the approach to, illumination by, and union with the Divine.²¹²

If we now compare Denis' own words with St. Bonaventure's quotation of this "divine law," we observe a difference between them. Whenever Denis mentions the law about the *return*, he speaks merely of *higher* and *lower* beings. We see this not only in the two examples of our present section but also in other places.²¹³ Only in the case of the law about the order *among* creatures does he give a complete enumeration of the *three* essential levels. This difference in the form of the two laws is kept even in the above-quoted passage where both are mentioned in the same sentence. If, therefore, St. Bonaventure presents the law concerning the *return* with an explicit mention of *three* basic levels, he is not merely quoting the indicated source, but actually going a step further than Denis by combining the two principles. The law with regard to the *return*, as he quotes it, contains also the other law concerning the order *among* creatures, which is nothing else than St. Bonaventure's principle of the three terms.

This evidence of a connection between the two authors in the present case lends new importance and significance to other existing parallels. The similarity between the Dionysian law about three levels in every hierarchy and St. Bonaventure's principle about the necessity

²¹² "Etenim non solum et in superpositis et subiectis animis, sed et in aequae potentibus ipsa lex definitur superessentiali omnium ordinationis principio, hoc est, per unamquamque hierarchiam *primas et medias et ultimas* esse et ordinationes, et virtutes, et *minorum* esse *diviniores* doctores et manuductores, in divinam adductionem et illuminationem et communicationem." *Ibid.* (MG 3. 181A; ML 122. 1047C—D).

²¹³ *De caelest. hier.* 8. 2 (MG 3. 240D): "Hoc est enim omnino divina taxiarchia divinitus promulgatum, *per prima secunda* divinis participare illuminationibus" (ML 122. 1054—5). In the same way *De ecclesiast. hier.* 5. 4 (MG 3. 504C): "Lex quidem haec est thearchiae sacratissima, *per prima secunda* ad divinissimam suam reducere lucem" (ML 122. 1096C).

of three terms in every perfect order is indeed very great, especially in view of the fact that Denis himself defines this hierarchy as a "sacred order."²¹⁴ One of the peculiar features which our previous analysis has brought out is the fact that the older sources do not yet mention the term "order" in connection with those three elements, as later authors, who are closer in time to St. Bonaventure, have done. The introduction of this notion and its final incorporation in St. Bonaventure's principle may well be a result of this Dionysian idea and axiom.

Perhaps the actual influence of Denis the Areopagite on St. Bonaventure's principle goes even further than this. The idea of a *tripartite* order with two extremes and one intermediate term as their connecting link is certainly something that controls the entire system of Denis and appears frequently and under various forms.²¹⁵ Denis mentions altogether three different principal hierarchies,²¹⁶ and already this general plan reflects our principle. On the highest plane and entirely removed from matter we find the "Celestial Hierarchy" of the heavenly *spirits*. At the greatest distance from this is the "Legal Hierarchy" of the Old Testament, which existed completely in *sensible* signs and images. But this Legal Hierarchy foreshadowed the "Ecclesiastical Hierarchy," which now stands in the middle and is related to both of these extremes because it possesses a *spiritual* as well as a *material* element.²¹⁷

Each of these hierarchies is organized and further subdivided according to that general law of three distinct levels which Denis states in the

²¹⁴ "*De caelest. hier.* 3. 1 (MG 3. 164 D): 'Est quidem hierarchia secundum me *ordo divinus* (τάξις ἱερά), et scientia, et actio, deiformi quantum possibile simulata, iuxta inditas ei divinitus illuminationes proportionaliter in Dei similitudinem ascendens' (ML 122. 1044 C). Another text describes the hierarchy more from a static viewpoint: 'Nonne ergo hierarchiam qui dicit, *sacram* quandam universaliter declarat *dispositionem* (ἱεράν τινα καθόλου διακόσμησιν)?' *Ibid.* 3. 2 (MG 3. 165 B; ML 122. 1045 A). — Phil. Boehner points out that this hierarchy appears in these definitions both as an existing *state* and as a *task* or aim to be accomplished: 'Wie man sieht, ist die Hierarchie als *Stand* und als *Aufgabe* zu unterscheiden' (italics mine) (P. Boehner — E. Gilson, *Christliche Philosophie* [3. ed., Paderborn 1954] 137). This corresponds exactly to the two kinds of order which St. Bonaventure distinguishes.

²¹⁵ About the terms μέσος and μεσότης in the works of Denis see A. van den Daele, *Indices Pseudo-Dionysiani* (Louvain 1941) 94.

²¹⁶ This enumeration is given in *De ecclesiast. hier.* 5. 2 (MG 3. 501 A—504 A).

²¹⁷ "Est autem et *caelestis* et *legalis* communicativae *medietati* extremarum recepta, ei quidem communicans intellectualibus contemplationibus: huic vero, quia symbolis sensibilibus variatur, et per ea sacre in Deum reducitur." *Ibid.* (MG 3. 501 C—D; ML 122. 1095 C).

above-quoted passage and also on other occasions.²¹⁸ But this order in every hierarchy is more than a simple division into three sections. Each hierarchy has an *upper* extreme which exists in a certain state of perfection and has something to give. Each also possesses a *lower* extreme which only receives. Finally, between these two extremes we invariably find the important *intermediate* member which is both receiving from the upper level and handing down to the level below.²¹⁹ The general effect of this intermediate level is the harmonious connection and coherence within the ternary, because this intermediate level is meeting each extreme on the common ground of some similar quality.²²⁰ All this shows striking parallels with St. Bonaventure's principle and his notion of order. Although hardly mentioned, the Dionysian writings, so highly respected during the Middle Ages, can rightly be considered as an important factor in the general development of our principle,²²¹ and may also have had some direct influence on the Seraphic Doctor in this matter.

²¹⁸ E. g. *De caelest. hier.* 10. 2 (MG 3. 273A—B): "Omnem hierarchiam videmus in *primas*, et *medias*, et *ultimas* virtutes divisam" (ML 122. 1059A). Also 9. 2 (MG 3. 257C). — The further subdivision of each hierarchy according to the same pattern is indicated in *De ecclesiast. hier.* 5. 2 (MG 3. 501D—504A): "Unaquaeque vero trium nostrae hierarchiae divisionum consequenter et legali et diviniore eorum, quae secundum nos, hierarchiae *prima* et *media* et *ultima* ordinatur virtute, et divina analogia praevisa, et omnium bono ornatu, et secundum ordinem compacta et coniunctiva societate" (ML 122. 1095D—1096A).

²¹⁹ The intermediate position of the Archangels in the lower Celestial Hierarchy is described in *De caelest. hier.* 9. 2 (MG 3. 257C): "Quoniam quidem non est hierarchia, non et *primas* et *medias* et *ultimas* virtutes habens, archangelorum sanctus ordo communicative hierarchicae *medietati extremorum* recipitur. Etenim sacratissimis Principatibus communicat, et sanctis Angelis" (ML 122. 1056B). — *De ecclesiast. hier.* 5. 1 (MG 3. 501A) mentions the three functions that characterize the three levels in every hierarchy: 1) the upper level of Divine Mysteries (*τελεται*); 2) the intermediate bond of initiated and experienced "priests" (*υποσται*); 3) the lower level of those who are being initiated (*τελουμενοι*). This enumeration has, in the first place, the "Ecclesiastical Hierarchy" in mind; in the case of the "Celestial Hierarchy," the upper level of the "Divine Mysteries" consists of those who are the first and most perfect possessors of the Divine illumination. But the basic idea is the same.

²²⁰ In chapter 11 of *De divinis nom.*, Denis praises the Divine Peace as the ultimate source of all created harmony, and he sees this harmony among creatures accomplished through such connecting intermediate beings: "Pervenit enim perfectissimae pacis universitas in omnia existentia, secundum simplicissimum eius et clarum unificae virtutis adventum, unificans omnia, et coniungens *summa per media summis*, per unam connaturalem coniugata amicitiam" (11. 2 [MG 3. 952A; ML 122. 1165D]).

²²¹ A sign of this general influence is an argument listed by Denis the Carthusian: "Natura non procedit a distante in distans nisi per medium, ut S. Dionysius protestatur" (II *Sent.* 1. 9. arg. 2 [*Op. omnia* (Tournay 1903) 21. 107aD]).

§ 3

*The Neoplatonic Ideas of Proclus and their
Transmission to the Middle Ages*a) Proclus as Source for Denis the Areopagite and the Neoplatonic Notion
of Causality

Of particular importance for our question is the source behind Dionysian writings, and here we are able to arrive at some definite conclusions. We now know that the real author of these writings is not the Dionysius of Athens, whom the Acts of the Apostles mention as convert and disciple of St. Paul, but an unknown Christian writer about the end of the fifth or the beginning of the sixth century.²²² His works bear the unmistakable marks of Neoplatonic philosophy,²²³ and are characterized by ideas that point more particularly to the later, more fully developed Neoplatonic system of Proclus and the Athenian school, in which the author seems to have received his training.²²⁴

This close relationship to Proclus is particularly evident in connection with our question, for it is in his works that we find ternaries with extremes and a middle term most completely and systematically developed.²²⁵ The only real triad in the doctrine of Plotinus is that of One, Mind, and Soul. But in the system of Proclus we see, for instance, the one realm of the Mind broken up into three groups: there are the *intelligible* beings, the *intellectual* beings, and between these two also the *intelligible-intellectual* beings.²²⁶ This last, intermediate group

²²² See J. Stiglmayr, *Des heiligen Dionysius Areopagita angebliche Schriften über die beiden Hierarchien*, BKV (Kempten 1911) Introduction 8—25; P. Boehner — E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, 131; Th. Campbell, *Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite: The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*, SST (2. ser.) 83 (diss. Washington 1955) Introd. 12—19.

²²³ The influence of both Plotinus and Proclus on Denis is shown by H. F. Müller, *Dionysios, Proklos, Plotinos: Ein historischer Beitrag zur neuplatonischen Philosophie*, BGPM 20. 3—4, Münster 1918.

²²⁴ See Th. Whittaker, *The Neo-Platonists: A Study in the History of Hellenism* (2. ed., Cambridge 1928) 187. — As a special sign of the close relationship between these two authors, E. Scheller (*op. cit.*, 63—4) mentions the peculiar idea of Unteilnehmbarkeit "(unparticipability)", which we find developed only in Proclus and used by Denis.

²²⁵ This development began with Iamblichus, to whom we can trace back some of the basic principles of the later system, such as the law of mean terms or that of triadic development. See E. R. Dodds, *Proclus: The Elements of Theology; A Revised Text with Translation, Introduction, and Commentary* (Oxford 1933) introd. 19—22. See also J. Stiglmayr, *op. cit.*, 32, note 1.

²²⁶ The intelligible beings (*νοητά*) are the objects of the mind or the ideas; the intellectual beings (*νοερά*) are the thinking minds; the intermediate group (*νοητά καὶ νοερά*) represents the movement of thought which links object to subject. While the two extremes correspond to being

attracts our special attention because it is expressed by the same kind of middle term which we have found in St. Bonaventure and on many other occasions. What gives the works of Proclus a particular value with regard to our question is the fact that they not only enumerate such ternaries but also seek to justify their tripartite structure. Here we find the deeper reason behind the necessity of a middle term so often referred to and, with it, an essential point of our analysis.

The real reason for the need of an intermediate term between two extremes — that is between two altogether distinct or completely diverse realities, as Proclus would say — lies in the Neoplatonic doctrine on causality,²²⁷ which can be described briefly as follows. Every cause imparts to the effect it produces some of its own characteristics, because the activity of an agent corresponds to its nature and is a result of it. With regard to these particular characteristics the effect is similar to its cause, is an *image* or reflection of it. Between cause and effect there exists a certain *similarity*, in virtue of which the two are related and *joined* to one another. Proclus expresses this first fundamental element in his notion of causality when he says that “all procession is accomplished through a likeness of the secondary to the primary.”²²⁸

In addition to this, a second and no less important element must be mentioned. However similar cause and effect may be, they can never be equal. Proclus assures us that the producer is, of necessity, higher than that which is produced.²²⁹ The cause imparts to its effect some of its own characteristics, but never all of them. The effect is an image of its cause, but only a *partial* image, reflecting certain aspects of it. Cause and effect are not only similar but also *dissimilar* and, in this latter respect, they are *distinct*. Proclus combines these two basic elements when he states: “All that is immediately produced by any principle both *remains* in the producing cause and *proceeds* from it.”²³⁰

and mind, the intermediate term corresponds to life. See E. R. Dodds, *op. cit.*, introd. 16, comment. 253, 282; F. Ueberweg, *Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie*; I. Teil: *Die Philosophie des Altertums*, ed. by K. Praechter (13. ed., Basel 1953) 614, 621, 627; A. E. Taylor, *Philosophical Studies*; 4.: *The Philosophy of Proclus* (London 1934) 177.

²²⁷ This important fact is brought out well by A. E. Taylor, *op. cit.*, 160—61. The following outline is also based on Taylor's clear presentation, see esp. p. 164 and 169—70.

²²⁸ *Elements of Theology*, prop. 29 (E. R. Dodds, *op. cit.*, 35). — This idea of similarity is an expression of the Platonic notion of participation; see E. Scheller, *op. cit.*, 57, 62—3, 65, 67.

²²⁹ *Elements of Theology*, prop. 28 (*op. cit.*, 33).

²³⁰ *Ibid.* prop. 30 (*op. cit.*, 35). — If we add to these two elements of *similarity* and *distinction* the further fact that the produced being, by reason of its similarity to its source, tends to *return* to the same, we have the com-

Every time something is produced, these two aspects of causality are present. If the effect again produces another being and this process of causation continues, a *series* of beings is established in which the individual members, on the one hand, gradually *differ* in nature and perfection, but, on the other hand, also form a *continuous whole* because each member has some quality in common with its immediately preceding or succeeding neighbor. This *similarity* of certain qualities in adjacent members is, according to the Neoplatonic system, the essential basis on which the harmonious connection and unity of the entire series rests. As long as two beings are "altogether distinct, they will be incapable of association."²³¹ The necessity of some similarity between all neighboring members does not mean that there cannot be completely different members within the same series; but it does require an intermediate term between such entirely different members, in order to have a gradual transition and continuous causal connection through similarities.²³² Such a connection can, in turn, be accomplished only through a middle term that combines, in itself, qualities of both extremes; and it is precisely this kind of middle term which we have met so frequently during our analysis and which St. Bonaventure demands in his principle of a perfect order.


b) The Understanding in Later Times of the Basic Elements in the Neoplatonic Notion of Causality

Our brief review of the Neoplatonic doctrine on the connection of beings has shown that the law about the necessity of some similarity

plete principle of the *triadic development* (μονή, πρόδος, ἐπιστροφή), from which the other principle of *triadic arrangement* with extremes and middle term results. The third element, the return of things to their source, will be discussed in the second part of our study.

²³¹ *Elements of Theology*, prop. 28 (*op. cit.*, 33).

²³² "All procession advances through similars until it reaches the wholly dissimilar." *Ibid.* prop. 64 (*op. cit.*, 63). — The following scheme may serve as an illustration of the Neoplatonic principles of causality, similarity, and intermediate term:



A and B are completely diverse or altogether distinct (prop. 28); A is doubly disjunct (διέστηκε) from B (prop. 55). As terms in a causal series, A and B cannot be in immediate juxtaposition, but must have an intermediate term between them, so that some similarity exists between all adjacent members.

in adjacent terms and, with it, the other law about a necessary intermediate term between two extremes have their origin in the notion of causality. The preceding quotations from Proclus confirm this in so far as they clearly and continually refer to procession and emanation. This origin from causality is worthy of note, for it means that these laws apply, in their original meaning, only to a series or order in which each member actually produces the next lower one and thus stands in a true relationship of cause and effect to its immediate neighbors. Such a relationship, however, does not exist in that order of creation to which St. Bonaventure applies these same principles; for, in his system, the various members or levels do not proceed from one another in the manner of a causal series but are all immediately produced by the one Creator.²³³ There is, in other words, a definite shift from the order of origin and *production* of one member by another, as appears in Proclus, to the order of an harmonious *arrangement* of things and their connection by gradual transitions, as understood later by the Scholastics.²³⁴

Occasionally the Scholastics still use expressions which, at first sight, may seem to refer to some causal relationship; so, for instance, when St. Thomas in his *Commentary on the Liber de Causis* says that the order or gradation of things "*proceeds* through similars."²³⁵ Such expressions, however, now merely mean the gradual and continuous succession of

²³³ "Omnia in prima conditione immediate a Deo sunt producta." II *Sent.* I. I. 2. 2. c. (II. 29b).

²³⁴ A similar shift is involved when St. Bonaventure, in one of his arguments, proves the existence of pure spirits in creation on the basis of the principle that, if something exists which is *composed of two natures*, and if one of these two exists also separately by itself, then the other must likewise exist separately by itself (see above, note 196). The Quaracchi-edition rightly refers to Aristotle (*Phys.* 8. 5) as source of this principle; but it is important to note that the texts of Aristotle speak only about a causal series of movements. In such a series there is some member which only is moved; there can also be found a member which *both moves and is moved* and which is thus "composed" of two elements; Aristotle's conclusion is that a being which only moves without being moved by another must also exist. Aristotle himself is concerned only with the realm of causality; but the later commentators of his work then state the same principle also in a general form and apply it to the components of every being (see above, note 195, where the expression "*quasi compositum ex movente et moto*" shows that they were aware of the fact that the parallel between the two kinds of order and composition is not complete). In this way they started a shift from the order of causality to another order in which things stand in a completely different relationship to one another, and in which the separate existence of one element found in a composition does not prove the separate existence of the other element in the same way.

²³⁵ "Ita enim procedit ordo rerum ut similia se invicem subsequantur . . . Unde oportet ponere inter haec duo extrema aliquod medium quod sit simile utrique extremo: ut sic gradus rerum procedant per similia." *Comment. in Libr. de Causis*, lect. 30 (*Op. omnia* [ed. Vivès] 26. 568a).

the different levels in creation. This is also true of the example which St. Thomas adds in the same Commentary and in which he explains: "Nature does not proceed immediately from perfect animals to plants, but produces, between them, imperfect animals which are sensitive with the animals and immovable with the plants."²³⁶ This "nature" is certainly not understood as something that produces one level of beings after the other in the manner of a causal series. It is the one Creator who has produced every level; but He has laid down as a rule for this nature that its various members should form a harmonious unity with gradual transitions, and for this reason intermediate beings were created between distant extremes.²³⁷

A certain basis, and perhaps the starting point, for such a change in the notion of order can be found in the writings of Proclus himself. In his *Elements of Theology* he not only explains how things are produced and how this process gradually *advances* from one extreme to another, but he occasionally also describes the order among things in terms of a permanent *state*, explaining both its tripartite structure and each one of the three terms involved. Speaking of the internal unity in every divine order, Proclus characterizes the intermediate member and its function in the following way:

The mean term, reaching out toward both the extremes, links the whole together with itself as mediator; it transmits the bestowal of the first members of its order, draws upward the potentialities of the last, and implants in all a common character and mutual nexus — for in this sense also givers and receivers constitute a single complete order, in that they converge upon the mean term as on a centre.²³⁸

The impression we receive from this text is that it speaks about an existing order of three members in which the mean term serves as a

²³⁶ "Natura ergo non *procedit* immediate ab animalibus perfectis ad plantas sed *producit in medio* animalia imperfecta quae sunt sensibilia cum animalibus et immobilia cum plantis." *Ibid.* — The same example appears in Nemesius, *De natura hominis* 1 (MG 40. 509A—B), except that Nemesius ascends in the order of beings, whereas St. Thomas mentions the higher level first. Nemesius calls these intermediate creatures ζώοντα.

²³⁷ E. Gilson expresses the same idea when he writes: "Il n'y a pas de discontinuité dans la hiérarchie des perfections créées, et cette absence même de discontinuité constitue la loi profonde qui régit la procession des êtres hors de Dieu. Thomas d'Aquin refuse de fragmenter l'activité créatrice, comme faisaient les philosophes arabes et leur disciples occidentaux; mais, s'il n'admet pas que chaque degré supérieur de créatures donne l'être au degré immédiatement inférieur, il maintient fermement cette multiplicité hiérarchique de degrés" (*Le Thomisme*, EPM 1 [5. ed., Paris 1944] 229—30).

²³⁸ *Elements of Theology*, prop. 148 (E. R. Dodds, *op. cit.*, 131). Prop. 132 (p. 117) says in a similar way: "All orders of gods are bound together by mean terms." However, the explanation to this proposition keeps the idea of causality in the foreground.

connecting link between the extremes on either side, so that all three members are harmoniously joined together both in their being and their activities. The parallel between this text and the hierarchical order of Denis the Areopagite is certainly very close; and this notion of a hierarchical order, which the West later received from Denis, was in agreement with the Christian doctrine of creation.

Speaking about the transmission of Neoplatonic thought to the Middle Ages, we must at least briefly mention one further source besides Denis, namely the so-called *Liber de Causis*. While most of the Scholastics considered this treatise as a work of Aristotle, it is actually an Arabian work, based on Proclus' *Elements of Theology*, and translated into Latin by Gerard of Cremona between 1167 and 1187.²³⁹ Since it deals, in its last three propositions, with the necessity of a medium between two completely distinct levels in the universe,²⁴⁰ it must be taken into consideration as another possible factor in the development of St. Bonaventure's principle,²⁴¹ although it contains nothing that could not be found in the other sources we have already considered. As regards our question concerning the notion of order, we find that the idea of a causal series is not so clearly expressed. Most of the explanations about similarity and connection between things give the impression that they describe an harmonious arrangement of different existing things. Since the Scholastics received the ideas of Proclus as they were presented in this work, they again did not find it too difficult to understand them in their sense of order and thus to incorporate them in their Christian doctrine of creation.

But while the original notion of *order* has thus been changed, the other idea of *similarity* between adjacent members, in which Proclus had seen the essential bond for his causal series,²⁴² was fully retained

²³⁹ See E. R. Dodds, *op. cit.*, introd. 30, and also A. E. Taylor, *op. cit.*, 151—2.

²⁴⁰ Prop. 30—32. — For the Latin text of the *Liber de Causis* see St. Thomas' Commentary on this work, where the text is printed at the beginning of each lesson (*Op. omnia* [ed. Vivès] 26. 567a—570a).

²⁴¹ St. Thomas, in his Commentary on the *Sentences* (II. 39. 3. 1. c. [*Op. omnia* (ed. Vivès) 8. 521a]), mentions both Denis the Areopagite and the *Liber de Causis* as authorities for the idea of similarity between consecutive members in the order of created things. — An explicit reference to the *Liber de Causis* also appears later in the works of Denis the Carthusian. In his Commentary on *De divinis nominibus* (7, art. 77) he quotes, as a further testimony for the necessary connection between things, three propositions (146—8) from Proclus and adds: "Consonat his illud libri Causarum: Creata se ad invicem sequuntur, et oportet quod continuatio et ligatio sit in eis" (*Op. omnia* [ed. Tournai] 16. 261aA—B).

²⁴² *Elements of Theology*, prop. 29. The same fundamental fact is frequently repeated, so e. g. in prop. 147: "Conjunction is effected through likeness." See E. R. Dodds, *op. cit.*, 35, 131.

and still considered to be necessary for true continuity. The same thought of similarity which the work of Nemesis contained and transmitted in a more general way,²⁴³ was now brought to the Middle Ages in a more specific and systematic form through the Neoplatonic works of Denis and the *Liber de Causis*. It became a generally accepted doctrine, and St. Bonaventure is, so far, on common ground with the other Scholastics.

c) The Different Ways in which St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure Approach the General Neoplatonic Tradition

Within the framework of the common Neoplatonic heritage there was still room for a difference in approach, emphasis, and interpretation. In the beginning of our analysis we have seen St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas referring to the same text of Aristotle, and yet, we found that their interpretation was quite different.²⁴⁴ With regard to the present idea of similarity as a connecting bond we now see them both in a definite relationship to Denis the Arcopagite; but here again, a more careful comparison shows a real difference in approach and emphasis.

The text to which St. Thomas frequently refers²⁴⁵ is a passage in the seventh chapter of Denis' work *On the Divine Names*. The third paragraph of this chapter explains how God, who is in Himself incomprehensible to any created mind, can nevertheless be known through the things He created, especially through their order and proportion.²⁴⁶ The final sentence returns to this idea and states that the Divine Wisdom "is the cause of the indissoluble harmony and order of all things, *always connecting the ends of the higher with the beginnings of the next-lower things*, and thus producing the one concord and beautiful harmony of the whole."²⁴⁷

²⁴³ See above, p. 270 and note 127.

²⁴⁴ See above, p. 237—238.

²⁴⁵ E. g. II *Sent.* 39. 3. 1. c. (*Op. omnia* [ed. Vivès] 8. 521a); *De spiritalibus creaturis* 2. c. (14. 12b) and 8. ad 10 (14. 41b); *De anima* 1. arg. 17 (14. 63a); *Summa c. gent.* 2. 91 and 3. 97 (*Op. omnia* [ed. Leon.] 13. 552a and 14. 299b).

²⁴⁶ "Ex omnium existentium ordinatione . . . secundum omnium analogiam, quorum est causalis." *De divinis nom.* 7. 3 (MG 3. 869D—872A; ML 122. 1155B—C).

²⁴⁷ "Ipsa [scil. sapientia] enim est, secundum eloquium, omnium facatrix, et semper omnia compaginans, et insolubilis omnium congruentiae et ordinationis causa, et semper fines priorum connectens principiis secundorum (ἀεὶ τὰ τέλη τῶν προτέρων συνάπτουσα ταῖς ἀρχαῖς τῶν δευτέρων), et unam universitatis conspirantiam et harmoniam pulchram faciens." *Ibid.* (MG 3. 872B; ML 122. 1155C—D).

The principle stated by Denis in this passage has a close parallel and perhaps immediate source in the 147th proposition of Proclus' *Elements of Theology* which says, that "in any divine rank the highest term is assimilated to the last term of the supra-jacent rank."²⁴⁸ The explanation which then follows shows, with still greater clarity, both the parallel to Denis and the original idea of Proclus. Here we read:

For if there must be *continuity* in the divine procession and each order must be bound together by the appropriate mean terms, *the highest terms of the secondary rank are of necessity conjoined with the limiting terms of the primal*. Now, conjunction is effected through likeness. Therefore there will be likeness between the initial principles of the lower order and the last members of the higher.²⁴⁹

This proposition is not so much concerned with the fact that each rank or order must be bound together by a mean term, for that point has been discussed in proposition 132 and is mentioned here only as a condition for continuity *within* each order. The present thesis stresses in the first place the connection *between* these closed ranks or ternaries; this connection is likewise necessary if all orders are to form one great continuous series.

The same question of a connection between one hierarchy and another is taken up, at least implicitly, by Denis. On one occasion he explains how the highest members of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, namely the bishops, are, at least in some qualities, similar to the lowest members of the Celestial Hierarchy and can, for this reason, rightly be called "angels."²⁵⁰ In view of a passage like this and especially in connection with the parallel proposition of Proclus, Denis seems to think of this same kind of connection *between* hierarchies when stating the above-quoted principle in his work *On the Divine Names*.

However, the fact that he speaks, in this place, about creation as a whole, might lead a reader of this single passage to understand the given principle in a *more general* sense. It could be understood merely as a statement of the fundamental law of hierarchical order, according to which two *adjacent* members always *touch* one another through some *similar quality*, whether this be between members of the same hierarchy or between the extremes of two different, consecutive hierarchies. In this general sense the principle only expresses the un-

²⁴⁸ See E. R. Dodds, *op. cit.*, 129.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.* 129—31. — Proclus uses the same term *συνάπτειν* as we find it in the work of Denis.

²⁵⁰ *De caelest. hier.* 12. 1—2 (MG 3. 292 C—293 A).

broken continuity of all levels in creation, disregarding the division into ternaries so essential for the Dionysian system.

In this sense, apparently, the principle was taken over by St. Thomas Aquinas, and since he used it extensively, it entered deeply into his doctrine and became an important principle in the Thomistic system.²⁵¹ The only concern in this approach is that wherever two different levels of creation meet one another they do so by means of similar qualities, for this assures the continuity throughout creation. The number of levels has no influence on this continuity and is, therefore, not of vital importance. The more specific idea of three members within each hierarchy is, as we have seen, not contained in the above-quoted principle, as formulated by Denis and Proclus, and has no particular place in the doctrine which uses this principle. The essential element in this picture is that each level *touches* the next one by means of some similar, common quality.²⁵² The position of man in this picture is characterized by the frequently occurring remark that he stands on the *border line* of two levels. St. Thomas says particularly about the human soul that "it is placed on the *confines* of spiritual and corporeal creatures."²⁵³

St. Bonaventure in no way denies this law of contact through similarity. It is an essential element also of his own principle about the three terms. But it is interesting and perhaps significant that he never quotes that Dionysian principle which is so common in the writings of St. Thomas.²⁵⁴ The Seraphic Doctor appeals to other Dionysian

²⁵¹ See A. Combes, *Jean Gerson commentateur dionysien: Les 'Notulae super quaedam verba Dionysii de Caelesti Hierarchia,'* appendix 7: *Une citation dionysienne caractéristique*, EPM 30 (Paris 1940) 503.

²⁵² The words *contingere* and *attingere* are used in most of the texts indicated above in footnote 245.

²⁵³ "Si anima humana, inquantum unitur corpori ut forma, habet esse elevatum supra corpus, non dependens ab eo, manifestum est quod ipsa est in *confinio* corporalium et separatarum substantiarum constituta." *De anima* I. I. c. (*Op. omnia* [ed. Vivès] 14. 65a). The *Summa Theologica* says in a similar way: "Videlicet quia est in *confinio* spiritualium et corporalium creaturarum" (I. 77. 2. c. [*Op. omnia* (ed. Leon.) 5. 240b]). See also 108. 3 ad 3 (5. 497b), where the same term in *confinio* is used in a different connection. — The expression *in confinio constituta* has a surprising parallel in Nemesius' work *De natura hominis* 1, where we read about the position of man: "Ἐν μεθόριῳ οὖν τῆς ἀλόγου καὶ λογικῆς φύσεως ὁ ἄνθρωπος ταχθεὶς" (MG 40. 512B—C). Gregory of Nyssa applies the term *μεθόριον* in a more general way to every point of transition in the universe (*De hominis opificio* 1 [MG 44. 129B]). — E. Gilson (*Le Thomisme*, 501) indicates the same idea when he writes: "Entre l'ange et la nature matérielle vient s'insérer d'autre part la créature humaine, *frontière* et *ligne d'horizon* entre les esprits et les corps" (italics mine).

²⁵⁴ Of the four paragraphs in chapter 7 of *De divinis nominibus*, precisely this third paragraph is entirely missing among the numerous quota-

principles, namely to those which contain statements about the structure and activity *within each hierarchy*. There he finds the fundamental idea of *three* levels, and all he has to do now is to apply this tripartite structure of one Dionysian hierarchy to the entire creation. Following the Neoplatonic procedure of Proclus and Denis, he directs our attention first to the two *extremes*, in this case to the spiritual and the corporeal world.²⁵⁵ These two radically different levels can form one unified creation only if there is an intermediate member between them. The reason for this necessity is not only the general law of similarity but also the more specific one of a *mean term*. This third, intermediate member, which combines qualities of both extremes, is man, whom St. Bonaventure now places in the *middle* as the unifying center and crowning completion of the entire created world.

Concluding Summary

With this return to the Scholastics and St. Bonaventure our historical analysis comes to an end, and it is now time to state the principal results in a brief summary. The *general basis* of St. Bonaventure's arguments for man's necessary intermediate position is the idea that the created universe, as the work of God, the All-perfect, was made, and continues to exist, in a certain state of *perfection*. The Scholastics used this thought frequently in order to prove, at least by an argument of convenience, the existence of intermediate creatures on the basis of already existing extremes. When we discussed the argument of Robert of Cowton and examined the reference he gave in this argument, we discovered St. Augustine's theory of illumination and, with it, also

tions of this work. The other three paragraphs are all mentioned and, at times, quoted in considerable length. Paragr. 1: III *Sent.* 11. dub. 3 (III. 259a); 31. 3. 1. c. (689a); 35. u. 1. fund. 3 (773b); *De scientia Christi* 7. c. (V. 40a). — Paragr. 2: I *Sent.* 35. u. 1. arg. 1 (I. 600b); IV *Sent.* 45. dub. 8 (IV. 953b); *De scientia Christi* 3. c. (V. 14a—b). — Paragr. 4: III *Sent.* 23. dub. 1 (III. 501b).

²⁵⁵ This way of approach may perhaps explain more fully why St. Bonaventure adds, at the end of his argument from the manifestation of God's wisdom (II *Sent.* 1. 2. 1. 2. fund. 2 [II. 41b]), the quotation from St. Augustine (*Conf.* 12. 7. 7): "*Duo fecisti Domine, unum prope te et aliud prope nihil.*" As a direct proof for the necessity of *three* principal kinds of substances in creation, this quotation would seem to miss the real point in question. But it does have a place in this argument if we see it as an expression of St. Bonaventure's manner of approach. It represents the first step, in creation itself as well as in the argument, from which the creation of man in the middle follows with a certain necessity. See Chapter I (*Franc. Stud.* 20 [1960]), p. 299—300.

Plato's doctrine of ideas as the real basis for such an approach, although writers of later periods may not always have been aware of this origin.

The general axiom about the perfection in the universe still leaves room for various applications, depending on the particular quality in which this perfection is seen. For St. Bonaventure the most perfect universe is that which most perfectly fulfills the first goal of all creation, which is to manifest the fundamental attributes of the Creator. This is accomplished in a particular way by a definite arrangement or *order* of the various creatures. The spiritual and the material realm of creation, which are most distant from each other and manifest already in themselves the greatness of the Creator, are marvelously joined together in man, who thus represents the most perfect manifestation of God's power, wisdom, and goodness. We have found these thoughts in some of the Greek Fathers, particularly in Nemesius of Emesa and St. Gregory of Nazianz. They both were used as sources later by St. John Damascene whose important work passed on these ideas to the Scholastic period.

The particular objective of our extensive analysis has been St. Bonaventure's *principle* that a *perfect order* must have *three* terms, namely a highest, a lowest, and an intermediate member; for this principle is the decisive element on which the validity and strength of St. Bonaventure's argument for the *necessary* intermediate position of man in creation depends. The first fact to be noted in this summary is, that not one of the many texts we have dealt with during our analysis shows the principle in its complete form. However, this is not too surprising if we remember that we saw some signs of change and progress even in the works of the Seraphic Doctor himself.²⁵⁶ Like the so-called Dionysian principle about the nature of the good, which we have met in St. Bonaventure's third argument, so this principle, too, is the result of a development that involves both a variety of sources and the composing and enlarging activity of certain individual authors. The fact that the writings of Alexander of Hales, which reflect the time immediately prior to St. Bonaventure, contain all the essential elements of the principle but do not state it in its precise form, suggests the possibility that the final formulation might have been completed by the Seraphic Doctor himself, in whose system the idea of medium constitutes such a fundamental and characteristic element.²⁵⁷

²⁵⁶ See Chapter I (*Franc. Stud.* 20 [1960]), p. 302—3.

²⁵⁷ About St. Bonaventure's predilection for this notion of medium and the vital role it plays in his system see J. Ratzinger, *Die Geschichtstheologie des heiligen Bonaventura* (Munich 1959) III—13, where further literature on this point is indicated.

Although our analysis has included only certain main sources, which were either mentioned in explicit references or indicated by definite facts, the texts we have examined are nevertheless sufficient for drawing some conclusions concerning the origin and development of St. Bonaventure's principle. The *three terms* of a first, intermediate, and last member have proved to be a very old thought in Greek literature and religion, where they seem to have been used as an expression of totality. A similar tendency to express the idea of completion and perfection by the number *three* also appears in the writings and customs of other nations and cultures.²⁵⁸ A closer consideration of this phenomenon, which here can only be hinted at, may well create the impression that the number *three* really goes like a mysterious rhythm through every part of creation.²⁵⁹

An important step beyond such a simple enumeration of the three terms was taken by the Pythagoreans who developed the fundamental idea of a *medium* which functions as a *necessary* means of *connection* between different terms. The fact that some of their basic discoveries were made in the field of music was probably one of the reasons why the other idea of *harmony* became closely associated with that of a connecting medium and has appeared together with it ever since.²⁶⁰ The further development of this idea of such a medium took different forms and directions. The *mathematical* approach of the Pythagoreans was taken over and continued by St. Augustine in his speculations on the perfection of the number *three* in which he sees a unique harmony because of the unique *proportion* that he finds in this number.

The same Pythagorean idea of a necessary medium between different terms was also used by Plato; but he went a step further when he transferred the need of such a mathematical medium to the realm of *real things*. He explains how intermediate elements must exist between the two extreme elements as a necessary *bond*. Only in his further discussion does he still follow the Pythagorean line by referring to the laws of proportion. Poseidonius, later, concentrated his attention entirely on this idea of a bond and developed it into a definite and comprehensive

²⁵⁸ In the dogmatic manual of M. Heinrichs, which takes into consideration also the Chinese culture, we read about the number *three*: "Mirum vero est, quod numerus ternarius fere ubique gentium fuit in honore tamquam numerus excellens. Legitur in libro dynastiae Han: Ternarius est numerus minimus, qui exprimit pluralitatem perfectam, significat profundum" (*Theses dogmaticae* [2. ed., Hong Kong 1954] 1. 223).

²⁵⁹ About the number *three* in life, culture, and religion of man see e. g. the special article "Die Drei" in the German encyclopedia *Der Große Herder* 3 (1954) 13—24.

²⁶⁰ See W. Jaeger, *Nemesios von Emesa* (Berlin 1914) 109—10.

system. The medium was now linked to the adjacent extremes no longer on the basis of a mathematical proportion, but rather by a contact which is called "*sympathy*" and which consists in a certain similarity between adjacent members. This contact establishes the *unity* of all members involved. Centuries later, many of these thoughts appear in the work of Nemesius who used them to draw a Christian world-picture which shows man as the decisive connecting and unifying bond of the entire creation. St. John Damascene becomes again the important transmitter of these ideas to the Scholastics of the Middle Ages.

The Platonic idea of an intermediary bond and Poseidonius' notion of sympathy between adjacent members received new power and played an important role later in the Neoplatonic system with its special notion of causality. In the series of emanations from the One First Being, each member produces another one which is both similar and dissimilar to the producing member; the *similarity* is the bond which assures the continuity of the whole, whereas the *dissimilarity* makes each member a stepping stone in the gradual transition from one extreme to the other. On the basis of this law of causality, the later Neoplatonic school of Proclus developed a number of *ternaries*, in which the *intermediate* member is always a *composition of the extremes*, so that, by possessing a similarity to each extreme, it joins them together and forms them into an harmonious unity.

This Neoplatonic system, particularly as it was worked out by Proclus,²⁶¹ seems to have given the greatest contribution to the final formation of St. Bonaventure's principle. It reached the Middle Ages through the *Liber de Causis* and especially through Denis the Areopagite, who essentially depended on Proclus and who called these ternaries a hierarchy or "sacred order." Perhaps, this has led to the association of the term *order* with the traditional three elements in a ternary group. That St. Bonaventure, in his principle, often speaks of a *perfect* order may be due to an influence of St. Augustine, who saw in the number *three* not only the first whole number but also the number of greatest perfection.

²⁶¹ R. Guardini suspects that St. Bonaventure may have known the "Elements" of Proclus directly through the Latin translation of William of Moerbeke (This opinion of R. Guardini is mentioned by B. Rosenmöller, *Religiöse Erkenntnis nach Bonaventura*, BGPM 25. 3—4 [Münster 1925] 59—60). Since this translation was made in 1268, it could have reached St. Bonaventure only in the last years of his life († 1274). But if Guardini's assumption is right, it could have contributed to the fact that St. Bonaventure uses the principle of the three terms particularly in his last work, the *Collationes in Hexaemeron*, which are lectures given at Paris in 1273.

In the course of our analysis the name of *Aristotle* has also arisen. The fact that he is the only source which St. Bonaventure mentions by name when speaking about the three terms of his principle as an expression of perfection,²⁶² and that, on several occasions, the edition of Quaracchi refers only to his works in connection with this principle,²⁶³ makes Aristotle here appear to be a very, or perhaps the most, important source. However, after a thorough and detailed study of the pertinent texts in Aristotle's own writings we have come more and more to the conclusion that the world of Aristotelian thought can hardly be the real source, although it is possible that some of the phrases in Aristotle's works, after being taken out of their context, have been used by the Scholastics to express this principle.

Aristotle does state the three terms as an expression of completeness and totality; but he himself also identifies this idea as Pythagorean doctrine of which he is only the transmitter, although his authority must have been a powerful factor in propagating it. Some of his texts seem to state the general principle of a necessary medium between two extremes; after a closer examination of their meaning and context, however, we have invariably found that he develops these statements with regard to a *single* and *continuous* physical thing or process, and applies the developed statements only to situations that are similar to them. The perfect order of St. Bonaventure's principle, on the other hand, concerns a *plurality* of *different* beings, and the necessity of a medium in such an order cannot have its real and sufficient basis in those statements of Aristotle. Only in as far as he brought out the fact that a medium must be a composition of two extremes does his doctrine contain a real and, indeed, important element of St. Bonaventure's principle; but the question remains as to how far this element was taken directly from Aristotle or received as a part of the Neoplatonic doctrine of a connection by similarity. Even while examining the texts of Aristotle, we several times met the real sources from which St. Bonaventure's principle must have developed. In its decisive ideas of a necessary intermediate bond and of a connection by similar qualities, this principle proves to be of Pythagorean, Platonic, and Neoplatonic origin.

Our analysis of the historical background has led us to a more complete understanding of what we found in the previous analysis of parallel texts in St. Bonaventure's own works.²⁶⁴ The principle which the

²⁶² I *Sent.* 2. u. 4. c. (I. 58a); see above, p. 3 and note 4.

²⁶³ Quaracchi-edition II. 42a, note 2 (see above, footnote 17), and III. 65b, note 4 (see above, footnote 38).

²⁶⁴ See Chapter I (*Franc. Stud.* 20 [1960]), p. 304—6.

Seraphic Doctor employs in order to prove the necessary intermediate position of man in creation contains the basic elements of a *true* and *perfect order*. The two extremes mark the *limits* within which the order of things is unfolded, whereas the intermediate term guarantees the necessary *connection* of the whole. With the creation of man the world receives this necessary harmonious unity which is, as the Introduction has shown, a fundamental characteristic in St. Bonaventure's doctrine and system.

PART II

THE FUNCTION OF MAN AS THE MEDIATOR BETWEEN THE CORPOREAL WORLD AND GOD

The first part of our study has shown how, according to St. Bonaventure, the work of creation proceeds like a great, powerful stream from the hands of the Creator, and how this stream spreads into a wonderful order, which is made perfect by the formation of man who stands between the two parts of creation. This vast and well-ordered stream reflects and manifests the glory of God, particularly the three fundamental attributes of the Creator, and thus fulfills the first purpose for which it was made and set in motion. But besides this first purpose of *manifestation* there is a second, namely that of *participation* of the creatures in the glory of their Creator.¹ God, who made the stream of creation proceed by an act of His infinite and overflowing goodness, also wanted the creatures to share in His glory.

This participation is a new element in the drama of creation. While the proceeding and spreading of the stream was a movement from God and downward, the participation is, in all its different forms and aspects, essentially a movement upward towards God. It constitutes the third phase of creation or the second half of the circular movement, which leads back to the first beginning. In the same way as God is the original

¹ "*Universa propter semetipsum operatus est Dominus* [Prov. 16. 4]; sed non propter suam utilitatem vel indigentiam, . . . ergo propter suam gloriam, non, inquam, propter gloriam augendam, sed propter gloriam manifestandam et propter gloriam suam communicandam; in cuius *manifestatione et participatione* attenditur summa utilitas creaturae, videlicet eius glorificatio sive beatificatio." II *Sent.* 1. 2. 2. 1. c. (II. 44 b) and ad 3 (45 a). About this twofold purpose of creation see also the Introduction, § 2 (*Franc. Stud.* 20 [1960]), p. 271—3.

source of all creatures, so He is also their final goal. "Because He is the first, all things flow from Him, and because they flow from Him, they return and are led back to Him as to their ultimate end."² This return and participation closes the great circular movement in the drama of creation and is a further answer to our initial question concerning the origin of a multitude from one principle; for however widely creation spreads out into a great number and variety of beings, it is in this way brought back to the all-dominating unity of God, who is both the beginning and the end of all creatures, and by whom everything is held together. The third phase of creation is, in this respect, a counterpart to the first phase and keeps the entire structure in perfect balance.³ The principal source of this idea of a return is again, as in the case of St. Bonaventure's doctrine on the origin and order of creation, Denis the Areopagite and his Neoplatonic background; but in the application of this idea there are now some significant changes, which we shall see as our study develops.

The fundamental fact in the return movement is that *all* creatures, without exception, have God as their final end and are to participate in His glory and goodness. St. Bonaventure frequently emphasizes this basic truth with the words from the Book of Proverbs: *The Lord has made all things for Himself*.⁴ The question that arises here concerns the *manner* of this return, especially in the case of the material universe. St. Bonaventure himself calls attention to this difficulty in the first objection he mentions against the creation of a threefold order: Since only a spiritual creature is capable of such a participation, was it not fitting to create only a spiritual world, and not a corporeal one?⁵ The Seraphic Doctor answers this objection with a distinction that is fundamental for the entire question of the universal return to God. He first considers the divine goodness on the broader basis of the two main purposes of

² "Nam eo ipso quo est primum, omnia ab ipso fluunt, et eo ipso quo fluunt ab ipso, ad ipsum recurrunt et reducuntur tanquam ad finem ultimum." *De myst. Trinit.* 3. 1. c. (V. 70b). See also *II Sent.* 1. 1. 1. 1. fund. 5 (II. 15a), where the correlation between causality and finality is mentioned.

³ This balance is visible e. g. in the fact that the human soul is in the *first* and *third* phase of creation directly related to God without any intermediate, whereas the *second* phase, the unfolded order of dignity among creatures, shows the soul below the angels: "Ad illud quod obicitur, quod nulla creatura est superior anima secundum mentem, dicendum quod, etsi nulla sit superior secundum ordinem *efficientis* et *finis*, est tamen aliqua maioris *dignitatis* et excellentis naturae." *II Sent.* 24. 2. 1. 2. ad 3 (II. 577b).

⁴ Prov. 16:4. See e. g. the quotation above in footnote 1.

⁵ "Sola creatura spiritualis Dei capax est et eius particeps esse potest: ergo solam spirituales debuit facere, non corporales." *II Sent.* 1. 2. 1. 2. arg. 1 (II. 41a).

creation and reminds us that something can be created for the sake of the divine goodness in a twofold way, either to manifest this goodness or to participate in it. With regard to the first purpose all creatures are equal; for they all express the divine goodness, as we have seen in the first part of our study. But to be created for the sake of the divine goodness means also a participation in this goodness, and here St. Bonaventure distinguishes two groups of beings. Creatures, he says, can participate for two reasons, either because they are by nature made to participate, or because they serve those who participate. The first group consists of the spiritual creatures, and the second of the corporeal.⁶

This distinction divides the general movement of all creatures towards God into two main parts, namely into an *immediate* participation of the spiritual beings and a *mediate* participation of the material world.⁷ The proximate end of the corporeal creatures is to serve those who participate immediately. But St. Bonaventure points out that they, too, participate in a certain manner,⁸ not only in as far as their service helps others to reach the one ultimate end, but also in as far as they are drawn upward together with those who participate immediately. For their service is only an intermediate and subordinate aim, through which they finally reach, in some way, the primary and ultimate aim of all creatures.⁹

The distinction of an immediate and mediate participation coincides with the two extreme levels of creation which we have seen in the first part of our study. Since man is composed of a spiritual soul and a body, he not only stands as an intermediate creature between these two worlds, but he is also in the middle between these two kinds of movements or participations and joins them together. The basic formula *homo in medio constitutus*, man is placed at the center, is again verified, but,

⁶ "Fieri propter divinam bonitatem est dupliciter: aut ostendendam, et sic facta sunt cuncta; omnia enim exprimunt divinam bonitatem; aut participandam, et hoc dupliciter: aut quia sunt *nata participare* aut quia *serviunt participantibus*. Primo modo conditae sunt creaturae *spirituales*, secundo modo *corporales*." II *Sent.* 1. 2. 1. 2. ad 1 (II. 42a).

⁷ "Non habent ipsae creaturae irrationales immediate ad Deum ordinari, sed mediante creatura rationali. Ipsa autem creatura rationalis . . . nata est ordinari in Deum immediate." II *Sent.* 16. 1. 1. c. (II. 394b).

⁸ "Ipsae [scil. creaturae corporales] tamen aliquo modo participant; sed in earum participatione status non est, sed ordinantur ad ulteriorem." II *Sent.* 1. 2. 1. 2. ad 1 (II. 42a).

⁹ "Creaturae irrationales ad rationalem ordinantur tamquam in *finem* propter quem sunt factae, et mediante illo in *ultimum finem principalem*." II *Sent.* 16. 2. 1. c. (II. 401b). — "Finis, ad quem res ordinantur, duplex est. Quidam enim est finis principalis et ultimus, quidam vero est finis sub fine." II *Sent.* 15. 2. 1. c. (II. 382b). See also *ibid.* fund. 4 (382a) and 19. 1. 2. c. (463a).

compared with its application in the first part of this study, an important shift is to be noticed. In this upward movement of the general return man does not stand between the material world and the *angels*, as we saw him before in the order within creation, but he now functions as mediator between the corporeal creatures and *God* who alone is the ultimate end of all things.¹⁰ A basic source for this second and more frequently mentioned aspect of the intermediate position of man is Hugh of St. Victor with his important work *De Sacramentis*,¹¹ which is quoted also in the Second Book of the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard.¹² These two aspects of man, namely as standing between the corporeal world and the angels on the one hand, and between the corporeal world and God on the other, are mentioned together in the *Glossa* of Alexander of Hales.¹³ The explanation here is very brief, but surprisingly clear and appears like an outline of St. Bonaventure's more elaborate doctrine.

This place of man in the general return of all creatures provides the key to the basic division of the second part of our study. In relation to the corporeal world *below*, man is the highest creature, to whom the entire material universe is ordained as to its immediate end. This movement of the visible world towards man, which constitutes a part of the general return, will be the subject of the *first* chapter, in which we shall

¹⁰ In connection with the final consummation of the world St. Bonaventure states in his *Breviloquium* (7. 4): "Quoniam ergo Deus secundum sapientiam suam ordinatissimam cunctum mundum istum sensibilem et maiorem fecit propter mundum minorem, videlicet hominem, qui inter Deum et res istas inferiores *in medio collocatus est*" (V. 284 b). — The same kind of intermediate position is described, when St. Bonaventure says in his Prologue to the Second Book of the *Sentences*: "Homo enim *in medio constitutus*, dum factus est ad Deum conversus et subiectus, cetera sunt ei subiecta" (II. 5a).

¹¹ *De Sacramentis* I. 2. 1 (ML 176. 205—6). The main idea of chapter 1 is summarized in the brief statement: "Ita *positus est in medio homo*, ut et ei serviretur et ipse serviret" (205C—D). St. Bonaventure uses the same work of Hugh of St. Victor when he describes man as one who *possesses* the things of the visible world and *strives* for the eternal good: "Ex his bonis Deus unum dedit, alterum promisit, ut unum gratis possideretur, alterum per meritum quaereretur" (*Brevil.* 2. 11 [V. 229b]). See *De Sacramentis* I. 6. 6 (ML 176. 267B—C).

¹² *Lib. II Sent.* 1. 4: "Et sicut factus est homo propter Deum, id est ut ei serviret, ita mundus factus est propter hominem, scilicet ut ei serviret. *Positus est ergo homo in medio*, ut et ei serviretur, et ipse serviret" (2. ed. Quaracchi 1916: I. 310).

¹³ The expression *in medio*, which Peter Lombard applies to man, is explained by Alexander of Hales in this way: "Respondeo: secundum existentiam ultimus est; secundum dignitatem tamen dicitur *in medio* positus, quoniam superior est aliis creaturis et inferior angelis. Vel dicatur quod est *in medio* quoad ministrationem, inter Deum scilicet et mundum, quoniam mundus factus est ut ministret homini, homo vero ut ministret Deo; unde ministrat et ei ministratur" (*Glossa in II Sent.* 1. 26, BFSMA 13 [Quaracchi 1952] 11).

consider man as the *king and center* of creation, whom every created being serves. In relation to God, the ultimate end *above*, man himself is a server and pilgrim, and the *second* chapter will therefore be concerned with man in his own movement towards God, in which he becomes at the same time the decisive *link and mediator* for all creatures under him on their way to the ultimate end.¹⁴

CHAPTER III

MAN AS THE KING AND CENTER OF THE CREATED WORLD

The movement of the general return goes, as we have just seen, from the corporeal world through man to God. Man is, because of this intermediate position, in the full sense master and king over the corporeal world which serves him in every respect. This *kingship of man* over the visible universe will therefore be the *first* point of the present chapter. But since this movement through man to God seems to bypass the angels, who constitute one of the fundamental extremes in the order of creation, the question of their relationship to this general return also arises. Unless they are in some way joined to the general movement of the rest of creation towards God, the unity and harmony of creation appears to be disturbed. An examination of this *relation of the angels* to the kingship of man follows in a *second*, complementary section and will show in what sense man is placed at the center of all creation.

Section A

The Corporeal World under the Kingship of Man

That the entire visible world is created for the sake of man is a thought which St. Bonaventure expresses on various occasions and in

¹⁴ St. Bonaventure indicates the two main steps by which the corporeal world reaches the ultimate end of all creation when he says: "Corporales naturae inferiores factae sunt ut *deservirent* creaturae rationali, sicut supra ostensum fuit; factae sunt etiam ut mediante illa quodam modo *perducantur* in finem" (II *Sent.* 17. 2. 1. c. [II. 419b—420a]). The same idea is expressed in II *Sent.* 15. 2. 1. c.: "Quia vero [homo] per similitudinem natus est in Deum immediate tendere, ideo omnes creaturae irrationales ad ipsum *ordinantur*, ut mediante ipso in finem ultimum *perducantur*" (II. 383a). See furthermore II *Sent.* 16. 2. 1. c. (II. 401b). — The twofold role of man

very different connections.¹⁵ He finds this truth stated not only in Holy Scripture,¹⁶ but also in the *Physics* of Aristotle from whom he often quotes a phrase which says, in a somewhat modified version, that "we are in a certain way the end of everything that exists."¹⁷ The fact of this orientation (or, to remain true to St. Bonaventure's own terminology, of this "ordination") of the created world towards God is used by St. Bonaventure in one of his arguments against the possibility of a creation without a beginning in time. If the world were eternal without a beginning, then, he concludes, there would have lived an infinite number of human beings; for since all things are in a certain way for the sake of man, the world has never been without him. Because human souls are incorruptible, there would now exist an actually infinite number of them, which is impossible.¹⁸ The idea of the necessary presence of man as the completion and immediate goal of creation thus plays an important role in the proof for a doctrine of which St. Bonaventure is an outstanding representative and defender.

as goal and mediator with regard to the material world is brought out also in the recent study of W. Rauch, *Das Buch Gottes: Eine systematische Untersuchung des Buchbegriffes bei Bonaventura*, Münchener Theologische Studien II—20 (Munich 1961) 73.

¹⁵ E. g. II *Sent.* 15. 2. 1 (II. 382—4), esp. fund. 4 (382a), also *Brevil.* Prolog. § 2 (V. 204a) and *De triplici via* 1. 4 (no. 18) (VIII. 7b).

¹⁶ "Anima enim et corpus sunt partes hominis constitutivae, propter quem factae sunt ceterae creaturae, secundum illud Genesis primo (v. 26): *Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, et praesit volatilibus caeli* etc." *Comment. in Luc.* 12. 34 (v. 23) (VII. 319b). The same quotation is used in II *Sent.* 15. 2. 1. c. (II. 383a).

¹⁷ *Phys.* 2. 2, where Aristotle explains the notion of finality or "that for the sake of which" and gives the following example: "Quoniam autem faciunt artes materiam, aliae quidem simpliciter aliae vero operose, et utimur tanquam propter nos omnibus quae sunt (sumus enim quodammodo et nos finis)" (194a 33—5). The quotation of this text in the works of St. Bonaventure reads: "Sumus nos finis quodam modo omnium eorum quae sunt." See e. g. II *Sent.* 1. 2. 2. 2. arg. 2 (II. 46a), 2. 2. 1. 2. fund. 2 (73a), 15. 2. 1. fund. 3 (382a) and concl. (383a). St. Thomas, in his Commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*, still indicates the limited meaning of this phrase in the original text when he says: "Item considerandum est quod nos utimur omnibus quae sunt secundum artem facta, sicut propter nos existentibus. Nos enim sumus quodammodo finis omnium artificialium" (*Comment. in 8 libr. Phys.* 2. 2, lect. 4.8 [*Op. omnia* (ed. Leon.) 2. 66a]). The Latin version of the above-quoted text from Aristotle is also taken from this edition (2. 64b).

¹⁸ The first part of the argument says: "Impossibile est infinita simul esse; sed si mundus est aeternus sine principio, cum non sit sine homine — propter hominem enim sunt quodam modo omnia — et homo duret finito tempore: ergo infiniti homines fuerunt." II *Sent.* 1. 1. 1. 2. fund. 5 (II. 21b). The important remark in the parenthesis is a reference to the same text of Aristotle mentioned in the preceding footnote.

Because all created things are ordained towards him, man is the creature of greatest dignity¹⁹ and "is placed in this world like the king in a kingdom."²⁰ This highest dignity of human nature plays a special role in some questions concerning redemption. Since all other things are made for the sake of man, the redemption of man was most fitting. For had he lost his final end, all the other creatures would have been likewise deprived of their own end.²¹ As the most excellent creature in the universe, man comes nearer to God than any other being in this world; and it was, therefore, most appropriate that this creature become united with God.²² Finally, in order to preserve the high dignity of man, which consists in the fact that he is subject only to God, it was fitting that God Himself should become the Redeemer, and that this Redeemer should not assume any other nature than that of the sinful generation of Adam; for in this way man remained in his royal position, in which he is subject only to God, without any other creature interfering.²³

These few examples have given us a general picture of the dominating position and key role of man with regard to the entire corporeal world. We shall now complete this picture in some of its details by considering three particular aspects of this service which the visible universe and its inhabitants render to man. With St. Bonaventure, we can distinguish 1) the ordination of the *visible universe* towards man and its service to him, 2) the service of the *animal world* in particular, and 3) the role of *all* these creatures as guideposts on man's road to God.²⁴

¹⁹ "Dei est imago et creatura dignissima, propter quam sunt omnia mundana creata." *Apol. pauperum* 10. 13 (VIII. 309a). See also II *Sent.* 14. 2. 2. c. (II. 363a) and 16. dub. 1 (406b).

²⁰ "Ut disponat orbem terrarum [Sap. 9 : 3]; scilicet per sapientiam; est enim homo positus in hoc mundo, sicut rex in regno." *Comment. in Sap.* 9. 3 (VI. 167a).

²¹ "Dignitas namque hominis tanta erat, ut propter ipsum facta sunt universa. Si ergo homo careret suo fine, iam omnia essent suo fine defraudata." III *Sent.* 20. u. 1. c. (III. 417b—418a).

²² See III *Sent.* 2. 1. 1. fund. 4 (III. 37a).

²³ "Quarta vero ratio est ad conservandam altitudinem humanae naturae, quam Deus in tanta dignitate considerat ut nulli alii generi creaturae, sed soli Deo esset obnoxia. Si ergo non modicum est obnoxia Redemptori, decens est ut Redemptor aut solum esset Deus aut, si haberet in se genus naturae creatae, hoc esset de genere illius massae quae ortum habet a lumbis Adae." III *Sent.* 12. 1. 1. c. (III. 263a).

²⁴ St. Bonaventure explicitly enumerates the first two points: "Facta sunt et corporalia et sensibilia propter homines." II *Sent.* 16. 2. 1. c. (II. 401b) For the same division see *Brevil.* 2. 4 (V. 221b). This chapter also mentions the first and third point of our division: "Omnia corporalia facta sunt ad humanum obsequium, ut ex illis omnibus accendatur homo ad amandum et laudandum Factorem universorum" (222a).

§ I

*The Ordination of the Visible Universe towards Man
and the Service it Renders to him*

The Seraphic Doctor himself has given us a general synthesis on this point in a special chapter of his *Breviloquium*,²⁵ where he not only mentions the various parts of the universe, but also shows their harmonious co-operation and especially their common ordination towards man. He speaks about the *influence* of the celestial bodies on the world below them, but also about the *subordination* of all these things to man who, in spite of this influence, remains the king and master over the universe.²⁶ By taking the heavenly bodies and their operations as starting point of his explanation, St. Bonaventure provides the widest possible frame and setting for a general picture which will later show man as the predominant figure in the center.

The celestial bodies, which are in the outer realm of creation, possess, on account of their proximity to the First Principle, four outstanding qualities which enable them to exercise their influence upon the rest of creation. In them there is light, motion, heat, and power.²⁷ Their *light* and *motion* brings about the various distinctions of time. The light of the sun and the motion of the firmament determine the day; the motion of moon and sun in the oblique circle of the zodiac establishes month and year. The various ages are distinguished by the motions and recurring constellations of the planets.²⁸ In this way the celestial bodies influence the rest of the world and serve man by regulating his life and activity.

Through their *heat* and *power* the celestial bodies exercise another and more profound influence on the formation of all earthly things. According to the Aristotelian physics, which was generally accepted by the Scholastics of the Middle Ages, all things of the sublunary world are constituted by some combination of the four elements of earth, water, air, and fire.²⁹ Since these elements possess contrary qualities,

²⁵ *Brevil.* 2. 4: De natura corporali quantum ad operari et influere.

²⁶ *Ibid.* no. 1, where St. Bonaventure gives this outline in form of a thesis, which he then explains.

²⁷ "Cum in corporibus caelestibus propter proximitatem ad primum principium sit lux, motus, calor et virtus, . . . caelestia corpora per lumen et motum sunt in distinctiones temporum." *Brevil.* 2. 4 (V. 221b).

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ "Necesse fuit ponere aliqua corpora simplicia, quae multiformiter possent misceri ad introductionem formarum multiformium; et talis est natura subiecta contrarietati, et haec est elementaris." *Brevil.* 2. 3 (V. 220b). — "Ex nullis corporibus constituitur corpus mixtum, nisi quae possunt ad

a special power was thought to be necessary in order to bring them to a union and to reconcile them with one another.³⁰ This power and function was attributed to the celestial bodies and to the heavens in general, which was conceived as something beyond those terrestrial contraries and changes.³¹

St. Bonaventure has this reconciling and uniting influence in mind when he says that "by power and heat the heavenly bodies have an effect on the production of those things which are generated from the elements," and that they exercise this influence "by stimulating, advancing, and bringing together."³² The degree in which this harmonization of contrary elements takes place, varies and determines the degree of perfection and dignity of each particular being. In this way the celestial bodies help in educing the various forms of corporeal beings. As long as this reconciliation of contraries remains remote from equality, only the ordinary *mixed* bodies or minerals result; if it is less remote from equality, the *vegetative* beings are produced; when the reconciliation comes near to equality, the *sentient* beings or animals are constituted; finally, the state of equality being reached, the *human body* is formed.³³

invicem agere et pati; haec autem sola sunt habentia contrarietatem." II *Sent.* 17. 2. 2. fund. 1 (II. 421b). The four contrary qualities and their combination in the four elements were shown in Chapter 2 (page 2, note 34).

³⁰ "Si aliqua diversa reducantur ad concordiam per aliquid, videtur, quod non habeat naturam alicuius illorum, sed quod potens sit super omnia; sed firmamentum sua influentia facit elementa contraria concurrere ad corpora mixta; ergo non est de natura alicuius elementi." II *Sent.* 14. 1. 1. 2. fund. 6 (II. 339b).

³¹ "Communitur enim philosophi praeter quatuor elementa posuerunt *essentiam quintam*, quam dixerunt esse corpus incorruptibile et elevatum a contrarietate, et per hoc esse *principium conciliativum* et *conservativum*." II *Sent.* 14. 1. 1. 2. c. (II. 339b—340a). — "Generantia sunt corpora simplicia, scilicet corpora caelestia et quatuor elementa. Nam ex elementis *per virtutem lucis conciliantis* contrarietatem elementorum in mixtis habent generari et produci, quaecumque generantur et producuntur per operationem virtutis naturalis." *Itiner.* 2. 2 (V. 300a). — "Necesse etiam fuit, fieri naturam, per quam haberent haec contraria in mixto conciliari; et talis est natura elongata a contrarietate, cuiusmodi est natura lucis et corporis supercaelestis." *Brevil.* 2. 3 (V. 220b—221a). See also *In Hexaem.* 4. 17 (V. 352a), where the contrary elements are seen in an upward and downward movement, whereas the celestial bodies, which lack this contrariety, move in circles.

³² "Per *virtutem* autem et *calorem* influunt ad productionem eorum quae ex elementis generantur, excitando, promovendo, conciliando." *Brevil.* 2. 4 (V. 221b). The translation is partly from E. E. Nemmers, *Breviloquium* by St. Bonaventure (St. Louis, Mo., 1946) 56.

³³ "Influunt . . . ita quod secundum conciliationem contrariorum ab aequalitate remotam influunt in *mineralia*; secundum conciliationem ab aequalitate minus longinquam, in *vegetabilia*; secundum conciliationem aequalitati proximantem, in *sensibilia*; secundum vero conciliationem aequalem, in *corpora humana*." *Ibid.*

In this way St. Bonaventure shows us the entire series of corporeal forms; these forms come into actual existence under the gradually increasing influence of the heavenly bodies. The decisive point with regard to our topic of man in creation is the strong element of finality in the present picture which St. Bonaventure has constructed with the help of the traditional data of medieval physics and astronomy. The series of forms, which our author presents in this text and on several other occasions, is not merely an order of juxtaposition or a hierarchy of beings with different degrees of perfection; in addition to this, each form is essentially *ordained* towards the next higher one.³⁴ The substantial form in St. Bonaventure's system does not only give a being its proper perfection, but also disposes it for a higher substantial form and thus prepares the way to a further goal.³⁵ In accordance with this ordination of each substantial form to a higher one, matter is considered as having a certain appetite or *desire* to be united with a higher form,³⁶ and this desire goes from the lowest condition of prime matter throughout the corporeal world. The highest substantial form in this world, towards which all others are ordained, and in which the desire of matter finds its complete fulfillment, is the spiritual human soul;³⁷ and man is therefore truly the goal of the entire corporeal world.

³⁴ "[Physicus] considerat mobile et generationem secundum influentiam corporum caelestium in elementa, et *ordinationem elementorum* ad formam mixtionis, et formae *mixtionis* ad formam *complexionis*, et formae *complexionis* ad animam *vegetabilem*, et illius ad *sensibilem*, et illius ad *rationalem*, et ibi est finis." *In Hexaem.* I. 18 (V. 332b). — "Similiter ex parte corporis optima proportio est in relatione *ad finem*. Cum enim sit *ordo in formis corporalibus* — quod patet, quia forma *elementi* ad formam *mixti*, et forma *mixtionis* ad formam *complexionis*, et rursus *vegetabilis* ad *sensibilem* — et non sit status in re corporali et imperfecta; non est status ibi, sed ultimo *disponunt* huiusmodi formae ad *animam rationalem*." *II Sent.* I. 2. I. 2. ad 2. 3 (II, 42b). — "Sed *is est ordo*, quod forma *elementaris* unitur animae *mediante* forma *mixtionis*, et forma *mixtionis* *disponit* ad formam *complexionis*. Et quia haec, cum est in aequalitate et harmonia, conformatur naturae caelesti; ideo habilis est ad susceptionem nobilissimae influentiae, scilicet vitae." *II Sent.* 17. 2. 2. ad 6 (II, 423b).

³⁵ See with regard to this point the very fine comparison which E. Gilson makes between the notion of substantial form in St. Thomas Aquinas and in St. Bonaventure: "Que l'on réfléchisse aux deux orientations intellectuelles si différentes que supposent ces deux conceptions de la forme, l'une surtout *faiseuse d'être*, l'autre surtout *intermédiaire d'influences et de perfections*, on les verra s'accorder avec l'inspiration profonde des deux systèmes" (*La philosophie de saint Bonaventure*, EPM 4, 2. ed., Paris 1943] 224, italics mine).

³⁶ "Quia enim natura, secundum quod dicit Philosophus [*De generat. et corrupt.* 2. 10], semper desiderat quod melius est, materia, quae est sub forma *elementari*, appetit esse sub forma *mixti*, et quae est sub forma *mixtionis* appetit esse sub forma *complexionis*." *II Sent.* 15. I. 2. ad 6 (II, 378b).

³⁷ "Appetitus, qui est in materia, ordinatur ad rationes intellectuales, ut nullo modo perfecta sit generatio, nisi anima rationalis uniatur materiae corporali." *De reduct. art.* 20 (V. 324b). See also *II Sent.* 17. I. 2. ad 6 (II, 415b—416a) and 19. I. I. c. (460a—b). The entire series of corporeal

This ordination of the different forms towards man appears in its full light if we remember that St. Bonaventure holds the doctrine of a plurality of substantial forms in corporeal creatures. He never deals with this question explicitly, but his statements and explanations which involve this point imply or presuppose such a plurality.³⁸ According to this opinion, which was widely held at the time of St. Bonaventure, the different forms that are listed in the above-mentioned series do not follow one another in such a way that the lower form disappears when the next higher one appears. St. Bonaventure seems to hold that the lower forms remain in some real manner in the new composite and continue to be the basis of the higher form.³⁹ This point is of special significance with regard to our question concerning man in the visible universe; for, according to this opinion, the human body which stands as the most perfect and harmonious mixture at the end of the ascending series of forms, truly contains all these different levels of the corporeal world, beginning with the basic forms of the four elements. The celestial bodies also join in with their powerful influence; St. Bonaventure sees in this influence one of the purposes for which they were created.⁴⁰ The entire visible creation is, in this way, ordained towards man and also actually represented in man, who thus becomes the center of creation to which all other creatures point and in which the entire universe is contained. This idea of representation will again be brought up in our last chapter about the final return of the material world to God.

forms is for St. Bonaventure nothing else than a gradual preparation towards the union of the corporeal and the spiritual realm in man. This desire for higher forms also manifests the general tendency of creation to return to God who is purely form, and implies a hidden movement to the pure form; see W. Rauch, *op. cit.*, 42—3. St. Bonaventure speaks about God as pure form in II *Sent.* 13. 2. 1. c.: "Nulla substantia per se existens, sive corporalis sive spiritualis, est *pure forma* nisi solus Deus" (II. 317b). But he also remarks in II *Sent.* 12. 1. 1. ad 5: "Cum enim dicitur: Deus est *pure forma*, equivocatur nomen formae, quia non dicitur ibi forma prout est perfectio materiae; sed forma nominat ibi essentiam, quae habet *esse in omnimoda actualitate et completionem*, et nullo modo potest pervenire ad alterius compositionem" (II. 294b).

³⁸ See the Scholia to II *Sent.* 13. 2. 2. (II. 322—3) and 15. 1. 2. (379) in the edition of Quaracchi.

³⁹ See K. Ziesché, "Die Naturlehre Bonaventuras: Nach den Quellen dargestellt," *PJ* 21 (1908) 156—7. — St. Bonaventure implies the existence of at least two forms in a corporeal being when he says: "Quoniam duplex est informatio materiae corporalis, quaedam generalis, quaedam specialis — *generalis* per formam communem omnibus corporalibus, et haec est forma *lucis*; *specialis* vero per *alias* formas, sive elementares sive mixtionis." II *Sent.* 13. div. text. (II. 310a).

⁴⁰ "Potest summi ratio diversitatis illorum luminarium [caeli] ex parte quadruplicis causae. Et primum ex parte *finis* sumitur ratio. Sunt enim producta *propter diversas influentias in his inferioribus faciendas* et propter ornandam caelestem naturam." II *Sent.* 14. 2. 2. 1. c. (II. 358b).

We now understand what follows in the chapter of the *Breviloquium*, which we took as basis of our explanation. After describing the formation of the various corporeal beings under the influence of the celestial bodies, St. Bonaventure directs his attention to the highest and most perfect results of this process, to the human bodies, and he continues:

These are disposed for the most noble form, namely the rational soul, towards which is ordained and in which is brought to an end the desire of the entire sensible and corporeal nature, so that through the soul, which is an existing, living, sentient, and intelligent form, this nature may be led back as if in the manner of an intelligible circle to its beginning, in which it is perfected and beatified.⁴¹

This passage sums up our discussion about the ordination of all visible creatures towards man. "It is therefore undoubtedly true," the Seraphic Doctor continues and stresses with special emphasis, "that we are the end of all things that exist,"⁴² and all corporeal beings are made for the service of man."⁴³ But the same passage also points out that man himself is ordained to a further and final end. His spiritual soul is able and destined to reach God, the ultimate end of all creation; and in this higher ordination lies the real basis for man's kingship over the visible world. The reason why the desire of the material universe reaches its aim when it is united with the human soul lies precisely in the fact that this most noble form is able to attain the final end and rest in God. The power that makes man capable of such an ascent is the *liberum arbitrium* which, in the terminology of St. Bonaventure, signifies the entire higher portion of the human soul and includes both intellect and free will.⁴⁴ With regard to this capability man "excels every power of corporeal beings. All things are, therefore, by nature made to serve him, and nothing can dominate over him except God alone, not fate and not the power of the stars' position."⁴⁵

⁴¹ "Corpora humana, quae disposita sunt ad nobilissimam formam, quae est anima rationalis; ad quam ordinatur et terminatur appetitus omnis naturae sensibilis et corporalis, ut per eam quae est forma ens, vivens, sentiens et intelligens, quasi ad modum circuli intelligibilis reducat ad suum principium, in quo perficiatur et beatificetur." *Brevil.* 2. 4 (V. 221b).

⁴² Here again St. Bonaventure quotes the *Physics* of Aristotle (see above, note 17), but the familiar addition *quodam modo* is left out, which indicates the particular stress that is now laid on this fact.

⁴³ "Et propterea indubitanter verum est, quod sumus finis omnium eorum quae sunt; et omnia corporalia facta sunt ad humanum obsequium." *Brevil.* 2. 4 (V. 222a).

⁴⁴ A further explanation of this *liberum arbitrium* in the doctrine of St. Bonaventure will follow in Section A of the last chapter.

⁴⁵ "Et quoniam in illud tendit per liberum arbitrium, ideo quantum ad arbitrii libertatem praecellit omnem virtutem corporalem; ac per hoc cuncta nata sunt sibi servire, nihil autem sibi dominari habet nisi solus Deus, non fatum seu vis positionis siderum." *Brevil.* 2. 4 (V. 221b).

The final remark which St. Bonaventure adds here concerning the power of the stars is intended to meet an objection that could perhaps arise from the preceding explanations. If the entire series of corporeal forms, in which the human body takes the highest place, is educed by such a powerful influence of the heavenly bodies, does man then not seem to be subject to these powers in such a way that they determine also his life and activity? This question was a serious one at the time of St. Bonaventure when astrology was practiced extensively, and he devotes a special question to this problem in his Commentary on the *Sentences*.⁴⁶ His answer is another confirmation of man's royal position in creation.

In accordance with the physical and astronomical theories of his time, which he himself uses in his explanations, he admits a certain influence of the heavenly bodies, not only on the formation of earthly things but indirectly also on the behavior and conduct of man.⁴⁷ By co-operating in the mixture of the elements, and by having a part in the fixation of the particular dispositions and characteristics in each organic body, the celestial bodies are believed to have some influence also upon the soul which, for its part, is inclined to imitate and follow the complexity of its own body with which it is so intimately united.⁴⁸ From this complexity, which is different in each individual and is usually called temperament, certain impulses originate and produce affections in the soul. St. Bonaventure also admits that some special stars or combinations of stars may occasionally stir up one of the fluids in the body and thus create in a similar way a favorable disposition to certain inclinations and manners of acting.⁴⁹

Having thus conceded some of the theories upon which the astrology of his time was based, St. Bonaventure now draws the definite limits of

⁴⁶ II *Sent.* 14. 2. 2. 3: Utrum ex impressionibus luminarium causetur in hominibus diversitas morum (II. 361—365).

⁴⁷ "Si autem dicatur mores hominum a dispositionibus siderum variari *dispositive* et *contingenter*, sic potest habere veritatem, quia nec rationi nec fidei repugnat." *Ibid.* c. (II. 363b).

⁴⁸ "Planum est enim quod dispositio corporis varia multum facit ad variationem affectionum et morum animae. Ut plurimum enim anima complexionem corporis imitatur; unde cholericus sunt iracundi et sanguinei sunt benigni et melancholici sunt lividi, flegmatici pigri . . . Quoniam igitur virtus corporum caelestium operatur ad mixtionem et qualitatem complexionum, hinc est quod per consequens operatur quodam modo ad qualitatem morum, valde tamen de longinquo." *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ "Ad illud quod obicitur, quod bella causantur ex positione siderum, dicendum quod illud verbum Philosophi non tribuit aliud sideribus quam quamdam dispositionem ad tales affectus, ex quibus bella generantur. Ex commotione enim alicuius humoris potest aliqua affectio in anima excitari." *Ibid.* ad 2 (II. 364b).

this astral influence. His answer is that such effects follow, by no means, with necessity.⁵⁰ Only in the case of those who yield to such impulses and affections, and who in this way submit themselves to the influence of the stars, are the astrologists able to make true predictions, particularly about those who "live merely according to their senses" (animaliter viventes). But with regard to those who "are spiritually minded" (spiritualiter sapientes), and who make the soul dominate over the body with its passions, little or nothing can be predicted,⁵¹ especially if the free will of man is guided, assisted, and strengthened by the powerful supernatural factor of divine grace.

The decisive factor which not merely makes man the highest member in a series of corporeal beings, but elevates him far above as king and ruler, is the spiritual power of his free will. Only if he steps down from this height and surrenders to the world beneath him, to which his body belongs, does he lose the dignity and commanding position of his kingship. By submitting the higher to the inferior, man inverts the order of creation, becomes a sinner before God, and discards the mission that is entrusted to him with regard to the rest of the visible universe. According to the right, God-given order, man is king over the corporeal world, but in such a way that his own goal lies not in this world, but beyond and above it. Only in his ordination towards God and the submission to His will is his own kingship guaranteed. The entire visible world is like a house which God, the Creator, has constructed for man, that he may live in it as lord and ruler, but also as an administrator who is responsible to a higher Master and Owner.⁵² Man lives in this house, but only for a while, "until he comes to the house not made by hands in heaven."⁵³

⁵⁰ The answer is summarized in these words: "Si igitur hoc modo quaereretur, utrum impressiones siderum aliquo modo disponant ad varietatem morum, respondendum esset quod sic, verumtamen non dispositione necessaria et proxima et sufficiente, sed *dispositione remota et contingente*." *Ibid.* c. (II. 364a). — "Anima complexiones corporis imitatur . . . Hoc autem non est necessario; anima enim dominatur suo corpori, maxime quando est adiuta per gratiam." *Ibid.* (363b).

⁵¹ *Ibid.* ad 2 (II. 364b).

⁵² "Totus mundus *servit homini*, quia factus est pro homine, ut *ipse serviat* ei qui fecit mundum et hominem. Ergo (si) sentis beneficium continuæ administrationis, redde debitum bonae operationis." *Dom. 8. p. Pent.*, sermo I. I. 2 (IX. 385b).

⁵³ "Haec igitur sensibilis corporalium machina est tanquam quaedam domus a summo opifice homini fabricata, donec ad domum veniat non manufactam in caelis." *Brevil. 2. 4* (V. 222a). Reference is made to 2 Cor. 5:1.

§ 2

The Service of the Animal World to Man

After having seen in a magnificent general picture how the entire corporeal world is ordained towards man, we shall now add some considerations about the role which St. Bonaventure attributes to the animals in particular, for they stand nearest to man in the order of the universe. The Seraphic Doctor has discussed this topic in two special questions of his Commentary on the *Sentences*.⁵⁴ They manifest his fine observation of God's creatures and his tender love for them; at the same time, and perhaps in the first place, they are another powerful expression of man's kingship over all created beings in this visible world.

The irrational animals belong to that part of creation which is transitory,⁵⁵ but they share in the general purpose of all creatures in as far as they manifest the wisdom and goodness of the Creator. St. Bonaventure considers their life and death as a decoration of the universe and compares their succession and order with a most beautiful poem in which one syllable follows the other.⁵⁶ As a part of the transitory world the animals serve man during the time of his earthly pilgrimage.⁵⁷

Suffering and death in the world of animals may, at times, appear as a disturbing element in the harmony of God's creation, and some have therefore tried to explain it as a consequence of man's sin.⁵⁸ But St. Bonaventure clearly rejects such an opinion and recalls a passage of St. Augustine, in which he says that, even if man had not sinned, there would have been beasts of prey that live by hunting and killing other animals.⁵⁹ The fact that the animals die is, for St. Bonaventure,

⁵⁴ II *Sent.* 19. 1. 2: Utrum quaevis anima, etiam brutalis, ex prima conditione fuerit immortalis (II. 461—4). II *Sent.* 15. 2. 1: Utrum omnia sensibilia facta sint propter hominem (II. 382—4).

⁵⁵ "Illae vero quae respiciunt quantum ad *esse decurrens*, utpote quae consistunt in generatione et corruptione, qualia sunt mineralia, plantae et animalia bruta, non debent habere *esse* perpetuum, sed terminatum, quae quasi quodam transitu suo et quadam inveteratione et innovatione, morte et vivificatione decorant universum." II *Sent.* 19. 1. 2. c. (II. 463a).

⁵⁶ "Sicut animalia sua *vita* habitationem hominis decorant et ornant, sic etiam *morte* sua ex successione faciunt ad universi decorationem . . . Quadam successione et ordine, dum animalia sibi succederent, universum decorarent tanquam pulcherrimum carmen, in quo syllaba succedit syllabae." II *Sent.* 15. 2. 1. ad 4—5 (II. 383b). About the Augustinian origin of this comparison see the Introduction, § 2 (*Franc. Stud.* 20 [1960]), p. 274, note 64.

⁵⁷ "Illa vero, quae facta sunt propter hominem secundum statum viae, cum ille status sit pertransitorius et habeat finem, debent esse corruptibilia; talia autem sunt animalia bruta." II *Sent.* 19. 1. 2. c. (II. 463b).

⁵⁸ *Ibid.* (462b), where this opinion is listed in the second place, but then disproved by the author.

⁵⁹ See St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* 3. 16 (no. 25) (ML 34. 289f).

part of the original creation.⁶⁰ Animals may feel pain when they are killed or wounded, but only a *rational* being, which is capable of reaching happiness, can know the lack of this happiness and can suffer misery. Only a being that possesses the power of *free decision* can suffer punishment.⁶¹ These dispositions are found only in man, who possesses the *liberum arbitrium* by which he is elevated above all corporeal creation. We see how strongly St. Bonaventure considers and judges the nature and role of animals from the viewpoint of man's unique dignity on account of which all other creatures of the visible universe are destined to serve him, not only by their life but also by their death.⁶²

However, the actual realization of this service is influenced by another important fact. We already saw at the end of the last paragraph that the kingship of man over the corporeal world, and with it the service of this world for man, depend on man's fidelity to his role as mediator between this world and God. Although the animals serve man in every condition, this service was not the same in the state of original innocence as it is now in the state of fallen nature.⁶³ St. Bonaventure discusses the two cases separately, and his description reflects man's original royal dignity as well as his weakness and poverty after sin.

In the state of original innocence the animals were ordained towards man and served him in four different ways. The first two of these concern man's role as king of the universe; the animals manifested the sovereign power of man by obeying him in everything, and decorated his dwelling place on earth by their great numbers. The other two concern man on his own way to God; the animals were intended to open the eyes of man to see in their different natures the manifold wisdom of the Creator, and should also excite man's affection. By seeing how the animals live according to their nature and love that for which they are made, man should be moved to love God. The entire world of animals, not only the beasts of burden, but also wild animals and cattle,

⁶⁰ St. Bonaventure's own final conclusion is: "Et sic concedendae sunt rationes ostendentes animas brutales esse mortales ex sua prima conditione." *Ibid.* (463b).

⁶¹ "Ad illud quod obicitur de libro Sapientiae, dicendum quod loquitur vel de morte damnationis aeternae vel de morte temporali in eo cui mors est poena. Tale autem est solum animal rationis capax, quod, sicut solum natum est esse beatum, solum natum est esse miserum, sic solum natum est praemiari, solum natum est puniri, quia solum ipsum est cui data est vis discretiva inter bonum et malum, verum et falsum. Unde etsi bestia doleat cum occiditur vel laeditur, non tamen punitur; non enim est capax miseriae." *Ibid.* ad 2 (463b).

⁶² *Ibid.* fund. 2 (462a).

⁶³ "Aliter ordinantur animalia ad hominem secundum statum innocentiae, aliter secundum statum naturae lapsae." II *Sent.* 15. 2. 1. c. (II. 383a).

were in this fourfold way the servers of man during the state of original justice.⁶⁴

After the sin of Adam, which disturbed the right order in creation and changed man's world from a paradise into a valley of tears, the animals still serve man, but they now do so in different ways and for reasons that are connected with man's fallen state. The beasts of burden and cattle are now there to meet the needs of man as regards food, clothing, and the hard work of daily life. Other animals, like certain birds and little dogs, serve man by giving him some joy and consolation. The wild and harmful animals are likewise ordained towards man and his ultimate end. The injuries they inflict are a punishment for sin and an opportunity of salutary penance and patience. Their wild nature also calls man to exercise his abilities.⁶⁵ These animals are now able to harm man not because they have changed in their nature or received a new power, but because man has lost his own dignity and royal power over them.⁶⁶

Redemption through Jesus Christ has restored man in his right and original relationship to God, but the disturbance which sin has caused in the created order, is still present. However, the more the re-formation of man progresses and approaches the state of original innocence, so much the more is also restored the original relationship of the animals and other creatures to man.⁶⁷ With the return to perfect submission under God, as it is realized in the great saints, man's complete kingship over nature is likewise renewed. As an outstanding example of this, St. Bonaventure mentions his own spiritual father, St. Francis of Assisi. What he writes about him in his biography is a fitting conclusion to what we have seen in the present section about man's place between the visible universe and God.

The Seraphic Doctor begins the chapter on the piety of St. Francis with the general statement that this virtue "had so filled and penetrated

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ *Ibid.* (363a—b). — The purpose of the wild animals after the fall of man is described with the words of St. Augustine in *De Genesi ad litteram* 3. 17 (no. 26) (ML 34. 290).

⁶⁶ "Quod autem noceant vel offendant, hoc est propter peccatum hominis, non propter novam potentiam eis datam, sed propter dignitatis praesidentiam ab homine amissam." II *Sent.* 15. 2. 1 ad 3 (II. 383b).

⁶⁷ "Secundum quod homo plus reformatur et reducitur ad statum innocentiae, secundum hoc magis sibi mansuescunt huiusmodi creaturae et ipse circa eas maiori pietate movetur, sicut de beato Francisco legitur quod erga huiusmodi creaturas mira pietatis ténacitate affluebat, quia iam quodam modo innocentiam recuperaverat." III *Sent.* 28 u. 1. c. (III. 622b). II *Sent.* 15. 2. 1 ad 3 (II. 383b) mentions Daniel in the lions' den (Dan. 6 : 22) as another example.

the heart of St. Francis, the Servant of God, that he was seen to be wholly subject to its dominion."⁶⁸ He mentions as one of the marvelous effects of this high perfection of piety in St. Francis that "through his all-embracing love for every creature it set forth a new picture of man's state of innocence."⁶⁹ At the end of the same chapter St. Bonaventure relates an event in the life of St. Francis, which confirms and illustrates this particular point. Once, the people of Greccio were troubled with ravenous wolves and frequent hail storms. St. Francis told them to do penance and assured them that, if and as long as they would be faithful to God, these plagues would stop. The report then continues: "The hail having ceased, the wolves also kept the promise made by the Servant of God, and ventured no more to rage against those men who no longer impiously rebelled against the laws of the merciful God."⁷⁰ St. Bonaventure ends his report with the concluding remark: "It behoves us, therefore, piously to venerate the piety of that blessed man, by whose marvelous sweetness and power ferocious beasts were quelled, wild animals tamed, the mild ones instructed, and the nature of brutes, rebellious to man since his fall, was sweetly inclined to his obedience."⁷¹

What St. Bonaventure tells us in this chapter about the power of St. Francis over the animals and over nature in general because of his extraordinary piety and union with God, has a parallel in another event which is reported in the fifth chapter of the same work. One time St. Francis was counselled by the physicians to suffer the application of a cautery for the relief of his eyes. After he had prayed and had made the sign of the cross over the hot, seething iron, the operation was performed. When they asked him later about the pain, St. Francis replied that he had neither felt heat nor suffered from the burning iron. St. Bonaventure then concludes his report with the following profound reflection:

The man of God had attained to such a degree of purity that his flesh was subject to his spirit, and his spirit to God in a wonderful harmony and agreement, and all creatures were thus in marvelous subjection to his will and command, who was himself the faithful servant of the Creator.⁷²

⁶⁸ "Pietas . . . adeo cor Francisci repleverat ac penetraverat viscera, ut totum videretur virum Dei in suum dominium vindicasse." *Legenda S. Francisci* 8. 1 (VIII. 526a). The Engl. transl. is taken from Card. Manning, *The Life of St. Francis of Assisi by St. Bonaventure* (9. ed., London 1925) 74.

⁶⁹ "Haec est, quae ipsum . . . per universalem conciliationem ad singula refigurabat ad innocentiae statum." *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ *Leg. S. Franc.* 8. 11 (VIII. 529b). Transl. by Card. Manning, *op. cit.*, 84.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² "Quia enim ad tantam pervenerat puritatem, ut caro spiritui et spiritus Deo harmonia mirabili concordarent, divina ordinatione fiebat, ut creatura Factori suo deserviens voluntati et imperio eius mirabiliter subiaceret." *Leg. S. Franc.* 5. 9 (VIII. 519a). Transl. by Card. Manning, *op. cit.*, 51.

What makes these reports so important and significant for our topic is the way in which St. Bonaventure presents and explains the relationship of St. Francis to creation, a relationship that is so much praised, but often so little understood in its real nature and origin. The Seraphic Doctor indicates in each case the deeper theological foundation, which he finds in man's position and function between the visible world and God. The kingship of man over creation is essentially dependent on his own ordination towards God and his union with Him.

§ 3

The Service of All Visible Creatures to Man on his Way to God

Up to now, the goal of the corporeal world in general and of the animal world in particular was shown to be man in his life here on earth with its temporal interests and needs. What we have seen was grand, but is not yet the entire picture. The complete service of this world to man includes not only his body and his earthly life, but also and even more his soul and the higher, eternal life for which he has been created. To help man in knowing and loving God and in obtaining true wisdom, is Nature's most noble service.⁷³ Such a function seems almost to lie beyond the limits of this Nature, for it means that someone who comes nearer to an intended goal is led by something that stands and remains at a much greater distance from it.⁷⁴ But although the corporeal beings are inferior, they are able to carry out this function as humble, but very important signs along man's road to God, which he is supposed to study and follow with gratitude and fidelity until he reaches his final destiny.⁷⁵

This function of the corporeal beings is one of the main purposes for which they were made. "The First Principle created this sensible world in order to make Himself known so that, as it were, by a mirror and vestige man should be led back to loving and praising God, the Artificer."⁷⁶ All creatures bear, at least in some remote way, the marks

⁷³ "Mundus, etsi servit homini quantum ad corpus, potissime tamen quantum ad animam; et si servit quantum ad vitam, potissime quantum ad sapientiam." *In Hexaem.* 13. 12 (V. 389b—390a).

⁷⁴ *I Sent.* 3. 1. u. 3. arg. 2: "Non est rectus ordo, quod propinquius perveniat in finem per medium magis distans" (I. 74a).

⁷⁵ "Aliae creaturae possunt considerari ut *res* vel ut *signa*. Primo modo sunt inferiores homine, secundo modo sunt *media* in deveniendo sive *in via*, non in termino, quia illae non perveniunt, sed per illas pervenit homo ad Deum, illis post se relictis." *Ibid.* ad 2 (75b).

⁷⁶ *Brevil.* 2. 4 (V. 229a). For the complete text see above, Chapter I (*Franc. Stud.* 20 [1960]), p. 313, note 163.

of their Creator, and St. Bonaventure has gathered and explained these signs with great care, particularly in the first chapter of his *Itinerarium*. He groups these marks together in ternaries which correspond, by appropriation, to the three Divine Persons, so that the Triune God is reflected everywhere in creation.⁷⁷

Because the creatures are in this way signs that express and represent something else, the Seraphic Doctor compares the entire visible creation to a book.⁷⁸ This analogy is fundamental to St. Bonaventure's system; it is significant for him also because it contains his central notion of medium. Through a book the author expresses himself to a reader, and through this book the reader comes to know the author. In the same way, the Book of Nature functions as a medium both in the movement of creation *from* God and in its return *to* God in as far as man should read in this book about the glories of his great and loving Creator and, by reading and understanding the book, should find the way to God and be brought back to Him. The exemplarity of all created things, which is present in the unfolded order of the universe and belongs in this respect to the second phase of the great drama of creation, thus also leads over into the general return.⁷⁹

As long as man remained in the state of original innocence and kept his spiritual faculties untainted by sin and elevated by grace, he was able to read in this Book of Creation. "He had knowledge about the created things and was, through their representation, lifted up to God in order to praise, to adore, and to love Him."⁸⁰ In this state man saw things not only as they existed below himself in nature, and as they

⁷⁷ See e. g. *De myst. Trinit.* 1. 2. c. (V. 54b—55a), or *Brevil.* 2. 1 (V. 219a—b).

⁷⁸ About this "typically Bonaventurian conception" (p. 31) of a book and its various applications in the doctrine of St. Bonaventure see esp. G. H. Tavard, *Transiency and Permanence: The Nature of Theology according to St. Bonaventure*, FIP—ThS 4 (St. Bonaventure, N. Y., 1954) 31—102: The Three Books. The recent study of W. Rauch, *Das Buch Gottes* (Munich 1961), shows that the entire doctrine of St. Bonaventure can be presented under the aspect of this central notion, and thus proves the importance of this analogy in the system of the Seraphic Doctor; for the idea of *medium* in this analogy see p. 12—15, 118—9, 142, and 185—7. — In so far as St. Bonaventure uses the analogy of a book in order to show the necessity of man's composite nature and intermediate position in creation, it was mentioned above, Chapter I (*Franc. Stud.* 20 [1960]), p. 313—4.

⁷⁹ "Omnis creatura repraesentat Deum, qui est Trinitas, et qualiter pervenitur ad eum." In *Hexaem.* 13. 11 (V. 389b). — About the relation between the *exemplarity* of creation and the great circular movement *from* and *to* God see the Introduction, § 1 (*Franc. Stud.* 20 [1960]), p. 264.

⁸⁰ "Certum est, quod homo stans habebat cognitionem rerum creatarum et per illarum repraesentationem ferebatur in Deum ad ipsum laudandum, venerandum, amandum." In *Hexaem.* 13. 12 (V. 390a).

were reflected in his mind, but, with the eye of contemplation, also as they existed above himself in their original source, the Divine Exemplar and norm of all truth. Such a comprehensive view gave him true wisdom.⁸¹ The eye of contemplation was still imperfect, but would reach its perfection in the glory of heaven.

However, this intermediate position of man, in which he was able to see things both below and above himself, also involved a certain danger. Man could use this Book of Nature in a wrong way and thus defeat its real purpose. The true mission of man with regard to the visible world is to ascend from the created things to God. St. Bonaventure calls this movement, which man is expected to make, a transition from vanity to truth.⁸² However, the things of the visible world may appear to man so beautiful and attractive that he falls in love with them. This means that he begins to bow down to them, wants to know and experience them, and finally wishes to be united with them.⁸³

The result of this tragic step is that man begins to consider the created beings only in themselves and forgets that they are images of something higher.⁸⁴ He now investigates only the beautiful letters in the Book of Nature, without paying attention to their real meaning. He looks at created things as if they were made only for themselves. For him they become a value in themselves and a good to be attained for its own sake, without reference to that higher and ultimate end for which they were actually created.

By approaching the Book of Nature in this way, and by loving a changeable, transitory, and vain good, man moves into the opposite direction: he passes over from truth to vanity. St. Bonaventure gives the example of King Solomon, "who wanted to know all things *and treated about trees from the cedar that is in Libanus unto the hyssop*; but

⁸¹ "Et ideo in statu innocentiae, cum imago non erat vitiata, sed deiformis effecta per gratiam, sufficebat liber creaturae, in quo se ipsum exerceret homo ad contuendum lumen divinae sapientiae; ut sic sapiens esset, cum universas res videret *in se*, videret *in proprio genere*, videret etiam *in arte*, secundum quod res tripliciter habent esse, scilicet in *materia* vel *natura propria*, in *intelligentia creata* et in *arte aeterna*." *Brevil.* 2. 12 (V. 230b).

⁸² "*Vanitas vanitatum, et omnia vanitas* [Eccles. 1: 2]. Haec propositio vera est et probatur in toto libro. Oportet ergo transire ab omnibus ad veritatem, ut non sit delectatio nisi in Deo." *In Hexaem.* 19. 2 (V. 420a).

⁸³ "Sapientia autem est *supra* tamquam nobilis; sed scientia *infra*, at videtur homini pulcra, et ideo vult sibi coniungi, et inclinatur anima ad scibilia et sensibilia et vult ea cognoscere et cognita experiri et per consequens eis uniri." *Ibid.* 19. 3 (V. 420b).

⁸⁴ See I *Sent.* 3. 1. u. 2. ad 1 (I. 72b), where St. Bonaventure distinguishes two ways of looking at a picture: "Aut sicut *pictura*, aut sicut *imago*; unde aut sistitur in pulcritudine creaturae, aut per illam tenditur in aliud."

he forgot the main thing, and he therefore became vain.”⁸⁵ St. Bonaventure gives us here a good explanation of his notion of vanity, which occurs so frequently in his writings. By calling the things of the visible world vain, he does not mean to deny their goodness and value in the order of creation. They are considered as vanity only in as far as they do not possess a firm hold and stability in themselves and do not represent an independent goal that could be sought for its own sake.⁸⁶ Man falls into this vanity when he considers and treats the created beings in this world as things in themselves. Undertaken in such an attitude, all his searching in the Book of Nature is vain because it looks for a meaning which the book does not possess.

This transition from truth to vanity is the source of all evil, and St. Bonaventure sees the sin of Adam precisely in such a step. “If we incline ourselves to the knowledge and experience of things by investigating further than we are permitted to do, we fall from true contemplation and taste of the forbidden tree of knowledge of good and evil.”⁸⁷ If our first parents had fixed their eye of contemplation on the eternal truth and had, in this way, been led back from the knowledge of creatures to the union with the Father, they would have come from the dim twilight, in which God’s glory is reflected in creatures, to the bright daylight of divine truth and glory.⁸⁸ But they lost this “day” because of their curiosity about those excellent created things and their desire to possess them.

⁸⁵ “Et ita enervatur, ut Salomon, qui voluit omnia scire *et disputavit super lignis a cedro, quae est in Libano, usque ad hyssopum* [3 Kings 4 : 33]; et oblitus est principalis, et ideo est factus vanus.” *In Hexaem.* 19. 3 (V. 420b).

⁸⁶ With this notion of vanity in mind we also understand why St. Bonaventure considers as vanity all knowledge that is acquired merely for the sake of knowledge and does not in some way lead to greater love, a better life, or some other result in view of the *final* end. See e. g. *De red. art.* 26 (V. 325b) and also *In Hexaem.* 22. 21: “Multa enim scire et nihil gustare quid valet?” (V. 440b).

⁸⁷ “Si vero declinamus ad notitiam rerum in experientia (the other *Reportatio* [A] says: “ad rerum notitiam et experientiam; see F. Delorme, *Collat. in Hexaem.*, BFSMA 8, Quaracchi 1934, 7), investigantes amplius, quam nobis conceditur; cadimus a vera contemplatione et gustamus de ligno vetito scientiae boni et mali.” *In Hexaem.* 1. 17 (V. 332a). See also *ibid.* 19. 1 and 4 (420a—b). In *II Sent.* 30. 1. 1. c., the two possible movements of the mind are mentioned in a similar way: “Ratio in inquirendo dupliciter potest procedere: aut prout est adiuta radio fidei, et sic procedit *aspiciendo* ad causas *superiores*; aut prout iudicio proprio relictæ est, et sic procedit *inspiciendo* ad naturas et causas *inferiores*; acquirit enim scientiam per viam sensus et experientiae.” (II. 716a). See also R. W. Mulligan, “Portio superior and portio inferior rationis in the Writings of St. Bonaventure,” *FS* 15 (1955) 338—40.

⁸⁸ *In Hexaem.* 1. 17 (V. 332a).

The same curiosity which led to the fall of Adam still remains active in the sinful nature of man. Having lost contact with the Eternal Truth, without however forfeiting his capacity and desire for the Infinite Good, man continues searching in the Book of Nature, but now only to be pushed by his curiosity into an infinity of questions.⁸⁹ By bending down to creatures, man broke away from the great general circular movement that tends and leads back to final rest in God. He now finds himself in another kind of circular movement, which is rotating like a whirlwind around the things he has chosen as his good, and in which he never finds clarity or peace.⁹⁰

For man in such a condition, the Book of Nature had become unintelligible. Although the writing was still there and still expressed the divine wisdom, the letters appeared to man like Greek and Hebrew characters to the unlearned, and their origin was now completely unknown to him.⁹¹ Since the Book of Creation had no longer intelligent and understanding readers, it was, so to speak, dead and deleted. By losing its noble function of being a guide for man on his way to God, it lost also its own share in the general return.⁹²

In order to restore the original order of the return, it was necessary that man should again be capable of reading the Book of Nature. To achieve this, God wrote another book which, like a dictionary, shows man the real meaning of created things. This book is Holy Scripture. As a divine revelation it never fails⁹³ and has the power to supplement man's deficiency. In its many figures and parables, which are taken from the Book of Creation, it shows that the created beings can be, and actually are, signs of higher realities. It also teaches man what are these realities which he can find represented in creatures.⁹⁴ In this way

⁸⁹ "Unde intelligentia [humana], avertendo se a summa veritate ignara effecta, infinitis quaestionibus se immiscuit per curiositatem." II *Sent.* Proem. (II. 5b).

⁹⁰ "Virtus autem, discontinuando se a summa potestate facta infirma, immiscuit se infinitis quaestionibus per instabilitatem, unde semper quaerit quidem et non invenit. Unde Isaiae decimo nono (v. 14): *Dominus immiscuit in medio Aegypti spiritum vertiginis* . . . Et ideo erit *tamquam pulvis, quem proicit ventus a facie terrae*. Sicut igitur pulvis non potest quiescere, quamdiu est ventus vertiginis, sic nec nostra virtus stabilis permanere." *Ibid.* (6a—b). See also *Comment. in Eccl.* I. 7 (VI. 13a).

⁹¹ *In Hexaem.* 2. 20 (V. 340a).

⁹² "Cadente autem homine, cum amisisset cognitionem, non erat qui reduceret eas in Deum. Unde iste liber, scilicet mundus, quasi emortuus et deletus erat." *Ibid.* 13. 12 (390a).

⁹³ See *De myst. Trinit.* I. 2. c. (V. 55a).

⁹⁴ "Necessarius autem fuit alius liber, per quem iste illuminaretur, ut acciperet metaphoras rerum. Hic autem liber est Scripturae, qui ponit similitudines, proprietates et metaphoras rerum in libro mundi scriptarum." *In Hexaem.* 13. 12 (V. 390a). See also E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, 354.

Holy Scripture, in co-operation with faith⁹⁵ and sanctifying grace, revives in man the eye of contemplation⁹⁶ and enables him once more to read the Book of Creation, to receive the full service of the things below him, and to be in this way their decisive mediator on the way to God, their ultimate end.

Section B

The Relation of the Angels to the Kingship of Man

The preceding section has shown, in various ways, how the entire visible world is ordained towards man and serves him in every respect. This service of the corporeal beings to man is part of the general return to God, the ultimate end, which the material world reaches through man. The question which still remains to be answered is that concerning the exact place of the angels in this general return, particularly their relation to man's dominating intermediate position and function in creation.

The Seraphic Doctor himself leads us to this question when he states that all things are created for man. It is true, and the context often shows it, that such expressions are usually meant to refer only to the corporeal universe. But there are some cases where such an interpretation does not seem to be sufficient. On one occasion St. Bonaventure explains: Man alone is called "every creature" because his *spiritual* soul is united to a body through which he has, at the same time, something in common with all *corporeal* beings.⁹⁷ Since soul and body are mentioned, the expression "every creature" obviously includes both the spiritual world of the angels and the material world. It has this same comprehensive meaning in the *Homily* of Gregory the Great whence it is originally taken,⁹⁸ and also in further texts of St. Bonaven-

⁹⁵ "Vestigium relucet in omnibus et singulis creaturis... Ad quod tamen testimonium audiendum et videndum aperiuntur aures et oculi *solorum fidelium*, quibus revelata sunt divina mysteria." *Serm. de reb. theol.*, sermo 1. 7 (V. 536b).

⁹⁶ "Oculus contemplationis actum suum... recuperat autem per gratiam et fidem et Scripturarum intelligentiam." *Brevil.* 2. 12 (V. 230b).

⁹⁷ "Sic est imago in *anima*, quod ex parte *corporis* cum omnibus corporalibus habet quandam convenientiam; et ideo solus homo dicitur 'omnis creatura,' et omnia *propter ipsum quodam modo* fieri et ad ipsum etiam referri." II *Sent.* 16. 1. 3. ad 5 (II. 399b).

⁹⁸ "*Praedicate omni creaturae?* [Mk. 16 : 15] Sed omnis creaturae nomine signatur homo... *Lapides* itaque sunt, sed non vivunt. *Arbusta* autem sunt, et vivunt, sed non sentiunt. *Bruta vero animalia* sunt, vivunt, sentiunt, sed non discernunt. *Angeli* etenim sunt, vivunt, sentiunt, et discernunt. Omnis

ture.⁹⁹ But in the present case the same sentence now continues the idea of this expression: "Man alone is called '*every creature*,' and *everything* is said to be created in a certain way *for* him, and is also said to be related *to* him."¹⁰⁰ As an immediate continuation, this addition must have the same comprehensive meaning as the preceding expression and must therefore include also the angels. St. Gregory, in the above-mentioned *Homily*, is more careful in this regard. When speaking about finality, he describes man as the one "for whom everything *on earth* is created."¹⁰¹ But there is no restriction of *this* kind in the present text of St. Bonaventure; nor is this the only place where such a thought occurs. When he states, in the beginning of his Commentary on the Second Book of the *Sentences*, that "man has something in common with *all* creatures and that the *others* are made for man,"¹⁰² he seems to express the same idea of man as being the center and goal of the entire creation.

However, by adding in the above-quoted phrase that everything is created for man *in a certain way*, St. Bonaventure does make *some* restriction; but this addition does not mean that he simply excludes the angels. It rather limits his comprehensive statement to a certain viewpoint; and his answer to the problem of the relation between the angels and man is actually based on various aspects. According to these different aspects, the angels can be called *higher* than man, on an *equal level* with man, and, in a certain sense, even *ordained* towards man as the more important creature in view of the entire creation. We now have to examine each one of these three points.

From the viewpoint of the first part of our study, which showed the angels as the upper and most excellent level in the order of creation, it would seem to be the proper procedure to deal, in the first place, with

autem creaturae aliquid habet homo . . . Si ergo commune habet aliquid cum omni creatura homo, iuxta aliquid omnis creatura est homo." *Homil. in Evang.* 2. 29. 2 (ML 76. 1214A—B).

⁹⁹ E. g. *Comment. in Sap.* 1. 7 (VI. 114b) and 11. 27 (184b), also *Sermo de Ss. Phil. et Iacobo* 3 (IX. 533b).

¹⁰⁰ The complete text is given above, note 97.

¹⁰¹ "Omni ergo creaturae praedicatur Evangelium, cum soli homini praedicatur, quia ille videlicet docetur, *propter quem in terra cuncta creata sunt*, et a quo *omnia per quamdam similitudinem aliena non sunt*." *Loc. cit.* (B). Note that the restriction is made only with regard to finality. Afterwards, the comprehensive meaning is immediately resumed again.

¹⁰² "Prima pars habet duas; quia enim homo communicat *cum omnibus creaturis*, et *cetera facta sunt propter hominem*, ideo primo agit de conditione rerum in generali, secundo vero in speciali." II *Sent.* 1. 1. div. text. (II. 13b—14a). The first part of the sentence surely includes all creatures, and there is no indication that the corresponding second part is understood in a less general sense.

the higher dignity of the angels and then gradually to descend to the other aspects which appear to be more of an accidental nature. Such an approach, however, would hardly be in agreement with St. Bonaventure's fundamental ideas in this matter. Among the three aspects there is one which he considers as basic, and this is not the higher dignity of the angels, but rather the equal destiny of angel and man. The main fact in the eyes of St. Bonaventure is that, as spiritual beings, they both are immediately ordained towards God and eternal beatitude. This basic equality is then modified by some additional circumstances which show either the angels or man in a more prominent position and function.¹⁰³ In this connection it is significant that both questions in which St. Bonaventure deals explicitly with this problem,¹⁰⁴ mention and treat the equality of angel and man first and let the superiority of the angels follow afterwards, although our author, for this reason, had to reverse the usual sequence of the two kinds of order in creation by placing the *ordo in finem* before the *ordo rerum ad invicem*.¹⁰⁵ In order to assure a true presentation of St. Bonaventure's doctrine, we shall follow the same order in our discussion of the three aspects in the relation between the angels and man.

§ I

The Fundamental Equality of the Angels and Man

In the first part of our study we have seen how God, in order to create a world that would manifest his infinite power, wisdom, and goodness in the most perfect way, produced two levels of creatures which were at the greatest possible distance from one another. One

¹⁰³ II *Sent.* 16. 2. 1. c. (II. 401a—402a). How this modification by accidental circumstances affects the relative position of angel and man, will be explained in §§ 2—3 of this Section.

¹⁰⁴ II *Sent.* 1. 2. 2. 2: *Utrum natura spiritualis dignitate naturae prae-cellat compositam ex spirituali et corporali* (II. 45—47). — II *Sent.* 16. 2. 1: *Utrum imaginis ratio principalius reperiatur in angelo quam in anima* (II. 400—402).

¹⁰⁵ "Cum quaeritur de ordine spiritus rationalis sive uniti ad spiritum angelicum vel separatim, de duplici ordine potest intelligi: aut de ordine quantum *ad finem* aut quantum *ad naturae dignitatem*. Si quantum *ad finem*, sic dico, quod sunt *pares* . . . Si autem loquamur de ordine quantum *ad naturae dignitatem*, dicendum quod, simpliciter loquendo, Angelus est creatura *superior homine*." II *Sent.* 1. 2. 2. 2. c. (II. 46a—b). According to the main division, this question considers only two aspects in the relation between angel and man; but the third aspect, namely man's superiority to the angels, is included in the discussion about the *ordo in finem* in so far as it deals with the ordination of angel and man not only towards God but also towards one another.

extreme was near to nothing, namely matter as such and the corporeal things that were then made out of this matter. The other extreme was as near to God as a creature could be. This upper level is constituted by the angels. Because they are nearest to God, they have to be most similar to Him both with regard to substance and faculties. They possess this required degree of similarity to God in their *substance* on account of the fact that they are simple beings, in their *faculties* on account of their three spiritual powers of memory, intellect, and will, which represent the Blessed Trinity.¹⁰⁶ This combination of one simple substance and three distinct powers is what St. Bonaventure calls the "image of God," and he sees in this image the essence of every created spirit.¹⁰⁷

Between this spiritual world of the angels and the material world is man, composed of soul and body. Although such a composition makes him stand below the angels, his soul is nevertheless a spiritual being like the angels, and because of this soul St. Bonaventure is inclined to place the entire man very close to the angels. He is justified in following this inclination since he holds the opinion that the human soul is composed of matter and form like any other creature, and is, for this reason, a true substance that has its own existence and operation.¹⁰⁸ As a spiritual substance the soul has those same essential qualities of a created spirit which we have just seen in the case of the angels. Man, too, is therefore an image of God by possessing the three spiritual powers of memory, intellect, and will in the one simple substance of his soul.¹⁰⁹

Our task is now to make a more exact comparison between the angels and man. But before examining this question, we must clarify the notion of image around which the entire answer of St. Bonaventure centers. In accordance with the teaching of the Seraphic Doctor we can define image as that which shows a *clearly expressed similarity* to some person or object.¹¹⁰ The image of God in a created spirit consists therefore in

¹⁰⁶ *Brevil.* 2. 6 (V. 224a).

¹⁰⁷ With regard to the human soul St. Bonaventure states explicitly: "Esse imaginem Dei non est homini accidens, sed potius substantiale, sicut esse vestigium nulli accidit creaturae." II *Sent.* 16. 1. 2. fund. 4 (II. 397a).

¹⁰⁸ See II *Sent.* 17. 1. 2 (II. 413—6). As regards the present application of this general doctrine see E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, 195. — The ordination towards a body does not destroy the intrinsic nobility of the human soul, but represents an additional ability, as we shall see later in § 3 of this Section.

¹⁰⁹ In the 2nd part of the *Breviloquium* we find, in this respect, numerous parallels between chapter 6 about the angels and chapter 9 about the human soul.

¹¹⁰ "Imago dicit expressam similitudinem." II *Sent.* 16. 1. 1. c. (II. 394b).

some definite similarity with God. In the further determination of this similarity St. Bonaventure then makes a distinction which is important for our question, in so far as the two points of this distinction will be used in each step of our comparison between angel and man. The similarity between the created spirit and God can be fulfilled in two ways,¹¹¹ which correspond to the two kinds of order in creation.

The first kind of similarity consists in a *conformity based on order* (*convenientia ordinis*),¹¹² which is now understood in the sense of *ordination*. This means that a creature possesses a clearly expressed similarity to God when, by its nature, it is immediately ordained towards Him and capable of a direct communication with Him. The connection of this notion of ordination with that of an image may, perhaps, come as a surprise; but the relationship between these two notions becomes clear in the light of St. Bonaventure's explanation that such an ordination of one being towards another also includes and presupposes some congruity and similarity between the two. This similarity increases with the degree of ordination, so that an immediate ordination implies a very special congruity and a clearly expressed similarity. The second kind of similarity consists in a *conformity based on proportion* (*convenientia proportionis*).¹¹³ The conformity now lies in certain relations which exist between the three powers in a created spirit on the one hand and the three Persons in God on the other, in the same way as the proportions between the lines of a portrait are similar to those of the model.

These two kinds of similarity are different in character. The first similarity, which is based on *ordination*, contains a *dynamic* element; it represents a certain *movement* from the creature to God and thus belongs to the *ordo in finem* or the final return of creation. The second similarity, which is based on *proportion*, shows a *static* character; it represents a *condition* which exists within the creature and corresponds to the *ordo rerum ad invicem* with its characteristic note of exemplarity.

¹¹¹ "Quaedam vero [est similitudo] secundum *proportionalitatem*, sicut nauta et auriga conveniunt secundum comparisonem ad illa quae regunt; quaedam est similitudo per *convenientiam ordinis*, sicut exemplatum assimilatur exemplari." *Ibid.* — For further explanations of these two kinds of similarity see E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, 178—82; E. Sauer, *Die religiöse Wertung der Welt in Bonaventuras Itinerarium mentis in Deum*, FF 4 (Werl 1937) 100—102; J. R. Rézette, "Grâce et similitude de Dieu chez saint Bonaventure," *ÉTL* 32 (1956) 52—4; W. Rauch, *op. cit.*, 65—6, 74—85.

¹¹² "Quia enim [anima] ei [scil. Deo] immediate ordinatur, ideo capax eius est vel e converso; et quia capax est, nata est ei configurari." *Ibid.* (395a). About the connection between *imago Dei* and *capax Dei* see also J. R. Rézette, *art. cit.*, 55.

¹¹³ "Convenientia enim proportionis attenditur secundum similiter se habere." *Ibid.*

Every created spirit is an image of God in this twofold way, and the degree of dignity which each spirit possesses depends on the intensity or perfection of this twofold similarity.¹¹⁴

Here we are at the starting point of St. Bonaventure's answer to our present question; for this degree of similarity is, for him, the decisive criterion by which he determines the relative position of angel and man in creation. He compares them under two different aspects: first, he considers them with regard to the *image itself* as it is in each created spirit, independently of particular circumstances; then he compares them with regard to their *relation to other creatures*.¹¹⁵

With regard to the first and principal aspect, St. Bonaventure states that the angel and the human soul, and thereby also angel and man, are equal. Both are created for final beatitude.¹¹⁶ They are intended to fulfill in a perfect way the basic aim of creation, which is to praise the supreme power and majesty of God, to receive and understand the manifestation of God who is the supreme light, and to share in God, the supreme goodness. Only a spiritual being is capable of reaching such a destination.¹¹⁷ Since both angel and man are created for the fulfillment of this highest destiny, they both must have received the necessary means for attaining it. Both must have the same spiritual nature and powers ordaining them towards God in this immediate way.¹¹⁸ In possessing the same immediate ordination, both angel and man are in the same way an image of God which consists essentially in such an immediate ordination.¹¹⁹ In this respect, which St. Bonaventure considers as fundamental, angel and man are equal.¹²⁰

¹¹⁴ "Cum expressio imaginis consistat in convenientia ordinis et proportionis, intensio dignitatis imaginis consistit secundum intensionem convenientiae quantum ad proportionem vel ordinem." II *Sent.* 16. 2. 1. c. (II. 401a).

¹¹⁵ This second point will be discussed in §§ 2—3 of the present Section.

¹¹⁶ "Non tantum spiritum angelicum et separatum fecit beatificabilem, sed etiam spiritum coniunctum, scilicet humanum." *Brevil.* 2. 9 (V. 226b—227a).

¹¹⁷ See II *Sent.* 16. 1. 1. c. (II. 394a).

¹¹⁸ *Brevil.* 2. 9 says with regard to the human soul: "Forma beatificabilis est capax Dei per memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem" (V. 227a).

¹¹⁹ The complete text concerning this first point reads: "Et sic triplex est ordo in creatura rationali, secundum quem conformatur Deo. Primus, quod immediate nata est Deo coniungi; et hic est essentialis imagini, et in hoc angelus et anima aequiparantur, quia utriusque mens immediate ab ipsa prima veritate formatur." II *Sent.* 16. 2. 1. c. (II. 401b).

¹²⁰ The second main question dealing with our problem says in a similar way: "Si quantum ad finem; sic dico quod sunt pares. Nam ad eundem finem, scilicet ad aeternam beatitudinem, immediate ordinantur; et eadem est mensura hominis, quae et angeli, nec homo propter angelum, nec angelus propter hominem." II *Sent.* 1. 2. 2. c. (II. 46a).

To express and to emphasize the fact that man, with his spiritual soul, is immediately ordained towards God, and that there are no other creatures between him and God, St. Bonaventure often uses certain quotations from St. Augustine who has described in many ways the immediate and intimate contact of the human soul with God.¹²¹ According to him, no creature is nearer to God than man, and none is more united with Him. Only God is above the human mind which is immediately informed and influenced by the Eternal Truth, and no medium exists between the human mind and God.¹²² St. Bonaventure takes over this Augustinian thought with great enthusiasm. Speaking, for instance, about the different ways in which the mind ascends to the knowledge and presence of God, he mentions as third and most perfect ascent the one that takes place "from the soul to God, because 'the image is informed by Eternal Truth Itself, and is joined to God immediately'."¹²³

This Augustinian and truly Christian thought has influenced St. Bonaventure in the use of Neoplatonic ideas and has led to some significant modifications of them, which are particularly visible in the question of the final return. The fundamental idea of a circular movement from the First Principle and back to It is an essential part of the Neoplatonic system¹²⁴ and was taken over by Denis the Areopagite. But according to the Neoplatonic doctrine, the return of each member in the long causal series of beings takes place only to the next higher member, and the return movement is, in this way, the exact counterpart to the gradual emanations.¹²⁵ In the same order in which the lower beings received their existence through the higher ones, so they also return only through them.

¹²¹ Most of these quotations are mentioned together in II *Sent.* 1. 2. 2. 2. arg. 1 (II. 45 b). The Quaracchi-edition indicates, in a footnote (no. 5) to this argument, the main texts of St. Augustine in which this idea is expressed.

¹²² A passage that contains most of these ideas together is found in *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, 51. 2: "Iam porro quae sapiunt, ita illisimilitudine sunt proxima, ut in creaturis nihil sit propinquius. . . . Quare cum homo possit particeps esse sapientiae secundum interiorem hominem, secundum ipsum ita est ad imaginem, ut nulla natura interposita formetur; et ideo nihil sit Deo coniunctius" (ML 40. 33).

¹²³ "Tertius [gradus quantum ad ascensum ad aspectum praesentiae] est ab anima in Deum, quia 'imago ab ipsa veritate formatur et Deo immediate coniungitur'." I *Sent.* 3. 1. u. 2. ad 4 (I. 73 a).

¹²⁴ Proclus says in prop. 31 of his *Elements of Theology*: "All that proceeds from any principle reverts in respect of its being upon that from which it proceeds." See E. R. Dodds, *Proclus: The Elements of Theology* (Oxford 1933) 35. In prop. 33 we read: "All that proceeds from any principle and reverts upon it has a cyclic activity . . . Thus all things proceed in a circuit, from their causes to their causes again" (*Ibid.* 37). See also prop. 146 (*Ibid.* 129).

The "divine law" of Denis the Areopagite, according to which the lower beings are to be led back to the divine light through the higher beings,¹²⁶ reflects this Neoplatonic doctrine. St. Bonaventure considers it as a valid axiom and refers to it on various occasions, but he never lets it interfere with his favorite Augustinian idea about the immediate contact between man and God.¹²⁷ As far as the participation of the *material* world in the final beatitude is concerned, he applies the Dionysian principle in its full sense: "To the corporeal and distant creation God communicates His beatitude mediately because 'the divine law is this, that the lowest things are led to the highest through intermediaries'."¹²⁸ In this case man is truly the mediator.

However, as soon as St. Bonaventure applies this same principle to the *angels* and their *relation to man*, he shows by his explanations, and at times in explicit words, that the term medium is to be taken now in a more limited sense. In his *Collationes in Hexaemeron* he describes how the rays of the divine light descend from above and illumine first the Heavenly Hierarchy of the angels and then also the minds of men in the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy on earth. Through this illumination man is led back again to the contemplation of heavenly things and finally of things above heaven in God.¹²⁹ Both the downward and the upward movement are here described as taking place in two stages, and the angels appear in between God and man. This position of the angels and their activity as mediators is further emphasized by the reference to the "divine law" of Denis, according to which "the lowest beings are to be led back to the highest through intermediaries."¹³⁰ But St. Bona-

¹²⁵ See A. E. Taylor, *Philosophical Studies*; 4.: *The Philosophy of Proclus* (London 1934) 181—3.

¹²⁶ See above, Chapter II, p. 61, where the manner in which St. Bonaventure quotes this "divine law" is compared with its original form in the works of Denis. For the texts containing this principle see Chapter II, notes 211—13.

¹²⁷ About the presence of both the Dionysian and the Augustinian principle in St. Bonaventure's doctrine see B. Rosenmöller, *Religiöse Erkenntnis nach Bonaventura*, BGPM 25. 3—4 (Münster 1925) 37—8.

¹²⁸ "Corporali tamen [creaturae] et longinquae communicat mediate, quia 'lex divinitatis haec est, ut infima per media reducantur ad summa'." *Brevil.* 2. 9 (V. 226b). Transl. by E. E. Nemmers, *Breviloquium by St. Bonaventure* (St. Louis, Mo., 1946) 67. — We already saw the first part of man's role as mediator, namely the ordination of the entire visible world towards man; the second part of it, the final return of this world through and with man to God, will follow in the next chapter.

¹²⁹ "Ille thearchicus radius, descendens in *caelestem* hierarchiam, illam illuminat et per illam ecclesiasticam sive *subcaelestem* . . . Deinde ordine resolutorio ille radius nos reducit in contemplatione *caelestium* et deinde *supercaelestium*." In *Hexaem.* 3. 32 (V. 348b).

¹³⁰ "Sicut dicit Dionysius de Ecclesiastica Hierarchia, 'lex Divinitatis est *infima per media ad suprema* reducere'." *Ibid.* — The text of Denis

venture at once explains in what sense this mediating function of the angels must be understood. They do not in any way participate actively in the transmission of the divine light, but are only the occasion for its direct transmission.¹³¹ St. Bonaventure illustrates this point by using an example which he again takes from St. Augustine.¹³² He compares the angels with someone who opens the shutters so that the light of the sun can enter the house and illumine it.¹³³ The rays of light come in this way still directly from God to man, and St. Bonaventure thus saves and keeps the Augustinian idea of an immediate contact between God and man within the Dionysian structure of mediate transmission.

We find similar interpretations in the doctrine of the Guardian Angels. As a proof of their existence St. Bonaventure cites the "divine law" of Denis twice in the same question,¹³⁴ but his explanation of the doctrine makes it clear that he does not consider them in any way as a medium that would interfere with man's direct relation to God. The function of the Guardian Angels is merely to protect this immediate connection between man and God, and to promote it, wherever possible, by a certain influence,¹³⁵ and this only upon the inferior part of the human soul. The superior part, which constitutes the image of God, is influenced by Him alone.¹³⁶ The rather clearly expressed doctrine of Denis that the divine light is received first and in its greatest fullness by the highest ranks, and that the others below take part in this light

reads: "Lex quidem haec est thearchiae sacratissima, *per prima secunda* ad divinissimam suam reducere lucem." *De ecclesiast. hier.* 5. 4 (MG 3. 504C; ML 122. 1096C).

¹³¹ "Totum tamen facit ille radius, quia Angeli ibi nihil faciunt nisi occasionaliter." *In Hexaem., loc. cit.* — In the shorter *Reportatio* (A) this point is far more elaborated, and the term *occasionaliter* occurs five times. See F. Delorme, *op. cit.*, 47.

¹³² "Deus itaque per semetipsum, quia lux est, illuminat pias mentes, ut ea quae divina dicuntur vel ostenduntur, intelligant . . . Ad hoc ministro utitur angelo . . . quemadmodum quisquam dicitur lucem dare domui, vel illuminare domum, cui fenestram facit; cum eam non sua luce penetret et illustret, sed tantummodo aditum quo penetretur atque illustretur, aperiat." *Enarratio in Ps. 118*, sermo 18. 4 (ML 37. 1552—3).

¹³³ "Sicut, si quis vellet, quod radius illuminaret multas domus, aperiret fenestras, et tunc radius omnes domus illuminaret." *In Hexaem.* 3. 32 (V. 348b).

¹³⁴ II *Sent.* II. I. I. fund. 3 (II. 277a—b) and concl. (277b).

¹³⁵ "Sicut doctor, dum exterius loquitur, *excitat* intellectum et viam parat ad intelligendum, . . . sic etiam suo modo intelligendum est quod angelus hoc possit facere interius." II *Sent.* 10. 2. 2. c. (II. 266a—b). See also the preceding question (263—4). The fact that most of the other Commentators do not devote special questions to this influence of the angels upon man's affection and intellect (Scholion II. 264a), shows the particular interest of St. Bonaventure in this matter.

¹³⁶ "Animam quoad superiorem portionem rationis illuminare solius Dei est proprium, sicut in pluribus locis ostendit Augustinus." *Ibid.* (265b).

only through them,¹³⁷ is interpreted by the Seraphic Doctor in the sense of an exterior and accidental influence;¹³⁸ whatever helps man on his road to God is considered as a medium only in the sense that it creates certain dispositions¹³⁹ which help to guarantee and strengthen man's immediate ordination towards God, in which he is on equal ground with the angels.¹⁴⁰

Since angel and man are immediately *ordained* towards God, they both possess the same spiritual nature and powers which make them capable of reaching such a goal. This means that the image of God in them is equal also with regard to the second kind of similarity, the conformity based on *proportion*.¹⁴¹ Both angel and human soul consist of a spiritual substance in which are the three distinct powers of memory, intellect, and will. The image is now constituted by certain relations. The *three* powers in the *one* substance of a created spirit resemble and represent the Three Persons in One God. In addition to this relation of the powers *to their substance*, there are also some characteristic relations *between* the three powers. Memory, the power of holding and *presenting* an object before the mind, is the first and basic faculty; it is the necessary disposition for the operation of the intellect which *apprehends* the object thus presented; both of these powers are then again the necessary disposition for the activity of the will which *loves* the presented and apprehended object.¹⁴² These relations between the three powers represent the Three Divine Persons in their distinction, order, and procession; they are the same in all spiritual creatures and thus confirm the fundamental equality of angel and man.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.* arg. 1 (264a –b), in which *De caelest. hier.* 13. 3 (MG 301B–C) is quoted.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.* ad 1 (266b). Ad 2 proceeds in a similar way.

¹³⁹ "Duplex est medium, scilicet *efficiens* et *disponens*. De primo medio debet intelligi quod dixit Augustinus, sed de secundo non; quoniam Deus est medium *efficiens* et objectum ipsius mentis." I *Sent.* 3. 1. u. 3. ad 1 (I. 75a).

¹⁴⁰ "Unde beatus Augustinus ubicumque de mente loquitur, istum errorem extirpat, ostendens quod ita immediate anima secundum mentem unitur Deo, sicut et mens angelica." II *Sent.* 10. 2. 1. c. (II. 264a).

¹⁴¹ II *Sent.* 16. 1. 1. c. (II. 395a–b).

¹⁴² "Imago attenditur in his tribus potentiis, tamen in comparatione ad unitatem essentiae et pluralitatem actuum, in quibus est distinctio et ordo et origo unius ab altero per modum quemdam disponendi. Nam *re- tentio* speciei disponit ad *intelligendum* et intelligentia ad *amandum*, si quod intelligitur est bonum." I *Sent.* 3. 2. 1. 1. c. (I. 81a). A similar explanation is given in *De myst. Trinit.* 1. 2. c.: "Habet enim creatura intellectualis memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem, seu mentem, notitiam et amorem: mentem ad modum *parentis*, notitiam ad modum *prolis*, amorem ad modum *nexus ab utroque procedentis* et utrumque connectentis; non enim potest mens non amare verbum, quod generat" (V. 55a).

§ 2

The Superiority of the Angels to Man

Up to now we have considered the image of God in every created spirit merely *in itself*, both in its immediate ordination towards God and in its inner structure, without taking into account the relations of these created spirits to other creatures outside of them. Since creation is not only a vast multitude of beings but also a well-ordered unity, its members are not only individual beings but are also *related to one another* in various ways and constitute a hierarchy with different degrees of perfection. St. Bonaventure now compares the angel and the human soul under this aspect of their particular place and role in the general order of creation. Although the image of God is the same in both of them as far as the essence of this image is concerned (*quantum ad esse*), their different relations to this order of creation introduce a number of new elements which, in an accidental manner, cause some of the spiritual creatures to be, in one respect or another, a clearer and more expressive representation and image of God than others; with regard to such an additional perfection (*quantum ad bene esse*), angel and human soul differ from one another.¹⁴³ Since St. Bonaventure considers the degree in which a creature represents God, the Eternal Exemplar, as the decisive factor for determining the grade of its dignity, he is thus able to show that, in one respect, the angels are the more noble creatures, but that, in another respect, man excels the angels.

We have seen how St. Bonaventure builds up his exposition of the image in a created spirit on the distinction between the conformity based on *order* and that based on *proportion*. In order to determine the influence of additional perfections on the *intensity* of the image and, thereby, on

¹⁴³ The outline of St. Bonaventure's answer to this question is as follows: "Intensio dignitatis imaginis consistit secundum intensionem convenientiae quantum ad proportionem vel ordinem. Attendendum autem quod convenientia creaturae rationalis ad Deum secundum ORDINEM quaedam est de esse imaginis, et quaedam de bene esse. De *esse* imaginis est quod creatura *immediate ordinetur* ad Deum; de *bene esse* vero est quod creatura, quae est imago, *praeponatur aliis* quae tenent rationem vestigii et quod *alia ordinentur in ipsam tamquam in finem*. Et sic triplex est ordo in creatura rationali, secundum quem conformatur Deo . . . Consimili modo reperimus et aequalitatem et mutuum excessum in expressione imaginis quae attenditur secundum convenientiam PROPORTIONIS; quia quaedam est convenientia habitudinis, quae est de esse imaginis, quaedam de bene esse. Illa est de *esse*, quae consistit in comparatione ad *intrinsicam* sicut ad potentias . . . Illa vero convenientia habitudinis est de *bene esse*, quae attenditur in comparatione creaturae rationalis ad aliquod *extrinsecum*, utpote ad corpus, quod est ipsa inferius. Haec autem dupliciter potest esse expressior: vel *privative* vel *positive*." II Sent. 16. 2. 1. c. (II. 401a—b).

the dignity of a created spirit, he now takes the same two notions again as guiding principles for his explanations. The angels surpass man in the realm of *order* in as far as they are *placed above other creatures*. This gives them a greater ruling power, and they are, because of this greater perfection, more similar to God who is the absolute ruler over all creatures. The Seraphic Doctor explains the influence of this perfection on the relative position of angel and man as follows:

In this respect the angels excel because they are deputed to be rulers not only over the wild animals but also over men, according to the words in the seventeenth chapter of Ecclesiasticus: *Over every nation he set rulers*,¹⁴⁴ which the *Gloss* interprets as angels; and this is the order in which the irrational creatures are ruled by God through the mediation of the rational.¹⁴⁵

This passage may surprise a reader in as far as it seems to contradict the doctrine about the immediate ordination of man towards God and the direct contact between the human soul and God, the doctrine we have seen so vigorously expressed and defended by St. Bonaventure. A closer examination, however, shows that the above-stated equality of angel and man is compatible with an angelic superiority over man.¹⁴⁶ The greater ruling power of the angels does not interfere with man's immediate ordination towards God and direct contact with Him. St. Bonaventure himself indicates this in the present passage when he speaks of a ruling over nations and creatures in *general*, and not over man with his *individual* aim. The angels constitute the highest level in the order of creation, and such a position makes them, to a certain extent, rulers over the affairs and events in the world below. The fact that they are ordained not only directly towards God but also towards this ruling over the rest of creation in general, gives them an additional perfection.¹⁴⁷ In this respect they are more excellent than

¹⁴⁴ Ecclus. 17: 14. The text of the Vulgate uses the singular form *rectorem*.

¹⁴⁵ "Et in hoc angeli praececellunt, quia non solum bestiis, sed etiam hominibus rectores sunt deputati, secundum illud, Ecclesiastici decimo septimo: *In unamquamque gentem praeposuit rectores*, Glossa: id est angelos; et iste est ordo quo creatura irrationalis regitur a Deo mediante rationali." II *Sent.* 16. 2. 1. c. (II. 401b).

¹⁴⁶ "Ad illud quod obicitur, quod nulla creatura est superior anima secundum mentem, dicendum quod, etsi nulla sit superior secundum ordinem *efficientis* et *finis*, est tamen aliqua maioris *dignitatis* et excellentis naturae." II *Sent.* 24. 2. 1. 2. ad 3 (II. 577b).

¹⁴⁷ "Quantum ad ordinem respectu creaturarum se habent per modum excedentis et excessi. Angelus enim magis convenit quantum ad ordinem sub ratione regiminis; homo vero magis quantum ad ordinem qui attenditur in ratione finis." II *Sent.* 16. 2. 1. c. (II. 401b).

man whose power of ruling extends only over the irrational world below him.¹⁴⁸

A similar superiority of the angel to man exists in the realm of *proportion*, which is here understood in the sense of presence or absence of a relation to a body. In as far as the angel, in contradistinction to the human soul, is *not related* to a body, neither actually nor potentially, but is completely independent of any corporeal matter, he is a more perfect representation of God who is pure spirit and independent of all creatures.¹⁴⁹ This clearer representation again adds a further perfection to the fundamental nature of the angel as image of God and elevates him, in this respect, above man.

St. Bonaventure thus shows the angel not only in his fundamental equality with man, but also in his higher dignity over man. As a being that is incorruptible in its entire nature,¹⁵⁰ the angel possesses a greater nobility. His spiritual powers of memory, intellect, and will are, as such, superior to those in man, and he is, in this respect, more similar to God.¹⁵¹ But this does not change the basic fact that angel and man are equal as far as the essence of the image is concerned; for the image itself consists in the *immediate ordination* towards God and in the *relations between* the spiritual faculties, and these relations remain always the same.¹⁵² The greater power and intensity of each individual faculty gives the angel a higher place in the order of creation without letting him lose man as his equal companion in the final destiny.¹⁵³

¹⁴⁸ *Comment. in Sap.* 9. 2: "Ut dominaretur creaturae, quae a te facta est, creaturae, scilicet non spirituali vel angelicae, sed corporali" (VI. 167a).

¹⁴⁹ "Angelus magis repraesentat Deum, quia Deus est spiritus purus, omnino impermixtus et independens a creaturis omnibus; et hoc repraesentat angelicus spiritus, dum est a corpore secundum actum et aptitudinem separatus." II *Sent.* 16. 2. 1. c. (II. 402a).

¹⁵⁰ See II *Sent.* 1. 2. 2. 2. fund. 2—3 (II. 45a—b) and concl. (46b).

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.* fund. 4: "Angelus est Deo similior et deiformior quam homo" (II. 45b).

¹⁵² "Illa est [convenientia habitudinis] de *esse*, quae consistit in comparatione ad intrinseca sicut ad potentias; et in hac homo et angelus adaequantur, quia ita bene est distinctio et origo et aequalitas et consubstantialitas in potentiis animae, in memoria scilicet, intelligentia et voluntate, sicut in potentiis angeli." II *Sent.* 16. 2. 1. c. (II. 401b). The answer to objections 3—4 explains in a similar way: "Similitudo enim consistit in proprietatibus naturalibus, imago vero in origine et habitudine; et quavis potentiae in angelis sint vivaciores quam in animabus, et ideo Deo similiores, eundem tamen habent ordinem et habitudinem" (402b).

¹⁵³ The equality with regard to the final destiny is compatible with a difference in dignity because the eternal beatitude to which angel and man are equally ordained is a *perfectio in esse secundo*, which does not require the same nature in every respect. See II *Sent.* 1. 2. 3. 1. ad 1 (II. 48b).

§ 3

The Superiority of Man to the Angels

The idea of a more expressive representation of God in a created spirit because of certain additional perfections resulting from a particular place and function in the order of creation, is used by St. Bonaventure not only in order to show the higher dignity of the angels, but also to bring out that man, in a certain way, excels the angels. In explaining this side of the relative position of angel and man he again follows the same division. In the realm of *order*, which is now understood more definitely in the sense of ordination, man is a more exalted creature than the angels in as far as *other creatures are ordained towards him as towards their end*. The irrational creatures were made not so much for the sake of the angels, but rather for the sake of man; and it is through man that the visible world reaches its final goal. The fact that man is, unlike the angels, really the goal of other creatures, makes him more similar to God who is the ultimate end of everything.¹⁵⁴ Since man is the proximate goal of other creatures and the necessary link for them to their ultimate goal, his own ordination towards God assumes greater importance with regard to the general order of creation and thereby receives an additional perfection. The ruling power of the angels over creation and over the events in the visible world, which shows the *angels* in their higher nobility, appears as a *downward* movement involving the different levels *within* the order of creation; but in connection with the *return to God*, which definitely is an *upward* movement, *man* comes into the foreground as the more exalted creature.¹⁵⁵ This exaltation of man finds its highest expression in the Incarnation; the Divine Word assumed human nature in order that man should be restored to his full dignity and that, through him as mediator, the visible creation should be brought back to its ultimate goal.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁴ "Tertius est ordo, quo creaturae irrationales ad rationalem ordinantur tamquam in finem propter quem sunt factae, et mediante illo in ultimum finem principalem; et secundum hunc ordinem magis convenit homo cum Deo quam angelus; magis enim facta sunt et corporalia et sensibilia propter homines quam propter angelos." II *Sent.* 16. 2. 1. c. (II. 401b).

¹⁵⁵ "Cum Deus sit *alpha* et *omega*, principium et finis, et rationalis creatura in utraque habitudine sit ei propinqua, proprie tamen loquendo, *angelica* natura plus ei appropinquat in ratione *principii* et *humana* plus in ratione *finis*. Ideo inter omnes creaturas prior omnium creata est sapientia, sive creatura angelica, et *dignitate* et *origine*; et post omnia producta est anima humana tamquam *finis* omnium et consummatio." II *Sent.* 17. 1. 3. ad 6 (II. 418b). See also the text quoted above in footnote 147.

¹⁵⁶ "Si ergo loquamur de dilectione Dei quantum ad effectum *conditionis*, sic magis dilexit angelos, quia meliora contulit eis naturalia et magis

A superiority of man to the angels also appears in the realm of *proportion*, where the image of God consists in a similarity of certain relations. We have seen that, under one aspect, the *angel* reflects God more perfectly by *not* being related and bound to something corporeal; under another aspect, however, the *human soul* is a more clearly expressed image of God precisely because it *is related* to a body. "The soul is united to the body in such a way that it thereby becomes the principle of others and inhabits the entire body";¹⁵⁷ in so far as God

potentes eos fecit et in eis magis manifestatur divina potentia. — Si autem loquamur quantum ad effectum *reparationis*, sic magis dilexit homines quam angelos, quoniam angelos deseruit, sed homines relevavit." III *Sent.* 32. u. 4. c. (III. 703b—704a). See also *ibid.* 2. 1. 2. c. (40b).

¹⁵⁷ The entire sentence reads: "Si positive: sic anima est imago expressior, quae in hoc quod coniungitur corpori ita quod per illud est principium aliorum, et per illud totum inhabitat, magis repraesentat Deum qui est principium omnium et qui unus est in omnibus." II *Sent.* 16. 2. 1. c. (II. 401b—402a). — The seemingly indefinite expression *principium aliorum* signifies something of which the soul is capable by virtue of its union with the body. According to the immediate context it seems to be understood as "the principle of other *bodies*"; but in *fund.* 3 of the same question St. Bonaventure himself determines this expression more precisely by alluding to the fact that man is the principle of other *men*: "Homo repraesentat Deum non solum ut ens est in se, sed etiam ut est *principium aliorum*, quia 'sicut ex uno Deo omnia, ita ex uno homine omnes homines,' sicut vult Glossa, I ad Corinthios 11: 7" (II. 400b). *Fund.* 1 also refers to this origin of one man from another: "Homo expressius repraesentat distinctionem personarum, quia in homine est *personalis discretio per originem*, in angelis autem non" (400a). Later, St. Bonaventure mentions the same idea of greater representation as one of the reasons why it was more fitting that the Redeemer assumed *human* nature; he now considers the soul more as the principle of *activity* for the body which it *rules*: "Anima enim rationalis non tantum repraesentat Deum prout consideratur in se, sed in quantum unitur corpori, quod *regit* et in quo toto inhabitat sicut Deus in maiori mundo" (III *Sent.* 2. 1. 2. c. (III. 40b). — The text quoted at the beginning of this footnote is summarized by T. Szabó: "Anima humana repraesentat Deum positive, cum per corpus, quod inhabitat, aliorum sit principium, sicut Deus omnibus creaturis praesens earum est principium" (*De SS. Trinitate in creaturis refulgente doctrina S. Bonaventurae*, BACH-PT 1 [Rome 1955] 128). W. Rauch gives a different interpretation and translates: "Die Seele ist ein ausgeprägteres Bild (Gottes als der Engel); denn sie ist derart mit dem Leib verbunden, daß sie durch ihn Prinzip für *alles andere* (*Sichtbare*) ist und dem *Ganzen* innewohnt" (*Das Buch Gottes* [Munich 1961] 79, italics mine). This interpretation, however, contains a difficulty. In as far as the entire visible world is *ordained* towards man, we can call man in a certain sense the "principle" of creation; but in the light of the more definite parallel texts quoted above it seems to be unlikely that St. Bonaventure uses the term *principium* now in this sense. With regard to the entire visible world St. Bonaventure places man not at the beginning as source and starting point, but rather at the end, as goal and completion (see e. g. the text quoted above in note 155). The present text is not concerned with the *final* cause (which is involved in the other conformity based on *ordination*), but only intends to show man's greater similarity to God in the realm of *efficient* causality. See II *Sent.* 16. 1. 1. c., which mentions in connection with the conformity based on *proportion* only the *efficient* causality: "Comparatio illa quae est ad effectum *productum*" (II. 395a). This limits the meaning also

is the principle of all things and is present as the One in all things, man represents God in a more complete manner than the angel who is incapable of such a relation.

St. Bonaventure considers this capability of being united with a body not only as an essential element and as the specific difference that distinguishes the soul from an angel, but he also sees in it a great nobility. It is because of this capability that the human soul is the highest of all created forms; through the union with this soul the entire corporeal nature, represented in the human body, comes to rest in the fulfillment of its desire for higher perfection.¹⁵⁸

Because of the important function which man fulfills in the general return of creation to God, even the angels are in a certain sense *ordained towards man*. Moreover, the fact that angel and man are created for the same immediate participation in God makes them not only stand side by side, but joins them together as citizens of the same heavenly kingdom. Just as the members of one body and the citizens of one state here on earth are bound together by the law of charity and help one another in their needs, so angel and man are bound together in *mutual relationship*.¹⁵⁹ The angel who is confirmed in grace and glory helps man in his weakness, while man who is able to rise from his fall will make up for the otherwise irreparable loss of the fallen angels and will fill up the ranks of the celestial hierarchies.¹⁶⁰ Although angel and man are basically equal and independent in their immediate ordination towards God, they are thus, in a true sense, ordained also towards one another.

The service which the angels render to man is perfectly compatible with their higher dignity; for their activity in this regard is not so much a submission, but rather a kind of presiding over those whom they help and protect.¹⁶¹ St. Bonaventure further reminds us that the angels do

of the other term *aliorum*; in this sense of efficient causality man cannot be called "the principle of all other visible things." — The words *totum inhabitat* in the second part of the sentence have a parallel and further explanation in *fund. 2*: "Anima repraesentat Trinitatem summam et prout est in se ipsa et prout est in rebus, ut sic *in qualibet parte corporis sit tota*, sicut summa essentia est in creatura" (II. 400a—b).

¹⁵⁸ See II *Sent.* 1. 2. 3. 2. c. (II. 50b).

¹⁵⁹ "Sicut lex caritatis facit in membris corporalibus et concivibus civitatis, quod unum membrum supplet indigentiam alterius . . . similiter intelligendum est in homine et angelo, qui sunt cives civitatis supernae." II *Sent.* 1. 2. 2. c. (II. 46a—b).

¹⁶⁰ See e. g. II *Sent.* 9. u. 5 (II. 250—1) and 9. u. 1. ad 1 (243b).

¹⁶¹ "Custodire autem hominem, etsi ministerium dicat, magis tamen importat, angelum praesidere homini quam esse subiectum." II *Sent.* 11. 1. 1. ad 3 (II. 278b).

not render this service merely in view of man, but also for the sake of God whose image they see in man. They act like a soldier who serves not only his king but also the members of the entire royal family, no matter how humble a member may be.¹⁶² Themselves rich, the angels help man in his poverty; being strong, they assist man in his infirmity.¹⁶³

Thus we see how both the corporeal and the spiritual world converge in man, who can therefore be called in a true sense the center of the entire creation. The higher position of the angels is not affected thereby, because this general ordination of all creatures towards man rests not so much on man's pre-eminence as on the fact that man is in need of this assistance from every side. Such a need does not exist in the angels and does not, in itself, constitute a greater nobility.¹⁶⁴ But although man is not the highest being in creation, he does hold the central place and exercises a decisive function in the general return. In this position and function lies the real reason for the universal service of all creatures to him.

CHAPTER IV

MAN AS THE DECISIVE LINK IN THE FINAL RETURN OF THE CORPOREAL WORLD TO GOD

Although the subject of the preceding chapter was limited to the ordination of the creatures towards man, another fact was frequently mentioned and appeared to be inseparably connected with this ordination; it was the fact that man himself, and with him all that was created for him, is on the way to a further and final end, which is God. This

¹⁶² *Ibid.* (278a—b).

¹⁶³ *II Sent.* 1. 2. 2. 2. ad 4 (II. 47b).

¹⁶⁴ "Quod obicitur secundo, quod homo tenet rationem finis; dicendum, quod aliquid, propter quod res est, aut est *ad supplendum indigentiam*, sicut domus propter hominem, et calceus propter pedem; aut *ad suscipiendum eius influentiam*, sicut homo propter Deum. Quod ultimo modo habet rationem finis, nobilior est; quod primo modo, non. Quia enim homo omnibus indiget, angelus nullo nisi Deo; ideo omnia propter hominem, non omnia propter angelum. In cuius rei signum angelus conditus est in principio, homo vero in die sexto." *Ibid.* ad 2 (II. 46b). — It may, perhaps, be surprising to see St. Bonaventure using the fact of the soul's union with a body in one place as a proof for the higher position of man (*II Sent.* 16. 2. 1. c. [II. 401b—402a]) and in the present question (arg. 2 [46a]; ad 2 [46b]) as a proof for the higher dignity of the angels. But the seeming contradiction disappears if we remember that the greatness of man lies in his central and key position, but that this position does not exclude his indigence. The picture of man, as St. Bonaventure has drawn it, contains both elements.

second half of the general return we shall now consider. Having seen the first part of the general return in the ordination of created things towards man, we now have to follow the second part which leads from him to God; in this great movement man functions as leader and mediator. This part of the return again includes two main aspects. Since every mediate participation presupposes that something participates immediately, we have to consider in the first place how the mediator himself reaches the final end. Our first section will therefore deal with the immediate return of man or, more exactly, with the return of the *human soul* which alone is the immediate possessor of the necessary spiritual powers. The second section can then consider the return of the *corporeal world*, which is a sharing in this immediate participation.¹

Section A

The Immediate Return of the Human Soul to God and its Final Glorification

The comparison between man and the angels has shown us man in his greatest nobility as an image of God. This means that he is immediately ordained towards God, is capable of entering into a direct and intimate relationship with God, and is thus able to reach the final beatification in God. But great and astonishing as is this capability of the rational spirit, it does not, and cannot, lead man to the actual attainment of this highest end. "Eternal beatitude," St. Bonaventure explains, "consists in the possession of the Supreme Good, and this is God, a good that excels, out of proportion, all dignity of human worship. No one whatever is therefore worthy of attaining that Supreme Good, since it is entirely above all limits of nature."² As an image of God, man only possesses a natural disposition for such a participation.³ He has the

¹ The division into creatures that return immediately and those that are led back by others is insinuated by St. Bonaventure when he says in *De myst. Trinit.* 3. 1. c.: "Eo ipso quo fluunt ab ipso, ad ipsum *recurrunt et reducuntur* tanquam ad finem ultimum" (V. 70b).

² "Beatitudo aeterna consistit in habendo summum bonum; et hoc est Deus et bonum excellens impropotionaliter omnem humani obsequii dignitatem. Secundum autem illud quod importat *dispositionem sufficientem*, cum sit omnino supra omnes limites naturae." *Brevil.* 5. 1 (V. 252b).

³ "Prout enim hoc quod est beatificabile importat *aptitudinem*, sic inest homini *per naturam*: homo enim a natura sua habet aptitudinem ad beatitudinem. Secundum autem illud quod importat *dispositionem sufficientem*, per quam quis pervenit ad beatitudinem sive sufficientem ordinem ad actum, sic inest homini non per naturam, sed *per gratiam*, per quam sufficienter disponitur ad gloriam, nec sine illa potest sufficere natura." II *Sent.* 19. 3. 1. c. (II. 469b).

basic faculties that are necessary for this immediate contact, but they only point in the direction of this goal without ever being able to reach it by their own natural capacity. The power that leads the created spirit to the actual attainment of his final end is the additional, supernatural gift of divine grace which now enters the picture of the general return as a new and essential element.

The tremendous distance that still exists between the noble natural faculties of the created spirit and the final goal he is destined to attain is bridged over by a condescending act on the part of God, which elevates the creature above its own nature. This elevation takes place through a divine influence, which produces in the created spirit the "godlike *habitus*" of sanctifying grace.⁴ The various effects of this grace all contribute to the one fundamental fact that the creature becomes pleasing and acceptable to God,⁵ and is, at the same time, provided with the necessary powers for the final ascent.

As far as the spiritual soul of man is concerned, this immediate ascent under the elevating influence of divine grace takes place in two distinct phases which differ in kind, perfection, and time. Man was created in order to participate in the eternal beatitude, but in such a way that he attain it through merits and good works. Before becoming possessor of this happiness, he must therefore be a pilgrim and walk along the road that leads to his eternal home.⁶ Even if he had remained in the state of original justice, he would still have been obliged to go through this period of pilgrimage and would have advanced from an imperfect cognition of God to the perfect vision and possession.⁷ The supernatural life of grace, by which the final ascent of the soul is accomplished, remains basically the same throughout the entire return; but

⁴ The *Breviloquium* (5. 1) gives the following concise summary: "Nullus omnino ad illud summum bonum dignus est pervenire, cum sit omnino supra omnes limites naturae, nisi, Deo condescendente sibi, elevetur ipse supra se. Deus autem non condescendit per sui essentiam incommutabilem, sed per influentiam ab ipso manantem; nec spiritus elevatur supra se per situm localem, sed per *habitus deiformem*" (V. 252b). See also II *Sent.* 27. 1. 1. c. (II. 654b).

⁵ *Brevil.* 5. 1 (V. 253a). In II *Sent.* 26. dub. 2, we find the following definition: "*Gratia est forma, a Deo gratis data sine meritis, gratum faciens habentem et opus eius bonum reddens*" (II. 648b—649a).

⁶ "Etsi [homo] factus est propter beatitudinem, ita tamen ut illuc perveniret per merita et bona opera, et ita prius esset viator quam comprehensor." II *Sent.* 17. 2. 1 ad 3 (II. 420b).

⁷ "Tunc enim erat in *similitudine gratiae*, sed perducenda erat ad *dei-formitatem gloriae*, in qua non solum aspiceret divinum effectum, sed etiam ipsum vultum desideratum." II *Sent.* 23. 2. 3. ad 6 (II. 546a). See also II *Sent.* 7. 1. 1. 1. c. (II. 176b) and 21. 3. 2. c. (507a).

while it is still in its *initial stage* and capable of further increase and development as long as man lives on this earth, it will reach its *complete fulfillment* and its fixed degree in the final glorification.⁸ In our study of the various steps that lead from the natural disposition of the human soul to the final union with God, we shall follow this fundamental division.

§ I

The Initial Stage of the Immediate Return through Grace and Virtues

The supernatural *habitus* of sanctifying grace, which is produced in the human soul by divine influence, and which initiates the immediate return of this soul to God, is something that transcends all limits of nature; but it nevertheless operates in harmony and correspondence with the natural dispositions existing in the soul. When God created man in his natural condition, He gave him not only life as such, but also a number of distinct faculties through which this life could unfold itself in a great variety of operations. In His work of supernatural re-creation God acted in a similar way. He not only elevated the substance of the soul by giving it sanctifying grace, but he also provided each of the individual faculties with a special supernatural *habitus*. St. Bonaventure distinguishes three different groups or levels of such supernatural "habits." The first and fundamental group comprises the seven *virtues*. Their function is to rectify and strengthen each faculty so that it can act according to the life of grace. Then follow the seven *gifts* of the Holy Ghost, and finally the seven *beatitudes*; the function of these two groups is to facilitate and perfect the supernatural activity.⁹ Since the faculties of the soul are directed towards different objects and, for this reason, differ in their activity, they need such an individual perfection by different supernatural habits. Without them the elevation of the soul would not be complete, and St. Bonaventure's conclusion is that "although the vivifying grace is one, it

⁸ "Agit enim theologus de salute animae, quomodo inchoatur in fide, promovetur in virtutibus, consummatur in dotibus." *In Hexaem.* I. 38 (V. 335b).

⁹ "Gratia gratum faciens ramificatur in habitus *virtutum*, quorum est animam *rectificare*; in habitus *donorum*, quorum est animam *expedire*; et in habitus *beatitudinum*, quorum est animam *perficere*." *Brevil.* 5. 4 (V. 256b). — The correspondence between virtues, gifts, and beatitudes is shown in the following chapters 5 and 6 of the *Breviloquium* (257a—260a). See also *III Sent.* 34. I. I. I. c. (III. 737a).

necessarily has to branch out into various habits because of the various operations."¹⁰

The natural disposition by which man is immediately ordained towards God and capable of a direct participation in His divine life is that combination of faculties in the soul which is called image. Since the supernatural gift of grace, which is given in order to bring this ordination and capability to an actual realization, elevates both the substance of the soul and its individual faculties, the structure of this supernatural gift must be similar and parallel to that of the image. St. Bonaventure calls this structure of grace and virtues "similitude" or the "image of re-creation."¹¹ Of particular interest with regard to the ascent of man, and the visible world with him, is the way in which the natural and the supernatural structure unite in man and, thereby, close the decisive link in the chain that connects the material world with God. A study of the manner in which, according to St. Bonaventure, the similitude is *formed* in the soul and *perfects* the image will reveal an impressive picture of harmonious correspondence and organic unity of nature and the supernatural.

a) The Formation of the Supernatural Image in Man

In the last-quoted passage from the *Breviloquium* we saw how St. Bonaventure describes sanctifying grace as branching out into various supernatural virtues. This idea of ramification deserves special attention. By comparing sanctifying grace and virtues with a tree and its branches the Seraphic Doctor expresses in a fitting analogy both the *unity* of sanctifying grace in all the virtues and the *difference* between the virtues themselves. In as far as the same principle of life is present and effective both in the stem and in the branches of a tree, the analogy brings out the fact that sanctifying grace is the one principle which operates in all the virtues; in as far as one branch differs from the other, the same analogy also indicates the diversity among the virtues.

The question of the relation between the one sanctifying grace and the different virtues is of particular interest in view of our present topic because it leads us to St. Bonaventure's doctrine about the formation of the supernatural image in the human soul. The unity of stem and

¹⁰ "Cum actus diversificentur per obiecta, et diversitas actuum requirat distinctionem habituum: hinc est, quod licet *una* sit gratia vivificans, *ramificari* tamen necessario habet *in varios habitus* propter varias operationes." *Brevil.* 5. 4 (V. 256a).

¹¹ See e. g. *Brevil.* 5. 1: "Immediate manet ab ipso *Dei similitudo*, quae est divinae imaginis perfectio deiformis, et ideo dicitur imago recreationis" (V. 252b—253a).

branches in his analogy is certainly not meant to convey the idea of an identity of grace and virtues. The opinion which says that these two are the *same* reality considered from two different viewpoints is discarded by the Seraphic Doctor because of the difficulties it involves.¹² His first objection is that those who hold this opinion would not be able to explain how the various virtues can be really different from one another, since there is only one sanctifying grace in the soul. He then adds a second objection. If this opinion were true, he says, then the virtues should entirely disappear whenever sanctifying grace leaves the soul; but experience shows something else. The fact that all virtues, with the exception of charity, can remain after sanctifying grace has departed from the soul because of sin, is regarded by St. Bonaventure as a sign that they involve something more. This *additional* element, which at the same time specifies the supernatural virtues and differentiates them from one another, is not found in sanctifying grace itself, but in the underlying natural dispositions which this grace finds in the faculties of the human soul.

We arrive at a similar conclusion when we follow St. Bonaventure's discussion of another opinion which he mentions in the second place. According to this opinion there is a *real distinction* between grace and virtues. The individual virtues are now said to be related to sanctifying grace in exactly the same way as the faculties of the soul are related to the substance; just as the faculties proceed from the substance of the soul, so are the virtues believed to proceed from sanctifying grace.¹³ We find this doctrine in the works of St. Thomas Aquinas who clearly states such a complete parallel between grace and its virtues on the one side and the soul with its faculties on the other.¹⁴ St. Bonaventure, however,

¹² See II *Sent.* 27. 1. 2. c. (II. 657—8). The first objection against this opinion states: "Nam prima [positio], quae dicit quod gratia nihil aliud est quam virtutis habitus, necesse habet dicere aut quod omnes virtutes sint una virtus aut quod in uno homine sint multae gratiae gratum facientes" (657b). The second objection says: "Necesse etiam habet dicere aut quod gratia gratum faciens non totaliter tollitur per culpam aut quod post peccatum nihil remanet de virtute aliqua" (*ibid.*).

¹³ This opinion is presented in II *Sent.* 27. 1. 2. c. (II. 657a) and mentioned also in III *Sent.* 23. 2. 5. arg. 6 (III. 498a).

¹⁴ "Sicut ab essentia animae effluunt eius potentiae, quae sunt operum principia; ita etiam ab ipsa gratia effluunt virtutes in potentias animae, per quas potentiae moventur ad actus." *Summa theol.* II—I. 110. 4. ad 1 (*Op. omnia* [ed. Leon.] 7. 315b). The answer to the second objection states: "Est enim gratia principium meritorii operis mediantibus virtutibus, sicut essentia animae est principium operum vitae mediantibus potentiis" (*ibid.* ad 2). For a comparison between the doctrine of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas Aquinas on this point see esp. J. Fr. Bonnefoy, *Le Saint-Esprit et ses dons selon Saint Bonaventure*, EPM 10 (Paris 1929) 74—8.

in spite of his great love for harmony and correspondence, discards this opinion. One of his arguments against it points to the fact that this opinion is based upon a more general theory which he has already disproved in a previous question. The present opinion regards the *substance* of the soul as the primary subject of sanctifying grace, whereas St. Bonaventure considers the *faculties* as the primary receivers through which this grace then also reaches the substance.¹⁵

Of equal and perhaps greater importance for the rejection of this opinion is the argument which concerns the more specific problem of the relation between grace and virtues. While the Seraphic Doctor has criticized the first opinion for not securing the required *difference* between the virtues, he now excludes the second opinion because it does not preserve the necessary *unity* of grace. He rejects the idea of a complete parallel "because the diversity between grace itself and the virtues is, with regard to their formal principle, not as great as that between the soul and its faculties; for the virtues are not said to be virtues of the grace itself, through which this grace would act as the soul acts through its faculties."¹⁶ The difference that would exist between grace and virtues in the case of such a complete parallel is considered to be incompatible with the unity of sanctifying grace, which renders acceptable to God not only the soul itself but also every *habitus* and good work.

St. Bonaventure finally turns against an erroneous deduction from this opinion and thereby points to a further difficulty. As he sees it, this opinion leads "to the false idea that grace enters the soul and its faculties in exactly the same way as the soul enters the body and its organs; for it would then be absolutely necessary that, when grace departs because of sin, *every habitus* of virtue, which grace carries with it, be also expelled; that this is false is obvious from experience."¹⁷ Here

¹⁵ "Alius [modus] etiam a veritate deviare videtur. Primum in eo quod ponit quod gratia primo existat in substantia et postmodum influat in potentias; hoc enim improbatum est supra." II *Sent.* 27. 1. 2. c. (II. 657 b). The more general question concerning the primary subject of sanctifying grace is treated in II *Sent.* 26. u. 5 (II. 641 a—644 b).

¹⁶ "Non est tanta diversitas ipsius gratiae ad virtutes quantum ad earum principium formale sicut animae ad suas vires . . . Virtutes enim non dicuntur esse virtutes ipsius gratiae, per quas ipsa gratia operetur, sicut anima operatur per suas potentias." III *Sent.* 23. 2. 5. ad 6 (III. 500 a). The corresponding answer to the same point in II *Sent.* 27. 1. 2. c. says: "Ponit in uno et eodem homine esse diversas gratias gratum facientes; et hoc ipsum supra improbatum est. *Unus* enim est decor qui datur faciei animae, ex quo non solum ipsa acceptatur, immo etiam habitus et opera" (II. 657 b).

¹⁷ "Nec est intelligendum quod gratia et virtus sint in diversis subiectis. Haec enim ducunt in imaginationem falsam, in hanc videlicet quod gratia omnino ita veniat in animam et eius potentias sicut anima venit in corpus

we meet the same difficulty which we saw in the first opinion. In order to explain the continued presence of some of the virtues after grace itself has departed, and to preserve both the unity of grace in all the virtues and the difference between the virtues themselves, St. Bonaventure offers another solution. He considers not only sanctifying grace, but also the natural dispositions of the soul which receives this grace. The process by which the supernatural image is formed in the soul under the influence of divine grace includes these dispositions as an additional and important factor.

St. Bonaventure distinguishes in the supernatural *habitus* of the virtues a material and a formal element. The material basis consists in one of the natural faculties and dispositions of the soul. By nature man possesses a certain rectitude and is therefore capable of good deeds. By repeating such deeds he is, to a certain extent, also able to develop a natural *habitus*, which St. Bonaventure calls virtue in a more general sense.¹⁸ This *habitus* is rooted in the nature of man "because we possess implanted in our nature a moral rectitude by which we are, at least in an imperfect manner, capable of doing works of virtue and honesty."¹⁹ Such natural dispositions, which man is able to develop, always remain imperfect; but they represent the material principle which sanctifying grace can inform and thus bring to supernatural perfection.

St. Bonaventure speaks of an underlying natural *habitus*, or *habitus substratus* as he calls it, not only in connection with the four cardinal virtues, which regulate the relations of man towards creatures, but also in connection with the three theological virtues, which are directed

et eius organa. Tunc enim necessario oporteret quod, gratia abeunte per peccatum, expellerentur omnes habitus virtutum quos secum defert; quod ex ipsa experientia planum est esse falsum. Et ideo ratio illa non concludit, quia accipit pro simili quod *valde est dissimile*." III *Sent.* 23. 2. 5. ad 6 (III. 500a).

¹⁸ "Virtus dupliciter consuevit accipi, cum dicimus aliquem habitum esse virtutem, proprie videlicet et communiter. PROPRIE namque dicitur virtus recta ratio *perducens in finem*; et hoc modo virtus est principium operis *meritorii* et dicitur solummodo de habitu *gratia informato*, sine quo non contingit pervenire ad finem gloriæ. Alio modo dicitur virtus COMMUNITER habitus *rectificans* potentiam aliqua rectitude iustitiæ et *vigorans* eam circa opus difficile, quamvis non perducatur eam in finem." III *Sent.* 23. 2. 1. c. (III. 488b).

¹⁹ "A natura, inquam, sunt radicaliter, quia plantatam habemus in nostra natura rectitudinem, per quam apti sumus, licet imperfecte, ad opera virtutis et honestatis." III *Sent.* 33. u. 5. c. (III. 723a). Although the present text speaks only about the cardinal virtues, the same principle is applied also to the theological virtues. When discussing the *habitus substratus* of faith (III *Sent.* 23. 2. 5. ad 6 [III. 500b]), St. Bonaventure refers to the present text for a more detailed explanation. — See also J. Fr. Bonnefoy, *op. cit.*, 67—8.

immediately towards God²⁰ and constitute the supernatural image in the sanctified soul. In the case of faith and hope such a natural *habitus* and basis can begin to develop without the presence of sanctifying grace and can also remain after sanctifying grace has left the soul.²¹ Even charity has a natural root and foundation. The reason why this virtue is never present without sanctifying grace is not the lack of such a natural basis but, rather, the fact that it is, even in this rudimentary stage, incompatible with sin.²²

Under the influence of sanctifying grace this natural basis becomes fully informed²³ and is now constituted as truly supernatural virtue. Wherever the natural basis is still completely undeveloped, sanctifying grace operates as an originating principle and brings it into being. St. Bonaventure sees in such a first development of the natural basis a reason for calling a virtue infused. This case, however, does not always occur; the main reason why the Seraphic Doctor calls a virtue infused is the information of the natural basis by sanctifying grace²⁴ which

²⁰ "In ipsis [viribus] possunt esse virtutes theologicae et cardinales: *theologicae*, in quantum immediate eleuantur in *Deum*, ipsum diligendo et ipsi innitendo; *cardinales* vero, in quantum versantur circa *bonum creatum*." III *Sent.* 33. u. 3. c. (III. 717b).

²¹ Referring to the more general meaning of virtue (see above, note 18) St. Bonaventure says: "Hoc modo accipiendi virtutem, habitus politici informes dicuntur esse virtutes; hoc etiam modo *fides informis*, quae quidem est in malis Christianis, habet esse in genere virtutis . . . Et sic concedi potest quod *fides informis* sit in genere *virtutis*, secundum quod nomen virtutis accipitur large et extenditur ad habitum *rectificantem* et *vigorantem* potentiam in his actibus, circa quos consistit via iustitiae." III *Sent.* 23. 2. 1. c. (III. 488b—489a). In III *Sent.* 26. 1. 4. c. we read about faith and hope: "Sicut *fides* absque caritate virtus *informis* est, quia tribuit animae quamdam rectitudinem et vigorem, qui compleri habet et perfici per gratiae infusionem, sic intelligendum est et circa ipsam spem" (III. 564a). St. Bonaventure explains with regard to the underlying *habitus* of hope: "Ille actus sperandi *ab aliquo habitu procedit*, qui quidem habitus *bonus* est et tenet etiam quodam modo rationem *virtutis*, pro eo quod potentiam, quam perficit, quodam modo rectificat et vigorat" (*ibid.*). The possibility of acquiring this underlying natural disposition is mentioned e. g. in III *Sent.* 23. 2. 2. c.: "Si autem loquamur de fide quantum ad formale, videlicet quantum ad illud quod facit assentire, sic dicendum est quod quaedam *fides informis* est per *acquisitionem*, quaedam per *infusionem*" (III. 491a). The Seraphic Doctor remarks to the expression *fides informis*: "Non enim dicitur *informis*, quia careat omni forma, sed quia caret forma gratiae gratum facientis" (*ibid.*).

²² "Caritas non potest esse *informis*, sicut aliae virtutes; hoc enim est, quia caritas non solum in quantum *gratuita*, sed etiam in quantum *affectio recta* sive quantum ad *habitu substratum* repugnat omni peccato." III *Sent.* 27. 1. 4. c. (III. 600b).

²³ "Ces diverses dispositions au bien seront comme la matière qu'informera la grâce. Elles lui demeureront sous-jacentes, d'où le nom d'*habitu substratus* que leur donne saint Bonaventure, et constitueront le principe spécifique des *habitu gratuits*." J. Fr. Bonnefoy, *op. cit.*, 68.

²⁴ "Ad illud quod obicitur, quod omnes virtutes simul *infunduntur*,

makes it acceptable to God and meritorious in its operation. The soul is, in this way, endowed not only with sanctifying grace but also with the supernatural splendor and power of the virtues. Since the natural faculties of the soul, which provide the basis for the virtues and are elevated by this sanctifying grace, still retain all their essential and particular characteristics, they now become the principle that differentiates the supernatural virtues. Although one and the same grace is present and effective in all of them, these virtues differ from one another because of their different natural basis.²⁵

In order to explain and to illustrate this formation of the supernatural virtues in the soul under the influence of sanctifying grace, and to show the relation between this one grace and the various virtues, St. Bonaventure again uses some analogies. The first of these compares grace and natural dispositions in the soul to light and colors.²⁶ In the same way as many different colors in a dark room become luminous and receive their full form and beauty through the *same* light falling into this room,²⁷ so do the natural faculties and dispositions of the soul become informed, vivified, and acceptable to God through the one light of grace.²⁸ Just as the particular materials in the room reflect the same light in *different* ways and thus appear in different colors, so do the different underlying natural dispositions in the soul cause the same influence of grace to result in different gratuitous virtues. And in the

dicendum quod verum est quantum ad illud quod est in eis *formale*; quantum autem ad *materiale* sive ad *habitus substratum*, non habet veritatem, nisi quando non invenit habitum in subiecto quem informet." III *Sent.* 23. 2. 4. ad 4 (III. 496b).

²⁵ "Quamvis [habitus virtutum gratuitarum] *formaliter* dividantur quantum ad habitus substratos, tamen, in quantum gratuiti sunt, communicant in ipsa gratia, quae est omnium virtutum gratuitarum perfectiva in esse gratuito." III. *Sent.* 36. u. 1. ad 4 (III. 793b). — See F. Imle-J. Kaup, *Die Theologie des heiligen Bonaventura* (Werl 1931) 169: "Eine und dieselbe habituelle Gnade erzeugt also in uns Innenwirkungen, die unter sich differenziert sind; Tugenden, Gaben, . . . Seligkeiten."

²⁶ "Ipsa gratia gratum faciens comparatur ad habitus virtutum substratos sicut comparatur lux ad colores." III *Sent.* 23. 2. 5. c. (III. 498b). See also *Brevil.* 5. 4 (V. 257a). — It is significant for the different approach of St. Thomas that he rejects this example of light and colors; see II *Sent.* 26. 1. 4. c. (*Op. omnia* [ed. Vivès] 8. 354a).

²⁷ "Sicut multi colores in una domo tenebrosa existentes efficiuntur luminosi per unam luminositatem supervenientem et ab illa informantur et decorantur et venustantur, sic habitus virtutum informes, existente in anima, venustantur et decorantur ab una gratia superveniente." III *Sent.* 23. 2. 5. c. (III. 498b—499a).

²⁸ "Virtus, quae est habilitatio potentiae, absque gratia gratum faciente informis est, sicut color sine lumine; sed, ea adveniente, ex qua tota anima in se et in suis potentiis decoratur, formari et vivificari dicuntur habitus virtutum et effici Deo accepti." II *Sent.* 27. 1. 2. c. (II. 657b).

same way as the light does not enter an essential *union* with the colors, but unites itself with them only in as far as it ordains them towards visibility, so does sanctifying grace not inform the underlying natural dispositions in the strict sense of an essential union between matter and form;²⁹ it informs them in as far as it ordains them towards their proper end.³⁰ Sanctifying grace and the unformed *habitus* of faith, St. Bonaventure explains, "become one only according to a certain ordination and relation, because with the coming of grace the unformed faith begins to be completely ordained towards the end, to tend towards God, and to please Him."³¹ What is said here about faith, applies in the same way to the other virtues.

With the analogy of light and colors St. Bonaventure is thus able to explain a good number of points in his doctrine about the relation between sanctifying grace and the supernatural virtues. In one respect, however, this example is insufficient. The analogy of the light always presupposes that certain dispositions for colors are already present in the room when the light enters. Sanctifying grace, on the other hand, does not always find the natural basis for the gratuitous virtues sufficiently developed; but, as we have seen, it is able to bring these required dispositions into being, whereas the light has not such a power with regard to colors.

St. Bonaventure recognizes this deficiency in his first example³² and therefore adds a second analogy which emphasizes this aspect of development. He now compares sanctifying grace with rain coming

²⁹ "Informatio habitus informis virtutis a gratia non est per essentialem unionem, sed magis secundum quamdam ordinationem et directionem in finem. Nam proprie loquendo, accidentia non habent materiam et formam, sed quod dicitur habitus informis esse materia fidei et illud quod superinducitur esse forma, hoc est secundum quamdam comparisonem, sicut prius dictum est de lumine et colore." III *Sent.* 23. 2. 5. ad 4 (III. 499b).

³⁰ "Gratia superveniens cum habitu virtutis, quem formare dicitur, non facit unum per essentiam, sed ideo format quia ad finem suum ordinat." II *Sent.* 27. 1. 2. c. (II. 658a).

³¹ "Et sicut ex colore et lumine superinfuso non fit unum per essentiam, sed unum per ordinationem quamdam, sic nec ex gratia gratum faciente et informi fide intelligitur fieri unum nisi secundum quamdam ordinationem et relationem, quia fides informis per adventum gratiae incipit complete ordinari in finem et in Deum tendere et eidem complacere." III. *Sent.* 23. 2. 5. c. (III. 499a). The *Breviloquium* (5. 4) reflects the same thought when it says: "Quemadmodum ex luce et coloribus fit unum in ratione motivi, . . . sic ex gratia et habitibus informibus, cum formantur, fit unum secundum rationem meritorii et gratuiti" (V. 257a).

³² "In hoc tamen est differentia quod lux ista corporalis non ita effiaciter potest colores educere de potentia in actum quantum ad esse quod habet color in genere coloris secundum quod ipsa gratia existens in ipsa anima potest facere germinare habitus virtutum." III *Sent.* 23. 2. 5. c. (III. 498b).

down on a field that is filled with various kinds of seeds. This rain causes the seeds to germinate, to grow into plants, and to bear fruit. Although it is the same rain that irrigates the entire field, each plant grows and develops according to its own species.³³ If the rain ceases, the plants become dry, but they are still on the field. A new rain-shower will make them green, strong, and beautiful again.

The soul upon which the rain of sanctifying grace descends contains, in a similar way, the seeds of the natural dispositions that will serve as basis for the virtues. As a confirmation of the fact that such "seeds of virtues with regard to the underlying *habitus* are implanted in the nature of the human soul," St. Bonaventure refers to the great number of explicit texts in St. Augustine and also to works of St. Bernard and Cassian.³⁴ Grace causes these seeds to germinate, "so that, if grace is present, there are, as a consequence of it, also the virtues."³⁵ The rain of grace makes them grow continuously, until they are brought to perfection. They become dry, as it were, if the moisture of grace is shut out by sin, but they are revived again with the return of grace to the soul.

The solution which St. Bonaventure gives to the question of the relation between the one sanctifying grace and the different virtues, and which he illustrates by those two examples, shows two characteristic features that are noteworthy with regard to the return of the human soul to God. The first fact is the decisive role of grace in this supernatural elevation. Just as the colors will never appear in their beauty without the light, and the seeds will never develop into full-grown plants without rain and moisture, so do the natural dispositions of the soul depend in their supernatural perfection and in their ascent to God essentially on the presence of sanctifying grace. Not only this grace in itself but also the virtues it produces in the soul are, therefore, truly supernatural; they are infused into the soul as a gift from God.

However, the process of this supernatural elevation and its gradual perfection does not exclude the God-given natural faculties and dis-

³³ "Si enim una pluvia adveniat in terram in qua sunt plantata diversa semina quae non germinaverunt, facit illam germinare et secundum diversitatem seminum diversas plantas producere." *Ibid.* ad 6 (500a).

³⁴ "Quod autem seminaria virtutum quantum ad habitus substratos sint plantata in natura mentis rationalis, expresse potest haberi ab Augustino in multis locis, et a Bernardo, in decimo capitulo De amore Dei, et in Libro De collationibus sanctorum Patrum." *Ibid.* (500b; see also note 6).

³⁵ "Sic gratia adveniens in animam, in qua sunt seminaria habituum virtutum, facit ipsam germinare, ita quod, ipsa habita, habentur *per consequens* et virtutes et continue facit illa germina crescere, quousque perducatur usque ad perfectionem." *Ibid.*

positions of the soul, which constitute the image of God and make the soul capable of reaching God. Since grace is intended to bring this capability to an actual realization, the elevation rather includes these faculties and their activities in a decisive manner, without losing thereby its essentially supernatural character. This is the second important and characteristic aspect in St. Bonaventure's explanations and examples. The colors in the illuminated room are not simply imposed upon the object by the light, but are the result of a co-operation between the light and the particular disposition of each object. In the case of the rain that falls on a field, the participation on the part of seeds and growing plants is even more evident. With the help of these analogies St. Bonaventure wants to point out a similar situation in the process of the soul's elevation by grace. What we may call the supernatural edifice of grace and virtues is, in its complete structure, not simply superimposed upon the soul, but rather grows organically in the soul under the influence of the one infused sanctifying grace. The soul and its faculties are, in this way, elevated and perfected without losing any of their natural characteristics and activities. This establishes continuity at the most decisive point in the return of creation to God, at the point where the natural and the supernatural level meet one another and unite.

We have seen that St. Bonaventure does not accept a complete parallel between soul and grace in the sense that the natural image of God in the soul, which consists of three faculties in one substance, is perfected by a grace that possesses already in itself the parallel structure of three theological virtues.³⁶ In spite of his love for harmony he did not accept such an external correspondence; a complete parallel appears for St. Bonaventure only later, as a result of the influence of grace. After he has shown how sanctifying grace elevates the soul and how, by an intimate and mysterious co-operation with the natural dispositions, it develops in this soul a supernatural structure of virtues, he can then show also the full correspondence between the natural and

³⁶ St. Bonaventure sometimes makes a comparison between the natural and the supernatural image of God in man, and we, too, shall examine their relationship immediately. But such comparisons always refer to grace and virtues as they exist *in* the soul *after* sanctification has taken place, and not to the structure of grace itself which is always simple. An explicit comparison occurs in III *Sent.* 27. 1. 1. c.: "Consistit enim *imago recreationis* in tribus virtutibus theologicis et unitate gratiae, sicut *imago creationis* in tribus potentiis et unitate substantiae" (III. 592a). But as J. Fr. Bonnefoy (*op. cit.*, 78) rightly remarks, the point of comparison is the real distinction between the three elements on either side. See also III *Sent.* 26. 1. 3. fund.5 (III. 561a).

the supernatural image in man, which is necessary if the one is to be truly the perfection of the other. Having first established the firm and harmonious connection between the natural and the supernatural level, which results in a perfect correspondence, St. Bonaventure can now place the remaining steps to the final union with God on a much firmer basis.

b) The Manner in which the Supernatural Image Perfects the Natural Image in Man

Before we follow St. Bonaventure in his explanation of the final part of man's return to God, we must take one more look at the correspondence between the natural and the supernatural image of God in man; for if we consider the details of the relationship between the two images, we discover a difficulty that must be solved and properly explained in order to uphold the idea of perfect harmony. In man there is first the *natural* image, which consists in the one substance of the soul and its three faculties of memory, intellect, and will. This image is then elevated and *perfected* by the *supernatural* image, which St. Bonaventure calls *similitude*, and which is constituted by the one sanctifying grace and the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity. In order to be a *perfection* of the entire natural image, the similitude must *correspond* to this image in every respect, not only in the sense that sanctifying grace perfects the soul in general, but also that each theological virtue perfects one particular faculty of the natural image.³⁷ In two cases a correspondence is clearly visible: the faculty of the intellect is well adapted for elevation and perfection by faith, and the will is, in a similar way, adapted for such a perfection by charity. The difficulty lies in the correspondence between memory and hope. What deepens the problem is the fact that the memory in the natural image appears as a part of the intellective faculty, whereas hope is always related, and by nature belongs, to the affective part of the rational soul.

St. Bonaventure was well aware of this difficulty and has explained on various occasions how the similitude perfects the image and how the necessary correspondence is preserved. In order to understand his explanations, we must call to mind his teaching about the faculties of

³⁷ The fact that the similitude corresponds to the image and functions as the supernatural perfection of this image is indicated in I *Sent.* 3. 2. 2. 1. c.: "Nam proprie loquendo, imago consistit in unitate essentiae et trinitate potentiarum, secundum quas anima nata est ab illa summa Trinitate sigillari imagine similitudinis, quae consistit in gratia et virtutibus theologicis" (I. 89b).

the human soul, and particularly the way in which he divides them. The *rational* power of the human soul, as distinct from the vegetative and the sensitive, consists of two principal and truly different parts, namely the *intellective* or cognitive faculty on the one hand, and the *affective* or motive faculty on the other.³⁸ These two parts are also designated by the terms reason and will. Each part is then subdivided into two particular faculties, which are less distinct from one another than the main parts because they are concerned in different ways with the same object. Therefore, instead of being distinct faculties, they are rather two powers of the same basic faculty. The cognitive part consists of *intellect* and *memory*, while the affective part comprises the *irascible* and the *concupiscible* powers.³⁹

These divisions include the elements of the natural image as well as those of the supernatural similitude, for both image and similitude consist in a combination of three of these powers. However, the combination is different in each case, and this is the point where the difficulty arises. The natural image has two of its powers, namely intellect and memory, in the cognitive part of the soul, and only the one power of the will on the affective side. This fact gives the image a predominantly intellectual character.

We observe a shift in the combination of the powers, however, as soon as we consider the supernatural perfection by grace. St. Bonaventure holds the opinion that the first and immediate receiver of grace is not the substance of the soul, but rather its powers; for he sees in them the necessary means by which the soul turns towards God and receives the divine influence.⁴⁰ Since sanctifying grace is supposed to

³⁸ "Multis modis consueverunt auctores divisionem potentiarum animae accipere. Aliquando secundum naturam ipsarum potentiarum, ut cum dividuntur potentiae animae in *vegetabilem*, *sensibilem* et *rationalem*, vel ipsa rationalis in *intellectivam* et *affectivam*." II *Sent.* 24. 1. 2. 3. c. (II. 566a—b). — "Omnes etiam, quotquot dividunt animae potentias, prima divisione dividunt in cognitivam et affectivam sive motivam." *Ibid.* 24. 1. 2. 1. c. (II. 560b). — "Potentiae animae rationalis sufficienter dividuntur per cognitivam et motivam, et omnes actus animae per has potentias, quae sunt cognitiva et affectiva sive *ratio* et *voluntas*, exerceri possunt." *Ibid.* 25. 1. u. 2. c. (II. 596b).

³⁹ "Maior est differentia intelligentiae ad voluntatem quam sit intelligentiae ad memoriam vel etiam irascibilis ad concupiscibilem . . . Et quia utrumque horum necessarium est ad perfectionem actus cognitionis et affectionis, ideo *memoria* et *intelligentia* potius dicuntur diversae vires quam diversae potentiae, similiter *irascibilis* et *concupiscibilis*." II *Sent.* 24. 1. 2. 1. c. (II. 560b). — The diagram in note 58 on page 367 illustrates these divisions of the rational power of the human soul.

⁴⁰ See II *Sent.* 26. u. 5 (II. 641—4). One of the reasons for this opinion is expressed as follows: "Si enim intelligimus gratiam tamquam habitum quemdam et influentiam quae inest animae ad Deum conversae, cum talis

perfect the image, we would expect that the powers in which grace primarily resides and acts as supernatural perfection are the same which constitute the image. But this is not the case. St. Bonaventure now regularly mentions as the immediate and proper subject of sanctifying grace the *liberum arbitrium*,⁴¹ which consists of the *rational*, *irascible*, and *concupiscible* powers.⁴² The supernatural similitude resides in these three powers and in them alone. If we compare this group of powers with the above-mentioned divisions, we find that only the first one belongs to the cognitive part of the soul, whereas the other two are in the affective part. The similitude, which is supposed to be the perfection of the image, is thus predominantly on the affective side.

St. Bonaventure realizes this shift from the cognitive to the affective side of the soul and gives us various reasons for it. One of these reasons lies in the very nature of image and similitude. The notion of *image* implies a conformity in regard to *quantity*,⁴³ this means, in the case of spiritual beings, a similarity in their inner *structure*.⁴⁴ The image of God in the human soul consists in such a configuration, in as far as certain powers of the soul are in their *relations* to one another similar to the three Divine Persons.⁴⁵ The powers that possess this noble distinction are primarily in the cognitive part. The activity of the *memory* is the necessary condition and starting point for the operation of the *intellect*, and these two powers of the cognitive part together assume the role of an originative principle with regard to the activity of the *will* which represents the closing member in the ternary of the image. The two *particular powers* of the will, the irascible and concupiscible, do *not* stand in such a relation to one another⁴⁶ and are not mentioned

habilitatio et influentiae susceptio et conversio non possit intelligi nisi per potentiam, non videtur posse recte intelligi quomodo gratia sit in anima abstracto potentia." *Ibid.* c. (643 b).

⁴¹ "Et ideo gratia inest animae primo secundum libertatem arbitrii; et huius signum est, quia ad eas solas potentias se extendit ad quas se extendit arbitrii libertas." II *Sent.* 26. u. 5. c. (II. 643 b).

⁴² "Liberum arbitrium secundum rem comprehendit istas tres potentias, videlicet *rationalem*, *irascibilem* et *concupiscibilem*." II *Sent.* 25. 1. u. 6. ad 2 (II. 605 b). The same is stated in III *Sent.* 33. u. 3. ad 1 (III. 717 b).

⁴³ "De prima nominis impositione differt imago et similitudo. Imago enim nominat conformitatem in *quantitate*, similitudo vero convenientiam in *qualitate*. Imago enim nominat quamdam configurationem, et ita importat figuram." II *Sent.* 16. 2. 3. c. (II. 405 a).

⁴⁴ J. P. Rézette explains: "Dans ce cas, la *quantitas* est à prendre au sens métaphorique du terme, et désigne le nombre et les rapports de certaines propriétés" ("Grâce et similitude de Dieu chez saint Bonaventure," *ETL* 32 [1956] 52).

⁴⁵ "Imago enim dicit ordinem et originem in potentiis, sicut est in personis." II *Sent.* 16. 2. 3 ad 2 (II. 406 a).

⁴⁶ "Imago enim principaliter respicit *originem* et *habitudinem*; habitudo

specifically as part of the image. The characteristic features of origin and relation, which mark the image of God in the human soul, are thus predominantly on the cognitive side. Although the powers that constitute the image are ordained towards God and capable of immediate participation in Him, the image has also the character of *representing* the original and belongs, in this respect, still to the *second* phase or exemplarity of creation.

The *similitude*, on the other hand, is based on a conformity in *quality* and *nature*. The unique quality by which the soul is similar to God and capable of actual communication and union with Him is sanctifying grace which, together with the theological virtues, constitutes the supernatural image or similitude. But it is important to realize that this similitude is not another image in the sense that its three theological virtues would, in their relations to one another, reflect the relations between the Divine Persons. The similitude is called image not because of any representation on its own, but only because it restores and perfects the natural image⁴⁷ and achieves its final *return* to God; it therefore belongs to the *third* phase of creation. This tendency and movement towards God is primarily a matter for the irascible and concupiscible powers of the will.⁴⁸ For this reason, the similitude belongs predominantly to the affective part, and the rational power is joined to it more as the necessary condition for the perfect union in love.⁴⁹

A further reason why sanctifying grace is given in the first place to the powers of the *liberum arbitrium* lies, for St. Bonaventure, in the fact that man is destined to receive the final beatitude not only as a gift

autem et origo attenditur inter memoriam et intelligentiam per modum parentis et prolis, et inter haec duo et voluntatem secundum modum derivationis sive processionis. Inter irascibilem vero et concupiscibilem nec est talis ordo nec origo, cum motus irascibilis possit esse sine concupiscibili et e converso; motus autem voluntatis non potest esse sine motu intelligentiae praevisio, nec actus similiter intelligentiae sine actu memoriae, in his dico quae sunt de ratione imaginis." *Ibid.* c. (405b). — About these relations between the three powers of the image see also the explanation given above in Chapter III on page 110.

⁴⁷ This point is brought out by T. Szabó, *De SS. Trinitate in creaturis refulgente doctrina S. Bonaventurae*, BACH-PT 1 (Rome 1955) 161—2.

⁴⁸ "Similitudo vero principaliter consistit in unione animae ad Deum, quae quidem est per gratiam. Et quoniam unio et gratia principaliter respiciunt affectivam, hinc est quod in imagine recreationis, quae quidem est in gratuitis, duae sunt virtutes quae respiciunt affectivam." II *Sent.* 16. 2. 3. c. (II. 405b).

⁴⁹ In his Commentary on the Book of Wisdom (2. 23) St. Bonaventure gives the following summary: "*Ad imaginem*, scilicet in naturalibus; *similitudinis suae*, scilicet in gratuitis; vel: *ad imaginem*, in potentia cognitiva; *ad similitudinem*, in potentia affectiva; *imago* enim est principium cognoscendi, *similitudo* ratio diligendi." (VI. 125a).

of grace but, at the same time, also as a glorious reward for merits which he has gained during his earthly pilgrimage.⁵⁰ Now, the principle of merit is the free will which alone makes an act praiseworthy or reprehensible.⁵¹ In order to make these meritorious acts, which proceed from the powers of the free will, supernatural and acceptable to God, sanctifying grace perfects primarily these three powers.⁵² In doing this, grace also counteracts and deletes sin, which originates and resides in the same powers of the free will.⁵³ All this shows the decisive role of the *liberum arbitrium* in the actual return to God.⁵⁴ The powers that constitute this *liberum arbitrium*, and not those of the image, are therefore the immediate subject of *grace* and of the supernatural virtues.

But in spite of this shift in the combination of the powers, the similitude is still in a true sense the perfection of the image as a *whole* and in *each part*. Although image and similitude consist in a combination of different powers, they both comprise the *entire rational* power of the human soul and coincide in this respect. Since the one affective faculty of the will in the image includes both the irascible and the concupiscible power,⁵⁵ and since the one intellective faculty of reason in the *liberum arbitrium* contains both intellect and memory,⁵⁶ image and *liberum arbitrium*, and thereby also image and similitude, comprise the same basic powers of the human soul.

As far as the exact relationship between each of these powers and the corresponding theological virtue is concerned, it remains true that hope perfects *directly* the irascible power in the affective, and not the memory in the cognitive part; but St. Bonaventure answers this difficulty also. He attributes to the *irascible* power not only the detesting of evil and the enduring of suffering, but also the reaching out for great

⁵⁰ "Ad beatitudinis praemium pervenire non est gloriosum nisi per meritum." *Brevil.* 2. 9 (V. 227a). See also II *Sent.* 23. 1. 1. fund. 1 (II. 532a).

⁵¹ "Si ergo liberum arbitrium principium est meriti et demeriti, necesse est omnem virtutem in libero arbitrio poni." III *Sent.* 23. 1. 2. c. (III. 476b)

⁵² "Omnes [virtutes cardinales] etiam sunt principium merendi. Et propterea, cum meritum consistat radicaliter circa liberum arbitrium, in solis illis potentis habent esse virtutes, sive cardinales sive theologicae, in quibus reperitur libertas arbitrii." III *Sent.* 33. u. 3. c. (III. 717a).

⁵³ "Culpatio autem et laus et vituperium inest animae primo secundum liberum arbitrium, ac per hoc et gratiae donum." II *Sent.* 26. u. 5. c. (II. 643b). See also *Brevil.* 7. 6 (V. 288a).

⁵⁴ The *Breviloquium* (2. 4) says about the return of the soul to the First Principle: "In illud tendit per liberum arbitrium" (V. 221b).

⁵⁵ "Ipsa voluntas includit in se irascibilem et concupiscibilem." II *Sent.* 25. 1. u. 2. ad 1 (II. 597a). See also *ibid.* 25. 1. u. 6. ad 2 (605b) and III *Sent.* 33. u. 3. c. (III. 717b).


⁵⁶ "Ipsa ratio includit in se intelligentiam et memoriam." II *Sent.* 25. 1. u. 2. ad 1 (II. 597a).

and difficult things which it tries to bring into secure possession.⁵⁷ The *memory* performs the same role in keeping a firm hold upon ideas in order to present them to the intellect. On the basis of this *common function of retention*, therefore, the virtue of hope perfects not only the irascible power, but that of memory as well.⁵⁸

This common basis links the two powers together and makes the correspondence and continuity between image and similitude complete. With this explanation in mind St. Bonaventure can state in his *Brevilo-*

⁵⁷ "Potentiae enim irascibilis non tantum est detestari mala culpaе et perpeti mala ponae, sed etiam aggredi terribilia et erigi ad magna et ardua... Stabilitio autem et confirmatio pertinet ad potentiam irascibilem." III *Sent.* 26. 2. 5. c. (III. 579b—580a).

⁵⁸ "Virtus spei reformando potentiam irascibilem, quae est potentia affectiva, *per consequens* reformat ipsam memoriam, quae in actu communicat cum ea, videlicet in actu tenendi. Et ideo non oportet quod spes reponatur in memoria sicut in proprio subiecto." *Ibid* ad 4 (III. 580b—581a). See also I *Sent.* 3. 2. 1. 1. ad 4 (I. 81b), II *Sent.* 16. 2. 3. c. (II. 405b), III *Sent.* 27. dub. 4 (III. 619a—b), and IV *Sent.* 49. 1. u. 5. ad 4—5 (IV. 1009b—1010a). For the most detailed explanation of this point see J. J. Hartnett, *Doctrina Sancti Bonaventurae de deiformitate* (Diss. Mundelein, Ill., 1936) 46—8. — The following diagram represents a brief review of our discussion. It shows how St. Bonaventure divides the various faculties and powers of the human soul; it also illustrates the structure of image and similitude and the correspondence between them.



intelligentia	memoria	pot. irascibilis	concupiscibilis
Pars intellectiva vel cognitiva (RATIO)		Pars affectiva vel motiva (VOLUNTAS)	
Potentia rationalis			
Potentia sensibilis			
Potentia vegetabilis			

quium that, "with regard to its upper face, in which the image of the Eternal Trinity consists, the soul must be rectified through the three theological virtues."⁵⁹ And he is able to express the same parallel in his *Itinerarium* where he writes: "The image of our soul, therefore, must be clothed over with the three theological virtues by which the soul is purified, enlightened, and perfected. In this way the image is reformed and made conformable to the heavenly Jerusalem."⁶⁰

The human soul, thus elevated and perfected by grace and virtues, begins its final ascent to God and "is borne directly into the Highest Trinity."⁶¹ The preposition "into" is the precise translation of the Latin text and is frequently used by St. Bonaventure in connection with man's immediate return to God. It is characteristic of our author and signifies the actual union in love.⁶² The soul possessing sanctifying grace and, with it, the theological virtues, also enters into a special relationship with the Most Blessed Trinity, in so far as each of these virtues corresponds to something that is attributed to one of the Divine Persons. "Faith leads into the highest truth by believing in it and assenting to it; hope leads to the highest summit by holding on to it and expecting it; and charity leads to the highest good by longing for it and loving it."⁶³ The highest truth refers to the Son, the highest summit to the Father, and the highest good to the Holy Ghost.

The direct return, thus initiated through grace and the theological virtues, is then further facilitated and perfected by the corresponding *gifts* and *beatitudes*. The gift of understanding is added to faith, the gift of counsel to hope, and the gift of wisdom to charity.⁶⁴ This last correspondence is particularly remarkable. In the same way as charity is

⁵⁹ "Ideo necesse est, animam quantum ad superiorem faciem, in qua consistit imago Trinitatis aeternae, rectificari per tres theologicas virtutes." *Brevil.* 5. 4 (V. 256b).

⁶⁰ "Supervestienda est igitur imago mentis nostrae tribus virtutibus theologis, quibus anima purificatur, illuminatur et perficitur, et sic imago reformatur et conformis supernae Ierusalem efficitur." *Itiner.* 4. 3 (V. 306b); transl. by Phil. Boehner, *Saint Bonaventure's Itinerarium mentis in Deum with an Introduction, Translation and Commentary*, WSB 2 (St. Bonaventure, N. Y., 1956) 73.

⁶¹ "Imago recreationis [consistit] in trinitate habituum cum unitate gratiae, per quos anima fertur recte in summam Trinitatem secundum tria appropriata tribus personis." *Brevil.* 5. 4 (V. 256b).

⁶² See e. g. *De myst. Trinit.* 8. ad 7 (V. 115b) and *Brevil.* 5. 1 (V. 253a). We see a particular example of this in the very title of his work "*Itinerarium mentis in Deum*." See the explanation given by Phil. Boehner, *op. cit.*, 105.

⁶³ "Fides dirigit in summe verum credendo et assentiendo, spes in summe arduum innitendo et expectando, caritas in summe bonum desiderando et diligendo." *Brevil.* 5. 4 (V. 256b). See also T. Szabó, *op. cit.*, 162—3.

⁶⁴ *Brevil.* 5. 5 (V. 257b).

"the mother and consummation of all the virtues," so is wisdom the summary and crown of all the gifts.⁶⁵ These gifts, in turn, are the disposition for the corresponding beatitudes. The gift of understanding prepares for purity of heart, the gift of counsel for mercy, and the gift of wisdom for peace.⁶⁶ Here the sanctified soul, as far as is compatible with its earthly pilgrimage, reaches the highest point of contemplation and union with God; for "wisdom joins us with the highest truth and good in which our entire rational appetite finds its goal and comes to rest."⁶⁷ The twelve *fruits of the Holy Ghost* are merely the result of this highest perfection; St. Bonaventure considers them not as an additional, higher perfection, but only as a manifestation of the abundance which the soul enjoys in this spiritual union with God.⁶⁸

§ 2

The Complete Fulfillment of the Immediate Return through Glorification and Endowments

Sanctifying grace, and the gratuitous gifts which this grace develops in the soul, are the means by which man actually realizes his ability to approach God and to enter into a direct relationship with Him. This return to God, however, reaches its definite fulfillment only in the final glory or beatitude. As long as man remains on earth, he is still on the road and exposed to the danger of even losing the divine treasure of grace. This period on earth is the time of trials and merits, during which his vision of God is only a mediate one as through a mirror.⁶⁹ Since man does not see God directly and walks in the darkness of faith, he is capable of turning away from Him and choosing a created, transitory good as his primary and final goal. When he reaches the end of his earthly road and passes over into the final state, he is therefore either ordained towards God through the possession of grace, or he is in the disorder of sin. The justice of God which, together with His goodness, prevails in the concluding phase of the drama of creation will give each

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ *Ibid.* 5. 6 (259b).

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ "Qua pace adepti, necessario sequitur superabundans delectatio spiritualis, quae in duodenario fructuum continetur ad insinuandam superabundantiam delectationum." *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ See II *Sent.* 23. 2. 3. c. (II. 544b—545a) and *De scientia Christi* 4. c. (V. 24a—b). Even in the highest forms of contemplation, where the soul experiences and enjoys the presence of God, there remains a certain night and darkness (*Brevil.* 5. 6 [V. 260a]; *Itiner.* 7. 6 [V. 313b]) which, like a veil, prevents the clear and immediate vision of God.

one the reward or punishment he deserves; and both reward and punishment will consist in a completion and perpetuation of that order which each man has chosen and retained by his own free decision.

Whoever passes over the threshold of eternity in the state of mortal sin, will receive a punishment that reflects and perpetuates the disorder of sin in its various aspects. Because such a man has turned away from the highest light and goodness and has not revoked his decision by doing penance, he will be deprived of the vision of God and will never reach that final end and place of rest for which he was created.⁷⁰ By stooping down to a created good and by choosing this good as his end, he has made himself subject to the inferior things and in a certain way "to the vileness and nothingness of sin." He has thus perverted the dignity of his nature and the God-given order according to which the spirit is placed above the body and has the power of influencing and ruling it. The order of justice, therefore, requires that the sinner be bound to a corporeal fire. The order of creation is now reversed: while the soul by nature was able to influence the body, the corporeal now takes the upper hand; the sinner is, in his state of punishment, bound to those inferior things to which he stooped in his earthly existence.⁷¹ Because of his lasting disobedience towards God, the sinner is hurled down from the dignity of his intermediate position among creatures into a place that is lowest and at the greatest possible distance from the state of glory.⁷² There the damned will be dominated and afflicted by the lowest and most terrifying elements, "and the smoke of their torments goes up forever and ever"⁷³ as a sign and glorification of God's justice and majesty.

But this dark picture of divine severity represents only one side of the final phase of creation. St. Bonaventure compares it with certain sharp contrasts that make the picture as a whole only the more beau-

⁷⁰ *Brevil.* 7. 6 (V. 288b).

⁷¹ "Et quoniam spiritus, qui per naturam praeponitur corpori et in corpus habet influere et ipsum movere, dignitatem naturae per culpam pervertit et se subicit quodam modo vilitati et nihilitati peccati: hinc est, quod secundum ordinem iustitiae debet ordinari, ut tam peccator spiritus quam homo igni corporco alligetur, non ut in illum influat vitam, sed ut divino decreto suscipiat poenam." *Ibid.* (288a—b).

⁷² *Ibid.* (288a). About the "perfect distance" between the state of the blessed in heaven and the condemned in hell see *IV Sent.* 44. 2. 1. 2. c. (*IV.* 924b). In *IV Sent.* 44. 2. 1. 1. fund. 3 (*IV.* 920b—921a) the "perfect beatitude" and the "perfect misery" are considered as two extremes with the life on earth as intermediate state between them.

⁷³ In his *Breviloquium*, St. Bonaventure closes the chapter on hell with these words from *Apoc.* 14: 11.

tiful.⁷⁴ The bright and predominant part in this picture is made up by those who serve God and end their earthly pilgrimage in the possession of grace. The ordination of their souls towards God, representing the dynamic aspect of the image, present in them as a natural disposition, and already actualized by grace, will now find its ultimate fulfillment. God Himself, who alone can entirely satisfy the desire of the rational spirit,⁷⁵ will now be the final reward and the source of eternal happiness.

In order that the soul may be able to participate in God, the Un-created Beatitude, a special divine influence is necessary which informs the soul in the same way as sanctifying grace does during the earthly life.⁷⁶ St. Bonaventure calls this influence *deiformitas* in the full and proper sense. This "deiformity" is the final consummation of sanctifying grace⁷⁷ and consists in a created *habitus* that is infused into the soul. But the Seraphic Doctor sees in it more than a mere *habitus*; since a *habitus* is perfected by act, and since the final beatitude represents the highest and ultimate perfection, he conceives the deiformity of the glorified soul as a *habitus* which is continuously in act.⁷⁸

This divine influence or deiformity is received not only by the substance of the soul, but also by its powers, particularly by those which are directly ordained towards God.⁷⁹ They are, according to St. Bonaventure, even the primary bearers of this deiformity, just as they were

⁷⁴ "Congruum enim est ut pulcritudo universi decoretur quibusdam antithetis, ut sicut bonis redduntur bona aeterna, ita et malis aeterna supplicia." IV *Sent.* 44. 2. 1. 1. c. (IV. 921 b).

⁷⁵ "Nullo minus Deo potest rationalis spiritus praemiari nec impleri, nec eius capacitas terminari." *Brevil.* 7. 7 (V. 289 b).

⁷⁶ "Beatitudo est finis satians nostrum appetitum. Satians autem nostrum appetitum est dupliciter: vel sicut obiectum vel sicut informans. Satians nostrum appetitum sicut *obiectum* solus Deus est, ad quem capiendum humana anima ordinatur. Satians autem sicut *informans* est ipsa influentia Dei in animam, quae est ipsa deiformitas et satietas." IV *Sent.* 49. 1. u. 1. c. (IV. 1000 b—1001 a).

⁷⁷ "Tam gratia gratum faciens quam gloria nominat divinam influentiam, per quam anima habet Deum, et Deus habitat in anima. Habere autem contingit dupliciter: vel perfecte, . . . vel semiplene . . . Primum est gloriae, secundum est gratiae." II *Sent.* 27. 1. 3. c. (II. 660 a).

⁷⁸ "Beatitudo creata non dicit actum pure, quia constat quod actus gloriosus ab aliquo habitu procedit; nec dicit habitum pure, quia dicit perfectionem summam, quae est in actu continuo: ideo necesse est quod dicat habitum ut actum sive in actu, sicut si diceret scientiam, quae semper est in considerando." IV *Sent.* 49. 1. u. 1. ad 5 (IV. 1001 b). For a more detailed study on the notion of *deiformitas* in the doctrine of St. Bonaventure see J. J. Hartnett, *op. cit.*, 77—95; the deiformity as a *medium* between habitus and act is mentioned on p. 78—9.

⁷⁹ "Quia substantiale praemium beatitudinis in Deo consistit, ideo actus gloriae principales sunt secundum quos anima convertitur in Deum. Et secundum hos actus dotes assignantur, quia secundum hos anima unitur Deo tamquam sponsa sponso." IV *Sent.* 49. 1. u. 5. c. (IV. 1009 a).

in the case of sanctifying grace.⁸⁰ The immediate recipients of the divine influence are again the three powers of the *liberum arbitrium*. The particular perfections, which these three powers now receive under this influence, are the so-called endowments of the glorified soul. They correspond to the three theological virtues, so that the parallel between glory and grace is complete.⁸¹ How the one leads the other to final perfection is explained by St. Bonaventure in the following words:

All the powers, the activity of which is directed through grace towards God, will have, through glory, a perfect activity, after the imperfect has become void. Hence the *rational* power, the property of which is now to believe by faith, will then see openly; the *concupiscible* power, the function of which is to love, will then love perfectly; the *irascible* power, the property of which is to reach up and to hold on through hope, will then retain possession permanently and securely. Hence we distinguish, in accordance with these three acts, the three endowments of vision, love, and comprehension or possession or enjoyment by appropriation, for enjoyment embraces these three.⁸²

Through the *habitus* of deiformity and its three special endowments the created spirit reaches the final union with God and becomes an immediate partaker in His glory. These heavenly gifts reside primarily in the three powers of the *liberum arbitrium*; but since these three powers and those in which the natural image consists correspond to one another in a real sense, the deiformity with its three endowments perfects also the image which, in this way, returns to God. St. Bonaventure can therefore truly say that "the rational spirit, which proceeds from the Most Blessed Trinity and is an image of the Trinity, returns through memory, intellect, and will, and through the deiformity of

⁸⁰ "Unde credo quod tam gratia quam gloria primo est in potentia." IV *Sent.* 49. 1. u. 4. c. (IV. 1006b). See above, p. 132, note 40.

⁸¹ The correspondence between the three powers of the *liberum arbitrium*, the three theological virtues, and the three endowments is expressed in III *Sent.* 26. 1. 3. c. (III. 562a). — The works of St. Bonaventure do not contain any explicit statement about the exact relation between the one *deiformity* and the three *endowments*. A study of the few texts touching this question has led J. J. Hartnett to the conclusion: "Quare concludimus, et merito, gratiam consummatam consistere in triplici dote, quia una eademque influentia considerata ut habitus nominatur deiformitas; sed considerata ut actus est triplex, scilicet dos visionis, tentionis et fruitionis" (*op. cit.*, 81).

⁸² "Omnes vires quae habent per gratiam actum in Deum, habebunt per gloriam actus perfectos, evacuatis imperfectis. Unde rationalis, cuius est modo credere per fidem, tunc videbit aperte; concupiscibilis, cuius est amare, diligit tunc perfecte; irascibilis, cuius est erigi et inniti per spem, tunc tenebit continue et certe. Unde secundum hos tres actus distinguuntur tres dotes, scilicet visio, dilectio, comprehensio sive tentio sive fruitio per appropriationem; nam fruitio ista tria complectitur." IV *Sent.* 49. 1. u. 5. c. (IV. 1009b).

glory by way of a certain intelligible circle into the Most Blessed Trinity."⁸³

How the divine influence of deiformity perfects the powers of the natural image in the state of heavenly glory, is made clear by the Seraphic Doctor in the words of St. Bernard which he frequently quotes: "For the intellect God will be the fullness of light, for the will the abundance of peace, and for the memory the continuation of eternity."⁸⁴ Under this divine influence the rational spirit "becomes conformed to God. He sees Him clearly with his reason, loves Him fully with his will, and retains Him forever with his memory." Through this influence God is giving Himself as the eternal reward, "in order that, in this way, the entire soul may live, the entire soul be richly endowed in its three powers, the entire soul be conformed to God, be wholly united with Him, and wholly rest in Him, finding in Him, as in the sum total of all good, peace, light, and eternal sufficiency."⁸⁵

Section B

The Mediate Return of the Corporeal World to God and its Share in the Final Glorification

After following the human soul in its immediate ascent and final return to God and the heavenly glory, we must now recall the fact that this soul is not a spiritual being on its own, but is joined to a body. As a combination of spirit and matter, man is the connecting link between the two principal levels of creation and functions as mediator between the corporeal world and God. We have already seen that the entire material universe is ordained towards man and serves him in every respect. It is on the basis of this ordination and service that the visible world shares in the general return to God and the final glorification.

⁸³ "Vita aeterna haec sola est, ut spiritus rationalis, qui manat a beatissima Trinitate et est imago Trinitatis, per modum cuiusdam circuli intelligibilis redeat per memoriam, intelligentiam et voluntatem, per deiformitatem gloriae in beatissimam Trinitatem." *De myst. Trinit.* 8. ad 7 (V. 115b).

⁸⁴ "Deus futurus est rationi plenitudo lucis, voluntati multitudo pacis et memoriae continuatio aeternitatis." St. Bernard, *In Cant.*, sermo 11. 5 (ML 183. 826). These words are quoted by St. Bonaventure e. g. in his *Breviloquium* 7. 7 (V. 289a) and in *IV Sent.* 49. 1. u. 5. fund. 5 (IV. 1008b).

⁸⁵ "In praemium datur ei deiformitas gloriae, per quam Deo effectus conformis, et ratione ipsum videat clare et voluntate diligat plene et memoria retineat in aeternum, ut sic anima tota vivat, tota dotetur in tribus animae viribus, tota Deo configuretur, tota illi uniatur, tota in illo requiescat, in ipso sicut in omni bono inveniens pacem, lucem et sufficientiam sempiternam." *Brevil.* 7. 7 (V. 289b).

The nature and degree of this mediate participation depend on the importance and intimacy of this service. The corporeal being which excels, in these respects, all other material things is the human body, because it is joined to the soul in a substantial union. To this unique relationship corresponds a unique participation which differs from that of all other things in this visible world. Our study on the mediate return of the material creation is therefore divided into two clearly distinct parts which St. Bonaventure himself indicates:⁸⁶ the final glorification of the *human body*, and the renovation of the *visible universe*.

§ 1

The Participation of the Human Body through the Four Endowments

The function of man in creation, as the connecting link and as mediator, rests essentially on the fact that man is composed of a material body and a spiritual soul. The firm union of body and soul in man is, therefore, the decisive point upon which the harmony and continuity in creation and, also, the general return of all creatures depend. It is, in view of this fact, not surprising but rather to be expected, that St. Bonaventure stresses this union in a particular way.

The Seraphic Doctor considers the human soul as a true substance and calls it on numerous occasions a *hoc aliquid* — this something.⁸⁷ Because of this substantiality the soul is capable of existing by itself and has its proper spiritual activities. But it would be a wrong interpretation of St. Bonaventure's doctrine on the soul and contrary to his basic ideas of man to consider this capability of existing separately as the principal reason and purpose of the soul's substantiality, and to see in its separation from the body a more perfect and desirable condition.⁸⁸ Rather the opposite is the case. The *union* of the soul with its body is the primary and fundamental fact. The ability to enter into a substantial union with a body is an essential and characteristic note

⁸⁶ "Ultimo disponunt huiusmodi formae ad animam rationalem, per quam etiam *corpus* et *natura corporalis* efficitur particeps aeternae beatitudinis." II *Sent.* 1. 2. 1. 2. ad 3 (II. 42b).

⁸⁷ See e. g. II *Sent.* 17. 1. 2. c. (II. 414b) and *Brevil.* 2. 9 (V. 227a). That St. Bonaventure understands this expression in the sense of a true substance, consisting of matter and form, is clear from II *Sent.* 3. 1. 2. 3. c. (II. 109b—110a), 15. 1. 1. ad 2 (375b), and 18. 1. 3. fund. 4 (440a).

⁸⁸ See on this point particularly the article of I. Brady, "In Seipso Subsistere: An Examination of St. Bonaventure's Doctrine on the Substantiality of the Soul," *Progress in Philosophy: Philosophical Studies in Honor of Rev. Doctor Charles A. Hart* (Milwaukee, Wisc., 1955) 141—8.

of the human soul.⁸⁹ Without this union the soul is a true, but not a complete substance.

The soul possesses a natural inclination towards its own body.⁹⁰ It has not only spiritual powers, but also the vegetative and sensitive powers by which it is linked to the body and which it is able to use only in union with the body. The soul therefore desires to communicate its operations to this body.⁹¹ "Although the soul does not depend on the body in the sense that it is in need of it for the continuation of its existence, it is nevertheless dependent because of the inclination of its desire which it has towards the body as the form has towards its proper matter."⁹² The fulfillment of this inclination is so essential for the soul that St. Bonaventure does not consider the soul without its body to be a person because it lacks, in this condition, the required completeness and incommunicability.⁹³

In order to illustrate the intensity of the soul's love and desire for its own body, St. Bonaventure compares the union between the two with the most intimate relations among men, especially with the bond of love in marriage;⁹⁴ but the desire of the soul for its body surpasses even this.⁹⁵ The inclination of the soul is, in turn, met by a desire on the part of the corporeal nature which likewise longs for the most perfect form of the human soul; for in this union the desire of matter for higher forms comes to rest.⁹⁶ The inclination thus becomes mutual.⁹⁷ Through this union both soul and body receive their final perfection.

This essential ordination and inclination of body and soul towards each other, so strongly emphasized by St. Bonaventure, shows that he considers the union of the two as the state which corresponds to their

⁸⁹ See esp. II *Sent.* 1. 2. 3. 2 (II. 49—51).

⁹⁰ "Anima essentialiter inclinationem habet ad corpus." In *Hexaem.* 7. 5 (V. 366a). Also *Brevil.* 7. 7 (V. 289b), II *Sent.* 31. 2. 2. c. (II. 753a), and III *Sent.* 16. 2. 1. c. (III. 354a).

⁹¹ "Anima magna inclinatione inclinatur ad corpus et corpori suas operationes communicat." II *Sent.* 19. 1. 1. ad 6 (II. 461b).

⁹² "Etsi [anima] non dependeat a corpore tanquam indigens eo ad sui conservationem, dependet tamen per appetitus sui inclinationem, quam habet ad ipsum, sicut forma ad materiam propriam." II *Sent.* 17. 1. 3. ad 4 (II. 418a).

⁹³ See III *Sent.* 5. 2. 3 (III. 135—7).

⁹⁴ See IV *Sent.* 43. 1. 5. ad 6 (IV. 894a) and 44. 1. 2. 1. ad 4 (912b).

⁹⁵ "Unde notandum, quod magna est dilectio, qua mater diligit filium; . . . Maior, qua uxor virum, . . . Maxima anima ad corpus." *Comment. in Ioan.* 15. 13 (no. 20) (VI. 450b). See also II *Sent.* 31. 2. 2. ad 1 (II. 753a).

⁹⁶ See II *Sent.* 1. 2. 3. 2. c. (II. 50b).

⁹⁷ "Appetitus et indigentia est in utroque, quia constituunt tertium." IV *Sent.* 17. 1. dub. 3 (IV. 433a). Also *Brevil.* 7. 5 (V. 286b) and II *Sent.* 17. 1. 2. ad 6 (II. 415b—416a).

nature. Since the soul is immortal and always possesses this inclination,⁹⁸ the necessary proportion in creation requires that such a soul be united to an incorruptible body.⁹⁹ According to St. Bonaventure, it would have been against the order of divine justice if Adam had died without having sinned; for, in the eyes of the Seraphic Doctor, the separation of soul and body in death bears the clear and unmistakable mark of a punishment.¹⁰⁰ God therefore created man in the state of original justice, in which the union of soul and body was to be permanent because a special influence of God actualized and completed the natural aptitude and desire.¹⁰¹ After the sin of Adam, the separation of soul and body in death was decreed by God as a punishment attached to the human nature and not removed by grace and justification.¹⁰²

The soul, after leaving the body and being cleansed from the last remnants of sin, ascends into heaven and enjoys eternal happiness. But since the soul still possesses the natural and essential inclination towards its body, its joy is not complete¹⁰³ and its peace not perfect¹⁰⁴ as long as it is separated from its body. The full restoration of man's complete nature¹⁰⁵ and of his function in creation therefore includes the resurrection of the human body as part of the final act in the drama of creation.

⁹⁸ "Anima semper appetit uniri corpori." II *Sent.* 19. 2. 1. fund. 6 (II. 465b).

⁹⁹ "In solo autem homine anima est immortalis per naturam, sicut ostensum fuit supra; et ideo mortalitas in aliis animalibus non ponit aliquam *improportionem perfectibilis ad suam perfectionem*, sicut ponit in homine." II *Sent.* 30. 1. 1. ad 2 (II. 716b). — "Spiritus enim, qui naturaliter coniungitur corpori, numquam natus est a corpore separari nisi *propter poenam peccati*. Cum enim sit incorruptibilis secundum naturalem institutionem, debet ei aptari corpus incorruptibile, cum non possit ab eo separari absque dolore." II *Sent.* 18. 2. 2. ad 5 (II. 451a).

¹⁰⁰ "Corporis dissolutio non potest animae purae et innocenti non esse poena." II *Sent.* 19. 2. 1. c. (II. 465b). See on this point I. Brady, "The Relation between Sin and Death according to Mediaeval Theologians," *SM* 7 (Burlington, Wisc., 1952) 62—6; also *op. cit.*, 148—52.

¹⁰¹ See II *Sent.* 19. 3. 1 (II. 468—71). St. Bonaventure summarizes his answer to this question by saying: "Et sic patet quod immortalitas, quae fuit in statu innocentiae, quantum ad *aptitudinem* fuit a natura, quantum ad *complementum* fuit a gratia" (470a). In his answer to the 4th objection we read: "Ad continuationem vitae non sufficit appetitus, sicut ad beatificationem non sufficit appetere beatitudinem, sed necessaria est ulterius virtus ad satisfaciendum appetitui" (470b).

¹⁰² *Ibid.* 33. dub. 4 (800a—b).

¹⁰³ "Nec naturalis appetitus patitur, quod anima sit plene beata, nisi restitatur ei corpus, ad quod resumendum habet inclinationem naturaliter insertam." *Brevil.* 7. 7. (V. 289b). — "Anima non est beata perfecta beatitudine nisi cum corpore. Hoc autem erit in resurrectione generali." *Sabb. S.*, sermo 1. 4 (IX. 269b).

¹⁰⁴ "Perfecta pax non est nisi in reunione corporis et animae; et hoc certum est. Si enim anima essentialiter inclinationem habet ad corpus, nunquam anima plene quietatur, nisi sibi corpus reddatur." *In Hexaem.* 7. 5 (V. 366a); see also 8. 13 (371a).

¹⁰⁵ See *Brevil.* 7. 5 (V. 286b).

The right order and proportion, which St. Bonaventure so frequently mentions in his argumentations, now requires that the body be restored to the soul in such a form that it corresponds to the glorified state of the soul. In order to be in so complete a harmony and to serve as a perfect instrument of the soul in every activity, the body must likewise be glorified and therefore receives four special endowments. In his *Breviloquium*, St. Bonaventure presents these endowments in close relationship to the three endowments of the soul.¹⁰⁶ Because the soul is clarified by the vision of the Eternal Light, its body must possess the extreme *clarity* of light. Since the soul is completely spiritualized by the love for the Highest Spirit, it must have in its body the corresponding *subtlety*. Because the possession of eternity has made the soul incapable of suffering, the body must likewise enjoy the gift of complete *impassibility* from within and without. In order to be able to follow the soul in its ascent to God and to serve in all its activities, the body must finally possess the highest *agility*.¹⁰⁷ The glory of the soul thus flows over into the body¹⁰⁸ which is now perfectly conformed and subjected to the soul, shares in its happiness, and is ready to take its permanent place in the heavenly home.

§ 2

The Participation of the Visible Universe through Renovation and Final Rest

In the same way as the human body receives the final glorification because of its union with the human soul, so do the other corporeal creatures reach the ultimate end because of their ordination towards man. It is significant and characteristic of St. Bonaventure that he begins his explanation of the final events in the visible world at the end of time with the explicit statement that man "is placed in the middle

¹⁰⁶ St. Bonaventure calls the glorification of the body the *praemium consubstantialie*. See *Brevil.* 7. 7 (V. 288b—289a).

¹⁰⁷ See *Brevil.* 7. 7 (V. 289b—290a). The number of these endowments is discussed also in the Commentary on the *Sentences* where St. Bonaventure lists four reasons. He himself favors the last solution according to which the four endowments are given in order to counteract the four principal weaknesses of the body. These weaknesses, in turn, are traced back to the four elements of which the body consists. See IV *Sent.* 49. 2. 1. 2. 1. c. (IV. 1015b—1016b).

¹⁰⁸ "Beatum denique per quamdam *redundantiam* est corpus humanum, in quod gaudium gloriae *redundat* per coniunctionem sui ad animam beatam." III *Sent.* 28. u. 4. c. (III. 629a). See also IV *Sent.* 49. 1. u. 3. c. (IV. 1005b) and *Brevil.* 7. 7 (V. 290a).

between God and these inferior things."¹⁰⁹ The corporeal world is like a house in which man dwells. The perfect order and harmony in creation, which manifests the wisdom of the Creator, requires that the house correspond to the actual condition of its inhabitants, and thus man becomes the controlling and decisive factor for the rest of creation. As long as man remained in the state of original justice, the visible world had to be in a good and calm condition. When man sinned, this world had to deteriorate also. Together with man, the visible universe will have to be purified, renewed, and brought to final rest.¹¹⁰

The transformation of the visible world at the end of time will be accomplished by fire, the most terrifying and powerful of the elements. It will punish the wicked, cleanse the just, and change the face of the earth.¹¹¹ The animals, plants, and other fleeting things (*esse decurrens*) will be consumed and dissolved by the fire, for they belong only to the transitory world in which they exist for the praise of God and for the perfection of the universe.¹¹² They are ordained towards man during the time of his earthly pilgrimage. Their function ends when man reaches his eternal destiny and the number of the elect is complete.¹¹³ But although the animals and plants will cease to exist in their own nature after the end of the present world, they will still have some share in the final glorification. They are, as St. Bonaventure explains, "saved in their principles and somehow in likeness, namely in man who has a likeness to every kind of creature. Hence in man's renovation and glorification we can speak of the renovation of all and, in some way, of the reward of all."¹¹⁴ Since the human body is composed of all four

¹⁰⁹ "Deus secundum sapientiam suam ordinatissimam cunctum mundum istum sensibilem et maiorem fecit propter mundum minorem, videlicet hominem, qui inter Deum et res istas inferiores in medio collocatus est." *Brevil.* 7. 4 (V. 284 b).

¹¹⁰ "Ut omnia sibi invicem congruant, et habitatio cum habitatore habeat harmoniam, homine bene instituto, debuit mundus iste in bono et quieto statu institui; homine labente, debuit etiam mundus iste deteriorari; homine perturbato, debuit perturbari; homine expurgato, debuit expurgari; homine innovato, debuit innovari; et homine consummato, debuit quietari." *Ibid.* (285 a).

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹¹² See IV *Sent.* 48. 2. 4. c. (IV. 994 b). For the distinction of *esse decurrens* and *esse permanens* see II *Sent.* 19. 1. 2. c. (II. 463 a).

¹¹³ "Postremo, quoniam mundus iste debet consummari, homine consummato; et tunc est homo consummatus, quando in gloria completus erit numerus electorum, qui quidem statum omnia tendunt sicut ad finem ultimum et completum." *Brevil.* 7. 4 (V. 285 b).

¹¹⁴ "Vegetabilia vero et sensibilia . . . necesse est in propria natura consumi, ita tamen, quod salvantur in *principiis* et quodam modo in *simili*, videlicet in homine, qui similitudinem habet cum omni genere creaturae; et ideo in ipsius innovatione et glorificatione possunt dici omnia innovari

elements¹¹⁵ and is, in its perfect mixture or complexity, similar also to the heavenly bodies,¹¹⁶ the entire corporeal world is thus represented in the glorified body of man and so participates in the final glorification.

But in addition to this, St. Bonaventure also speaks of a more real participation on the part of the heavenly bodies and the earthly elements, which together constitute the basic structure of the created world (*esse permanens*). The elements will be refined and renewed by the transforming fire. After this, they will no longer act upon one another, nor will they unite with one another to form other bodies;¹¹⁷ for all this activity of the elements is ordained towards the most noble form, namely, to the rational soul. And since human souls will then have reached their final number and state, there will have to be an end also to that which precedes and leads up to them.¹¹⁸ For the same reason, the heavenly bodies will then no longer move;¹¹⁹ rest and fullness of light is considered to be their final reward.¹²⁰

We thus see how the entire corporeal world reaches its ultimate end and shares in the final glorification through the mediation of man, whose spiritual soul alone is capable of an immediate participation in the glory of God, and whose power of free decision enables him to gain true merits and to obtain this glory as a real reward. The material world takes part in the final glorification and receives its reward only according to the degree in which it is related to man: the human body is glorified because it is most intimately united to the soul and therefore partakes in its meritorious deeds; the rest of the visible creation participates, although in a more remote way, on account of the service it renders to man.¹²¹

When St. Bonaventure explains how all creatures are rewarded according to their nature and their place in the order of creation, he

et quodam modo praemiari." *Ibid.* (285b—286a). The translation is according to E. E. Nemmers, *Breviloquium by St. Bonaventure* (St. Louis, Mo., 1946) 229—30.

¹¹⁵ See II *Sent.* 17. 2. 1. c. (II. 419b—420a).

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.* 17. 2. 2. ad 4 (423b).

¹¹⁷ See IV *Sent.* 48. 2. 3. c. (IV. 993b).

¹¹⁸ "Cum enim omnia ista ordinentur ad formam nobilissimam, quae quidem est anima rationalis; posito statu in animabus, necesse est, statum et complementum poni in ceteris praecedentibus." *Brevil.* 7. 4 (V. 285b).

¹¹⁹ IV *Sent.* 48. 2. 2. c. (IV. 991b—992a). See also II *Sent.* 18. 2. 1. ad 6 (II. 447b).

¹²⁰ See *Brevil.* 7. 4 (V. 285b).

¹²¹ "Respondeo: Dicendum quod tripliciter est aliquid remunerabile: primo modo, quod est *aptum natum mereri*, et hoc est liberum arbitrium; alio modo, quod est ipsi merenti *coniunctum*, ut corpus humanum; tertio modo, quod est ad ipsum ordinatum sicut ad *obsequium*." IV *Sent.* 48. 2. 1. c. (IV. 990a—b).

also points out that it is ultimately man who is rewarded in them.¹²² This is true not only with regard to his own body but also with regard to the visible creation around him; for, as St. Bonaventure says, "the Lord will, in his love for man, make the entire world more beautiful."¹²³ Here we see again how much the Seraphic Doctor considers man as the all-important figure in the general return of the visible world to God. Through the mediation of man, the lowest forms of creation are joined to God, their first beginning and final end, like links in a chain. The decisive link in this chain is man — and that, more particularly, in virtue of his soul which possesses an essential relationship both to the visible world below and to the Triune God above. St. Bonaventure expresses this fact when he defines the human soul as a *forma beatificabilis*.¹²⁴ As a substantial *form*, the soul is linked to its body and, through it, to the corporeal world; as a creature that is capable of a direct communication with God and of an eternal *beatitudo*, this same soul is directed upward and is, with its spiritual powers, ready to ascend to God. Man is thus the focal point in the order of creation. His redemption and beatification restore and perfect this order and bring it to a final completion.

CONCLUSION

With the return of all creatures to God the great drama of creation is concluded and St. Bonaventure's picture of man in this drama also completed. In accordance with the *twofold purpose* that sets in motion and controls the great circular movement of all creatures from God and back to God, we have seen man first in his *intermediate position* between spirit and matter as the most perfect *manifestation* of God's power, wisdom, and goodness. We then saw him also in his function as the *decisive mediator* in the general return of creation to God and its *participation* in the final beatitude. Although man is not the highest creature with regard to the dignity of nature, St. Bonaventure definitely

¹²² "Secundum hoc *praemiatur* homo aliquando in *se ipso*, aliquando in *corpore*, aliquando ex eis quae sibi sunt *utilia*." *Ibid.*

¹²³ "Unde dico, quod corpora supercaelestia praemiari, non est aliud quam hominem praemiari in illis, quia Dominus totum mundum hominis amore faciet pulcriorem." *Ibid.*

¹²⁴ "Non tantum spiritum angelicum et separatum fecit beatificabilem, sed etiam spiritum coniunctum, scilicet humanum. Est igitur anima rationalis *forma beatificabilis*." *Brevil.* 2. 9 (V. 226b—227a).

places him in the *center* of the entire creation as the creature to which all others are in some way related, and to which God has shown his greatest love.

The elements which St. Bonaventure uses in the composition of this picture of man are derived from various *sources*. Holy Scripture itself is quoted in a number of brief passages. More explicit statements about a threefold order in creation are found in some of the Greek Fathers, whose thoughts reached St. Bonaventure particularly through St. John Damascene. The idea of a direct contact between the human mind and God derives from the writings of St. Augustine. The principle about a necessary intermediate member, which St. Bonaventure uses in order to prove the necessity of man's function as a connecting link both in the order of creation and in the general return, contains some basic Neoplatonic ideas which were transmitted to the Middle Ages largely by Denis the Areopagite and have their roots in Plato and the Pythagoreans. The name of Aristotle is also mentioned, but his ideas are applied somewhat externally and do not constitute the real basis for St. Bonaventure's doctrine on man in creation.

The Seraphic Doctor has combined all these various elements in one great *synthesis*, in which we see man as an essential and central figure. The notion that controls both the position and the function of man is that of *order*. Since these two aspects of man in creation are so intimately connected with the two principal kinds of order, this fundamental notion in the doctrine of St. Bonaventure has played a very important part in our study. The harmony and correspondence which we have found everywhere is closely connected with this order; for a creation which is to reflect its Creator in the best possible way, cannot be without true and perfect order.

This great synthesis, which St. Bonaventure likes to compare to a circular movement, includes both the *natural* and the *supernatural* order. The return of all visible creatures to God is accomplished through the mediation of man; but man has, by nature, only the capacity for such a return. For its actual realization, man needs supernatural grace which elevates him and enables him to reach the final union with God and to participate in the eternal beatitude. In order that the great circle of creation be closed and completed, a supernatural elevation is therefore required, and likewise the work of redemption through which the gift of grace is restored to man. This does not mean a denial of the supernatural and gratuitous character of grace and redemption; it only shows that both the natural and the supernatural realm are parts

of the one divine plan, which the Seraphic Doctor has been able to present in such a unified and harmonious synthesis.

In stressing man's intermediate position, which essentially depends on the union of soul and body, St. Bonaventure also manifests a very positive attitude towards the *material world*. He considers the union of the soul with a body as a true perfection and as an essential part of the order in creation. He does not deny that a purely spiritual being, such as an angel, is in itself of a higher dignity; but he strongly emphasizes that, in view of the particular role of man in creation, this union with a material body is also a high nobility which places man, in some respects, above the angels. Since man stands in the middle of creation and is ordained towards God as well as towards the material world below, he reads not only in the book of the Eternal Ideas in God, but also in the book of the visible creation. Here again appears the very positive attitude towards the things in nature. They are not to be despised, but are to be used as stepping-stones on the way to God.

In this respect St. Bonaventure differs from Denis the Areopagite, the Father of Mystical Theology. Denis' first concern was to exclude all created things from the mind as soon as possible, and he was therefore anxious to transcend this visible world. St. Bonaventure makes another approach, which is best represented in his *Itinerarium*. He considers the material world as providing the first important steps in man's ascent to God, and only after he has made full use of their service does he leave them behind and let the soul ascend higher. Although St. Bonaventure stresses the positive value of this visible creation, he is not in danger of losing himself in it. He knows that man stands in the middle, and that the things below him are not an end in themselves, but only reflections of the Creator and signs on the road to Him, the ultimate end of all creatures. To recognize this intermediate position and to realize it in life, will ever be the fundamental task of man; in this respect, the doctrine of St. Bonaventure on man in creation represents true Christian wisdom and will always remain timely and effective.

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MATTHEW OF AQUASPARTA'S COGNITION THEORY

PART III OBJECTS OF INTELECTION*

CHAPTER VI OBJECT OF THE INTELLECT

Part II of this study has presented the ideogenetic theories of Matthew of Aquasparta, Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus, showing a development of doctrine on the question of how the intellect knows. The next part will concern itself with the objects of intellection as taught by these same four Scholastics. The first chapter will discuss the object of the intellect in general; the second, knowledge of singulars; the third chapter, the soul's knowledge of itself with a final chapter on the nature of universal knowledge.

Matthew of Aquasparta

The present chapter on the object of the human intellect concerns itself with the proper end of man's cognitive activity. Such a doctrine is obviously related to the respective authors' entire theory of ideogenesis. For example, Matthew teaches that the intellect forms a species from material furnished by the object and this intellectual activity is perfected by a special divine illumination. He emphasizes the activity of the intellect, yet admits that the external object is an instrumental cause of cognition. From this ideogenetic theory Matthew derives the thesis that the essence of a being is the object of the mind. As further corollary to his stress on the activity of the intellect, Matthew also maintains the possibility of a cognition of nonexistents, if this term is understood as "that which does not exist in some way."

Object of the Intellect: *quod quid est*

Matthew quotes with approval a passage in Aristotle which specifies that the object of the intellect is *quod quid est*.¹ In Matthew's own for-

* See *Franciscan Studies* 20 (1960), pp. 161 and 21 (1961) pp.

¹ *De cognitione*, Q. I, p. 209. Here Matthew quotes from Aristotle, *De anima* III, 26.

mula, the object of the human mind is "the quiddity of the thing conceived by the intellect and related to the eternal exemplar."²

According to Matthew, the proper object of the intellect is the essence of the object; he does not say, however, that the concept of this essence must be abstracted from sensible things, since the intellect is able to grasp the essence of any created object and this without necessarily having recourse to an abstractive process. The mind, for example, can know itself by a kind of intuition without need of any abstraction from the phantasm. In addition, the intellect, as already indicated, has certain innate ideas and impressed species. In the light of his ideogenesis, then, Matthew simply describes the object of the intellect as the essence of the thing. This does not mean, however, that the mind comes into direct contact with this essence; rather, the quiddity of the object is apprehended by the possible intellect through a species. Such an interpretation follows from Matthew's theory that the possible intellect turns itself towards a species which is brought forth from the phantasm, not impressed by the external object. Finally, the quiddity of an object can be understood fully and perfectly only in relation to its eternal exemplar; here Matthew returns to his thesis of special illumination required for perfect knowledge of the truth.

With regard to its proper object, the quiddity of the thing conceived by the mind and related to its eternal exemplar, the human intellect is always true, i. e. the concept is always true. Only the "composed intellect" which judges the relationship of concepts can be false.³ In other words, the intellect acting in conformity with its nature is always true on the level of simple apprehension; in fact this knowledge of truth is the proper operation of the intellect.⁴ But, as has been explained, perfect knowledge of truth involves illumination. Consequently, Matthew sums up his position by saying that truth has its origins in things, its formal cause in the intellect and its perfect exemplar in the divine ideas.⁵ When all three factors are present, the intellect always achieves the proper termination of its activity and thus comes to know truth. Thus, man's knowledge of the essence of an object is necessary and immutable, because it is based on a comparison with the eternal exem-

² *De cognitione*, Q. I, p. 215. Sed est quidditas ipsa concepta ab intellectu nostro, relata tamen ad artem sive exemplar aeternum, in quantum, tangens mentem nostram, se habet in ratione moventis.

³ *De providentia*, Q. III, pp. 300—301. Matthew does admit that the intellect, like the senses, can be false accidentally, for example in determining whether a definition should include one attribute or another.

⁴ *De gratia*, Q. IV, p. 104.

⁵ *De cognitione*, Q. I, p. 214.

plar.⁶ From this discussion of truth in relation to the intellect it becomes apparent how Matthew's theory on the quiddity of the thing as the object of the intellect grows out of and completes his ideogenesis, uniting the subject, the object and special illumination.

According to Bettoni, Matthew holds that God is the proper object of the human intellect. In substantiation of his view, Bettoni points out that according to Matthew the human mind, as an image of God, is ordained to know Him; God co-operates with man's cognitive activity, then, as an *objectum motivum*. In his illumination theory Matthew thus hints at the thesis that God is the *primum cognitum* of the human intellect, though he never specifically states this answer to the question of what is the proper object of the mind. As additional proof of his interpretation, Bettoni claims that such a thesis follows from Matthew's doctrinal dependence on Bonaventure,⁷ since both philosophers speak of an innate idea by means of which man comes to a general knowledge of God.

By way of evaluation of Bettoni's theory, it might be said that Matthew clearly states, in the reference cited by Bettoni, that God is the *objectum motivum* of the mind, not the *objectum quietans*. As an example, Matthew shows how the sun is not the object of vision but only the medium by which man sees; likewise, the light of special illumination enables man to see but it is not the object of cognition. Therefore, God motivates the intellect but is not its object.

Matthew does declare that in this life man cannot know God directly, even though the mind was made for such contemplation of the divinity. He attributes this deficiency in man's intellectual powers to the weakening effects of original sin.⁸

In this formulation, Matthew seems close to the position of Scotus who also claims that God is the object of the intellect in terms of perfection not in terms of origin or adequation nor in this present life. Matthew and Scotus thus agree in explaining that the intellect does not attain its proper object, because of original sin or because of the harmony of man's powers while body and soul are united. In other words, both Matthew and Scotus maintain that the intellect *in se* is capable of seeing God, a capacity, however, which is limited in this life. For Scotus

⁶ A. Pegis, "Matthew of Aquasparta and the Cognition of Non-being," *Scholastica ratione historico-critica instauranda* (Rome: Antoniam, 1951), p. 469.

⁷ E. Bettoni, "Rapporti dottrinali fra Matteo d'Aquasparta e Giovanni Duns Scoto," *Studi Francescani*, XV (1943), pp. 116—17.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 120.

the proper object of the human intellect is being as being; for Matthew the proper object is the quiddity of the thing, but in this life man's powers are limited to apprehending created essences. Matthew's limitation does not mean, however, that the intellect has no capacity to know God, any more than Scotus' thesis restricts the mind to a knowledge of sensible quiddities, even though present circumstances may so circumscribe the object of intellection.

In fact, both Matthew and Scotus object to the thesis that the object of man's intellect must be proportionate to the limits of his present state. Although the divine being is never proportionate to any finite intellect, still the human mind and the being of God are commensurate in a "proportion of order;"⁹ the human mind, in other words, is "ordered" towards a knowledge of God. As Scotus points out, proportionality even requires a certain dissimilarity, if beings are to be ordered to each other.¹⁰ Thus an inferior being can be ordered to a superior one and this ordering is proportional.

Cognition of Non-being

According to Matthew, then, the object of the human intellect is the quiddity of the object, conceived by the intellect in the light of the divine ideas. The question which naturally arises is the relation of this concept to the actual existence of the object — a problem which Matthew treats in detail in the first question of his *De cognitione*.

In the initial paragraph of his "response" to this question, Matthew dismisses the signification of terms as a problem belonging to logic and extraneous to his discussion. Whether a word signifies existing things or nonexisting things, whether it is a sign of things or of concepts — these, Matthew remarks, are difficult problems which he cannot attempt to answer in the present question.

At the outset, Matthew distinguishes between the cognition of non-being considered from the standpoint of the object itself or from the standpoint of the knowing intellect.

Beginning with the first of these, he further distinguishes between two kinds of objective non-being. The first type of non-being is that which is simply nonexisting in such a way that it has no claim at all on being; it does not exist in itself, nor in a cause, neither in act or in potency. Such a non-being, which lacks all possibility of ever existing, cannot be the object of the intellect. On the other hand, that type of

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 118—19.

¹⁰ *I Op. Ox.*, 3, 3, 4; IX: 90. III: 74.

being which is nonexistent in some way can be the object of cognition. For example, such a non-being may not exist in itself but it does exist in a cause; it may be nonexistent in act but it exists potentially.¹¹ To prove that this latter type of non-being can be the object of the intellect, Matthew appeals to prophecy, to determination of future events and to remembrance of the past.

In the first place, Scripture witnesses to the gift of prophecy and pre-knowledge of future events. Granted that an object which will exist in the future is presently nonexistent, it follows that a prophet must be able to know non-being, if he is to foretell future events.

A second proof, very similar to the first, is found in man's ability to make decisions. Now man cannot exercise his will unless he first knows the issues involved. In other words, a man must first grasp alternative courses of action which do not actually exist, before he can make a free decision concerning them. Knowledge of that which is nonexistent, precedes the actuality of decision. Matthew quotes here a dictum of Augustine that the mind can have a concept which is not followed by any action, but it is impossible to act without some kind of a concept preceding the activity. In this way, Matthew proves that man can know beings which are not actually existing, since such pre-knowledge is necessary for any act of volition.

Remembrance of the past is further evidence for a cognition of non-being. Since knowledge of the past is absolutely necessary for any science, one must admit a cognition of something which is no longer existing.¹² Again quoting from Augustine, Matthew bases the truth of future events on their causes, evidence of the present on the actual existence of the object, the validity of the past on the continued existence of the object in the memory of the knower.¹³ Now the first and third examples cited here, involve a knowledge of something which is

¹¹ *De cognitione*, Q. I, pp. 209—10. Ex parte non-entis distinguo quod non-ens duobus modis potest accipi: scilicet non-ens simpliciter, hoc est nullo modo ens, nec in se nec in causa, nec in potentia nec in actu, quod non fuit nec erit, nec est nec possibile est esse; et tunc dico simpliciter quod non-ens nullo modo potest esse obiectum intellectus. Nam, ut dicit Avicenna, primum quod occurrit intellectui, et primum quod est ab intellectu apprehensibile, est ens; ideo sicut 'nihil' non-est, intelligibile, ita non-ens. Alio modo potest intelligi non-ens, non 'non-ens' simpliciter, sed non ens aliquo modo, utpote non ens actu, ens tamen potentia; non ens in se, ens tamen in sua causa efficiente vel exemplari. Et sic dico quod non-ens potest esse obiectum intellectus et est intelligibile.

¹² *De cognitione*, Q. I, p. 210—11.

¹³ M. Grabmann, *Die Philosophische und Theologische Erkenntnislehre des Kardinals Matthaeus von Aquasparta* (Vienna: Verlag von Mayer, 1906), p. 44.

not existing in the present, though such a non-being did exist in the past or will exist in the future.

As final proof for cognition of non-being, Matthew appeals to his own theory of abstraction. According to his ideogenetic theory the agent intellect abstracts the universal from the particular, the intelligible species from the sensible species, the quiddities of the object from the phantasm. Now in each of these abstractions the intellect is indifferent to the existence or nonexistence of the object.

Having presented all these examples of man's ability to know that which is presently nonexistent, Matthew concludes that non-being, described as that which does not exist in some particular way, can be the object of the intellect.¹⁴

In a second section of his response, Matthew explains cognition of non-being from the standpoint of the knowing intellect. Again he subdivides his answer into a consideration of what he calls the simple, absolute intellect versus the concrete, composed intellect.

The composed intellect understands objects under particular aspects, i. e. as present at a certain time or place; obviously such cognition requires the existence of the object. The composed intellect, for instance, knows the present as present, the past as past and the future as future; now these time factors must be based on the actual existence of the object, if the intellect is to be true. Since past and future refer to the present, the composed intellect is always relating the object to its actual existence.¹⁵ Consequently, if the composed intellect makes a judgment about time or place, it must be able to verify this judgment in reality.

On the other hand, the simple, pure and absolute intellect, which enables the mind to know the essence of the object, does not require the existence of that object. In support of this thesis, Matthew appeals to the quiddity of the thing known, to the role of the intellect in cognition and to the place of the intelligible species in the cognitive process.

¹⁴ *De cognitione*, Q. I, p. 211. Quarto (apparet) ex intellectus virtute et operatione. Intellectus enim sua virtute activa, suo lumine agentis potest abstrahere universalia a particularibus, species intelligibiles a sensibilibus, quidditates a rebus actualiter existentibus. Certum est autem quod tam universalia quam species intelligibiles, quam rerum quidditates nullam concernunt rem actu existentem, immo indifferenter se habent ad existens et non existens; nec locum concernunt aut tempus, et ideo ad intelligendum huiusmodi existentia rei vel non-existentia nihil facit. Et ideo, sicut potest intellectus intelligere rei quidditatem per speciem intelligibilem re existente, ita potest et re non existente.

¹⁵ *De cognitione*, Q. I, p. 211.

Matthew begins his arguments by quoting the opinion of Avicenna, who taught that in all creatures, essence is really distinct from existence. Therefore the quiddity of the object can be known by the intellect without any reference to the existence or nonexistence of the being itself. For example, Matthew claims that the essential definition of man as a "rational animal" does not depend on the existence of any man. In fact, it is impossible to predicate this definition of any one individual and to say "man is a rational animal." The truth of a definition, then, is not based on the existence of any object but on the quiddity of the object defined.

The intelligible species is likewise indifferent to the existence of the object which it represents. Like a piece of sculpture, a species simply represents the object without reference to its existence or nonexistence. If a statue of Hercules only represents Hercules as existing, then it is not a true representation when he is dead. In the same way, the purpose of a species is to recall simply the object which it represents, without considering its existence or nonexistence.¹⁶

A third proof that the intellect can understand non-being is found in the intellectual process itself, since the mind has the power to apprehend the essence of a being abstracting from any spatial-temporal considerations. Through this abstractive process, the intellect arrives at a concept which has no existential reference whatsoever. Consequently, the mind should experience no difficulty in understanding an object which is not actually existing. As further evidence that the intellect does not depend on the existence of the object, Matthew cites man's ability to separate mentally those objects which are joined in reality or to unite in thought objects which are really separate. In either case, the intellect knows the object in a way distinct from the actual existence of the being.¹⁷

Such are Matthew's three arguments proving that the mind can know nonexistent being. Noteworthy is Matthew's apparent acceptance of the Avicennian distinction of essence and existence, a distinction which

¹⁶ *De cognitione*, Q. I, pp. 212—13.

¹⁷ *De cognitione*, Q. I, p. 213. Ex parte intellectus, quoniam, ut dictum est, intellectus habet vim quamdam abstractivam; et ideo habet quamdam, ut dictum est, operationem absolutam, quae non concernit rem esse vel non esse, sed apprehendit rem tantum vel quidditatem rei; sicut intelligit hominem: non hunc vel illum, hic vel ibi, heri vel hodie, sed hominem tantum. Unde sicut intelligit hominem homine existente, ita quod homo existens non est obiectum eius, quia ab illo abstrahit, ita intelligit hominem non existente. Nec est maior difficultas hic quam ibi, ut videtur; et per istam eandem vim dividit coniuncta et coniungit separata, quae tamen non sunt impossibilia.

permits the mind to grasp the quiddity of the thing without reference to its existence. If the absolute intellect is able to form a species representing the quiddity of the thing and abstracting from any existential reference, then the intellect can know non-being.

In addition to these three philosophical arguments Matthew also appeals to "theology." According to his way of thinking, these philosophical arguments are inadequate, since they could be used to prove that the intellect knows only nonexistent objects. In other words, these very proofs for the intellect's capacity to know non-being, might open the door to complete skepticism and thus undermine the whole intellectual process. To avoid this, Matthew takes refuge in the principles of theology, explaining that when man understands the quiddity of any object, he knows a necessary and immutable truth. As has been explained, this knowledge is guaranteed by illumination, i. e. by comparing the essence of the object to its divine exemplar.¹⁸

Here Matthew joins his theory on the intelligibility of non-being to his illumination theory. Since his philosophical proof that the mind can know non-being could prove an excuse for universal skepticism, Matthew appeals to illumination to safeguard the reality of the cognitive process. It is interesting to note that Matthew here speaks of illumination as a theological principle.

Matthew's whole thesis on the intellection of non-being seems to follow from his general theory of ideogenesis. As Bonafede points out, since the object is not the total cause of cognition, it does not impress any species on the powers, nor does the agent intellect form the intelligible species from the object.¹⁹ On the basis of these ideogenetic theories, the actual presence or existence of the object is no longer absolutely required for cognition.

In critique of Matthew's theory, Gilson calls this appeal to the "theology" of illumination in indication that this special divine enlightenment leads to skepticism from which it can be rescued only by a type of fideism.²⁰ In other words, illumination, as a theological principle, implies that man's natural cognitive powers are open to universal doubt. But it might be asked whether Matthew's classification of illumination as a theological principle implies all that Gilson thinks. Cer-

¹⁸ *De cognitione*, Q. I, pp. 213—14.

¹⁹ G. Bonafede, "La conoscenza del singolare nella scuola Francescana del secolo XIII," *Collectanea Franciscana*, XXII (1952), p. 34.

²⁰ E. Gilson, "Sur quelques difficultés de l'illumination augustinienne," *Revue néoscholastique de philosophie*, XXXVI (1934), pp. 330—31.

tainly, the whole notion of a division or separation of philosophy and theology would seem foreign to this faithful disciple of Bonaventure.

Of more importance for this study, is the fact that Pegis credits Matthew with one of the oldest formulations of this question on the cognition of nonexistents.²¹ Perhaps this pioneering element explains certain omissions in Matthew's treatment of the problem. For example, he fails to give any detailed exposition on how the nonexistent object can furnish the matter of the concept. Granted that the intellect can abstract from the existence of the object, still the problem remains as to how non-being gives rise to a proper species, since, as Matthew himself says, the object co-operates as an instrumental cause in the genesis of the concept. Though Matthew does fail to give a complete ideogenesis of non-being, still he makes an important contribution in proving that knowledge of a nonexistent object is not contrary to the nature of the intellect.

St. Bonaventure

Bonaventure's theory on the object of the intellect follows the same general pattern as that of Matthew of Aquasparta. Both philosophers hold that knowledge of corporeal things is received through the senses; however, the soul's knowledge of itself, of God, or of other spiritual substances does not depend on the phantasm.²² In these instances, the soul knows the object through its own essence and not by means of a similitude. The soul, for example, has an innate knowledge of love and fear, which are affections of the soul itself.²³ Following from this doctrine that the soul knows without recourse to the phantasm, Bonaventure declares that the *primum ens* is the supreme object of the intellect.²⁴

This thesis that God is the object of the intellect implies that all created things are known in God, i. e. knowledge of the truth of all beings requires the light of special illumination. Thus the possible intellect has the capacity to know all things but the agent intellect in itself lacks sufficient light to make this knowledge practical.²⁵ Since perfect knowledge requires illumination, Bonaventure can say that God is the object of the human intellect, because He is the supreme reason of all knowledge, as well as the Creator of all being.

²¹ A. Pegis, *op. cit.*, p. 463.

²² II *Sent.*, 39, 1, 2; II: 904 b.

²³ II *Sent.*, 39, 1, 2; II: 904 a.

²⁴ E. Bettoni, "Puncti di contatto fra la dottrina bonaventuriana dell' illuminazione e la dottrina scotista dell' univocità," *Scholastica ratione historico-critica instauranda* (Rome: Antonianum, 1951), p. 529.

²⁵ *De scientia Christi*, IV, concl.; V: 23 b.

Bonaventure agrees here with the Aristotelian principle that the mind is able to know all things; but for the Seraphic Doctor this "all" refers primarily to knowledge of God. Granted that the intellect cannot comprehend God, still it is capable of apprehending Him.²⁶ To explain this apprehension, Bonaventure says that being is "that which is first understood." Now this concept of being is really an innate principle, not an idea abstracted from created reality. Consequently, this first notion of the intellect which is both necessary and true, already presents the mind with a concept of Absolute Being.²⁷ In this way, Bonaventure concludes that being is the first concept of the mind; furthermore this idea of being is an innate, general notion of God; finally, all other objects are known by means of an illumination from the divine ideas. God becomes, then, the supreme object and complete reason of all intellection.

Man's knowledge of God, however, is not a direct intuition; what the intellect knows in itself and in all other beings, is the effect of God's loving, creative action.²⁸ In this life, then, man knows God only indirectly, yet God remains the supreme object of all cognition. On the basis of this thesis, Bonaventure explains his epistemology and metaphysics by a triple doctrine of emanation, exemplarism and reduction.

In contrast to Matthew's theory on the object of the intellect, Bonaventure's doctrine seems to place more emphasis on the need for special illumination. Both philosophers agree, however, in requiring a comparison with the divine exemplary ideas to establish the truth of cognition. Both maintain that this divine light is not the object known but only a means of coming to true cognition. For Bonaventure, however, this indirect intuition of God, this innate idea of the Supreme Being, is the proper object of the intellect, while Matthew, in a more realistic fashion, says that a being conceived by the mind and related to the divine exemplar is the object of man's cognition.

The Bonaventurian thesis that God is the object of the intellect is vigorously refuted by John Duns Scotus, who attributes this doctrine to Henry of Ghent making no mention of Bonaventure in his critique. Such a silence on the part of Scotus may serve to underline the points of agreement between these two Franciscans. Both discuss being as the adequate object of the mind; both admit that the intellect has the capacity to know the Supreme Being. But Bonaventure invokes illu-

²⁶ *Sent.*, 29, 8; I: 352b.

²⁷ E. Gilson, *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1938), p. 398.

²⁸ *II Sent.*, 23, 2, 3; II: 544b. Bonaventure also discusses the knowledge man had in paradise and what will be his intuition in glory.

mination to make this possible, while Scotus rejects the aid of divine light confining himself to a universal concept of being as being. Both admit man's inability to grasp the fullness of these objectives under the limitations of the present life.

Henry of Ghent

According to Matthew of Aquasparta, the object of the human intellect is the quiddity of a being, conceived by the mind and compared with the eternal exemplar. On the basis of this doctrine, Matthew can say that non-being, i. e. that which does not exist in some way can be the object of the intellect. Henry of Ghent likewise claims the essence of the thing as the object of cognition, but his theory too must be considered against the background of his ideogenesis. This discussion will consider the object of the intellect in general; God as the object of man's intellect; possible being and non-being as objects of cognition.

Object of the Intellect

For Henry, the object of the intellect is a concept of the quiddity or essence of the thing. This absolute essence is indifferent to actual or potential existence, to universality or to particularity.²⁹ Immediately, the agreement between Matthew and Henry becomes apparent, both teaching that the essence of the thing is the object of the intellect. According to Henry's ideogenesis, however, this quidditive concept is abstracted from the phantasm and not from the intelligible species, as Matthew had taught. Moreover, Henry says that the sensible species which is abstracted from the phantasm is neither singular nor universal, while Matthew claims that the intelligible species is singular when it represents a singular object and universal when it considers objects under a universal aspect.

For Henry, then, the object of the intellect is this absolute concept of the essence of the thing, a concept which abstracts from the individuality of the object and from any universal element in the mind. In this way, the first thing that the mind understands is the concept of being.³⁰

To explain this latter thesis Henry says that the possible intellect, illumined by the agent intellect, knows the quiddities of objects and

²⁹ *Quodl.*, VII, I, f. 388 r b. E. Bettoni characterizes this *esse essentiae* as Platonic. See *Il processo astrattivo nella concezione di Enrico di Gand* (Milan: Pubblicazione dell' Università Cattolica de Sacro Cuore, Nuova Serie, XLVII, 1954), p. 90.

³⁰ *Summa*, I, 2, C, f. 4—5.

thus it naturally knows being, since this concept is common to all things, both universal and particular and all other concepts are formed out of it and after it.³¹

This concept of being corresponds to a threefold reality: either existential, intellectual or essential.³² An existential concept of being refers to a concrete essence realized in nature, the *esse existentiae*; an essence conceived by the intellect is the diminished being of reason, the *esse rationis*; the intuition of an absolute essence corresponds to the *esse essentiae*.³³ In other words, the intellect apprehends the actual existing being but the concept of this existing object remains a being of reason in the mind. Distinct from both is the absolute essence which forms the adequate object of the intellect. It is this essential concept which is compared with the eternal exemplary idea thereby enabling the mind to arrive at truth.³⁴

Here one sees the marked similarity between the theories of Henry and Matthew. Both say that the adequate object of man's intellect is the absolute essence of the object, known perfectly with the aid of special illumination.

God as the Object of the Intellect

Having distinguished between the *esse existentiae* and the *esse essentiae*, Henry proceeds to relate both to the divine cause of all being. God is the formal cause of all created being and from this relationship comes the being's *esse essentiae*; in addition, God is the efficient cause of all things and this relationship terminates in the being's *esse existentiae*.³⁵ According to this theory, the divine ideas give essential form to every created being; subsequently, God effects the actual existence of these beings. On the basis of this distinction of essence and existence, Maurer says that being, according to Henry, is fundamentally an essence and not an existence.³⁶ It might be noted, however, that Henry holds only an intentional distinction between essence and existence; any attempt, however, at a complete exposition of this point is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

³¹ *Summa*, I, 12, L, f. 22r. Henry shows how the intellect proceeds from the concept of being to reasoning via contradiction and syllogistics.

³² J. Paulus, *Henri de Gand* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1938), p. 28.

³³ *Summa*, XL, 2, E, f. 9 r. Henry also uses the terms quiddative being, being of reason, being of nature.

³⁴ *Quodl.*, III, 9, f. 99 r b.

³⁵ *Quodl.*, X, 8, f. 160 r b.

³⁶ A. Maurer, "Henry of Ghent and the Unity of Mediaeval Man," *Mediaeval Studies*, X (1948), p. 19.

In Henry's theory, emphasis is placed on the essence of the object; but this concept of essence must be related to the divine Being which is its formal cause. Consequently, God is necessarily related to the object of the intellect, since God is the reason for man's knowledge of truth through His illumination. Here again Henry agrees with the theory of Matthew and Bonaventure.

Henry takes an even stronger position than did his predecessors, when he says that the absolute being which is the object of the intellect includes divine substance as well as created substance.³⁷ God is not only the reason of knowing but also an object of cognition. Paulus asks, in this regard, whether it is correct to say that the divine Essence is the object of the intellect, when man does not have a conscious knowledge of God.³⁸ Henry answers this query by distinguishing between a simple knowledge and a distinct knowledge. Distinct cognition involves a conscious direction of attention and in this life men are not able to fix their minds on God in such a way that they possess a distinct and clear knowledge of Him. Only in the next life, when men are completely absorbed in the beatific vision, will God be known distinctly as a being existing existing perfectly in Himself; only then will men have a direct vision of His goodness and be able to distinguish between divine and created goodness.³⁹

Even in this life, however, men are able to have a simple concept of God which is proper, though negative. This negative concept enables man to know God as an indeterminate being and it is analogous to a concept predicated privatively of creatures.⁴⁰ In other words, man does possess a proper knowledge of God by means of negative concepts which are simple denials of privations found in creature. This theory of a concept predicated analogously of God and creatures will be criticized by Scotus when he asks how a concept derived from creatures can still be proper to the Creator.⁴¹

It must be recalled, in this connection, that Henry is not speaking of a concept of God acquired through reasoning and abstraction; rather, this notion of God is conceived naturally along with a simple concept

³⁷ J. Paulus, *op. cit.*, pp. 27—28.

³⁸ J. Paulus, "Henri de Gand et l'argument ontologique," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, X (1935), p. 292.

³⁹ *Summa*, XXIV, 6, P, f. 142 r.

⁴⁰ *Summa*, XXI, 2, S, f. 125 r. This concept of being is predicated analogously of God and creatures.

⁴¹ *Op. Ox.*, 3, 2, 4—5; IX: 13—14. III: 14—15.

of being and of first principles. Such a concept of the Supreme Being is virtually innate, since creatures only furnish the occasion for the mind's formulation of it.

Henry presents, then, a twofold explanation of God as the object of the intellect. On the one hand, God is the reason for man's knowledge of any being, since He is the formal and efficient cause of this creature's essence and existence. Secondly, the mind can know any essence, either created or uncreated. In this life, however, man does not have a distinct concept of God but only proper, negative notions which are predicated analogously. Such an idea of God is not derived from creatures but is somehow innate.

Non-being as the Object of the Intellect

In a passage reminiscent of Matthew of Aquasparta, Henry discusses the cognition of non-being. Like Matthew, Henry explains that a non-existing object, which is not known by God and hence has no possibility of existing, cannot be the object of the mind. On the other hand, something which does not exist under one reason of being can still exist under another and thus can be known. Such a being, for example, may be denied actual existence but still exist potentially, since it is known by God and is thus an object of intellection.⁴² This doctrine follows from Henry's thesis that the essence of the thing is the object of the mind's cognition. A non-being which does not even have possible existence in the mind of God lacks an absolute essence and hence cannot be known. On the other hand, a possible essence possesses intentional existence in the divine ideas and thus can be included among the objects of the intellect. Moreover, such possible beings are definable and hence must be intelligible.⁴³

Henry places a real opposition between being and nothing, not between being which is actual and that which is potential. For him, being is the opposite of nothing, the latter being described as "that which neither is, nor is able to be, neither in things outside the intellect, nor in the mind itself."⁴⁴ Such a non-being, lacking even the possibility of existing, cannot be the object of the intellect.

In the above presentation, one observes the close parallel between the doctrine of Henry and that of Matthew. Both claim that the essence

⁴² *Quodl.*, III, 9, f. 99 v a. Here Henry shows a dependence on Avicenna, similar to that of Matthew.

⁴³ *Quodl.*, III, 2, f. 80 v b.

⁴⁴ *Quodl.*, III, 9, f. 99 r b.

of the thing, conceived by the intellect and related to the divine exemplar, is the object of the knowing mind. Both include God as an object of the intellect, though this knowledge of the divine Being is imperfect and indistinct in the present life. Finally, Matthew and Henry agree in admitting the possible as a kind of being and hence intelligible. In this respect Henry shows himself a faithful follower of the Augustinian tradition.

John Duns Scotus

Preceding discussions have shown that the object of the intellect for Matthew and Henry of Ghent is the essence of the object, conceived by the intellect and related to the divine idea, a thesis which follows from and depends upon the illumination theory of these Augustinians. Since Scotus rejects this special divine enlightenment, he must present a new theory on the object of intellection, a theory in line with his own psychology and epistemology. This discussion includes Scotus' doctrine on the general object of human cognition, its connection with his doctrine of univocity, his theory of intuition of nonexistents and finally, a critique of the Scotistic theory.

Being as the Object of the Intellect

In his usual careful way, Scotus begins his discussion by distinguishing between the object of the intellect in terms of origin, of perfection and finally, as proportional to the power of the knowing subject.⁴⁵

As to its origins, Scotus admits that in this life, all man's knowledge comes from the senses.⁴⁶ Consequently, the object of intellection is the common nature concretized in the singular quiddity. This does not mean that the substance of the object is known directly, since man at first possesses only a confused knowledge of the *species specialissima*.⁴⁷ In other words, man's first cognition can be subdivided into confused or distinct knowledge. In the former case, the intellect knows the object by name only, while distinct cognition involves a knowledge by definition.⁴⁸

Cognition of the *species specialissima* is the more concrete of the two kinds of cognition; moreover, it is temporally first. In proof of this temporal priority, Scotus points out that the intellect knows "whiteness"

⁴⁵ I *Op. Ox.*, 3, 2, 21; IX: 47 b. III: 48.

⁴⁶ VI *Metaph.*, I, 9; VII: 309 b.

⁴⁷ I *Op. Ox.*, 3, 2, 22; IX: 48 a. III: 50.

⁴⁸ I *Op. Ox.*, 3, 2, 21; IX: 48 a. III: 50.

before it knows the more abstract concept of color.⁴⁹ Knowledge of the *species specialissima* is also more perfect, since it is less common and more particular.

Since the nature of the intellect is such that it always produces its most perfect effect unless somehow impeded, this confused knowledge of the individual species is by nature the *primum cognitum*.⁵⁰ In other words, the object of the intellect, in terms of the origins of man's concepts, is the *species specialissima* of the material singular.

Now this *species specialissima* has been given a variety of interpretations. According to Heiser, it is the nature of the object considered simply as nature, i. e. the common nature which is neither singular nor universal.⁵¹ Father Wolter, on the other hand, explains that the individual species is that accidental quality which most forcibly affects man's senses.⁵² In this way, the actual existing individual becomes the immediate and proper object of man's cognition.⁵³ The difference in these interpretations concerns a knowledge of the nature as nature versus the nature as individualized. Scotus himself seems to allow for both explanations, since he sometimes relates indistinctness of the concept to the object known and sometimes to the manner of knowing. In the first case, it is the common nature which gives rise to the indistinct cognition; in the latter instance it is the individual which is known in a "confused" manner.

By way of origin, then, the object of the intellect is the individual sensible being, since man first arrives at indistinct knowledge of the *species specialissima*. This is still an indistinct knowledge, however, since man cannot know the singularity of the object, even though he grasps the singular being. (This point will be discussed more fully in the following chapter on the knowledge of singulars.) Thus man's first knowledge of the sensible singular is still indistinct, yet it is the more perfect type of cognition.

In contrast to this confused cognition of the singular, man's first distinct concept is that of being. As Scotus explains, that which is most

⁴⁹ I *Op. Ox.*, 3, 2, 26—27; IX: 50—51. III: 56—59.

⁵⁰ I *Op. Ox.*, 3, 2, 23; IX: 48—49. III: 52—53.

⁵¹ B. Heiser, "The *primum cognitum* according to Duns Scotus," *Franciscan Studies*, II (1942), p. 197. It is interesting to note that Belmond calls this common nature of Scotus the *quod quid est*, the very term used by Matthew in speaking of the object of the intellect. *Ibid.*, note 15.

⁵² A. Wolter, *The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus* (St. Bonaventure, New York: The Franciscan Institute, 1946), p. 63.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

common is always first, since in a being which possesses parts, these parts must be known before the whole can be understood. Now the notion of being has no parts, consequently, it is the first distinct concept. Moreover, the notion of being can be known before any other concept, while knowledge of everything else presupposes this most common idea.⁵⁴

Scotus calls this concept of being *simpliciter simplex* to indicate that it cannot be resolved into other concepts. In this way, it is contrasted with those simple concepts which can be broken down into a plurality of notions; an example of the latter is an essential definition which can be reduced to its parts.⁵⁵

Distinct knowledge, then, is described as grasping of the definition of an object and every definition must begin with the most common concept of being. In other words, man first comes to know an object as some being; when his knowledge becomes more perfect man approaches closer to the *species specialissima* which enables the mind to know this particular being. Thus the initial distinct notion is a general concept of being, while indistinct cognition begins with the concrete individual.

In conclusion, then, the first object of the intellect by way of origin is the quiddity of the sensible being, distinctly known as a being or indistinctly understood as an individual. This thesis of the material singular as an object of the intellect is in harmony with man's natural powers in the present life.⁵⁶

The first object of the intellect in terms of perfection is a knowledge of God. Here Scotus speaks of an absolute objective; in this present life, the most perfect actual cognition is that which is proportioned to the mind of the knower.⁵⁷ In the latter sense, God is not the perfect object of the human mind in the present state.

In this theory on God as the perfection of the intellect, Scotus takes exception to the position of Henry of Ghent who held that God is the proper object of the human intellect, *sub ratione motiva*. Scotus counters that God is not naturally ordered to man's mind, since He does not move the intellect immediately but only in some general way thus enabling man to exercise his own cognitive powers.⁵⁸ Just as Henry's

⁵⁴ I *Op. Ox.*, 3, 2, 24; IX: 49—50. III: 54—55.

⁵⁵ I *Op. Ox.*, 3, 2, 21; IX: 47—48. III: 49. The example of a definition is given in the *Vives* edition but not in the *Ordinatio*.

⁵⁶ IV *Op. Ox.*, 45, 4, 3; XX: 376 b.

⁵⁷ I *Op. Ox.*, 3, 2, 29; IX: 82—83. III: 62—63.

⁵⁸ I *Op. Ox.*, 3, 3, 5; IX: 98 a b. III: 78—80.

thesis follows from his doctrine of illumination, so Scotus' rejection is based on his denial of any special divine light. Though God is the motive for man's cognition, according to Scotus this is only a *concursus mediat*. Thus the divine Essence has only a virtual adequation to man's intellect. Granted that all man knows is found in God, still it is these created objects which move the intellect and not God Himself.

Having rejected God's immediate motivation of the human intellect, Scotus presents his own theory on how God is the perfection of the human mind. God is the perfect object of cognition in the sense that He is the most perfect Being the mind can know. Absolutely speaking, then, God can be called an object of the human mind, but in this life man has no immediate knowledge of God.

Scotus goes on to say that the first adequate object of the intellect is a univocal concept of being.⁵⁹ Being can be considered as the adequate object of the intellect on the basis of a twofold primacy, that of commonness and of virtuality. Thus every *per se* intelligible either includes being essentially or is virtually contained in something which includes being essentially. As examples of the primacy of being, Scotus points out that all genera and species, all individuals, even God Himself, are included in this concept of being. If being can be predicated of all these, then this concept has the primacy of commonness. On the other hand, being has a virtual primacy with regard to the ultimate differences and properties.⁶⁰ This virtual primacy, according to Wolter, is exemplified by God's essence which has the power to produce knowledge of all that can be known.⁶¹ In conclusion, then, being is the adequate object of the intellect, since all that can be known is either itself a being or is contained in a being or being can be predicated about it.

The concept of being, then, is the adequate object of the intellect, i. e. the object which is commensurate with man's intellectual powers. In proof of this thesis Scotus claims that the blessed in heaven are able to know all beings, even immaterial ones. Since the separated intellect has the same natural powers which it possessed while joined to the body, it is correct to say that even in this life man has the capacity to know all being. If one were to limit the intellect to a cognition of material quiddities, such an objective would not include all those beings which the mind will eventually be able to know. As final proof that being is

⁵⁹ *I Op. Ox.*, 3, 3, 6; IX: 102 b. III: 80—81.

⁶⁰ *I Op. Ox.*, 3, 3, 8; IX: 108—109. III: 85—86.

⁶¹ A. Wolter, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

the first adequate object of the mind, Scotus points out that this concept of being is not contained in anything else, while all other concepts are included in it. Since being has this primacy of commonness and virtuality, it is the first object of the intellect.

One caution, however; it must be realized that in this discussion Scotus is speaking of man's powers in an absolute sense. As an intellectual being, man has the natural capacity to know all being. In proof of this ability, Scotus points out that in the next life man will know all immaterial beings, even God Himself; therefore man must have this natural capacity to know all being, even in this present life.⁶² Here and now, man's intellect has as its objective in terms of origins a cognition of material quiddities. Being, as the most common concept which can be predicated about everything which man knows, remains, however, the adequate object of the human intellect.

Scotus and Univocity

If being can be predicated of everything which man knows, it remains to discuss the manner of this predication. The doctrine of the analogy of being, according to Wolter, is rooted in the illumination theory,⁶³ a contention which has been illustrated in the discussion on Henry of Ghent. In the illumination theory man's concept of created being must be related to an eternal exemplary idea, if the intellect is to arrive at the truth of being; in other words, analogy enables the mind to come to truth. Since Scotus rejects any special illumination and comparison to an eternal exemplar, he also rejects metaphysical analogy, formulating a new theory of univocal predication.

In the first place, Scotus admits that man is able to have a quidditive concept of being.⁶⁴ Now if this quidditive concept were predicated only equivocally or analogically of God and creatures, there could be no adequate object of the intellect with primacy of commonness.⁶⁵

Scotus posits his own theory of univocity, then, to substantiate his doctrine that being is the adequate object of the intellect. If the concept of being is essentially common, then it must also be univocal.⁶⁶ For example, the concept of animal is common to both man and dog; it is contracted to these individual species by means of a specific difference.

⁶² I *Op. Ox.*, 3, 3, 2; IX: 88—89. III: 70—72.

⁶³ A. Wolter, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

⁶⁴ I *Op. Ox.*, 3, 1, 5; IX: 16—17. III: 16—17.

⁶⁵ I *Op. Ox.*, 3, 3, 6; IX: 102 a b. III: 80.

⁶⁶ *Op. Ox.*, 3, 3, 9; IX: 109 a. III: 86.

This does not mean that man and animal have exactly the same kind of being but the concept of being can be predicated of both of them univocally. Such a univocal concept does not imply identity but only that degree of unity which would not permit it to be affirmed and denied of the same thing at the same time. In another description, a univocal concept is one which could be used as the middle term in a syllogism.⁶⁷

Univocity, then, is clearly related to Scotus' doctrine on the object of the intellect. Barth agrees that this transcendental concept of being is basic to all cognition. The problem arises as to how man can obtain a univocal concept predicable of all beings, even of God Himself, if all man's ideas originate in the finite world.⁶⁸

According to Devlin, this univocal concept of being is a certain "primitive intuition," obtained when man intuitively grasps the contingent world; univocity has a "psychological foundation."⁶⁹ Bettoni agrees that such a univocal concept is not abstracted from sensible things but is, in a certain sense, innate, since it is transcendental. This univocal concept enables man to know God and can be compared, perhaps, to Bonaventure's theory on innate knowledge of God.⁷⁰

Gilson, on the other hand, presents a different interpretation, claiming that objects of the intellect are equivocal from the standpoint of logic but analogous according to metaphysics.⁷¹ On the basis of this interpretation, he concludes that Scotus and Thomas are not fundamentally opposed on univocity and the object of the intellect.⁷²

Certainly it would be correct to say that analogy and/or univocity follow from the respective philosopher's stand on the general object of the intellect. Furthermore, if Scotus wishes to maintain that being is the first and adequate object of man's knowledge, then he must admit a commonness of predication which involves univocity.

Non-being as the Object of the Intellect

Both Matthew and Henry of Ghent admit the possibility of a cognition of nonexistents, if this term is taken to mean that which does not actually

⁶⁷ I *Op. Ox.*, 3, 1, 5; IX: 16—17. III: 18.

⁶⁸ T. Barth, "De univocationis entis scotisticae intentione principali necnon valore critico," *Antonianum*, XXVIII (1953), pp. 98—99.

⁶⁹ C. Devlin, *The Psychology of Duns Scotus* (Oxford: Blackfriars, 1950), pp. 11—12.

⁷⁰ E. Bettoni, "Puncti di contatto fra la dottrina bonaventuriana dell' illuminazione e la dottrina scotista dell' univocità," p. 526.

⁷¹ E. Gilson, "Avicenna et le point de départ de Duns Scot," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, II (1927), pp. 104—105.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 115.

exist. Since the intellect is the principle active cause of cognition, Matthew claims that cognition of non-being is naturally possible. But as pointed out, neither Matthew nor Henry give any details on how the mind arrives at such cognition of non-being.

Scotus proceeds to describe the process of knowing non-being in the light of his own psychology. Obviously, an abstractive or imperfect cognition of nonexistents is possible. But in intuition both subject and object are co-causes of cognition, since intuition, by definition, is the knowledge of an existing and present object. On the natural level, then, an intuition of a nonexistent object is impossible; however, supernatural intervention could enable man to intuit a nonexistent.⁷³ The need for both subject and object in intuition is simply a question of fact and not of right. Absolutely speaking, the intellect, as a natural light, can know all beings intuitively; the need for an existing object is an imperfection of man's present state.⁷⁴ If God were to impress a species on the human mind, the intellect would respond to this impression just as it reacts to the presence of the object itself.⁷⁵

The possibility of a supernatural intuition of nonexistents is explained by Day with a number of quotes from the works of Scotus.⁷⁶ Gilson and Bérubé, however, deny this type of intuition. The former says that Scotus used the presence or absence of the object to distinguish intuition from abstraction.⁷⁷ Bérubé, likewise, denies the possibility of an intuition of a nonexistent.⁷⁸

It is important to realize here that Scotus is speaking of an intuition of nonexistents while Matthew and Henry are concerned with some kind of abstraction. Matthew, for example, claims that knowledge of past and future does not require the presence of the object; Scotus, too, admits of such abstractive knowledge but he is less certain about the possibility of an intuition of that which is not present. He appeals to the supernatural to effect such direct knowledge, in much the same way that Matthew has recourse to illumination to prevent his theory from degenerating into skepticism.

⁷³ IV *Op. Ox.*, 10, 8, 8; XVII: 287 a b.

⁷⁴ VII *Metaph.* 18, 11; VII: 461 A.

⁷⁵ E. Gilson, *art. cit.*, p. 144.

⁷⁶ S. Day, *Intuitive Cognition, A Key to the Significance of the Later Scholastics* (St. Bonaventure, New York: The Franciscan Institute, 1947), pp. 101—104.

⁷⁷ E. Gilson, *Jean Duns Scot* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1952), pp. 564—65, in notes.

⁷⁸ C. Bérubé, "La connaissance intellectuelle du singulier matériel chez Duns Scot," *Franciscan Studies*, XIII (1955), No. 4, p. 43.

For Scotus, then, the object of the intellect taken in an absolute sense is the concept of being predicated univocally of all things which exist, both God and creatures. In this present life, however, man's cognition originates in a knowledge of sensible things. The question of man's intuition of nonexistents is not clearly interpreted by the historians of Scotus, though it does seem that such a cognition is supernaturally possible.

In fact the whole question of just what Scotus taught on the object of the intellect has been the subject of much debate among the scholars. An evaluation of all these various interpretations would be beyond the scope of this dissertation; the interested reader is referred to the excellent summary of O'Huallachain.⁷⁹ One might note, however, that an exact interpretation is made more difficult because Scotus sometimes speaks of the object of the intellect in this life; sometimes he refers to man's natural powers considered absolutely; sometimes he considers the intellect in the light of revelation.⁸⁰

According to Barth, Scotus' doctrine on the object of the intellect seems fundamentally Augustinian with a certain Aristotelian motivation.⁸¹ Scotus agrees with Aristotle that the object of the intellect in terms of origins is the sensible quiddity; but he follows Augustine in maintaining that being is the adequate object of the mind. According to Gilson, Scotus presents the Augustinian problem of illumination formulated in Aristotelian terms. Since man is an image of Him Who Is, the human intellect conceives everything under the species of being.⁸² Such an explanation tends to reconcile Scotus with the innatism and illumination of his predecessors, Bonaventure, Matthew and Henry.

To further illustrate Scotus' place in the Franciscan tradition, Bettone compares illumination and univocity; both theories try to validate the concept of being by evoking something which transcends the sensible.⁸³ For the Augustinians, illumination is essential to any consideration of the object of the intellect; for Scotus, the univocal concept of being becomes the adequate object of the intellect.

⁷⁹ C. O'Huallacháin, "On Recent Studies of the Opening Question in Scotus' *Ordinatio*," *Franciscan Studies*, XV (1955), pp. 5—18.

⁸⁰ C. Balič, "Circa positiones fundamentales Joannis Duns Scoti," *Antonianum*, XVIII (1953), p. 270.

⁸¹ T. Barth, "Duns Scotus und die ontologische Grundlage unserer Verstandeserkenntnis," *Franziskanische Studien*, XXXIII (1951), p. 356.

⁸² E. Gilson, "Avicenne et le point de départ de Duns Scot," p. 117.

⁸³ E. Bettone, "Puncti di contatto fra la dottrina bonaventuriana dell' illuminazione e la dottrina scotista dell' univocità," pp. 517—32.

CHAPTER VII

KNOWLEDGE OF THE SINGULAR

The preceding chapter has presented the general object of the intellect according to Matthew of Aquasparta, Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus. According to Matthew, the essence of the object, conceived by the intellect and related to the divine ideas is the object of the human mind. Henry speaks rather of an absolute essence, while Bonaventure sees God as the supreme object of intellection. For Scotus, being is the adequate object of man's intellectual powers. All these theories flow from the ideogenesis taught by their respective authors.

This same relationship to ideogenesis is even more apparent in the various theses on how the mind knows singular objects. The theories again show a gradual development from Bonaventure and Henry, who postulate only an indirect knowledge of singulars, to Matthew, who says that the singular is known through a singular species. Finally, Scotus claims a direct intuitive knowledge of the existing singular object. These theories on cognition of singulars follow from the principle of individuation held by each author; consequently, subsequent discussions will include a brief analysis of the author's principle of individuation along with a description of how the mind knows singulars.

Matthew of Aquasparta

According to Matthew's ideogenesis, cognition is primarily an activity of the intellect, since the mind, illumined by the divine light, is the principle, effective cause of knowledge, while the object supplies the matter for the concept. Consequently, it is the essence of the thing, conceived by the mind and related to the eternal exemplar, which is the object of the intellect. Since objects existing outside the mind are always singular, the mind must be able to know individuals. Before discussing the way in which the intellect comes to apprehend the singular, it is necessary to indicate the principle of singularity.

Principle of Individuation

In the fourth question of his *De cognitione*, Matthew presents his response to the question: does the human intellect know singulars. At the conclusion of his discussion Matthew specifically states that he does

not intend to treat the principle of individuation.¹ Grabmann asks whether this indicates that Matthew does not relate the principle of individuation to cognition of the singular or whether he is not satisfied with his own theory and wishes to revise it.² The latter interpretation seems more likely since none of Matthew's examined writings give any clear description of what constitutes the individual.

The recently published text of *De anima* VI contains a few references to the individuation of the human soul but no *ex professo* treatment of the problem of individuation. According to this text, Matthew teaches that an individual soul results from a union of matter and form.³ As noted in chapter I, Matthew, like Bonaventure, holds some kind of spiritual matter in the soul. Though he does not describe this matter in the soul, Matthew does speak of some kind of superior matter, simple and indestructible, which is found in the stars. He also enunciates the principle that matter is more or less noble, depending on the form to which it is joined.⁴ If the human soul possesses spiritual matter, then this hylomorphic composition could explain the soul's individuality. Such a thesis would be in line with Matthew's position as a follower of Bonaventure.

In another passage, however, Matthew speaks about the individuality of the soul as based on its relation to the body. The soul is one in number and individual but it does not have the perfect reason for its individuality, since it requires a body to form the perfection of a human person.⁵ Matthew claims, then, that the soul is not a person until it enters into a *per se* union with the body.⁶ In other words, the soul itself lacks incommunicability and therefore is not a personality.

¹ *De cognitione*, Q. IV, pp. 285—86. Cognoscit tamen intellectus singulare illud absolute, utpote quemdam hominem cum talibus conditionibus, cum talibus circumstantiis, quibus differt a quolibet alio homine; sed hic non determinamus de causa individuationis.

² M. Grabmann, *Die Philosophische und Theologische Erkenntnislehre des Kardinals Matthaeus von Aquasparta* (Vienna: Verlag von Mayer, 1906), p. 91.

³ *De anima* VI, Q. V, p. 317. In quantum vero est quaedam natura per se subsistens, non dependens a materia sed a materia separabilis, et habet esse praeter materiam, anima intellectiva est hoc aliquid utpote composita ex suis principiis ex quibus habet esse et ex quibus individuat . . .

⁴ *De anima* VI, Q. IV, pp. 304—305.

⁵ *De anima* VI, Q. V, pp. 326—27.

⁶ *De anima* VI, Q. V, p. 323. . . et ideo anima non est persona quia nec est per se una. — Vel potest dici quod ad rationem personae non sufficit ratio individui, sed cum individuitate requiritur incommunicabilitas ita quod in se habeat esse absolutum non communicabile alii vel ad aliud inclinatum, quod anima intellectiva non habet.

The above statements bear witness to a certain ambiguity in Matthew's formulation of a theory of individuation. Is the soul composed of matter and form and individuated by these same principles or is the soul only an individual in relation to the body which it informs? Perhaps these points could be clarified by recalling that body/soul union is a type of hylomorphic composition according to Matthew; also basic to his psychology is the thesis that the soul is a *per se subsistens*. Therefore the soul is a substance composed of spiritual matter and form; the soul is also the form of the compositum, which is the human person.

Proof for Knowledge of the Singular

Matthew introduces the response to his fourth question with a detailed proof that the human intellect is capable of knowing singulars; Matthew's arguments are taken from the "truths of faith, the authority of divine precept and the strenght of argument."⁷ The first two proofs obviously represent the views of a theologian, while the third is a philosophical argument based on the powers of the intellect, the activities of the speculative and practical intellect and on the object itself.

In his theological proofs, Matthew points out that the articles of faith, for example Christ's incarnation, passion, death, burial, etc., are singular beliefs. Since belief presupposes understanding, the intellect must be able to know singulars. Also the divine precept of love of neighbor requires a love of individuals. Now no one loves what he does not know, therefore man must be capable of knowing individuals.⁸

Matthew begins his philosophical proof for knowledge of singulars with a discussion on the powers of the intellect. These powers are so ordered that what an inferior power can do, the superior power can also accomplish. What the senses do, the imagination also performs, while the reasoning power equals and even surpasses the imagination. The intellect, as the supreme power in man, has all the capabilities of these lesser powers, plus its own unique excellence. Consequently, if the senses and imagination know singulars, so can the reason and the intellect.⁹ It might be noted that Matthew presents in this passage a form

⁷ *De cognitione*, Q. IV, p. 279. Dicendum indubitanter quod intellectus noster cognoscit sive intelligit singularia; et hoc necessario convincit veritas fidei, auctoritas divini praecepti et violentia argumenti.

⁸ *De cognitione*, Q. IV, pp. 279—80.

⁹ *De cognitione*, Q. IV, p. 280. Quoniam in potentiis ordinatis ad invicem, quod potest virtus inferior, necessario potest virtus superior et amplius. Si igitur potentiae sunt invicem ordinatae, ita quod primo est sensus, secundo imaginatio, tertio ratio, quarto intellectus sive intelligentia, necesse (est) quod id quod potest sensus, possit imaginatio et amplius; et quod potest

of the *per simile* proof which finds such a prominent place in Scotus' arguments for intuition.

Intellection of the singular can also be proved from the activities of the speculative and practical intellect. The speculative intellect frequently uses singular terms in forming a syllogism, for example — "every man is an animal; Sortes is a man; therefore Sortes is an animal." Now singular terms used in a syllogism presuppose a knowledge of singular beings. Even the abstraction of universals from particulars is based on the fact that particulars are known first. In a similar way, the practical intellect cannot direct man's activities unless it knows singular instances.¹⁰ Therefore, the activities of both the practical and the speculative intellect require a knowledge of the singular.

A third philosophical proof for cognition of singulars comes from the nature of the object known. Since being and truth are convertible, when the intellect grasp singular truth, it comes to know the singular being which is convertible with this truth.¹¹

Matthew's philosophical proofs for a knowledge of singulars are based, then, on the powers and activities of the intellect and on the nature of the object.

Manner of Knowing the Singular

Having established the fact that the intellect knows the singular, it now remains for Matthew to describe how such intellection is effected. To this difficult question, Matthew gives a more hesitant answer.

He begins by rejecting two theories: that the intellect has only an indirect knowledge, that singulars and universals are known through the same species.

The theory of indirect intellection of singulars claims that the mind abstracts from all individuating notes found in the concrete singular; consequently the intellect never achieves a direct knowledge of the singular object. The mind only apprehends the singular *per accidens* when it recognizes the activity of the senses; in other words, the mind knows singular objects through a certain reflection. In one explanation, the intellect first knows the universal which is its proper object, then grasps its own act and the species which is the principle of this act; finally,

imaginatio, possit ratio et amplius; et quod potest sensus, imaginatio et ratio, possit intellectus et amplius. Si igitur sensus et imaginatio cognoscunt et apprehendunt particulare, non autem universale, ergo ratio et intellectus non tantum universale, sed universale et particulare sive singulare cognoscit.

¹⁰ *De cognitione*, Q. IV, p. 281.

¹¹ *De cognitione*, Q. IV, pp. 281—82.

it knows the phantasm from which the species is abstracted. According to another version, the intellect possesses a particular reason which can be called either a sensitive power, since it unites and divides individual notions, or a cogitative power, because Avicenna located it in the brain. It is this power which applies the universal premise of the syllogism to the singular premise.¹²

Matthew takes exception to these theories that the mind knows the singular, either by reflection on the phantasm or by a special cogitative power. If the mind knows the singular through conversion to the phantasm, a position held by St. Thomas,¹³ then the singular would have to be known either in the phantasm or in the mind. Since the phantasm is not intelligible, nor the singular object in the mind, Matthew eliminates this explanation. The second theory which holds that the intellect knows the singular by means of some particular reason is likewise untenable. If the universal premise is known by the intellect and the singular premise by the cogitative power, which power would know the conclusion? If one answers that the intellect knows the singular conclusion, then a direct intellection is admitted and there is no need of a separate power. On the other hand, the cogitative power cannot know the conclusion, since such knowledge involves a deliberate choice which must come from the superior intellectual faculty. In fact, it seems unlikely that two such divergent powers could ever form one syllogism, because of the impossibility of relating the major and minor premises.¹⁴

In this way, Matthew refutes the theories that the intellect has only an indirect knowledge of the singular, either through conversion to the phantasm or through a particular, cogitative power. In a subsequent paragraph, Matthew criticizes another opinion, attributed by the editors of the *Quarrachi* edition to Richard of Mediavilla¹⁵ and Roger Bacon.¹⁶ According to these philosophers, the intellect understands the singular truly, properly and *per se* by means of the same species through which it knows the universal. Related to this doctrine is the thesis that the universal is found in singulars; in fact, the same object is both

¹² *De cognitione*, Q. IV, pp. 282—83.

¹³ *De veritate* X, 5, pp. 21—24. See St. Thomas Aquinas, *Truth* (Translated from the definitive Leonine text, Chicago: Regnery Co., 1952—1954).

¹⁴ *De cognitione*, Q. IV, pp. 283—84.

¹⁵ *II Sent.*, 24, 3, 4. This is cited in *De cognitione*, Q. IV, p. 284, in the notes. An excellent reference on this problem is H. D. Simonin, "La connaissance humaine des singuliers matériels d'après les maîtres franciscains au XIII^e siècle," *Mélanges Mandonnet*, II (1930), pp. 289—303.

¹⁶ *De multiplicatione specierum*, I, 2. This reference is cited in *De cognitione*, p. 284, in the notes.

singular and universal. Since species are multiplied from objects, these species are also both singular and universal.

In criticism of this theory, Matthew answers that a universal species must abstract from individual conditions, while a singular species should represent these individuating notes. As a further difference, the universal species presents to the mind a concept of all men as men; now if this universal species is not distinct from the species of individuals, then one would be forced to posit as many species as there are men. Moreover, if God has one species through which He knows all men and another through which He knows this man, then the human intellect certainly needs a twofold species.¹⁷ With these arguments, Matthew refutes any attempt to identify the universal and the particular species.

Such are Matthew's rejections of the various ways in which the mind knows the singular, either indirectly or through a species which is both universal and particular.

To turn now to Matthew's own theory on how the intellect knows singulars, he postulates a singular species which enables the mind to arrive at a proper and *per se* knowledge of the individual.

In support of this thesis, Matthew points out that if the intellect is to know the universal it must first apprehend the singular from which it "abstracts" the universal. To know the singular, however, the intellect must first form a singular species and it is through this species that the mind is able to know the individual.¹⁸

This singular species does not represent the object as either present or absent; nor does such a knowledge of the singular include the possibility of demonstration, since singulars are contingent and consequently cannot be part of an evident and necessary demonstration. But the singular is intelligible, since it exists and whatever has being can be known.¹⁹ Not only is the singular intelligible of itself, but it is also known *per se*, since the mind forms the species from the object and thus comes to a "proper" cognition. This "proper" cognition implies that it is of the very nature of the intellect to know the singular from which it "collects" the universal.²⁰

¹⁷ *De cognitione*, Q. IV, pp. 284—85.

¹⁸ *De cognitione*, Q. IV, p. 285.

¹⁹ *De cognitione*, Q. IV, pp. 285—86.

²⁰ *De cognitione*, Q. IV, p. 288. Ad septimum dicendum quod, si intelligatur quod singulare sit *per se* obiectum potentiae sensitivae, hoc est non *per accidens*, verum est. Si autem *per se* intelligatur praecise, hoc est non alterius potentiae, falsum est, quoniam, ut visum est superior potentia complectitur obiectum potentiae inferioris, non e converso; et ideo singulare potest esse obiectum intellectus, sed universale non potest esse obiectum sensus.

According to Matthew's thesis, cognition of the singular is accomplished by means of a special species which represents all the individuating notes of the object. This singular species permits the mind to know the object itself, since, according to Matthew's ideogenesis, the species is formed by the intellect and not impressed by the known object. Such cognition, moreover, is proper to the intellect and precedes any universal cognition. This theory on intellection of the singular via a singular species is linked with Matthew's doctrine on the essence of the thing as the object of the intellect and with his ideogenetic theory.

It must be remembered, however, that the mind knows the species, not the material object. This species, moreover, is not singular itself in the sense that it is modified by singular dimensions; rather, the singular species represents a quanticized being.²¹ Finally, the species is not abstracted in the Aristotelian meaning of that term, but it is "brought forth" from the phantasm. In this way, the singular species can be called a similitude of the extra-mental object, without reference, however, to the existence of this object.²²

From this description it is apparent that Matthew claims a *per se* and proper intellection of the singular. But is this cognition direct or only another instance of indirect knowledge? Bérubé maintains that this is a direct cognition,²³ while Belmond says that this is only an indirect knowledge.²⁴ In this case, as in every critique, it seems important to use terminology with great care. Matthew maintains that knowledge of the singular is really a grasping of the singular species, a species which does not refer to the presence or absence of the object and which is formed directly by the intellect. In the latter point, Matthew's theory is distinguished from the indirect reflection of Thomas; while the omission of an existential element differentiates Matthew's theory from the intuition of Scotus. Matthew's emphasis on the activity of the in-

²¹ *De cognitione*, Q. IV, p. 287. Dico enim quod singularia sunt in intellectu non per se, sed per suas species. — Quod vero dicit, quod 'species quae est in intellectu est abstracta a materia et conditionibus materialibus', dico quod verum est de specie universali et quae est ratio cognoscendi universale, non de specie singulari et quae est ratio cognoscendi singulare, nisi fortassis vocet abstractionem, quia facta est actu intellecta et intellectu apprehensa, et quae erat in phantasia quanta et dimensa, ut quidam volunt, facta est non quanta; sed tamen species non quanta ducit in cognitionem quanti, et species non dimensa in cognitionem dimensi.

²² E. Chiocchetti, "La cognizione dell' individuale Matteo d'Aquasparta e Duns Scoto," *Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica*, XXXII (1940), p. 285.

²³ C. Bérubé, "La connaissance intellectuelle du singulier matériel au XIII^e siècle," *Franciscan Studies*, XI (1951), p. 187.

²⁴ S. Belmond, "A l'école de S. Augustin," *Études Franciscaines*, XXXIII (1921), p. 152.

tellekt permits one to say, however, that his theory seems close to direct intellection, though it is still not the well-developed intuitionism of Scotus.

A further misunderstanding arises over the historians' interpretations of Matthew's theory. De Wulf accuses Matthew of contradicting himself in saying that the intellect knows objects without reference to their existence while at the same time maintaining that existing individual things are known by means of a singular species.²⁵ Belmond answers by pointing out that De Wulf fails to distinguish between the simple intellect, which does not require the existence of the object, and the composite intellect which does.²⁶ In other words, the simple intellect can know singular objects without reference to their existence; the composed intellect, however, requires some existential reference.

It seems safe to say, then, that Matthew accepts a direct, proper and *per se* knowledge of singulars via a singular species. This species, formed by the mind from the object, represents the individual as an individual.

St. Bonaventure

In contrast to Matthew's proper and *per se* knowledge effected by means of a singular species, Bonaventure admits only an indirect knowledge of singular objects. This thesis follows from his theory of ideogenesis which gives a more passive role to the intellect while maintaining that the object impresses itself upon the senses. This section will present Bonaventure's denial of any direct knowledge and then give his theory of indirect cognition of the material singular.

No Direct Knowledge of the Singular

Bonaventure clearly states that the intellect knows not only the universal, but also the singular.²⁷ However, this is no direct cognition of the material singular but only an indirect intellection. In proof of such indirect knowledge, Bonaventure points out that in this life the intellect knows extra-mental objects by way of the five senses.²⁸ In other words, the intellect knows a universal concept acquired by abstraction from the sensible species.

²⁵ M. De Wulf, *Histoire de la philosophie médiévale* (Louvain: Institut. supér. de phil., 1924), I: 360.

²⁶ S. Belmond, *art. cit.*, p. 152, note 4.

²⁷ II *Sent.*, 3, 1, 2, 2; II: 107 b.

²⁸ I *Sent.*, 39, 1, 2, 2; I: 689 b.

Bonaventure here returns to his original position on ideogenesis of extra-mental objects through the senses. Furthermore, this sense cognition is effected by means of a species produced by an impression of the object on the sense faculty. This impression causes a corresponding change in the sense power and it is this *immutatio* which the mind knows. In such an ideogenetic theory, the mind does not form the species, as Matthew claims, but sensation begins with a reception. Consequently, the mind has no direct knowledge of the existing singular object.

In a detailed analysis of this theory, Veuthey points out, however, that it is incorrect to say the mind knows only the species and lacks all knowledge of the object. In the first place, this species is a "radiation" from the light-form of the object. Even though the object is known only through its operation in generating this similitude, still one can say that the object itself is known, since operation follows being.²⁹ It could also be noted here that Bonaventure does admit some direct intellection of the immaterial singular, since he claims that the soul knows itself directly.³⁰ In this case, however, no sensation is involved and the mind comes directly into contact with the immaterial singular object.

Bonaventure is forced, then, by the very nature of his ideogenetic theory to deny any direct knowledge of the material singular, since the intellect simply receives an impression from the object and does not form the species with the same immediacy as Matthew claims.

Indirect Intellection of the Singular

Having denied any direct knowledge of the material singular, Bonaventure turns to his own explanation of indirect cognition. According to his thesis, the intellect knows the singular by way of an abstraction from the universal. This abstraction, however, is not a conversion to the phantasm, but a direction of attention towards the species.³¹ As Bonaventure goes on to explain, the intellect forms an intelligible species based on the relation of the sensible species and the object. This new species represents the whole individual essence of the object in such a way that the object is known in its proper singularity.³² In other words, Bonaventure admits that knowledge of the singular is proper to the intellect but it is not achieved by any direct cognition.

²⁹ L. Veuthey, *S. Bonaventurae philosophia christiana* (Rome: Officium Libri Catholici, 1943), pp. 49—50.

³⁰ *I Sent.*, 39, 1, 2, 2; I: 689 b.

³¹ *II Sent.*, 3, 2, 2, 1; II: 120 b. In this question Bonaventure considers the way in which angels know singulars without receiving any species from material objects.

³² *II Sent.*, 3, 2, 2, 1; II: 120 a.

This indirect intellection of the singular follows from Bonaventure's thesis that abstraction is not a stripping away from the phantasm but rather a judgment upon the intelligible element in the sensible species. Apprehending this species which represents an individual object, the intellect comes to an indirect knowledge of the singular. Such knowledge does not involve any conversion to the phantasm, nor any transformation of the species. Consequently, Bonaventure's theory on the singular admits a more direct knowledge than the thesis of St. Thomas, but it is still not the immediate contact of Matthew nor the intuition of Scotus.

In proof of this indirect knowledge of the singular, Bonaventure points out that the singular object is known in relation to the universal.³³ Since the intelligible element in the object is found in the universal, all knowledge of the singular must begin with this universal concept.³⁴

This indirect intellection of the singular applies only to the mind, since the senses know the singular in a direct manner. In fact, the senses must know the singular before the intellect can grasp the universal; the senses, for example, apprehend "Peter" and "Plato" before the intellect can understand the universal concept of "man".³⁵ It is important to recall in this connection, however, that Bonaventure does not posit any real distinction between the faculties of the soul. Consequently, Bérubé and Gilson agree that Bonaventure's theory of indirect knowledge of the singular is not so far from the Franciscan tradition of direct intellection as might at first appear.³⁶

Bonaventure's theory of indirect intellection follows from his description of the ideogenetic process. The mind judges the intelligible element in the species to form the universal; these universals are then compared in such a way that the mind knows the singular indirectly.

Moreover, the singular as singular is intelligible *per se*. According to Bonaventure, the principle of individuation is the composition of matter and form found in all created beings. Thus everything that exists is singular and can be known as such. God and separated spirits apprehend singulars, both material and immaterial, by a direct cognition; it is simply the limitation of man's sensation which makes it impossible for the human intellect to know the material singular directly.

³³ III *Sent.*, 26, 1, 5; III: 566 b.

³⁴ H. Križovljan, *Philosophia S. Bonaventurae* (Rome: Collegium Internationale S. Laurentii a Brundisio, 1956), p. 311.

³⁵ II *Sent.*, 3, 1, 2, 2; II: 107 b.

³⁶ C. Bérubé, "La connaissance intellectuelle du singulier matériel chez Duns Scot," *Franciscan Studies*, XIII (1953), No. 4, p. 50.

If one recalls this *per se* intelligibility of the singular and the union of the sense faculty with the soul itself, Bonaventure's theory seems closer to Matthew's thesis that the singular can be known directly. For Matthew, however, there is no priority of the universal; the intellect knows singulars through a singular species formed directly from the singular object. Such a species represents all the individuating circumstances of the object without reference, however, to the existence of the being. Thus Matthew's theory of ideogenesis admits a direct knowledge of the singular, though his formulation is still somewhat hesitant. Bonaventure, on the other hand, denies such direct intellection.

Henry of Ghent

Henry of Ghent, whose ideogenetic theory is comparable to that of Bonaventure, also claims indirect knowledge of the singular. More Aristotelian than either Matthew or Scotus on this point, Henry develops a unique theory of individuation which will be both used and criticized by Scotus and later on by Ockham. What follows is a brief explanation of Henry's indirect cognition and of his theory of individuation.

Indirect Intellection of the Singular

According to Henry, the object of the intellect is the absolute essence of the being conceived in the light of the eternal reasons and this essence is neither universal nor particular.³⁷ In terms of ideogenesis, however, the intellect first knows the universal and then apprehends the singular through a certain reflection on the sensible species.³⁸

Following Henry's theory, an impression is made by the object on the senses; when the sense power apprehends this change in the organ which has been determined by a sensible species, sensation follows. The sensible species, then, is the intermediary between the object and the intellect; no intelligible species is required for intellection.

With this in mind, one can better understand what Henry means when he says that the singular is known in three ways: in the first place, the sense organ knows the external object as present and singular; the imagination knows the object as singular but no longer present; the intellect knows the singular under a universal aspect.³⁹

³⁷ *Quodl.*, II, 8, f. 57 r b. Henry begins this question on the distinction of angels by denying that they possess matter, *Ibid.*, f. 55 v b. This universal hylomorphism was held by Bonaventure and by Matthew.

³⁸ *Quodl.*, IV, 21, f. 201 v a. This indirect method of knowing singulars is limited to this life. In this connection see *Quodl.*, IV, 21, f. 201 v b.

³⁹ *Quodl.*, IV, 21, f. 201 v a.

Henry agrees with almost all the Scholastics in thus positing a direct intuition of the singular on the sense level; he differs, however, from such philosophers as Matthew and Scotus in saying that the intellect has only an indirect cognition of the singular object. According to Henry's theory, the mind first perceives the intelligible element in the phantasm and thus knows the singular in an indirect manner.⁴⁰

Explaining this indirect knowledge of the singular through the phantasm, Henry postulates a cognition of the object which subsists as an individual. Since the object, as existing, is individual, the intellect knows this individuated essence by grasping its *adventita accidentia*, as Avicenna calls them. In this way, for example man comes to know spiritual beings by their subsisting attributes and individual bodies by their matter and quantity.⁴¹ Such knowledge, however, remains indirect, since it is acquired by means of the phantasm. Actually, knowledge of the universal implies knowledge of the singular, since the singular simply adds to the universal a certain agreement with extra-mental objects and a negation which limits the universal to this concrete particular being.⁴²

Henry's thesis on indirect cognition of the singular follows, then, from his ideogenetic theory with its emphasis on an initial impression from the object. The *species expressa* enables the mind to grasp the universal; the *species impressa* leads to cognition of the singular. The first is direct cognition, while the second is an indirect intellection.

Though Henry's ideogenesis, like that of Bonaventure, rules out any direct knowledge of the material singular, Henry does not present any extensive rejection of direct knowledge; he simply points out that the ancient authors deny it. On this point, Henry shows himself a faithful Aristotelian.⁴³

Principle of Individuation

For Bonaventure and apparently for Matthew, the principle of individuation is the union of matter and form found in all created things. According to Henry, however, individuation is a negative principle. As he explains, if the individuating principle were something positive, then

⁴⁰ C. Bérubé, "La connaissance intellectuelle du singulier matériel au XIII^e siècle," p. 177.

⁴¹ *Quodl.*, II, 8, f. 56 r b—v a.

⁴² C. Bérubé, "La connaissance intellectuelle du singulier matériel au XIII^e siècle," pp. 177—78.

⁴³ J. Paulus, *Henri de Gand* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1938), pp. 370—71.

this positive element would also require an individuating principle and so on *ad absurdum*.⁴⁴

Negation is implied in the very unity of being, since every being is distinct from all other existing objects simply because it is one; it is one because it is not divided within itself. Thus every existing thing is an actual unity in virtue of a twofold negation which denies any division within the being itself and at the same time distinguishes this individual from every other existing thing.⁴⁵ If an object has this absolute independence of being, then it is an individual.

This twofold negation does not add anything real to the specific essence,⁴⁶ since Henry says that the individual is nothing other than a form, which is simple and indivisible.⁴⁷ Individuation, then, is an *intentio subsistentiae*; the actual existing being is the individual.⁴⁸ Consequently, individuation is no longer rooted in matter, nor in the union of matter and form, but in the whole suppositum which constitutes an existential unity distinct from all other beings.⁴⁹

According to Henry's theory, then, an individual is simply the unity of an existing being which is undivided within itself and at the same time separated from all other beings. The mere fact that an object possesses such existential unity constitutes it an individual being without need for any positive principle of individuation.

If the intellect were to come into direct contact with such a unity, the mind would have direct knowledge of the individual, since the singular as an existing being, is intelligible *per se*. According to Henry's theory of ideogenesis, however, the object is known only through abstraction, i. e. the singular is known after the mind has grasped the intelligible element under universal form. Consequently, the intellect does not know the individual directly but only apprehends it indirectly via the phantasm. Though the existing individual remains intelligible in itself, it cannot be understood by the human intellect in this life.

In the above description, Henry's theory shows striking similarity to that of Bonaventure, who also holds an indirect cognition of the material singular while admitting that the individual is intelligible *per se*.

Furthermore, Henry's thesis will initiate Scotus' theory on direct cognition of the singular. In typical fashion Scotus begins his own dis-

⁴⁴ *Quodl.*, V, 8, f. 246 r a.

⁴⁵ *Quodl.*, V, 8, f. 246 r a.

⁴⁶ *Quodl.*, VII, I, f. 387 r a.

⁴⁷ *Quodl.*, V, 8, f. 244 v a.

⁴⁸ *Quodl.*, II, 8, f. 56 v b.

⁴⁹ M. De Wulf, *op. cit.*, II: 56—57.

cussion with a critique of Henry, objecting to the thesis that something negative can be the cause of distinguishing one being from another. According to Scotus, actual existence cannot be the cause of distinction, since existence does not explain the differences between beings. Any differentiation of existing beings must be based on a distinction of essences, not on the existence of these individuals.⁵⁰

Paulus criticizes Henry's thesis because of an apparent conflict between the theory of an absolute essence, which is indifferent to being either universal or singular, and the thesis that existing things are individual *per se*. According to Paulus this conflict will be resolved in one way by Scotus and in another by Ockham.⁵¹ Bérubé agrees that Henry's theory is a bridge between the indirect cognition of St. Thomas (likewise that of Bonaventure) and the direct intuition of the existing singular which Scotus teaches. The Subtile Doctor uses Henry's starting point but develops his own thesis more completely and with greater certainty.⁵²

John Duns Scotus

From the indirect cognition of singulars held by Bonaventure and Henry of Ghent to the proper and *per se* cognition of Matthew of Aquasparta, one finally comes to a direct intuitive knowledge of the singular taught by John Duns Scotus. This section presents Scotus' theory of individuation, his thesis of a direct intuition of the singular and finally, a critique of this theory.

Scotus' Theory of Individuation

The preceding section has explained Henry of Ghent's theory that individuation is a negative principle involving a denial of division within the being itself and a separation of this individual from everything else. Scotus agrees that singularity is a negative term denoting something with a definite quantity. Such a negation, however, is not a complete explanation of the individual. The singular is a positive something, a "this;" the individual is composed of this positive element of singularity and a common nature.⁵³

⁵⁰ II *Op. Ox.*, 3, 3, 2; XII: 87 a.

⁵¹ J. Paulus, *op. cit.*, p. 376. Thus Henry's doctrine leads, according to Paulus, to the "nominalism" of Ockham. He sees Henry as a "pre-Kantian" idealist.

⁵² C. Bérubé, "La connaissance intellectuelle du singulier matériel au XIII^e siècle," p. 175.

⁵³ T. Barth, "Individualität und Allgemeinheit bei J. Duns Skotus," *Wissenschaft und Weisheit*, XVI (1953), pp. 126—27.

As actually existing, the individual does imply a negation and limitation which distinguishes this particular being from all others. In addition to this negation, however, the individual is constituted by a positive quality which Scotus calls by various names but which has come to be known as the *haecceitas*, or the "thisness" of the being. An individual is thus composed, not only of a specific difference, distinguishing him from all other members of the same genus, but also of an individual difference separating him from all other members of the same species.⁵⁴ For example, man is distinguished from animals by the difference of rationality; an individual is distinguished from all other men by his own individual "thisness".

With the greatest care and exactitude, Scotus proceeds to describe this unique individuating factor. In the first place, it adds nothing to the quiddity of the object, since it is only an ultimate determination.⁵⁵ In other words, the "thisness" exists as a positive modification of a common nature; in itself it is not itself a quidditive being.

The obvious question arising at this point: if singularity is a positive perfection and determination yet not a quidditive being, exactly what is this principle of individuation? Scotus answers by saying that the *haecceitas* is a formality.⁵⁶

The principle of individuation, then, is the ultimate actuality of the form, the ultimate reality of being. Even though the form determines the specific nature, still this specific form is not properly an individual.⁵⁷ The species must be further determined by another element which is the principle of individuation. Even though the intellect can distinguish the singularity of the object from the form, these distinct concepts do not correspond to beings which are really distinct and separable; the individuating principle remains only a formality.⁵⁸

In this way, Scotus explains the principle of individuation as the ultimate reality of a being. Though the *haecceitas* is not a quiddity, yet it is a formality and consequently a positive entity; this principle of individuation is not just the form of the object but rather the ultimate reality of the form, from which it is formally distinct.

This Scotistic principle of individuation is commonly referred to as *haecceitas*. Devlin points out, however, that Scotus himself only uses this term once or twice and seems to prefer the designations *ultima*

⁵⁴ II *Op. Ox.*, 3, 6, 16; XII: 135 b.

⁵⁵ II *Op. Ox.*, 3, 6, 16; XII: 145 a.

⁵⁶ II *Op. Ox.*, 3, 6, 15; XII: 134 b.

⁵⁷ VII *Metaph.*, 13, 13; VII: 413 a.

⁵⁸ E. Gilson, *Jean Duns Scot* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1952), p. 464.

realitas entis or the *ultima solitudo*.⁵⁹ Scotus also speaks of the *forma individualis*, *differentia individualis*, *proprietas individualis*, *proprietas indivisibilis*.⁶⁰ All of these terms offer some help in discerning the exact meaning which Scotus gives to his principle of individuation.

Knowledge of the Singular

If the *haecceitas* is the ultimate reality of being by which a specific nature is determined and contracted to singularity, then the intellect can know individuals just as it can know species.⁶¹ Here Scotus presents his thesis of a direct intellection of the singular.

To understand how this direct cognition is effected, one must return to Scotus' theory of ideogenesis. In intuition, according to the Subtile Doctor, the object and the intellect cooperate as efficient, co-ordinating causes of cognition. In this way, the intellect comes into direct contact with the present, existing object. Following from this ideogenetic theory, being as being becomes the adequate object of the intellect, at least in terms of man's natural intellectual powers. Now these two theories — the activity of object and intellect in intuition and being as the adequate object of the intellect — have a direct bearing on Scotus' thesis of a direct cognition of the material singular.

If the formal reason why an individual is an individual is found in the concrete existing being,⁶² then the actual existing singular is *per se* intelligible.⁶³ Since being is the object of the intellect and beings exist as singulars, it is obvious that the individual as such is intelligible.

Scotus concedes, then, that man can know singulars even in this life. Moreover, this is an intuitive cognition and therefore direct. Here one sees how Scotus departs from the indirect intellection of Bonaventure and Henry, just as he differs from them in his ideogenetic theory.

What Scotus denies, at least for this life, is knowledge of the principle of singularity, i. e. cognition of the *haecceitas*. As an example of the mind's inability to grasp this principle of individuation, Scotus points out that if the mind were presented with two singulars, essentially distinct but similar in all accidents, neither the intellect, nor the senses would be able to distinguish between them. The mind experiences the

⁵⁹ C. Devlin, *The Psychology of Duns Scotus* (Oxford: Blackfriars, 1950), p. 8.

⁶⁰ T. Barth, *art. cit.*, p. 127. This article is a classic and deserves study. See this work for further terms and references.

⁶¹ P. Tochowicz, *Joannis Duns Scoti de cognitionis doctrina* (Freiburg: Studia Friburgensia, 1926), p. 77.

⁶² T. Barth, *art. cit.*, XIX (1956), p. 134.

⁶³ VII *Metaph.*, 13, 23; VII: 423 b.

fact that it knows individuals; but the intellect cannot grasp what makes this individual an individual.⁶⁴

Why is man unable to know this formality which constitutes the individual? The principle of singularity as such is not unintelligible, since in the next life man will be able to know God, Who is singular.⁶⁵ Actually, there are two reasons why the human intellect cannot know the singular formality in the present life. In the first place, this is a defect of man's fallen nature;⁶⁶ here one sees a parallel with Scotus' position that man cannot know being as being in this life. Another reason why the mind fails to grasp the principle of individuation is found in the very process of ideogenesis. According to Gilson, the nature of a being is known only through abstraction. Intuition is not a *visio essentialis ut essentia est* but only a *visio essentialis ut existens*.⁶⁷ Substantiation of this interpretation is found in the Scotistic text which declares that cognition involves assimilation; the principle of assimilation, however, is not the singular but the common nature.⁶⁸ In other words, the mind does not directly intuit the formality or nature of the object but only the existing being. In this way, the intellect knows the singular but it does not know the principle of singularity. Man's inability to know the *haecceitas* does not imply that this principle is unintelligible, since, as a formality, it is capable of being conceived in a distinct concept. In addition, the singularity of man is known to God, though it is not grasped by other men in this life.

To return to Scotus' statement that the singular is *per se* intelligible, the Subtle Doctor gives a whole series of arguments in favor of this thesis. If the senses, which are inferior powers, know the singular, the intellect, as a superior power, should also know it.⁶⁹ Here is the same *per simile* argument used to substantiate intuitive knowledge; it is also mentioned by Matthew in his arguments for intellection of the singular.

In this connection it will be helpful to recall that according to Scotus the powers of the soul are not really distinct from its substance; thus the sensitive and intellectual faculties are not really distinct from the soul itself, nor from each other. Since operation follows being it is only

⁶⁴ VII *Metaph.*, 15, 5; VII: 437 a b.

⁶⁵ II *Rep. Par.*, 12, 8, 10; XXIII: 40—41. Scotus "saves" the authority of Aristotle by explaining that 'the intellect does not know singulars' means that the mind does not know the singular in the same way that the senses do.

⁶⁶ E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 545.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 546—47, in the notes.

⁶⁸ *De anima*, 22 6: III: 630 b. Note that this work, though it is included in the *Vives* edition, is now considered *dubia*.

⁶⁹ P. Tochowicz, *op. cit.*, p. 77. The author calls this a "Platonizing."

natural for Scotus to claim that the intellect, like the senses, possesses an intuitive knowledge of the singular.

In addition to this proof by way of analogy with the senses, Scotus claims that knowledge of the singular is prior to universal cognition. Since the intellect knows universal principles through an induction which proceeds from singular to universal, the mind must first know the singular.⁷⁰ This thesis that knowledge of the singular precedes all universal cognition will be further explained in a subsequent discussion on the nature of the universal. Here it suffices to say that a universal predicate is "constructed" through a comparison of singulars.

As final proof for direct knowledge of the singular, Scotus points out that such intuitive knowledge is necessary, if man is to arrive at evident knowledge about the existence of any extramental object.⁷¹ Longpré points out that Scotistic certitude has profound roots in psychological experience;⁷² such an existential validation is necessary in view of Scotus' rejection of divine illumination.

According to Bérubé, Scotus' theory of direct intellection of the singular is developed on two levels. On the metaphysical level, the intelligibility of the singular is stressed. Just as the singular has primacy of being, it also has primacy of intelligibility; consequently, the singular can be known by a direct and distinct intellection. On the level of experience, however, the individuality of the being is known only indirectly.⁷³ This inability to know the singular as singular is restricted, however, to this present life. Just as Bonaventure and Henry admit a direct knowledge of the material singular in the case of the separated soul, so too Scotus grants the mind's ability to know the *haecceitas* in the next life.

Critique of Scotus' Theory

In a lengthy article on cognition of the material singular, Bérubé points out that the various theories on knowledge of the singular present essential points of divergence between the followers of Aristotle and the disciples of Augustine. For the former, knowledge of the universal has priority, while the latter emphasize cognition of the singular.⁷⁴

⁷⁰ VII *Metaph.*, 14, 1; VII: 429—30.

⁷¹ *Op. Ox.*, 45, 2, 12; XX: 305 b.

⁷² E. Longpré, "La philosophie du Bienheureux Duns Scot," *Études Franciscaines*, XXXVI (1924), p. 354.

⁷³ C. Bérubé, "La connaissance intellectuelle du singulier matériel chez Duns Scot," No. 4, p. 27.

⁷⁴ C. Bérubé, "La connaissance intellectuelle du singulier matériel au XIII^e siècle," pp. 159—60.

Following this distinction, Bonaventure and Henry of Ghent seem closer to Aristotle with their theories of indirect intellection, just as they are more Aristotelian in their admission of a certain initial passivity on the part of the intellect. Matthew and Scotus agree in teaching a direct knowledge of the singular in this life; they also differ from each other in some points. Scotus, for example, speaks of an intuitive knowledge of the singular; Matthew calls it a proper and *per se* knowledge. Scotus stresses that the existing singular is known, while Matthew claims that the intellect abstracts from any existential reference. Finally, Matthew posits a singular species; Scotus' teaching on the species, indicated in the chapter on ideogenesis, is a disputed point.

Both Matthew and Scotus, however, give priority to this direct cognition of the singular, just as both admit a certain causality from intellect and object in their respective theories of ideogenesis. As one would expect, the theory of Scotus is much more developed, but Matthew can be seen as a forerunner of the Subtle Doctor on this problem of direct intuition of the material singular.

Chapter VIII

SOUL'S KNOWLEDGE OF ITSELF

In line with the Augustinian tradition, Matthew, Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus all agree in emphasizing the soul's knowledge of itself. According to Matthew, the soul knows itself through a species, i. e. the essence of the soul is the object of knowledge, while the species is the formal reason of knowing. Bonaventure likewise postulates a direct and immediate knowledge of the soul's own essence, while Henry agrees with this thesis but denies any species for such intuitive knowledge. Finally, Scotus makes extensive use of the soul's intuitive cognition of itself, claiming that this is the most certain type of cognition.

Matthew of Aquasparta

Matthew devotes a whole "question" to the problem: whether the soul knows itself through its own essence or only through its acts. He begins his discussion with a description of the various ways in which an object can be known, applies these various types of cognition to the soul's knowledge of itself, and presents a detailed description and refutation

of the theory of indirect knowledge through conversion to the phantasm. Finally, Matthew describes his own theory of intuitive knowledge.

Ways in which the Soul Knows Itself

By way of preface to his discussion, Matthew explains that there are three ways in which anything can be known: through reason, through intuition and through a speculative knowledge of the quiddity. As an example of reasoned knowledge, he describes how a man seeing smoke reasons to the presence of fire. In much the same way, the mind knows the existence of something without direct knowledge of the object itself. On the other hand, intuitive knowledge, a "contuitive inspection," requires the presence of the object known. Finally, speculation about the quiddity of an object enables the mind to grasp the nature of a being without reference to particular qualities or to existence.¹

Matthew now proceeds to apply these three types of cognition to the soul's knowledge of itself. Quidditive speculation is not confined to the soul's knowledge of itself but extends to knowledge of any soul. In this way, the soul knows a particular virtue, even if it does not possess this habit, since quidditive knowledge is not related to the existence or nonexistence of the object. For example, a soul can know the essence of faith without possessing this virtue. How the soul comes to such an essential knowledge of itself and its habits, Matthew explains in terms of three possibilities. This knowledge may result from an impressed notion, so that the soul has an innate knowledge of its own nature; it may be achieved through investigation or, in the highest sense, this speculative knowledge of the soul's essence may be the effect of divine illumination.² Thus the soul comes to a quidditive knowledge of itself through an impressed notion, through experience and with the aid of special illumination.

¹ *De cognitione*, Q. V, p. 300. Ad istius quaestionis intelligentiam praenotandum est quod tripliciter dicitur aliquid cognosci, v. l. tripliciter de aliquo potest cognitio haberi. Contingit enim aliquid cognosci per manuductivam argutionem sive ratiocinationem, ut videndo fumum arguo ignem, videndo hominem loqui arguo ipsum habere animam rationalem. Secundo contingit aliquid cognosci per contuitivam inspectionem sive inspectivam contuitionem, sicut cum ignem praesentem oculis meis intueor et in ipsum dirigo obtutum. Tertio contingit aliquid cognosci per simplicem quidditatis speculationem in universali, non concernendo hoc vel illud, in hoc vel in illo, sicut cum considero quid est ignis. Primo modo cognoscitur de re vel deprehenditur an est vel inest, sed ipsa res non videtur, sicut videndo fumum deprehendo quod ibi est ignis, sed ipsum ignem non video. Tertio modo cognoscitur quid est res in generali, non cogitando si est vel inest. Secundo modo videtur res ipsa.

² *De cognitione*, Q. V, pp. 300—301.

The soul arrives at a reasoned knowledge of itself by means of an *a posteriori* process, proceeding from perception of an object, and recognition of this perception to cognition of the powers of the soul and finally coming to a knowledge of the essence of the soul.³ Though Matthew does not go into detail on this point, it might be helpful to recall that, according to his theory, the powers of the soul are consubstantial with it, so that knowledge of these powers, should lead to knowledge of the essence of the soul.

Matthew concludes his discussion on the soul's quidditive and reasoned knowledge of itself by saying that these two kinds of knowledge are accepted by all philosophers. Such agreement is not found in regard to the soul's intuitive knowledge of itself.

Refutation of an Indirect Knowledge

Before explaining the soul's intuitive knowledge of itself and its habits, Matthew refutes the theory that the soul has only an indirect knowledge of itself. According to this opinion, the soul, as long as it is joined to the body, can know itself only by way of a reflection on its own acts. This does not imply that the soul intuits these acts, which are just as spiritual as the soul itself; rather, the soul grasps the intelligible element in a species which has been abstracted from the phantasm. In other words, the intellect, reflecting on those things which it has apprehended through the phantasm, perceives its own act and in this perception comes to know its powers and even its essence. Such an *a posteriori* process does not permit the intellect to arrive at any direct knowledge of the soul.

In support of this thesis of indirect knowledge, two reasons are offered: the need for a phantasm and the distinction between actual and potential knowledge. According to this theory, the phantasm is the proper object of both the agent and the possible intellect, at least in this life. The agent intellect is the act of the phantasm, while the possible intellect is activated by it. In this way, the phantasm is necessary for every act of the intellect; not that the phantasm itself is understood, but it is an absolutely necessary means. In fact, according to Aristotle, nothing is understood without the phantasm.

³ *De cognitione*, Q. V, p. 301. Si autem quaeretur quomodo anima cognoscat se ipsam et habitus qui sunt in ea per arguitionem, dico quod cognoscat per signa et a posteriori: ab obiectis deveniendo in cognitionem actuum, et ex actibus deveniendo in cognitionem habitum et potentialium, ex potentiis autem et habitibus in cognitionem essentiae ipsius animae.

A second reason, advanced by those who hold the theory of indirect knowledge, is based on the dictum that nothing is understood unless it is in act. For example, the eye cannot see potential color but only an object which is actually colored; in much the same way, the intellect understands itself only in the act of understanding. Using another comparison, Matthew explains that the intellect is in potency with regard to intelligibles, much as matter is in pure potency with regard to sensibles. Since matter requires the intervention of sensible forms, if it is to become the object of sensation, so too the intellect requires a species, if it is to become capable of understanding itself. Thus the intellect knows itself through a species formed in knowing other objects, just as prime matter is known through the forms which it is capable of receiving. In this way, one argues from the fact that the soul receives immaterial species to the spirituality of the soul.⁴

In critique of this theory that the soul has only an indirect knowledge of itself, Matthew admits that this is the teaching of many great philosophers, yet he complains that it involves many difficulties. In the first place, the statement that the intellect does not know spiritual things intuitively, as well as the thesis that the phantasm is the object of the intellect, both theories are contrary to the teachings of Augustine. Such a wedding of the soul to the phantasm, moreover, is derogatory to the spiritual nature of the soul; finally, if the soul is by nature intended to understand all things, surely it should be able to know itself.⁵

In light of all these objections, Matthew rejects the soul's indirect knowledge of itself through conversion to the phantasm, since such a thesis is contrary to the doctrine of Augustine and is not consonant with the dignity and nature of the soul.

Theory of a Direct Intuitive Knowledge

Presenting his own theory on the soul's intuitive knowledge of itself, Matthew distinguishes between the initial stages of such cognition and complete knowledge. In terms of its first vague knowledge, the soul must be moved by an excitement of the senses. In this case, Matthew postulates a formula very similar to that of the "great philosophers" whom he has just refuted. Initially, the soul apprehends the phantasm and thus perceives its own act; knowing this act it arrives at cognition of the species existing in itself and finally, the soul comes to know its own habits and powers. Thus the soul begins with an indirect and reasoned knowledge

⁴ *De cognitione*, Q. V, pp. 301—302.

⁵ *De cognitione*, Q. V, pp. 302—304.

of its own essence. Once stimulated by exterior objects, the soul can by a "certain conversion" know itself in a direct intuition.⁶

As proof for such intuitive knowledge, Matthew presents a fourfold evidence, explaining that intellectual vision, like corporeal sight, requires a visible object, a power which is disposed to see, a proportional change in this power and finally, a light by which to see.

In the first place, the soul is a visible object for what could be more present to the mind, than the mind to itself. Secondly, the intellect has the power to know itself, since it is capable of knowing objects independently of the body. (This doctrine follows from Matthew's thesis that the soul is a *per se subsistens*.) The mind, moreover, is certainly proportionate to itself. Finally, the intellect receives the divine illumination required for all true cognition. Thus it can be shown that the mind has all the requirements for an intuitive knowledge of itself.⁷

The question now remains whether this knowledge refers to the soul's essence or only to the habits of the soul. Matthew answers by distinguishing between the object of knowledge and the formal reason of knowing. Even though the soul comes to know its own essence objectively, still this essence is not the formal reason for cognition since all knowledge requires the intervention of a species.⁸

Matthew proceeds to present his reasons for postulating a species even in the soul's intuitive knowledge of itself. Again his arguments are fourfold: a species is necessary because of the intelligible object, the intellectual power, the nature of cognition and the soul's role as an image of God.

⁶ *De cognitione*, Q. V, p. 304. Et ideo, quantum ad cognitionis initium et ad primum cognitionis actum, indiget commonitione et excitatione a corporis sensibus, hoc modo dirigendo se: intendendo in ea quae per phantasmata apprehendit, percipit actum suum; percipiendo actum, percipit et species in se existentes, demum potentias et habitus; tandem ipsam mentis essentiam quasi arguendo et ratiocinando apprehendit. Sed postquam facta est in actu per species a phantasmatibus abstractas, admonita sive commonita et excitata ab exteriori, quadam spiritali conversione in semetipsam revocata est, quae tota quasi in exterioribus erat distracta, semetipsam, sua interiora et ea quae in eius interioribus sunt directo aspectu potest cernere et intueri, ita quod semetipsam et habitus (in se) existentes cognoscit non tantum per arguitionem, sed per intuitionem et inspectionem, ita quod tamquam in obiectum in semetipsam et in ea quae sunt in ipsa potest dirigere intellectualem obtutum.

⁷ *De cognitione*, Q. V, pp. 304—306.

⁸ *De cognitione*, Q. V, p. 306. Utrum autem per suam essentiam vel habitum suorum se et habitus qui sunt in ipsa videat, dico quod per essentias suas obiective, ita quod ipsa mens et habitus qui sunt in ipsa per essentias suas sunt obiectum aspectus, et in ipsas dirigit suum intellectualem obtutum; sed formaliter non per essentiam, ita quod essentia sit ratio cognoscendi, sed per suas species sive similitudines expressas in acie cogitantis, secundum doctrinam Augustini et Anselmi.

Just as an object is not able to be seen unless its light is impressed on the pupil of the eye, so too an object is only known through a certain radiation of light and this illumination is a species. Here Matthew seems close to the light-form theory of Bonaventure.

A second reason is based on the fact that an intellectual power must be informed by something which is intellectual. Now the essence of the object is not in the intellect, but only in the extra-mental world, or at most in the memory or in the affections. Consequently, if the object is known, it must be intellectualized and this is accomplished by means of a species. Man's intellectual power, moreover, is only in potency to the act of understanding and must be activated by something else. This motivation cannot be the essence of the object nor the intellect itself, since in the latter case the intellect would always be in act. Therefore an intelligible species is needed to activate the intellectual power. If the intellectual power is activated, something new must be received and this new reception must come from outside the soul itself, since the essence of the soul is certainly not "new" to itself.

The very nature of intellectual cognition requires a species, since cognition involves an act, and this act requires a word, *locutio*, which in turn is dependent on a mental word ultimately based on a species. In other words, a true concept requires something from both the knower and the object known, otherwise the mind does not have a true *verbum* but only an imaginative product.

In final proof of the need for the species, Matthew appeals to the mind as an image of the Trinity. According to Matthew, the object, present in itself or in the memory, is the parent, while knowledge formed from the object is the child or the word. Finally, the will joins the act of cognition and the object known as love joins the parent and the child. If the species were omitted from this schema, the soul's resemblance to the Trinity would be spoiled. Therefore it is necessary to posit the existence of a species which is the formal reason for the soul's knowledge of itself.

In conclusion, then, Matthew says that the soul knows itself and its habits, not only through a quidditive speculation or reasoning process, but also through a direct intuition. In this latter way, the essence of the soul becomes the object of the intellect's direct vision; however, the formal reason for the soul's knowledge of itself is a species which informs the act of understanding.⁹

⁹ *De cognitione*, Q. V, pp. 306—309.

Critique of Matthew's Position

In declaring that the soul has an intuitive knowledge of its own essence, Matthew follows in the tradition of Augustine, treating this doctrine with "care and attention."¹⁰ Augustine uses this direct cognition as the starting point of his whole theory of knowledge. As Grabmann remarks, however, this epistemological aspect is often overlooked by the medieval schoolmen.¹¹ Matthew, likewise, does not use intuitive knowledge to establish certitude, at least he does not appeal to it in the same way as Scotus.

Matthew does present, however, a careful and detailed refutation of the indirect knowledge theory postulated by Thomas Aquinas and others; in fact, it is on this point that Grabmann finds the greatest contrast between Matthew and Thomas. According to the latter, the soul knows itself through a species abstracted from the phantasm; consequently, the soul does not have immediate knowledge of its own essence.¹² This basic Thomistic thesis is incompatible, however, with the whole ideogenesis of Matthew who denies that any species is "abstracted" from the phantasm.

Matthew, on the contrary, posits a direct knowledge of the soul's essence and this by means of a special species. According to his theory, once the soul is put into act through a sensible stimulation, it is able to know itself intuitively by means of a species. In proof of this need for a species, Matthew presents three philosophical arguments; he also appeals to the soul's role as an image of the Trinity.

In these philosophical arguments, one can see a further development of Matthew's doctrine on the species. In the first place, he claims that the species makes the light form of the object intelligible, a theory featured in Bonaventurian metaphysics.

A second proof of the need for a species is based on the nature of the intellectual powers, which require a species to place them in contact with the object. According to Matthew's ideogenesis the intellect forms a species from the object; the object does not impress itself on the mind. In this way, the species not only represents the extra-mental object,

¹⁰ M. Grabmann, *Die Philosophische und Theologische Erkenntnislehre des Kardinals Matthaeus von Aquasparta* (Vienna: Verlag von Mayer, 1906), p. 92.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 102—105. For the Thomistic doctrine on the soul's knowledge of itself see *De veritate*, Q. X, 8—9; *Summa Theologica*, I, 78, 1—2.

On this same point see the review of a dissertation: J. P. Ruane, "The Thomistic Arguments from Abstraction and Self-knowledge for the Spirituality of the Soul," *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, XL (1955), pp. 654—55.

but also partakes of the nature of the intellect which forms it. This spiritual species is the act of the agent intellect and also the activation of the possible intellect. Applying these theses to Matthew's theory, if the essence of the soul were to activate the mind without the intervention of any species, then the mind would always be in the act of knowing itself.

A third indication of the soul's need for a species even to understand itself, follows from Matthew's theory that a species is necessary for the formation of any concept. It is the species, formed by the agent intellect, which makes the object present in the mind; the species is similar to both object and knowing intellect. This dual nature of the species is in line with Matthew's *causa partialis* theory and with his dictum that the essence of the thing conceived by the intellect and related to the divine exemplar is the object of the intellect.

Such, then, is Matthew's theory of the soul's direct intuitive knowledge of itself by means of a special species. It is this need of a species, plus Matthew's critique of other theories, which makes his question of special interest and importance.

St. Bonaventure

On the question of the soul's knowledge of itself, Bonaventure and Matthew seem in close agreement. Both claim that the soul knows itself and its habits directly and without need of conversion to the phantasm. Bonaventure gives a less detailed account of the species but presents a more extensive treatment of the epistemology of such intuitive cognition.

Nature of the Soul's Knowledge of Itself

In his theory of ideogenesis, Bonaventure accepts the Aristotelian dictum that all knowledge comes through the senses. He does make some reservations, however, in this agreement, saying that the soul knows itself and those things which are in itself, without the phantasm.¹³ According to Bonaventure, the soul has a threefold knowledge: in the first place, the soul can turn itself to objects which are outside itself; secondly, it can know things which are in itself and finally, the human intellect can "attain" those objects which are above itself.¹⁴

Corresponding to these three objects, the soul possesses a triple set of powers which enable the mind to know sensibles, to abstract uni-

¹³ II *Sent.*, 39, 1, 2; II: 904 b.

¹⁴ *De scientia Christi*, VI, 31; V: 20 a b.

versals and to be influenced by the divine light. The second of these powers, that by which the soul abstracts universals, Bonaventure further subdivides into the *ratio*, or reason, and the *intellectus*, or intellect. It is by means of this "intellectual" power that the mind comes to know the soul itself and to understand other spiritual substances.¹⁵

Bonaventure here postulates a separate faculty enabling the soul to know spiritual beings without recourse to any phantasm received from the senses. In contrast to this power of *intellectus*, the *ratio* enables man to know universals which have been abstracted from sensibles. In other words, the process by which the soul comes to know itself is distinguished from abstract cognition by means of a special faculty. It might be recalled in this connection that the Bonaventurian faculties of the soul are not really distinct from the soul itself nor from each other.

What is the exact nature of the soul's special "intellectual" knowledge of itself? In the first place, this is an immediate cognition, since, as Bonaventure explains, the soul is immediately present to itself and joined directly to itself.¹⁶ This presence of the soul to itself implies that the soul is aware of itself as a principle of activity and as a spiritual substance. In other words, the soul has an immediate contact with itself and this knowledge implies not only a cognition of the operations of the soul but also an awareness of what the soul is in itself.¹⁷ As Bonaventure explains in another passage, the soul has an experimental and certain knowledge of itself.¹⁸

Finally, the soul actually possesses such an immediate and certain knowledge of itself. In other words, this is not just a potentiality, but the soul actually intuits itself, even in this life. For example, the soul knows that it has faith and this knowledge is immediate and actual.¹⁹

Epistemological Significance of this Intuition

Having established the fact that the soul has an intuitive knowledge of itself, Bonaventure proceeds in true Augustinian fashion to make this cognition a criteria of certitude. In a lengthy passage of the *De scientia Christi*, Bonaventure explains that the soul's knowledge of sensibles is simple, the soul's intuition of itself and of other spiritual substances is more simple, while the most simple knowledge is that obtained under

¹⁵ *In hexaëmeron*, V, 24; V: 358 a.

¹⁶ *I Sent.*, 3, 2, 2, 1; I: 90 a.

¹⁷ *I Sent.*, 3, 2, 1, 3; I: 86 a.

¹⁸ *III Sent.*, 23, 4; III: 504 a.

¹⁹ *III Sent.*, 23, 4; III: 504 a. The soul has certitude only of those objects which it experiences. Note the relation here to the doctrine of Scotus.

the influence of the divine light. Basic to these varying degrees of simplicity is the greater or lesser immediacy of the object. Even though the divine light is most closely united to the soul, still the soul is closer to itself than to any material object. Now the more simple and more intimate is also prior. Therefore, Bonaventure places the highest kind of certitude in the divine light, but the soul's knowledge of itself is the first and most certain of purely human cognitions; thus the soul's intuition of itself is prior to cognition of any extra-mental object.²⁰

In substantiation of this epistemological function, Veuthey explains that all cognition requires that the known object be in the mind of the knower. Now external objects can be in the mind of the knower only through an abstractive similitude or impression. The soul, however, is immediately present to itself and consequently can be known with certitude through a reflective process.²¹ Bonaventure fails, however, to give an exact description of this reflection which enables the soul to know itself. Moreover, the certitude of intuition is still dependent on special illumination. In these two respects the theory of Bonaventure lacks the integrity of the Scotistic thesis.

By way of comparison between Bonaventure and Matthew, both philosophers hold that the soul has an intuitive knowledge of itself. Matthew's presentation, however, emphasizes the need for a species to effect this cognition. Though Bonaventure also maintains that an intelligible species is required for all cognition,²² yet he does not go into the same detail as does Matthew, nor does he distinguish the various kinds of species. It might also be mentioned that Matthew seems more defensive, since he gives a lengthy and detailed critique of the theory of indirect intellection. Similar to his treatment of the illumination theory, Bonaventure's discussion is less polemic than that of his follower.

Henry of Ghent

Like Bonaventure and Matthew, Henry maintains that the soul has a direct knowledge of itself; unlike his predecessors, he claims that this cognition does not require the intervention of any species. *Quodlibet* IV, question 7, presents an extensive discussion on how the soul comes to a direct knowledge of itself and other spiritual substances.

²⁰ *De scientia Christi*. IV, 31; V: 20 a b.

²¹ L. Veuthey, *S. Bonaventurae philosophia christiana* (Rome: Officium Libri Catholici, 1943), p. 114.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 48. Veuthey explains that all cognition involves an action of the object and a reaction of the powers, this reaction being the generation of the species. The species, then, is formed in the very act of knowing.

Soul's Knowledge of Itself without a Species

According to Henry's theory, the created intellect is able to know God, itself and anything in itself through its own essence without the intervention of any species.²³ In proof of this latter contention, Henry appeals to the principle that what can be done with fewer objects, should be accomplished in this more perfect fashion. He also explains that his position is more in accord with Augustine, who only requires a species for knowledge of material objects. A species is needed to make extra-mental objects in the mind of the knower but since the soul is already present to itself there is no need for any species. In other words, if an object is not present to the intellect *per se*, then an expressed species is needed to make it intelligible; if the object is already present to the mind, then this very presence suffices to determine the mind.²⁴

Henry's denial of a species for the soul's knowledge of itself follows from his rejection of any intelligible species, a denial already discussed in the chapter on ideogenesis. There Henry declares that no intelligible species is necessary, since the intelligible element in the object is already present in the *species expressa*. From this sensible species, the agent intellect abstracts the intelligible essence without recourse to any intelligible species. Now in the case of a spiritual substance there is no question of a sensible species, hence Henry completely denies the species in his theory on how the soul knows itself.

It remains to describe just how the soul knows itself without any species. Henry explains that just as the senses are sensible of themselves, so the intellect is intelligible through itself. The soul is assimilated to itself through its own act of understanding.²⁵ As Henry says in another passage, the soul knows itself incorporeally in the same way that the senses know corporeal objects.²⁶

The soul's knowledge of itself is effected, then, by something incorporeal, since both subject and object are spiritual in nature. Specifically, the soul knows itself through the presence of its own essence; this essence of the knower is both the motive for knowing and also the object known. According to Henry, the act of knowing is an intrinsic operation informing the intellect and activating the soul to know itself. In other words, the act of the intellect is related to the soul as mover to moved,

²³ *Quodl.*, IV, 7, f. 151 v a.

²⁴ *Quodl.*, IV, 7, f. 148 v a.

²⁵ *Quodl.*, IV, 7, f. 148 v b.

²⁶ *Quodl.*, IV, 7, f. 148 v a.

and not simply as form inhering in a subject.²⁷ This thesis of Henry's seems comparable to Bonaventure's contention that the act of cognition is the species.

Critique of Henry's Theory

In discussing Henry's theory on how the soul knows itself, De Wulf distinguishes a twofold state of consciousness. In the case of direct consciousness, the soul knows itself immediately by a spontaneous action. Secondly, the soul knows itself through a reflective consciousness, when the soul turns upon itself and its own act. This reflection may be either subjective, having as object the modification occasioned by the soul's own act, or it may be objective, when the soul evaluates the truth of its cognition.²⁸ In either of these states of consciousness, the spontaneous or the reflective, the soul does not require any species. As Paulus points out, this denial of a species is only found in Henry's last works. In earlier questions, Henry requires a species even for intuitive cognition of spiritual substances. This change in Henry's teaching was occasioned, according to some historians, by the condemnations of 1277. Paulus objects, however, that such a motive is unworthy of any true philosopher; rather, this right about face in doctrine results from an internal development of Henry's theories on the nature of the soul and the intelligible object.²⁹ At any rate, the condemnations of Tempier remain a possible extrinsic factor, since they were published just two years prior to Henry's *Quodlibet* IV which was given at Easter of 1280.³⁰

Despite this disagreement as to the cause of Henry's change in doctrine, his final position remains a complete denial of any species in the soul's knowledge of itself. According to *Quodlibet* VII, the soul's essence is both the object known and the means of cognition.

In light of the above doctrine, it seems difficult to understand De Wulf's statement that Henry's thesis on the soul's knowledge of itself differs very little from the doctrine of St. Thomas.³¹ While Thomas' theory of indirect knowledge requires a conversion to the phantasm, Henry denies any intermediary in the soul's direct cognition of its own essence.

²⁷ *Quodl.*, IV, 7, f. 149 v b.

²⁸ M. De Wulf, *Études sur Henri de Gand* (Brussels: Mém.couronnés de l'Académie Royale de Belgique, 1895), p. 56.

²⁹ J. Paulus, "A propos de la théorie de la connaissance d'Henri de Gand," *Revue philosophique Louvain*, XLVII (1949), pp. 494—95.

³⁰ J. G. Caffarena, "Cronología de la 'Summa' de Enrique de Gante por relación a sus 'Quodlibetos'," *Gregorianum*, XXXVIII (1957), p. 133.

³¹ M. De Wulf, *art. cit.*, p. 118.

In this denial of a species, Henry differs from Matthew, who says that the essence of the soul is the object known, but a species is required to "move" the soul to know itself. While Matthew explains the soul's direct knowledge of itself via a special species, Henry postulates a type of intuition comparable to Scotus' theory.

John Duns Scotus

Bonaventure, Matthew and Henry of Ghent agree that the soul knows itself and its own acts directly; however, Matthew and Bonaventure claim that this cognition is effected by means of a species, while Henry denies the need for any intermediary between the intellect and the essence of the soul.

Like his predecessors, Scotus teaches that the soul has an intuitive knowledge of itself; he also makes extensive use of this type of cognition in his epistemology and in developing other theories, for example, in proving the immateriality of the soul. The following section will present his teaching on the nature of intuition, as well as give some indication of the epistemological significance of this doctrine. Finally, a brief summary will be added on the theory of intuition found in the *De rerum principio*, a work formerly attributed to Scotus but now believed to be that of Vitalis de Furno. The *De rerum* is of special interest for this study, since it is closely related to the positions of Matthew; an analysis of this work will also serve to avoid some of the confusion found in those discussions of Scotus which still make use of the *De rerum*.

Nature of Intuitive Knowledge

The preceding chapter has indicated the varied interpretations given by historians to Scotus' doctrine on an intuitive knowledge of the singular. These same differences of opinion are found in regard to Scotus' theory on the soul's intuitive knowledge of itself.

According to Scotus, the soul has an evident and intuitive knowledge of its own acts, for example the acts of thinking and willing.³² Now such knowledge could not come from the senses because of its purely intellectual character, therefore these acts must be directly intuited.³³

³² IV *Op. Ox.*, 49, 8, 5; XXI: 306 b.

³³ IV *Op. Ox.*, 45, 3, 17; XX: 349 a. According to Gilson, there is no real contradiction between Bonaventure and Scotus on the soul's intuitive knowledge of itself. Bonaventure has not delineated the problem as clearly as Scotus, while Matthew is closer to the approach of the Subtle Doctor. See E. Gilson, "Avicenne et le point de départ de Duns Scot," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, II (1927), p. 329.

Though the soul knows its own acts directly, still it does not have an intuition of its essence or nature.³⁴ From a knowledge of its own acts, however, the soul comes to know its powers and finally, to arrive at an indirect cognition of its own nature.³⁵ In other words, the soul knows its own acts through experience and concretely; it knows its own nature through reflection on these activities.

Every time the soul exercises its faculties of thinking and willing, this intuition of itself is renewed.³⁶ To further explain this direct knowledge, Scotus points out that the acts of the soul are intelligible in themselves as spiritual beings and as present to the soul itself. Therefore the acts of the soul can be known immediately, if nothing impedes the mind.³⁷

This thesis that the acts of the soul are intelligible in themselves follows from Scotus' position on the object of the intellect; if a being exists, it is capable of being known. Since the acts of the soul exist and are present to the soul itself, they are capable of being known. As has been pointed out, however, the capacity of the intellect to know being as being, is an absolute ability, based on the nature of the knowing subject; actually, in this life, the intellect is more limited in knowledge. Consequently, Scotus qualifies his original thesis by saying that the intellect can know its own acts "unless it is impeded." In this life, the soul is limited by the phantasm and the requirements of sense knowledge.³⁸

The Scotistic theory that the soul knows its acts but not its essence seems in direct contrast to the position of Bonaventure, Matthew and Henry of Ghent. According to Matthew, the soul knows its own essence objectively but not formally, since he posits a species by means of which the soul comes to know of itself. Matthew does admit, in addition, a reasoned knowledge which the soul derives from study of its own acts, thus coming to an indirect knowledge of its powers and finally to a cognition of the soul itself. Bonaventure and Henry agree in saying that the soul knows its own essence directly, though they differ on the need for a species in this type of cognition.

According to Scotus, however, the soul knows its own essence only "under a general reason," abstracted from the senses.³⁹ In Gilson's inter-

³⁴ Prol. *Op. Ox.*, I, 11; VIII: 21 a b I: 17. In this life the soul comes to know its essence only through an abstraction from the senses.

³⁵ Prol. *Op. Ox.*, I, 13; VIII: 23 a b. I: 21—22.

³⁶ E. Longpré, "The Psychology of Duns Scotus and its Modernity," *Franciscan Educational Conference*, XIII (1931), p. 26.

³⁷ II *Op. Ox.*, 3, 8, 13; XII: 194—95.

³⁸ I *Op. Ox.*, 3, 7, 38; XI: 388 b. III: 324. In this connection also see III *Op. Ox.*, 14, 3, 9; XIV: 529 a.

³⁹ Prol. *Op. Ox.*, I, 11; VIII: 21. I: 17—18.

pretation, this general reason is the notion of being.⁴⁰ Through abstraction from the senses, the soul comes to know that it is a being without possessing any direct intuition of its specific nature.

The question arises: does the soul actually possess such an intuitive knowledge of its own acts or is this simply a capacity similar to the soul's ability to know all being? To answer this question it seems necessary to repeat Scotus' own distinction between knowledge of the essence of the soul and knowledge of its acts. While admitting only an abstractive knowledge of the essence of the soul, Scotus maintains that the acts of the soul are directly intelligible in themselves as spiritual beings and as present to the soul. Scotus goes on to say, however, that in this life the soul knows via the senses. Consequently, the soul must rely on the phantasm to initiate the cognitive process.⁴¹ Matthew likewise claims that the soul must first be stimulated by the external senses, before it comes to an intuitive knowledge of itself.

The exact interpretation of this dependence on the phantasm and the possibility of the soul's direct knowledge of its own acts remains the subject of controversy. According to Gilson, Scotus denies the actuality of any such direct intuition in this life. What man intuits are not the acts of the soul in themselves, i. e. the nature of these acts, but only their existence. As in the preceding discussion on the soul's knowledge of the singular, the intellect knows intuitively the existing singular but it does not know the common nature.⁴² In other words, Gilson denies the possibility of the soul's intuition of the singular; the soul's knowledge of its acts falls under this same censure. In both cases, the soul must rely on the phantasm in this present life; intuition is always limited to a knowledge of the existence of the object without reference to its nature.

On the other hand, Father Sebastian Day defends the interpretation that Scotus holds an actual intuitive knowledge of singulars including the soul's cognition of its own acts. According to Day, what Scotus denies is an intuition of the principle of individuation, the "thisness" of the object; he does not reject a direct intuitive knowledge of the existing singular. In those passages where Scotus speaks of the mind's dependence on the phantasm, he is either treating of abstractive knowledge or he is simply claiming that the known object must be capable of being known through a phantasm.⁴³

⁴⁰ E. Gilson, *Jean Duns Scot* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1952), p. 551.

⁴¹ II *Op. Ox.*, 3, 8, 13; XII: 194—95.

⁴² E. Gilson, *Jean Duns Scot*, pp. 554—55.

⁴³ S. Day, *Intuitive Cognition, A Key to the Significance of the Later Scholastics* (St. Bonaventure, New York: The Franciscan Institute, 1947), pp. 119—22.

Thus the interpretation of Scotus' doctrine on intuition of singulars and on the soul's knowledge of itself are both controversial. In either case, the question seems reducible to the soul's need of a phantasm. Granted that the human intellect has powers which escape such dependence, this question remains: is the soul able to avoid such dependence in this life? This question, like the problem of the species, remains undecided by the authorities.

Epistemological Significance of Scotus' Doctrine

In the theory of Bonaventure and Henry, the soul's knowledge of itself enjoys a special degree of certitude, superior to any cognition abstracted from the senses and inferior only to divine illumination. Scotus agrees that the soul's intuition of itself is evident; he also makes this type of intuition the criteria for other theories.

Thus Scotus appeals to the soul's knowledge of itself, as proof for the immateriality of the soul. By way of reflection, the soul comes to know that it possesses a knowledge superior to sense cognition, since the intellect apprehends universals and considers various types of being beyond the limitations of the existing material singular. For example, the soul can know relations which do not really exist in the world outside the mind. The intellect also becomes aware of the certitude of its own judgments, for instance, the absolute certitude of first principles. Through an introspective knowledge of its own acts and a reflection on the nature of these acts, the mind comes to realize that it is capable of immaterial actions, which are personal to the soul itself. On the basis of this experience of its own acts, the intellect concludes to the immateriality of the soul.⁴⁴

Here is just one example of how Scotus uses the soul's knowledge of its own acts to validate another doctrine. Father Day quotes the above passage in support of his interpretation that Scotus taught the soul's actual intuition of its own acts, even in this life.⁴⁵ Gilson counters by saying that the above description is simply a presentation of the immateriality of these acts and not a psychological study of the workings of the soul; moreover, this is not an intuition of the essence of the soul, but only an intuition of the operations of the soul, derived from the phantasm. According to Gilson, it is this consciousness of the internal senses which Scotus calls intuition.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ IV *Op. Ox.*, 43, 2, 9—11; XX: 39—41.

⁴⁵ S. Day, *op. cit.*, pp. 133—34.

⁴⁶ E. Gilson, *Jean Duns Scot*, pp. 553—55. See the note on p. 553 for Gilson's disagreement with Day on this point.

Though historians disagree on the exact nature of this intuition, none deny that Scotus makes extensive use of this introspective method in developing his psychology. According to Day, this type of cognition is used to establish on an experimental basis that the intellect is active in cognition and that acquired habits co-operate with the activities of the intellect which they perfect. He also uses intuition to verify his thesis that there is no real distinction between the soul and its faculties. Such introspection further establishes the succession of internal activities and necessitates the denial of any innate ideas. Internal experience is also used to prove the freedom of the will and to give experimental limits to man's cognitive powers.⁴⁷ Without entering into greater detail, the above theses indicate Scotus' application of the soul's knowledge of itself.

If one accepts Day's identification of this introspective method with an intuition of the soul's own acts, then the significance of this doctrine becomes immediately apparent. According to Devlin, introspection is the Scotistic ideal of knowledge and one to which he would like to reduce all other types of cognition.⁴⁸ Obviously, Scotus makes extensive use of the soul's knowledge of itself in his epistemology. In fact, this element of his theory is more developed than in any of his predecessors. This fact is, of course, linked with his rejection of illumination and his consequent need of a realistic basis for the validity of man's knowledge.

The *De rerum principio*

Before concluding this section on Scotus' theory of the soul's intuitive knowledge of itself, it might be useful to summarize the teachings of the *De rerum principio* on intuitive knowledge of the soul's essence and habits. As pointed out, this work, formerly attributed to Scotus, is found in the *Vives* edition of the *Opera Omnia*. Because of this mistaken authorship, the *De rerum* is quoted by some of the historians in connection with Scotus' theory on the soul's intuition of itself; for example, extensive quotes from it are found in the work of Minges.⁴⁹ In order to distinguish the *De rerum*, now recognized as belonging to Vitalis de Furno, from the authentic doctrine of Scotus, it seems useful to present a brief summary of this work. A further point of interest is found in the remarkable similarity between this writing and the doctrine of Matthew.

⁴⁷ S. Day, *op. cit.*, pp. 130—31.

⁴⁸ C. Devlin, *The Psychology of Duns Scotus* (Oxford: Blackfriars, 1950), p. 5.

⁴⁹ P. Minges, *Joannis Duns Scoti: doctrina philosophica et theologica* (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1930), I: 251—57.

Vitalis de Furno begins his discussion on the soul's knowledge of itself declaring that the soul possesses three types of cognition: arguitive or reasoned knowledge, intuitive or direct vision, speculative or knowledge of the quiddity.

The soul's reasoned knowledge of itself leads to a *quia* cognition revealing whether the soul is sensible or rational. Such cognition does not require a species but is an *a posteriori* reasoning from effect to cause. It is applicable, not only to man's knowledge of his own soul, but to his knowledge of all souls.

In addition to this reasoned knowledge of its own existence, the soul also comes to know its quiddity or nature by proceeding *a posteriori* from the acts of the soul to an understanding of what the soul is essentially. This type of knowledge can be compared to the cognition of a substance acquired through knowledge of its accidents. For example, the soul knows that its essence is immaterial, since it is capable of immaterial actions.⁵⁰

Finally, the soul possesses an intuitive knowledge of itself. Now many philosophers hold divergent views on intuition; Vitalis himself declares that the human mind knows itself habitually through itself but actually through its own acts.⁵¹ This knowledge requires a species, formed by the soul in the very act of knowing itself.⁵²

Thus the author of the *De rerum principio* posits, not only a reasoned knowledge of the soul's existence and a speculative cognition of its quiddity, but also admits an intuition of the soul which is both habitual and actual. Like Matthew, he insists on the need of a species for such an intuition.

From the above, it can be seen that a mistaken identification of the *De rerum* as a work of Scotus confuses the interpretation of the Subtile Doctor both on intuition and on the need for a species.

⁵⁰ *De rerum principio*, XV, 1; IV: 547—51. A text edition of the questions of Vitalis de Furno on cognition is edited by F. Délorme, "Le cardinal Vital du Four. Huit questions disputées sur le problème de la connaissance," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, II (1927), pp. 151—337. The selection quoted here is given on pp. 232—36.

⁵¹ *De rerum principio*, XV, 8—9; IV: 551—52. This text is given by F. Délorme, *op. cit.*, pp. 236—38.

⁵² *De rerum principio*, XV, 28; IV: 563 a. F. Délorme, *op. cit.*, p. 248. This text is shortened in the edition of Délorme.

Chapter IX

KNOWLEDGE OF THE UNIVERSAL

Preceding chapters have presented varied theories on the general object of the intellect, cognition of the singular and the soul's knowledge of itself. This last chapter will describe the various explanations for knowledge of the universal, a controversial question on which Bonaventure, Matthew, Henry of Ghent and Scotus could all be classified as moderate realists. Though all these Scholastics agree that the universal has some foundation in reality, still they differ in their explanations of just what this foundation really is.

Matthew of Aquasparta

Matthew's theory on the universal develops from his thesis on cognition of the singular, which in turn, is based on his ideogenesis. Since cognition is effected by the activity of the intellect as principle cause along with the co-operation of the object as instrumental cause, the singular object can be known properly and *per se* by means of a singular species. This species, while abstracting from existence, still retains all the individuating notes found in reality. Thus the intellect comes to know the singular as singular.

According to Matthew's theory on the universal, further abstraction is made from the singular so that the mind forms a universal species representing the common nature of the object. This present discussion of Matthew's theory on the universal will explain, first of all, the locus of the universal and secondly, the way in which this universal is known, i. e. the universal species.

Locus of the Universal

Matthew declares that the universal is found in particular objects and in the mind;¹ in another passage he continues his explanation saying that according to truth the universal is in the extra-mental object but in intention it is only in the mind of the knower.² When Matthew says that the universal is in the external object, he does not mean this in

¹ *De fide*, Q. I, p. 54. Ad decimum dicendum quod universale est in rebus particularibus et in anima; sed non est in rebus particularibus absolute sed per comparationem unius ad aliam.

² *De anima* VI, Q. V, p. 321. . . . dico quod universale secundum veritatem est in rebus, secundum intentionem est in anima sive in intellectu. Est etiam universale secundum veritatem natura quaedam in qua plura nata sunt convenire, et est in particularibus, non ut particularia sunt, sed ut in natura illa conveniunt vel nata sunt convenire.

any absolute sense but only in terms of comparing one being with another. Thus the universal species in the mind represents the agreement found among real beings existing in the world outside the mind.³ This seems to be the basic tenet of Matthew's doctrine — the universal species, existing only in the mind, represents the common nature of extramental objects. For example, the mind can predicate "man" about all the members of the species "rational animal," because by comparison one realizes that all men share a common nature.

In this connection, Matthew, commenting on Aristotle's dictum that the "universal is always and everywhere" explains that the universal is found whenever and wherever there are particulars.⁴ As an example of this presence of the universal in the particular, Matthew says that *Sortes* is composed of body and soul, i. e. of universal principles which are common to all men; but his own individual body and soul make him this person.⁵

The universal, then, is not of the essence of the object in the sense that it is an essential principle, yet it is something essential to the being.⁶ Granted that the universal is not a constructive principle of being, since only individuals exist, still the common nature, which gives rise to this universal concept, is essential to man. As Matthew illustrates: "This individual man is truly a man."⁷ According to Bettoni's interpretation, the common nature which becomes the real foundation for the universal is really distinct from the principle of individuation, i. e. it is a distinct entity, independent of any mind conceiving it.⁸

Having established the real foundation for the universal in the common nature, it remains to explain the universal concept in the mind. Actually, this universal species is simply a logical equivalent of the similarities of objects.⁹ On the negative side, this universal notion abstracts from all individuating notes; on the positive side, it embraces

³ *De fide*, Q. I, p. 54. Universale, prout dicit rem aliquam, non est in anima, sed species universalis, id est istius naturae communis, ex qua colligit intentionem hanc propter convenientiam multorum, et vocat universale. Sic ergo universale est in rebus, secundum veritatem, sed secundum intentionem est in anima; . . .

⁴ *De fide*, Q. I, p. 51. Here he quotes from the *Posterior Analytics*, I, 87 b, 32—33.

⁵ *De anima* VI, Q. V, pp. 321—22.

⁶ *De fide*, Q. I, p. 54. . . . universale est de essentia rei, dico quod non est de essentia rei tamquam essenziale principium, sed est rei essenziale.

⁷ *De fide*, Q. I, p. 55.

⁸ E. Bettoni, "Rapporti dottrinali fra Matteo d'Aquasparta e Giovanni Duns Scoto," *Studi Francescani*, XV (1943), pp. 114—15.

⁹ S. Belmond, "A l'école de S. Augustin," *Études Franciscaines*, XXXIII (1921), p. 150.

all the objects which belong to the same genus or species. Like the singular species from which it is abstracted, this universal species does not refer to the existence or non-existence of the object. Knowledge of the universal, moreover, still requires illumination, if the intellect is to attain the perfection of truth.

Such then is the locus of the universal, according to Matthew. On the one hand, he speaks, as will Scotus after him, of the common nature found in the individual extra-mental object. In this way, the universal is not merely a *fictio animae*, a product of the mind, since it has a true foundation in reality.¹⁰ On the other hand, Matthew is equally insistent that universality, as such, is not a quality of the object but only of the species or intention existing in the mind.

Universal Species

Since the universal species is simply a logical representation based on the comparison of common natures, it remains to describe how this universal species is obtained.

As Matthew has already explained, both object and intellect co-operate to form a sensible species from which the intellect abstracts a singular species, representing the individual object. The intellect further abstracts from this singular species to arrive at a universal intention in the mind.¹¹ But it must be noted again that Matthew's use of the word "abstracts" does not imply any Aristotelian ideogenesis. Rather, Matthew postulates a twofold abstraction: in forming the singular species the intellect abstracts from the existence of the object while still retaining all the individuating notes found in real being; secondly, the mind abstracts from these individuating notes and thus arrives at the common nature of the object. The universal species, then, is really a comprehensive view of many singulars seen at one time and under one aspect.¹²

As a consequence of his theory on how the universal is formed, Matthew speaks of various grades of universality, based on the various kinds of agreement found in the external world.¹³ For example, the

¹⁰ *De anima* VI, Q. V, p. 322.

¹¹ *De cognitione*, Q. IV, p. 281.

¹² *De cognitione*, Q. IV, p. 285. Prius igitur defertur species singularis ad intellectum et ex illa colligit intentionem universalem, quam ipsum universale intelligat. Oportet enim cognoscere ea ex quibus intentionem cognoscibilem colligit sive abstrahit, ut praedictum est. Is est ergo modus, quod per speciem universalem hominis, vel cuiuscumque, omnem hominem cognoscit in quantum homo est.

¹³ *De anima*, VI, Q. V, p. 322.

concept "animal" is more universal than that of "man," since the former can be predicated of more beings and consequently is a more universal notion.

A universal concept frees the mind from some of the limitations of contingent reality. For example, the mind can define "man" as a creature composed of body and soul and this definition remains necessarily true, independent of the existence of any or of all men. A science of contingents is based, then, on a twofold abstraction from reality and yet it has its genesis in the extramental world. According to Matthew, this "scientific" universal must still be "rectified" by a comparison with the eternal exemplar.¹⁴ It is only on this level that man comes to the fullness of truth.

Such, then, is Matthew's theory of the universal based on the common nature of real beings and on the universal species existing only in the mind. Through this species, the intellect comes to predicate this common nature about a plurality of objects.

One final caution is necessary to better understand Matthew's doctrine on the universal species. In itself, a species is neither universal nor particular; it is simply a representation. Matthew says that a universal species can be called singular, since it is a particular kind of being and exists in a particular intellect; a species is universal only when it represents many and is abstracted from many. In a similar fashion, the singular species represents a singular object, yet this species is germinally universal, since it indicates the conformity of one being with other singular objects.¹⁵ In other words, the species, of itself, is neither universal nor singular; if it represents the common nature it is a universal species.

St. Bonaventure

According to Matthew of Aquasparta, then, the universal is based on the common nature of the object and is represented in the mind by a universal species. Bonaventure also presents a theory of moderate

¹⁴ S. Belmond, *art. cit.*, p. 150.

¹⁵ *De anima* VI, Q. V, p. 320—21. Et utraque istarum est quodam modo universalis, quodam modo particularis; nam et universalis illa species quodam modo singularis est quia haec species et in hoc in intellectu, et quodam modo universalis et indifferens ad multa et quia ex multis abstracta et ad multa representanda. Et singularis species quodam modo est universalis et quodam modo singularis; singularis quidem quia a re singulari et rei singularis et quia in intellectu singulari, sed sortitur quodam modo rationem universalis secundum quamdam conformitatem quia abstracta a re et facta actu intelligibilis quemadmodum et universalis.

realism, giving the universal some basis in reality while maintaining that universality is essentially a concept in the mind, rectified through comparison with an eternal exemplar.

Knowledge of the Universal

In a formulation similar to that of Matthew, Bonaventure says that the universal is in objects, in the mind and in the eternal exemplar.¹⁶ To begin with the real foundation for the universal, Bonaventure claims that the form through which many objects are related to one another is the universal form.¹⁷ Form united to matter constitutes the individual; abstracted from matter, this same form gives rise to the universal.

In other words, this universal form found in the extra-mental object gives rise to a universal concept. According to Bonaventure's ideogenetic theory, this universal concept is "abstracted" from the intelligible species.¹⁸ Again one must remember that "abstraction" is interpreted in a fashion very different from the Aristotelian use of the term. According to Bonaventure, this is really a judgment process, in which the universal is formed, when the intellect grasps the intelligible element, i. e. the form of the object, and at the same time eliminates all individuating elements. Thus the mind comes to know the universal directly; the singular is known only in an indirect manner.¹⁹

Here then is the complete picture of Bonaventurian ideogenesis. The object is impressed on the sense organ and the sense power judges this impression to form a species; from this sensible species the intellect abstracts the form of the object. Abstraction, then, is really a judgment process in which the intellect determines the form of the being. Obviously, then, Bonaventure gives priority to the universal concept in the mind.

The universal, as universal, does not exist in the concrete extra-mental objects, yet the basis for the intellect's judgment on the universal is found in a comparison of the essential form of singular objects. Furthermore, this judgment on the universal form found in various singular objects still requires the aid of special illumination.²⁰ In fact,

¹⁶ In *hexaëmeron*, IV, 9; V: 350 a b. Here Bonaventure refutes the opinion of Plato, who places the universal in God. He also criticizes the nominalists and conceptualists who hold that the universal is somehow only mental.

¹⁷ II *Sent.*, 18, 1, 3; II: 442 b.

¹⁸ I *Sent.*, 31, 1, 1, 2; I: 535 a.

¹⁹ J. De Dieu De Champsecrét, "L'intuition de la présence et la théorie bonaventurienne de la formation du concept," *Études Franciscaines*, VIII (1957), p. 28.

²⁰ R. Bourgeois, "La théorie de la connaissance intellectuelle chez Henri de Gand," *Revue de philosophie*, XXXVI (1936), p. 246.

Bonaventure speaks of two kinds of universals: one found in the inferior reason and based on the above-mentioned abstractive process, the other located in the superior reason expressing the relation of this concept to the eternal reasons.²¹ Such a comparison of the objective concept with an eternal exemplar is necessary, if the mind is to attain perfect truth. Like Matthew, Bonaventure bases his verification of a science of contingents on comparison with the divine ideas.

From the above, one can conclude that Bonaventure postulates three steps in the formation of the universal. In the first place, there is the experience of the one in the many, i. e. the individual object known through the senses. Secondly, the intellect forms a concept which abstracts from all these individuating conditions and grasps the universal form of the being. Finally, the mind, aided by illumination, affirms the necessary value of this universal concept in the light of the eternal reasons.²² The entire process of Bonaventurian abstraction involves a judgment process in which the concept becomes more and more refined or "abstract." Again Bonaventure uses Aristotelian terminology with his own unique Augustinian interpretation.²³

Though Matthew and Bonaventure seem very similar in their formulation of a universal found in objects, in the mind and in the eternal reasons, nevertheless, there are many doctrinal differences between these two philosophers. For example, both speak of a foundation for the universal in the object. According to Matthew this foundation is a common nature; according to Bonaventure it is the form of the being. Both agree that the intellect possesses a universal concept. For Matthew this involves a universal species derived from the singular species; Bonaventure, on the other hand, does not distinguish between a universal and singular species, since for him there is no question of direct knowledge of the singular. And here one comes to the greatest difference between Matthew and Bonaventure. For the former, the singular is known directly and has priority. Bonaventure, however, emphasizes the priority of the universal and admits only indirect cognition of the singular. Both philosophers agree in saying that a comparison with the divine ideas is needed to understand the complete truth of the universal concept.

In many respects one could say, then, that Matthew's formula on the universal is closer to the position of Scotus than to that of Bonaventure.

²¹ *De scientia Christi*, IV; V: 24 a.

²² J. De Dieu De Champsecret, *art. cit.*, p. 28.

²³ J. Križovljani, *Philosophia S. Bonaventurae* (Rome: Collegium: Internationale S. Laurentii a Brundisio, 1956), pp. 301—302.

Henry of Ghent

Like Matthew and Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent could be called a moderate realist in his interpretation of the universal, since he too speaks of a real foundation for the universal while emphasizing that universality is essentially a product of the mind. Henry's thesis is based on his doctrine of the absolute essence, a theory which has already been discussed in connection with the object of the intellect. This section will explain the real foundation for the universal and then give Henry's thesis on the genesis of the universal concept.

Universal in the Object and in the Mind

The object of the intellect, according to Henry, is the absolute essence of the being; it is this same absolute essence which gives rise to the universal. This does not mean, however, that the absolute essence, of itself, is either universal or singular, since it prescind from both of these modifications. Rather, in Henry's ideogenesis, the specific essence of the extramental object presents itself to the intellect in three different ways. In the first place, the mind knows the singular object existing outside the mind; secondly, the object is conceived in all its commonness and stripped of its individuality. Between the individual and the common essence lies the absolute essence, or the quiddity of the object.²⁴ De Wulf notes that this triple state of the essence is borrowed from Avicenna.²⁵

This threefold "being of essence" gives rise to Henry's theory of an essence which exists extra-mentally as singular but becomes common in the mind. Between this singular and common essence is that essence which is simply possible, existing neither in the mind nor in the object. The latter is the absolute essence, "the intrinsic possibility of the essence," which gives rise to the universal.²⁶

In light of this doctrine of an absolute essence, Henry defines the universal in terms of two elements: the object which is existing in reality and secondly, the reason or capacity for predicating this same nature of many other beings. An essence conceived along with all its properties and accidents is singular; when the definition of this quiddity is predicated of many, then the mind possesses a universal concept.²⁷

²⁴ *Quodl.*, III, 9, f. 98 v a.

²⁵ M. De Wulf, *Études sur Henri de Gand* (Brussels: Mém. couronnés de l'Académie Royale de Belgique, 1895), pp. 160—61.

²⁶ J. Paulus, *Henri de Gand* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1938), p. 81. If the essence were not possible, then it could never exist.

²⁷ *Quodl.*, III, 9, f. 98 v a b.

In this regard, Henry quotes with approval the dictum of Avicenna that the universal is that which is predicated about many while the individual is that which extends to only one being.²⁸

The universal may be described, then, either as a concept of the absolute essence or as a concept which can be predicated of many. In the former case, the essence of itself is indifferent to being either universal or singular; in fact, universality and singularity are accidents of this essence.²⁹ De Wulf interprets this term "accidents" to mean something which is superadded. Needless to say, universality is not an accident of the object itself but only of the concept.³⁰ The second description of the universal as that which can be predicated about many is subsequent to this notion of an absolute essence, since the former presupposes a relation based on the latter. In other words, the basis for all universality is the absolute essence, which is potentially universal; the concept of this essence becomes actually universal when it is predicated of many existing beings possessing a common essence or nature.

It is this "essential being" or this "non-being, existentially speaking," which, as Paulus points out, becomes the foundation for all of man's knowledge, his definitions and his necessary judgments.³¹ To obtain this element of necessity, the special aid of divine illumination is required in addition to the object and the intellect. For Henry, as for Bonaventure and Matthew, knowledge of universal truth requires a comparison with the divine exemplary ideas.

Thus Henry's concept of the universal stresses neither the real nor the rational, though he uses both kinds of being in his theory. Rather, the main tenet of his teaching is the idea of an absolute essence, which, of itself, exists only potentially. One could say, however, that universality as such is a product of the mind, since it is the intellect which recognizes that many existent beings have a real essence related to this absolute essence. That a real being cannot contain the universal, Henry deduces from the impossibility that an extra-mental object which is one, can also contain the many.³² The existing essence which is the concrete and individualized expression of the absolute essence only provides a real foundation for the universal concept.

²⁸ *Summa*, XLIII, 2, G, f. 9 r. Throughout, Henry refers to the *Metaphysicae* of Avicenna, Book V.

²⁹ *Quodl.*, III, 9, f. 99 v b. This is Henry's classic description of "that essence which is indifferent of itself to being and to non-being."

³⁰ *Quodl.*, III, 15, f. 120 v a.

³¹ J. Paulus, *op. cit.*, p. 114. The *esse essentiae*, as a contingent, created being reveals the divine idea in time; as an idea in the mind of God, this essence is necessary and eternal.

³² *Quodl.*, III, 15, f. 120 v a.

Genesis of the Universal Concept

Following Henry's theory of ideogenesis, the sense organ is determined by a species impressed by the exterior object. This sensible species is intermediary between the object and the knowing subject without need for any intelligible species, since the intelligible element in the phantasm is directly united to the intellect. When the agent intellect illuminates the phantasm abstracting the intelligible from it, the mind comes to know an object which is a concrete expression of the absolute essence. One can say, then, that the object of sense knowledge is the individual concrete body, while the intellect grasps the intelligible element abstracted from this object.³³

In his ideogenesis, Henry does not distinguish, as did Matthew, between an individual and a universal species. What the intellect knows is the essence of the being, contained in the *species expressa*.³⁴ This species is not "abstracted" from the phantasm; it is simply the result of an intellection devoid of material and particular conditions.³⁵ In other words, the intelligible essence, potentially universal, is already present in the phantasm.³⁶

From the above it can be seen that Henry, like Bonaventure and Matthew, uses "abstraction" with his own unique interpretation. For him "abstraction" of the universal involves a twofold action: first, the object which is only potentially intelligible is made intelligible in act; secondly, the intelligible element in the object informs the understanding.³⁷ Here one can also observe Henry's theory on the role of active and possible intellect. The universal in the phantasm is revealed through the action of the agent intellect;³⁸ however, it is the possible intellect which understands this universal essence.

Henry's theory on the genesis of the universal follows, then, from his ideogenetic theory. If the universal is simply the absolute essence predicated of many and this same essence is individualized in reality, then it only remains for the mind to "abstract" this essence in order to grasp the potential universal.

³³ R. Braun, *Die Erkenntnislehre Heinrichs von Ghent* (Freiburg: St. Paulus-Druckerei, 1916), p. 27.

³⁴ *Summa*, XLIII, 2, G, f. 9 r.

³⁵ *Quodl.*, III, 15, f. 120 r b. Henry links this "abstraction" with the spirituality and substantiality of the soul.

³⁶ *Quodl.*, XIV, 6, f. 530 r b. Henry equates "universal being" with *quid quod est*, a term which Matthew has already used.

³⁷ *Quodl.*, IV, 21, f. 200 r b.

³⁸ *Quodl.*, IV, 21, f. 201 r b.

In answer to the perennial question of which has priority, the singular or the universal, Henry replies that the concept of a universal essence, formed by the mind from the object, has a certain priority in the logical order.³⁹ As he points out in another text, the possible intellect understands first and *per se* the universal abstracted from the singular and not the singular itself.⁴⁰ Such a thesis is in line with Henry's theory of an indirect intellection of the singular. De Wulf claims that this is not only a logical but also a chronological priority of the universal, since the intellect, following the laws of spontaneous activity, first conceives "the most intimate reasons of things."⁴¹

By way of summarizing Henry's doctrine, he speaks of the universal in three ways. In one sense, the universal has a foundation in the existential essence of the singular object. This same essence conceived by the mind becomes the universal concept, since this concept abstracted from all individuating notes reveals what is common to many. Finally, the absolute essence gives rise to the possibility of a common predication. The universal concept, then, is already present in the phantasm and only requires the illumination of the agent intellect to reveal its intelligible elements. In this latter sense, one can interpret Henry's dictum that the universal belongs to a nature only when the mind forms a concept of it.⁴² Finally, Henry compares this potential universal, the absolute essence, with the ideas of God and thus illumination is required if the mind is to arrive at the truth of the universal.⁴³

Such, then, is Henry's own interpretation of the universal. Braun calls it a realistic presentation.⁴⁴ Paulus, on the other hand, wonders if Henry escapes all the "dangers" of nominalism or conceptualism, when he confines the universal to a concept, saying that the extra-mental existence of the essence involves singularity. Is such an interpretation very different, Paulus asks, from the position of Ockham? Perhaps it would be more accurate to compare Henry with Peter Aureoli, who also speaks of an intentional being similar to Henry's *esse essentiae*.⁴⁵

In light of these difference in interpretation, it would be safe to conclude that Henry occupies an intermediate position as a moderate realist. Like Bonaventure and Matthew, he gives the universal a certain

³⁹ *Quodl.*, III, 9, f. 98 v a.

⁴¹ M. De Wulf, *op. cit.*, p. 165.

⁴² *Summa*, XLIII, 2, G, f. 9 r. In other words, a definition, of itself, does not contain the notion of universality; it simply signifies the essence.

⁴³ J. Paulus, *op. cit.*, p. 98. This doctrine is dependent on Avicenna, yet differs from him: Henry suppresses intermediary creators and denies the necessary character of creation, both of which were taught by Avicenna.

⁴⁴ R. Braun, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

⁴⁰ *Summa*, I, 2, E, f. 5 r.

⁴⁵ J. Paulus, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

foundation in reality. Where Matthew speaks of a common nature and Bonaventure, of a form, Henry claims that the foundation of the universal is the essence of the object. Like his predecessors, Henry also teaches that the concept in the mind is the essential universal. But the way in which this universal concept is "abstracted" differs in Matthew, Bonaventure and Henry. While Matthew speaks of the formation of a universal species which abstracts from all individuating and existential conditions, Bonaventure says that this abstractive process is really a judgment enabling the mind to perceive the intelligible elements in the object and to compare members of the same species. For Henry, the agent intellect simply illumines the intelligible essence already contained in the phantasm.

In conclusion, one might say that Matthew's doctrine on the common nature seems the most realistic. There is also some similarity between Bonaventure's theory of a universal form and Henry's absolute essence.

John Duns Scotus

Preceding discussions have indicated the positions held by Bonaventure, Matthew of Aquasparta and Henry of Ghent on the universal. All agree on some foundation for the universal in reality, postulating either a common nature, an essential form or the absolute essence. All three admit that the universal, formally speaking, is found only in the intellect. With these theses of moderate realism, Scotus is in general agreement; however, the Subtile Doctor emphasizes the reality of the universal in the common nature. This section will present his "reality" of the universal, the genesis of the universal concept and finally, give some comparison of Scotus' position with that of Matthew of Aquasparta.

Nature of the Universal

In examining Scotus' theory on the universal, two aspects must be carefully distinguished; first, the common nature found in the object and secondly, the logical universal resulting from a common predication made by the intellect.

To start, as Scotus himself would start, with the common nature, there is a certain unity in beings preceding any act of the intellect, a unity found in the many and not simply predicated about the many. It is this real unity or commonness among beings which makes the universal something more than a mere product of the mind, a *fictio*.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ I *Metaph.* 6, 5; VII: 73 a.

Not that the common nature, in itself, is either singular or universal; it is simply undetermined. When this common nature is united with the *haecceitas*, the compositum is a singular being; when it is "abstracted" by the agent intellect, this common nature becomes "universalized". In knowing the object, the intellect knows the common nature and has no need for any abstraction or stripping from the phantasm in order to reveal the universal. According to Scotus' own formula, the mind grasps the common nature which already has the potency to be universalized.⁴⁷

It is this common nature found in extra-mental reality which is the foundation of all universal predication. When the intellect perceives a man it also grasps the nature of "rational animal," a nature common to all members of this same species. In predicating this concept, the intellect makes actually universal what was only virtually capable of universal predication. The "unity" of the common nature is, then, the unity proper to a species or a genus, according to Belmond;⁴⁸ it is not a numerical unity.

Scotus here presents two aspects of the universal: the ontological basis which is the common nature found in the object and the logical universal resulting from the common predication of this nature. According to Harris, subjectively, the universal signifies the second intention concept in the mind; objectively, it signifies the quiddity of the object.⁴⁹ It must be repeated, however, that the intellect produces the formal universal, since the common nature of the object is indifferent to universality as well as to particularity. This common nature is not universal; it is only the foundation for universal predication.

Genesis of the Universal Concept

In describing Scotus' theory on the universal, Gilson observes that both Thomas and Scotus agree that the universal has a certain foundation in reality and that the universal as such is essentially a product of the mind. The intellect, however, has "less to do" in the formation of a universal concept according to Scotistic ideogenesis, than in Thomistic abstraction.⁵⁰ This follows from Scotus' cognition theory. As explained, Scotus posits two types of intellection: intuition which is caused by the object itself and by the intellect; abstractive cognition which is co-caused by the species and the intellect. Abstraction, however, does not imply

⁴⁷ E. Gilson, *Jean Duns Scot* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1952), p. 536.

⁴⁸ S. Belmond, *art. cit.*, p. 288.

⁴⁹ C. R. S. Harris, *Duns Scotus* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1927), II: 10.

⁵⁰ E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 536.

any stripping from the phantasm but rather a prescinding from the existence and singularity of the object. In other words, the mind knows existing singulars through intuition; it knows the common nature through an abstractive process.

Abstraction, then, involves the agent intellect and a species representing the common nature. Since this nature is, of itself, undetermined and only potentially universal, the agent intellect must actuate the universal.⁵¹ This activity of the agent intellect produces a species representing as universal that same object which the mind knows intuitively as singular.⁵² In other words, to review the whole ideogenetic process, the existing object co-operates with the intellect in such a way that the mind knows the singular. This singular object is the partial cause, along with the intellect, of an intelligible species from which the agent intellect forms a universal concept.⁵³

Thus Scotus' *causa partialis* theory is basic to his doctrine on the genesis of the universal. Since the individual existing object is a co-cause of cognition, the intellect is in direct contact with the common nature of the object. Abstracting from the presence and existence of the singular, the agent intellect comes to know this same common nature through a species and in this way the intellect already apprehends the potential universal. Finally, this universal is actually predicated of all the members of the same species.

Such a theory makes it unnecessary for the intellect to transform or universalize; the common nature already given in the simple apprehension of the object is potentially universal.

According to Scotus, the actual universal is a concept which can be predicated of many. This universal concept belongs to the logical order, since it is a concept of a concept. Actually, the universal expresses a relation of one concept derived from reality with all the other concepts of the same genus and species.⁵⁴ The potential universal, in other words, is a concept of the common nature; the logical universal is a concept expressing the unity of all the individuals in a certain order. The concept of "man," for example, presents to the mind the common nature of "rational animal," while the notion of "every man" expresses the agreement of several first intention concepts.

In conclusion, Scotus takes his place with the moderate realists, placing, however, more emphasis on the real basis of the universal con-

⁵¹ VII *Metaph.* 18, 8; VII: 458 a b.

⁵² E. Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 515.

⁵³ I *Op. Ox.*, 3, 6, 15; IX: 256 a. III: 231—32.

⁵⁴ VII *Metaph.*, 18, 8; VII: 458 b.

cept, than does St. Thomas. Such a theory follows necessarily from the Scotistic ideogenesis with its emphasis on the causality of the object. In knowing the common nature of the object, the intellect already grasps the potential universal. It is to be noted, however, that according to Scotus, the mind first knows the singular and only then comes to an abstractive knowledge of the universal. Though the intellect can know the object, intuitively as singular or abstractively as universal, the senses are confined to the existing singular.⁵⁵

This question of universal cognition finds Matthew and Scotus in fundamental agreement. Both claim that the common nature of the extra-mental object is the real foundation for the universal, since the ideogenetic theories of both philosophers agree in establishing the object as a co-cause of cognition. Matthew claims, however, that from the singular species, the agent intellect forms a universal species representing the object under a universal aspect. While the singular species simply abstracts from the existence of the object, the universal represents a further abstraction, prescinding from all individuating notes.

Scotus, on the other hand, does not require any species for intuition of the existing singular. (Such, at least, is the interpretation of reliable historians.) In the case of abstractive knowledge, Scotus says that the phantasm and intellect are co-causes of an intelligible species which enables the mind to know the common nature. Knowledge of the singular is an intuition of the object as existing and present while knowledge of the universal is an abstraction from this existence and from all individuating notes. This latter explanation of abstraction finds its exact correspondence in Matthew.

Here one can see the basic agreement between Matthew and Scotus, as well as their differences. Both speak of a common nature; both agree that a species is needed to know this nature. Matthew, however, speaks of a universal species abstracted from the singular species; Scotus does not specify this as a universal species, perhaps because he does not accept any other kind of species. In one final point of divergence, Matthew, like Bonaventure and Henry, declares that the universal is finally ratified in comparison with the eternal ideas; such a recourse to illumination, however, finds no place in the Scotistic theory.

⁵⁵ *Quodl.*, XIII, 9; XXV: 522 a.

CONCLUSIONS

The preface of this dissertation points out that Matthew of Aquasparta occupies a transitional position in the history of philosophy and in the development of the theory of cognition.

In terms of chronology, Matthew studied and taught at the university of Paris immediately after St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas Aquinas; he was a contemporary of Henry of Ghent and antedated Scotus by a few years. In addition to his medial position among the greatest of the Scholastics, Matthew also witnessed the doctrinal upheavals consequent upon the meeting of Augustinianism, Aristotelianism and Averroism. Thus historical circumstances place Matthew in a central position during one of the most critical periods in the history of Scholasticism.

It is the contention of this study that Matthew's theory of cognition reflects this transitional character. As a faithful disciple of Bonaventure, Matthew retains many Augustinian elements in his ideogenesis; as a forerunner of Scotus, Matthew points the way towards a more Aristotelian position. Like his contemporary, Henry of Ghent, Matthew tries to effect a compromise between these divergent positions.

By way of summarizing this study and of enabling the reader to review the development of doctrine during this critical period, the author proposes to compare and contrast the theories of Matthew, Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus on ideogenesis, illumination and the object of the intellect.

Ideogenesis

The ideogenetic theories of all four Scholastics present certain common elements. All agree with the Aristotelian dictum that nothing is in the mind which was not first in the senses. With Augustine all admit that knowledge abstracted from the extra-mental world is not the complete source for all man's cognition. In explaining just how ideas originate from extra-mental reality, all four Scholastics propose theories containing both active and passive elements. It is, however, the exact proportion and sequence of these common elements in which Matthew, Bonaventure, Henry and Scotus differ.

Theory of Sensation

In developing his ideogenesis from the external object, Matthew proposes a rudimentary type of *causa partialis* theory, similar to the

formula of Scotus. According to Matthew's theory, both subject and object are co-causes of cognition. The senses furnish the matter for the concept, while the mind remains the formal, principal and effective cause of cognition. Thus the object does not impress itself upon the intellect, rather activity comes principally from the mind.

Bonaventure, on the other hand, admits that the corporeal organ is a passive power which receives an impression from the object. The sense organ, however, must adapt itself to the impression of this new form. In this way, Bonaventure's ideogenesis includes both an active and a passive element, the former consisting in the judgment of the soul, the latter in the reception of the body.

For Henry of Ghent, sensation is also a passive reception, since the object determines the sense organ which in turn determines the sense power. Sensation is defined, then, as a form composed by the sense power of the organ which has been informed by a sensible species. Thus Bonaventure and Henry agree that sensation admits an initial passivity in the intellect, a passivity which Matthew so vigorously denies.

In John Duns Scotus, the elements of activity and passivity are combined in a way comparable to that of Matthew. As Scotus explains, intellect and object together are one integral cause of cognition, yet each is an essential partial cause, perfect and independent in terms of its own causality. The extra-mental object passively offers the matter for the concept and at the same time actively informs the intellect; the intellect is passive in so far as it is moved by the object but is also active as the spiritual cause making all intellectual cognition possible. In the Scotistic formula, intellect and object are related as co-causes, while Matthew emphasizes the activity of the intellect as principal cause.

Phantasm/Species

According to Matthew's theory, the intellect first apprehends the phantasm, and from the phantasm the intelligible species is formed. It is to be noted that the intellect is not informed by the phantasm, nor is the phantasm transformed by the intellect; rather, the phantasm motivates the intellect, which then forms an intelligible species representing the object. Consequently, the species shares in the nature of the forming power and may be distinguished as a sensible species in the senses as an imaginative representation in the imagination or as an intelligible species in the intellect. The species, in any case, is not the object of knowledge but only the means of knowing some being. When the intellect knows a singular object, the species is singular; if the

intellect grasps the universal, it is through a universal species. Even when the mind knows itself, a species is required to motivate the intellect and make cognition "actual". Here Matthew's distinction as to kinds of species seems unique and worthy of note.

For Bonaventure the species is a substance *per reductionem*, i. e. it can be reduced to the substance of the object which it represents. This doctrine seems to follow from Bonaventure's theory that the sensible species is really an emanation from the light-form of the object. In addition to this sensible species which impresses itself upon the intellect, Bonaventure also postulates an intelligible species, which is necessary for all types of cognition.

In a unique theory, Henry of Ghent denies all need for an intelligible species, admitting only a sensible species. This sensible representation is, in the first place, an impression received from the object, *species impressa*; in addition, the intellect forms a *species expressa* containing the intelligible element of the object. The intellect has no need to abstract or form an intelligible species.

Scotus' theory on the need for a species remains a disputed question. All authorities agree that a species is required for abstractive knowledge but they disagree on the need of a species in intuition. This point will be clarified and discussed further in subsequent paragraphs on ideogenesis and knowledge of singulars.

Theory of Intellectual Cognition

According to Matthew's ideogenesis, the soul is not impressed by the object but rather assimilates the change in a sense organ to its own superior mode of being. Thus the agent intellect "brings forth" the intelligible species from the phantasm and likewise illuminates the possible intellect. The possible intellect, also active in Matthew's theory, turns itself toward the phantasm and thus comes to know the object in the phantasm.

Bonaventure's theory admits of more passivity, especially with regard to the original impression made by the object. The intellect, however, is also active in judging this sensible species from which it "abstracts" the intelligible species. "Abstraction" is described as a judgment process in which the species is more and more purified, until the intellect apprehends the essence of the object. Thus the agent intellect both receives the species and also actively illuminates it. The possible intellect is in potency to receive this illumination and is also active in judging the intelligible element in the phantasm. With this

emphasis on the activity of the intellect in judging the sensible species, the link between Bonaventure and Matthew seems strengthened.

According to Henry of Ghent, the agent intellect does not form any intelligible species; it simply illumines the intelligible element in the expressed species. In other words, the agent intellect "abstracts" the universal from the individual elements signified by the sensible species.

In the ideogenesis of Scotus it is necessary to distinguish on the level of simple apprehension between two types of knowledge. Intuition involves the knowledge of an existing and present object; according to some authorities, this type of direct cognition does not require a species. Abstractive cognition, on the other hand, prescind from any existential element and therefore must be motivated by a species. In this connection it is interesting to note that Matthew, who always speaks of an abstraction from existence, likewise always requires a species. Perhaps this fact would strengthen the interpretation that Scotus' intuitive knowledge of an existing being does not require a species. It is to be noted that both Matthew and Scotus admit the causality of the object in cognition. Both likewise claim that the possible intellect really understands the object, a thesis which is also part of the theories of Henry and Bonaventure.

Illumination

In addition to the object and the intellect as sources of cognition, Matthew, Bonaventure and Henry of Ghent require the special assistance of divine illumination, if the human intellect is to arrive at evident and complete knowledge of truth. Scotus alone dissents to this central thesis of Augustinian ideogenesis.

Nature of Illumination

On this one point the theories of Matthew and Bonaventure are in almost verbatim correspondence. Both claim that this special light is an immediate help given by God to the human intellect; illumination is a regulating and motivating influence which enables the human mind to attain the truth of a particular being. Thus illumination is not the supernatural influence of grace, nor the general assistance of God required for any human act. This light, moreover, is a means of cognition but not an object of the mind.

This latter thesis is especially important, since Bonaventure and Matthew claim that illumination originates in the divine ideas through which God knows and produces all creatures. Just as the divine Essence

is the efficient cause of all being, the divine ideas which express the creature's relation to this Essence are the formal cause of cognition. Since the divine ideas are one with the divine Essence, man cannot know illumination; he can only be influenced by the light originating from these ideas.

To this theory on the divine ideas, Bonaventure adds a unique Christocentric doctrine. Just as God expresses Himself and all that He knows in the Word, so too all created beings both exist and are known through Christ, the Source of all wisdom and knowledge. This Christocentric doctrine is not so developed by Matthew's published works.

Henry of Ghent also speaks of a special light which impresses itself on the human intellect motivating the mind's search for truth. As in Bonaventure and Matthew, this illumination has its source in the divine ideas through which God gives being and intelligibility to all creation. It is to be noted that Henry calls this light an "impression" while his predecessors use the term "influence." Thus Henry says that the divine light can be compared to man's own agent intellect, while Matthew and Bonaventure hold that illumination is something over and above the ideogenetic process.

As already mentioned, Scotus completely rejects illumination, at least he denies any need for the immediate concurrence of God to explain man's knowledge of truth. Having denied illumination, Scotus must also revise his notion of the divine ideas, which he re-defines as the quiddities of objects known by the divine intellect. Thus the divine ideas are no longer considered as patterns according to which God creates and as the source of man's special illumination.

Illumination and Truth

Matthew and Bonaventure claim that special illumination is necessary, if the human intellect is to grasp evident and necessary truth. Now man experiences that he possesses such true knowledge; but he also realizes that all the objects of his cognition are mutable and that his own mind is fallible. Therefore illumination becomes a necessary explanation in the truth theory of Bonaventure and Matthew. The latter, for example, says that truth is originally from the object, formally in the mind and exemplarily in God. Bonaventure agrees that truth is an adequation of the object and the divine intellect.

Henry of Ghent also states that every being is true in so far as it conforms to the exemplar which it represents. According to his theory,

the intellect can come to true knowledge by comparing an object with its natural exemplar, the universal concept; on this level of "the true" special illumination is not required. If the intellect is to grasp "truth," however, the object must be compared to the eternal exemplar and this necessitates illumination. Thus Henry formulates a type of natural knowledge which does not require any immediate divine concurrence as well as an illumination theory. Though Matthew seems to require illumination for all complete and perfect knowledge, nevertheless, he does say that the intellect, acting in accord with its nature, is always true; truth comes formally from the mind but perfectly from the divine ideas.

Going beyond this tentative admission of true knowledge, Scotus denies all need for illumination, since everything which exists is true and all true beings are knowable. Truth is described as the conformity of the object with an intellect which grasps the "state of affairs." This conformity is formulated in a proposition expressing the relation contained virtually in its terms. Thus Scotus bases his theory of truth on the evidence of an object known as present and existing in itself. To exemplify this type of evidence, Scotus appeals to the soul's knowledge of itself, to absolute certitude of *per se notae* propositions and to knowledge of reality in those cases where a non-free cause acts according to its nature.

Impressed Species

In addition to the intellect, the object and the divine light, some of the Scholastics also admit innate knowledge or impressed species as extrasensory sources of cognition. Matthew, Bonaventure and Henry agree, for example, that man's power to know is somehow innate; but all three disclaim any innate knowledge of sensibles. They do admit some other usages, however, of extrasensory knowledge.

Matthew, for example, says that God can impress a species on the intellect and this impression substitutes for the species normally abstracted from reality. Obviously, this is some type of supernatural intervention. On the natural level, man has an innate knowledge of God, angels, first principles and even of his own nature.

Bonaventure also postulates an extrasensory knowledge of God, first principles and virtue.

According to Henry of Ghent, the notions of "being, thing and necessity" are impressed on the mind, while knowledge of first principles is not derived from the senses but only occasioned by them. An

impressed species also enables the separated soul to acquire sense knowledge.

In accordance with his position on illumination, Scotus rejects innate ideas as a source of ideogenesis. According to some historians, however, the Scotistic univocal concept of being must be innate, since it could not be obtained via abstraction.

Object of the Intellect

On the basis of their ideogenetic theories Matthew, Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent and Scotus present divergent theories on what the mind can know. All are moderate realists, agreeing that the object of the intellect is based on reality; the mind knows singulars, either directly or indirectly; the intellect knows itself directly; the universal has a basis in reality. But the exact formulas for these various types of cognition vary considerably.

General Object of the Intellect

On this point, the theory of Matthew seems most in accord with the position of Henry of Ghent. Both philosophers claim that the essence of the being is the object of the intellect. According to Matthew, the intellect is limited in this life to an apprehension of created essences but absolutely speaking, the mind can grasp any essence. This distinction between the absolute capacity of the mind and the exercise of this power in the present life will be featured again in Scotus' theory.

Since essence and existence are distinct in created beings, Matthew admits that the mind can know non-being. As he explains, non-being is that which does not exist in some way; for example, it does not exist actually though it does have potential being. Since very species abstracts from existence, the intellect can know that which is not actually existing.

For Bonaventure, God Himself is the supreme object of the intellect. This follows from his thesis of an innate idea of being which is both necessary and true. Since God is the only absolutely necessary and true Being, He becomes the supreme object of all cognition, even though man has only a weak and imperfect knowledge of God in this life.

Like Matthew, Henry of Ghent speaks of the essence of being as the object of the intellect. To understand this Henrican notion, it is necessary to follow his subdivisions of essence: essence in concrete reality, essence existing only in the mind and absolute essence. It is the latter which is the potential object of the intellect. Now this absolute essence includes a knowledge of God as the formal cause of all created essences,

the efficient cause of all existence and the source of all illumination. Man arrives at this concept of God via an impressed notion of being. In this life, however, all man's knowledge of God remains negative, though the intellect does possess concepts proper to God alone.

Finally, Henry, like Matthew, claims that any being which has possible existence, i. e. existence in the mind of God, is somehow intelligible. In this sense non-being can be included among the objects of the intellect.

Scotus' theory on the object of the intellect treats of the first known in terms of origin, of perfection and of adequation. In terms of origin, the first indistinct cognition is a knowledge of the material singular; the first distinct knowledge is that of being. Obviously, the most perfect knowledge is that of God. In this life, however, the adequate object of the intellect is the univocal concept of being. This notion of being has the primacy of commonness and virtuality, since being can be predicated of all other concepts, i. e. all other ideas are contained in that of being. As already mentioned, this univocal concept seems to be innate; it is the Scotistic equivalent to that superior type of cognition effected in Bonaventure and Matthew by means of special illumination.

Knowledge of the Singular

Here Matthew postulates a proper and *per se* knowledge of the individual via a singular species. In other words, the object which is constituted an individual by the union of matter and form is represented in the intellect by a singular species. This species, which is "brought forth" and not "abstracted" from the phantasm, represents all the individuating characteristics of the real being; it prescind only from any existential reference. Knowledge of the singular is always prior to the universal concept, which must be abstracted from the singular species.

In opposition to Matthew's thesis, Bonaventure admits only an indirect intellection of the singular. When the intellect directs its attention to the intelligible species, an indirect knowledge of the singular object is obtained. For Bonaventure then, the universal has priority; the singular object is known only indirectly. The individual, as in Matthew's theory, is constituted by the union of matter and form.

According to Henry of Ghent, the principle of individuation is a negative element, signifying that a being is undivided in itself and divided from all other beings. Since all independently existing beings are individuals, the singular, as a being, is intelligible *per se*. Man's failure

to know the singular directly follows from Henry's ideogenesis which grants priority to the universal. According to his theory, the intellect knows the singular under a universal aspect, i. e. through an expressed species formed from the species impressed by the object.

Scotus objects to Henry's theory of individuation saying that existence does not explain the essential differences between singular beings. Scotus himself prefers to explain individuation in terms of a positive principle called the *haecceitas*. This formality is the ultimate reality of all beings; it is intelligible *in se* but it cannot be known directly in this life. Thus Scotus concludes that singulars can be known by a direct intuition, but the principle or reason of singularity is not grasped in this life.

Knowledge of Self

All the philosophers studied in this study agree that the soul has a direct knowledge of itself. For Matthew, Bonaventure and Henry this means that the soul knows its own essence; Scotus says that the soul intuitively only its acts.

According to Matthew, the soul first comes to an indirect knowledge by reflecting on its own act, the species, powers and finally, the essence of the soul. Once, however, the soul has been stimulated by such reflection, then the intellect comes to a direct knowledge of itself by means of a species formed in the act of knowing itself. This species is the formal reason for cognition, while the essence of the soul is the object of knowledge.

Bonaventure postulates a distinct power of the soul, the *intellectum*, which enables the soul to know itself and other spiritual substances. This direct knowledge which the soul has of its own essence is the most certain and evident of all natural knowledge.

According to Henry of Ghent, the soul knows itself through its essence and without any species. This denial follows from his theory that no intelligible species is necessary for any type of knowledge and certainly there could be no question of a sensible species in the soul's knowledge of itself. Henry says that the intellect is intelligible through its own essence in such a way that the essence is both the object and formal reason for knowledge. In this respect, he clearly differs from Matthew, who demands the motivation of a species, denying that the essence of the soul is the formal cause of cognition.

Scotus claims that the soul has a direct intuitive knowledge of its own acts; however, the essence of the soul is known only through an

indirect reflection on the powers of the soul. If intuition does not require a species, this may be a point of comparison and development between Matthew and Scotus, since the former admits a direct knowledge of the soul's own essence via a special species.

Knowledge of the Universal

Matthew, Bonaventure, Henry and Scotus agree that the universal has some foundation in reality, though universality essentially results from a predication in the mind.

In explaining this real foundation for the universal, Matthew postulates a common nature in the object. When the intellect grasps the universal species, which represents this common nature found in many individuals, then the mind possesses a universal concept, i. e. a concept which can be predicated of many. It is to be noted that this universal species is "abstracted" from the singular species and that it still requires a comparison with an eternal exemplar.

The real basis for the universal, according to Bonaventure, is the essential form of the object, a form which the agent intellect abstracts from the intelligible species. In this way the universal is prior and the singular is known only indirectly, a thesis directly contrary to Matthew's position.

Like Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent grants priority to the universal which is understood when the agent intellect grasps the intelligible element in the expressed species. This intelligible element is the essence; abstracted from the existing singular, it becomes capable of universal predication.

Scotus, developing Matthew's theory, claims priority for intuitive knowledge of the singular. The universal is known only abstractively when the intellect prescind from the existing individual and comes to know the common nature. As in Matthew, the common nature is the real basis for the Scotistic universal; however, this nature of itself is neither singular nor universal. Only when the common nature is predicated of many does the intellect possess a formal universal.

To complete this review of the doctrinal development in Matthew of Aquasparta, Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus, the author proposes three conclusions:

1. Matthew resembles Scotus in his ideogenesis, since both postulate a type of *causa partialis* theory. Because of this initial agreement, Matthew also anticipates the Scotistic theories on direct knowledge of the material

singular and in posterior knowledge of the universal, which is based on the common nature.

2. Matthew preserves the Augustinian doctrine of Bonaventure on divine illumination and impressed species. He also claims that the soul has a direct knowledge of its own essence.

3. Matthew seems to agree with Henry of Ghent that the object of the intellect is the essence of the thing.

Thus in the theories of illumination and self-knowledge, which are peculiarly Augustinian, Matthew remains a faithful disciple of Bonaventure; in the matter of ideogenesis and its application to knowledge of the singular and universal, Matthew anticipates the approach of Scotus. On the one hand, Matthew presents new insights into Augustinian illumination; on the other, he seems to provide an important introduction into Scotus' more Aristotelian formulas.

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